Gaullism and the liberal challenge - How parties change their programmes: The case of the Rassemblement pour la Republique, 1978-1986. by Fysh, Peter
G A I J  I. L. X  S M  and the L I B E R A L  
C H A L L E N G E  — How Parties Change their Programmes
The Case of the Rassambl ement pour la Republ 1 quo, 1978— 1986.
by Peter Fysh
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, the University of London, September 1990.
UMI Number: U048616
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U048616
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
77-f£S<£ S
P
6822- 
kq OF
~ POLITICAL «u
CL *ND X  %0A J&J
x c3 I I 2) °) Lc- 7 ^  2-
ABSTRACT
During the first half of the 1980s, the Gaullist Rassemblement pour 
la RSpubllque (RPR) abandoned the state interventionism which had been its 
traditional economic policy, while it was the dominant party in French 
politics during the 1960s, in favour of a liberalism which stressed 
individual responsibility and the free play of market forces. This thesis 
attempts both to describe what happened and to discuss the implications of 
such a dramatic reversal for theories of party behaviour.
The first three chapters are introductory; the first summarizes 
contemporary explanations of party behaviour, the second is a detailed 
exposition of the programmatic changes which took place between 1978 and 
1986, and the third recounts the political contexts in which the Gaullists 
acted from 1969 onwards.
Each of the next three chapters examines a single possible 
explanation of programme change. These are respectively organizational 
changes, generational or sociological changes, and an explanation based on 
the competition for votes. While each of these throws some light on what 
happened in the RPR, it is argued that they are not enough to account for 
the denial of previous party orthodoxy.
The party's ideological development is more readily explained by 
long-run changes in the climate of ideas in society generally, described 
in chapters 7 and 8, the source of a synthesis which could articulate the 
interests of an alliance of technocrats and the party's business friends 
who, as we show in chapters 9 and 10, exerted considerable influence on 
the drafting of new party programmes. Chapter 11 is devoted to an attempt 
to give a balanced interpretation of the different variables already 
ment ioned.
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Chapter I Introduction - the Causes ot Party Programme Change
What iactors determine the content oi political party programmes? The 
first intuitive answer to this question wouid probably be, "The contents 
ot previous party programmes." The second would be, "Voters' wishes, as 
expressed in opinion polls". Sometimes, however, parties change their 
programmes dramatically enough to make us suspect that other factors than 
vote-winning alone account tor programme-content, factors neglected 
perhaps because they have been masked by the long-term continuity ot most 
programmes, or because changes have been regarded as minor, and attributed 
to the day-to-day rivalries ot the political game.
This thesis examines the causes ot one such programme change, the 
transformation of its economic policy in the first half ot the 1980s by 
the Rassemblement pour la R£publique (RPR). The notion ot "programme" here 
includes not only the printed texts issued by the RPR in 1980 and 1984 and 
the platform on which the party leader, Jacques Chirac ran for the 
presidency in 1981, together with certain ot his statements made between 
1981 and 198b, but also the writings and characteristic policies ot 
General de Gaulle, founder ot the political movement from which the RPR 
claims descent. We will also refer to the joint platform on which the RPR 
fought the 1986 elections in partnership with the Union pour la D&mocratie 
Frangaise CUDF), and to certain policies carried out by the RPR-UDF 
government between 1966 and 1988. In other words, by "programme" we mean 
the stances of party leaders and the characteristic representations of 
policy made in the course ot everyday party competition. Programmes may 
sometimes be amended to serve strategic aims, but alternatively parties 
rnay plan their strategy around defence ot the programme. Programmes can be
more or less tactical constructions, and more or less ideological - and 
they are in turn an element ot party behaviour. Hopefully, this study ot 
programme change will contribute to the long-term efforts of political 
scientists to establish typologies of what parties are and what they do.
In this chapter we discuss four main approaches to programme content 
as defined in this way. The sociological and the market approaches are 
well-known; the latter has for some years been at the root ot explanations 
ot a variety ot party behaviours, which it treats as mainly determined by 
the party’s need to win votes in competition with its rivals in a 
political market. The organizational approach, in the version revived by 
Angelo Panebianco, became available to English readers in 19ti6. ' The 
fourth approach is a synthetic one which draws on recent articles by Jean 
Chariot and Jacques Lagroye.
Most theories of party behaviour accept some interaction of different 
causes to produce behavioural outcomes and concede a degree of explanatory 
power to the different approaches. The sociological approach admits that 
party leaders and members must have some regard to the need to win votes. 
The market approach accepts that adoption ot vote-winning strategies is 
constrained both by the members' shared aims and interests, and by the way 
these are organized or represented within the party, while the 
organizational approach in turn regards sociology and the demands of the 
political market as challenges to which the organization must respond.
A synthetic explanation of party programme content, as its name 
implies, attempts to combine a number ot variables in accounting for party 
behaviour. The synthetic approach is qualitatively different from each of 
the above, however, not because it attempts to assign equal weight to each 
ot the variables, (they are more likely to be ot different weights tor
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different parties), but because the tactors thought to account tor party 
behaviour are chiefly exogenous. It a continuum is imagined, with 
endogenous models at one end, and exogenous at the other, the sociological 
and organizational approaches would be near the endogenous end of the 
scale, with the market and synthetic approaches at the opposite end. But, 
for the market approach, the external tactors accounting tor party 
behaviour are restricted to the political market narrowly defined in terms 
ot opinion polls, electoral contests and the actions ot a certain number 
ot relevant competing parties. The synthetic approach sees party behaviour 
as determined by a much larger range ot external variables. A Marxist 
explanation of party behaviour would be a special case of the synthetic 
approach, assigning a key role to the class struggle, structured by 
changes in the relations of production, themselves provoked by the 
transformation of the means of production.
The value of an approach which seeks to explain effects by reference 
to multiple causes is debatable. It may be objected that, in any branch ot 
knowledge, synthetic approaches result only in an infinite number ot 
special cases. Highly productive ot precise descriptions, they are 
unproductive ot the paradigms which advance knowledge by positing general 
explanations which are then tested and refined by application to specific 
cases. Marxists would reply that the imposition on reality ot discrete 
frames ot reference, derived from a limited, bourgeois understanding of 
political struggle, serves to mask the connections between social events 
rather than to advance knowledge.
But one does not have to be a Marxist to be dissatisfied with 
existing approaches to the analysis ot party behaviour. Their respective 
limitations have recently been underlined by two distinguished French
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scholars who have adopted a more synthetic approach. 3 This study of the 
Gaullist party in the 1980s* although begun before those articles were 
published, can be seen as the application of a synthetic approach to a 
particular case. In the rest of this chapter, we justify this angle of 
attack by outlining the different approaches in turn.
The Sociological Approach
A purely sociological approach would attempt to explain the programme 
content of any party by reference to the interests or characteristic 
values ot groups assumed to play a dominant role within it.a There is 
little evidence of a generalized link ot this kind. Although we are
familiar, since Robert Michels, s with the idea that the aspirations of a
party's members might be negated by the preoccupations ot a bureacratic 
caste ot leaders, a 1980 study ot 8 European Social Democratic parties 
found no link in the reverse direction, that is, no systematic correlation 
between leaders' social class and the policy stances of elected 
representatives.'1-' On the other hand, research in American politics found 
evidence that activists in the major parties amended their own stances on 
certain issues in response to shifting voter preferences.^
The sociological approach has been used to account for the content of 
right-wing programmes in France in the 1980s, by Frernontier3 in describing 
the characteristic values ot a new generation of elected local government 
officials, and by Ysrnal3 in relation to both the membership and electorate 
of the right-wing parties. In neither case was any account taken ot the
contribution ot members ot these groups to the actual process of
programme-writing. Do wonder that Panebianco has described this sort ot 
vague juxtaposition ot membership and party behaviour as evidence of a 
"sociological prejudice", which systematically underestimates parties'
ability to mould the preferences of their own followers. 10 It is 
particularly inappropriate to apply the sociological approach to a party 
with virtually no internal democracy, in which all important decisions are 
monopolized by a narrow elite - the case of the RPR in the early 1980s, as 
we show in chapter 4. Neverthless, in even the least democratic of 
parties, sociology may operate as a kind ol controlling factor, setting 
limits on what the leadership may be able to get away with. We deal with 
the sociology ot the RPR membership in this sense in chapter 9, while 
Frernontier's "discoveries" are dealt with in chapter 5, in the context of 
the party grass roots' contribution to programme change.
The Market Approach
The political market approach to party behaviour is based on the most
visible and directly comprehensible of the roles traditionally assigned to
parties - contesting elections and, if successful, supplying personnel to
fill government posts. The paradigmatic version of the market approach was
elaborated by Anthony Downs' in 1957. Since he wrote that
parties formulate policies in order to win elections, 
rather than win elections in order to formulate 
policies, 11
his approach has achieved unparralleled iniluence in the politics 
departments of western universities, from which have emerged a succession 
ot models, all assuming that winning elections is parties' overriding aim, 
and correspondingly neglecting other determinants ot programme content.
The market approach has given us Kirchheimer1 s de-ideologized "catch-all" 
party, 1 :i: and its French version, the "electoral" party, applied to the 
Gauilists ot the 1960s and 1970s by Chariot and Lecomte. 1 :a For Sartoriwt, 
parties' "position manoeuvering" is constrained by little more than the 
activities ot other parties in adjacent positions within an assumed
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"continuum". For Budge and Fairlie, parties' "selective emphasis"1^ ot 
certain items in their programme depends more on their assumed popularity 
with the electorate, while other parties are ignored.
Although the above are examples of vote-maximization models, the 
market approach also incorporates vote-product ion models of party 
strategy, 1 the latter usually applied to social-democratic parties which 
seek to structure their electorate by means ot cradle-to-grave social 
support netorks. 1 In the UK however, a recent account has applied it to 
both Labour and Conservative parties, which are alleged to structure their 
electorates by astute manipulation ot state or sub-state resources. 1 *
Research on many aspects ot the party-voter linkage in the 1980s
seemed to have powerfully vindicated the market approach to party
behaviour. Voters are no longer faithfully attached, as they used to be,
to the same party, for whom they vote at election after election, new
social and issue cleavages have disturbed the size and shape ot party
systems, 1J while parties themselves have been able to call on a battery
ot increasingly sophisticated techniques to market their messages, thus
treeing themselves trom the need to recruit and reward an army ot
enthusiastic and campaigning members. 30 Unencumbered by strong ideological
traditions, treed by state subsidy trom reliance on unruly members,
prepared to moderate its policies in pursuit of unattached voters whose
preferences can in turn to an extent be moulded to suit party strategy, by
the end ot the 1980s,
Party increasingly becomes an organization ot leaders
rather than of citizens  a label by which a group
ot leaders is known and an organization for co­
ordinating elite activity.
It is not surprising, then, to find that the only discussion ot the
R P R ' s  programmatic development in the 1980s to have appeared in a British 
scholarly journal has adopted the classic market approach, treating the 
party as "sandwiched" between its rivals, and moderating its programme 
with the aim of winning the votes available in its part of the market. 2-*
Yet in chapter 6 we show that the market approach gives a 
fundamentally misleading account of the RPR's programme change. However 
well it accounts for some aspects of parties' behaviour, such as their 
reliance on the media and the abandonment of mass integration strategies, 
the market approach is a poor explainer of programme content and of 
ideology generally. It neglects not only the sociological and 
organizational characteristics of parties themselves, but also many 
factors operating in wider society, outside the narrow domain of party 
compet ition.
Its most glaring inadequacy is its inability to predict party 
behaviour which runs counter to vote-winning. The fact that the Labour 
party twice, in 1983 and 1967, went to the polls with a defence policy 
widely regarded as a vote loser is usually attributed to Labour's 
relatively democratic internal regime and the membership's reluctance to 
jettison long-standing convictions. But how are we to explain Waiter 
Mondale*s promise to raise taxes in 1964, or the RPR's promise to cut 
taxes for the rich in 1986?
As Dunleavy and Husbands have noted,23 it is because parties cannot 
"wish away" their leaders' or their members' ideological convictions, nor 
voters' perceptions of what the parties stand for, which are structured by 
history, the party's record in power, and the political messages of other 
opinion-formers such as business, government agencies, the media, and non- 
party political movements, that party programmes cannot be amended at will
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to suit market conditions. From that dilemna these authors constructed
their self-styled "radical"-"^1 model ot party behaviour, according to which
leaders tall back on manipulating voters' preferences, so that they
can simultaneously preserve continuity with past 
policy, satisfy their own ideological convictions, 
prevent damaging divisions inside their party and try 
to create increased electoral support.
According to the authors the ideological convictions of party leaders 
are changed not by direct inner-party discussions, but rather by long-run 
trends in the patterns of membership and recruitment, and these in turn 
are
rarely explicable simply in terms ot the party's 
internal affairs, but reflect broader social movements 
elsewhere in the economy and social system, spilling 
over into specif ic political implications.
As a result of this process, they argue, party positions change after 
"a lengthy time-lag. " Furthermore, as well as this osmosis operating 
through the party, the same long-run social changes may influence party 
Ideology by their direct effect on the perceptions of the party leaders.
This comes close to being a synthetic approach to party behaviour, 
similar to that adopted by Jacques Lagroye, (to whom we turn later.) Yet 
the "radical" authors give a rather cursory treatment of the transmission 
belts operating between developments in social and economic Hie, and 
those in the political sphere, suggesting at one point that the purpose of 
the British Conservatives' outlawing of some trade-union activity was to 
encourage voters "to extend 'guilt by association' to the rival party", ^  
and ignoring the more obvious explanation - that the Conservatives were 
motivated more in this instance by their particular vision of the sort of 
society they believe in than by the tactics of inter— party competition.
Like Budge and Fairlie, with their "selective emphasis" model, the
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"radical" authors have produced what is really no more than a model ot 
party tactics which cannot explain party behaviour otherwise than in terms 
ot the political market narrowly defined. But other writers have taken up 
some ot the points raised by Dunleavy and Husbands, and turned them into 
more wide-ranging critiques ot the market model. The most systematic ot 
these is the organizational approach of Angelo Panebianco 
The Organizational Approach
Panebianco has given us an original and systematic account ot party
behaviour, containing many fruitful insights too numerous to summarize
here. Particularly refreshing is his forthright rejection of the
"teleclogical prejudice" that party behaviour depends above all on the
search tor votes, because it cannot explain why
parties so frequently adopt courses ot action 
predictably destined to penalize them electorally, or 
at least act in ways which will not procure them 
electoral gains. 33
The treatment ot programme content, however, is one of the least 
satisfactory elements ot his work. He starts out, commendably enough, by 
dismissing the view that party behaviour can be deduced from torrnally 
proclaimed ideology. 33 The content ot parties' programmes, or their 
"ends", as Panebianco calls them, is not identical to the party's founding 
ideology, its "official aims",30 but the latter are maintained and 
detended by the leadership (the "dominant coalition") to the extent that 
their existence fulfils certain internal and external functions.
Internally, the maintenance of ideology serves the function ot 
distributing "collective incentives" to the rank and file members, for 
whom beliei and participation in the shared etiort to achieve the official 
aims constitutes the primary reward ot their membership. 31 Externally, 
ideology is bound up with the defence ot what Panebianco calls the party's
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hunting-ground, ie, the part ot the environment 
targeted by the organization's ideology, which the 
organization must control it it is to maintain its 
identity.33
A "crucial aspect"33 of party behaviour is the conquest or defence of
electoral "domains" in the form of party competition;
The competitor, in laying claim to another party's 
hunting ground, threatens the latter's identity and
destabilizes it; ......  the dominant coalition must
deny the competitor's claim to the hunting ground in 
order to preserve its identity (both in reference to 
the hunting-ground itself - the party's social base - 
and to the party members). 3/1
This seems rather nebulous until we realize that Panebianco is
thinking particularly ot parties whose potential electorate forms a
homogeneous group delimited by factors other than the party's own efforts;
If a religious party loses part ot its electorate to a 
new religious party, the result is more than an 
electoral defeat because the party’s very identity is 
at stake. (Such a party could).... bear the loss of a 
portion of the secular electorate better than a 
smaller part of the religious electorate. Analagously, 
a workers' party can more easily stand a loss in its 
bourgeois electorte than in its worker electorate.33
This would seem to mean that Panebianco's account ot externally- 
oriented behaviour undertaken in defence of ideology applies only to 
parties whose electoral effort is chiefly targeted on such homogeneous 
groups. On this reading, it is difficult to see what kind of electoral 
reverse could threaten a conservative or a merely electoral party's 
identity and provoke a vigorous restatement of its "official aims".
In this study of a single party we cannot test Panebianco's most 
original proposition, that all parties' behaviour can be predicted by 
reference to their organizational characteristics, that is, their 
institutional strength and the degrees of stability and cohesion possessed 
by their "dominant coalitions".3*3 He also suggests, however, that in every
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case programmatic change is acompanied by some kind ot inner-party 
organizational clash. Like Dunieavy and Husbands* he regards committed 
members or party bureaucrats as tactors which inhibit the leadership's 
ability to tamper with the party's official ideology at will.37' Such 
tampering will be easier for leaders of parties in which the oftice- 
hoiders are motivated by career or material incentives rather than by 
ideological commitment.3*3 But Panebianco, comes up with a much stronger 
formulation than that ottered by Dunieavy and Husbands, who leave open the 
possibility that leaders and members can amend their programmatic stances 
in tandern, in response to events arising outside the party. He believes 
that organizational characteristics are so decisive that organizational 
change is a necessary condition tor programmatic change;
Ho party can effect a genuine substitution ot ends
without such transformations. 3'-‘
This is a proposition which can easily be tested empirically. We 
examine the RPR's organizational structure in chapter 4, and return to 
Panebianco's suggestion in our concluding chapter. Panebianco certainly 
overreaches himself, however, in attempting to demonstrate that a 1975 
rule-change in the British Conservative Party - which allegedly turned the 
party leader into the "hostage" of Tory backbenchers - was a sufficient 
condition for ideological change, that is the radicalization of 
Conservative policies.*10 Crewe and Searing4-1 have recently shown just how 
few Conservative MPs share Mrs. Thatcher's beliefs. Clearly, Panebianco 
wou1d have done better to consult one of the many synthetic accounts which 
locate the Conservatives' radicalization, in the broader context of 
political struggle in Britain in the 1970s.4-2
In principle, Panebianco allows that changes in party behaviour can
be endogenous or exogenous, arising mainly from within the organization, 
or provoked primarily by outside events. For him, every party is an 
organization permanently in contact with its environment, which it can 
either adapt to or attempt to dominate, as external changes challenge both 
the equilibrium normally established between party behaviour, ends, and 
organizational physiognomy, and the leadership's efforts to safeguard the 
party's stability by harmonizing these three factors.43 The organizational 
focus is therefore compatible with a synthetic reading of party behaviour, 
on condition that outside event are considered the primary agents ot 
change, whose impact on parties is mediated differentially by the 
organizational criteria Panebianco has outlined. But Panebianco's bias 
towards an endogenous explanation ot party behaviour, evident in his 
treatment ot the UK Conservatives, results in an unsatisfactory account of 
ideology and is unable on its own to account for programmatic development 
in modern parties.
Ironically, in his last chapter, Panebianco notes that mass 
integration parties are less and less common; all parties are under 
pressure to conform to an "electoral-professional" model, de-ideologized 
and treed from reliance on a mass membership, of the type described 
above. 44 Absolved both from the need to defend the party's identity 
against trespassers on the hunting ground, and from the need to distribute 
collective benefits to the members, the leaders of such parties seemingly 
can amend or invent programmes as they wish. The organizational approach 
therefore leaves us with the question we began with - if not 
organizational pressures, then what factors structure the changing content 
ot party programmes?
The synthetic approach
According to Jean Chariot, at the time ot Duverger's Political
Parties*’*, there was a risk ot forcing the complex and largely unexplored
world of parties and party-systems into too reductionist a framework.
Today, the problem is rather the reverse;
So much complexity and so many different meanings have 
been attributed to political parties, that they seem 
to have imploded, losing their unity and almost 
ceasing to exist for political scientists.
Fortunately.....  a few specialists have tried to
reconstruct the object known as "party" by redefining 
the concept. It is doubtless by taking these efforts 
at synthesis as our starting point that we can advance 
theorizing about and knowledge of political parties.
Chariot's approach to party behaviour arises, then, from the need to
synthesize the results of existing research. In another passage, however,
we can find an admirable summary of the definition we have given above ot
the synthetic approach;
In order to understand what parties are, it is better 
to start from the whole (the political, economic, 
social, and cultural system, and the party system) 
than from the parts (the party), without forgetting, 
however, the element of autonomy enjoyed by the parts, 
which are not at the service of the whole. A
While Chariot is interested mainly in using a synthetic approach to 
define the functions of parties, his colleague Jacques Lagroye seeks to 
identify the factors which allow us to assign the label "party" to a given 
organization, to isolate the activities which are proper to parties, and, 
eventually, to identify a single partisan entity across changes in 
generation, organization or official party label. Although he does not use 
the term "synthesis", he asserts that party activity conforms to 
continually evolving unwritten norms and rules which are the accretion of 
social events contributing to the formation of a "political terrain"
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(champ politique an area ol relationships and rivalries moulded by a 
multitude ot social processes, including the evolution of institutions 
(churches, unions, etc.;, of different social groups, and their habits, 
(patterns ot consumption, trade, etc. ) and of changing ways of expressing 
relations between groups and between individuals.*11-* The party system is 
the "manifest form" of the champ politique.'1-'
It is not ditticult to see the contribution which this schema could 
make to understanding how party programmes are constructed. To help us in 
this we have at our disposal another of Lagroye's concepts, the 
"organizational network", (structure a'organisations) based on the 
postulate that parties develop long-term links to a common network ot 
organizations fulfilling distinct social functions, such as unions, 
cultural associations and professional groups. Despite their different 
roles these groups are linked by the fact that some individuals hold 
positions in two or more of them, by their partial identity ot interests, 
by their mechanisms ot socialization, and by a shared outlook or diffuse 
"ideology". Lagroye thus expects the determinants ot party behaviour to 
extend over a much larger field than the narrow one ot party composition, 
and to include the characteristics of other organizations than the parties 
themselves;
In so tar as it is inserted in an organizational 
network, a political party is affected by the 
transformations undergone by each of the other 
components ot the network. -’1
This approach opens up lines of enquiry parralleling the sociological
and organizational approaches, but which we may be able to to exploit with
greater precision than has been done in past. Lagroye refers not only to
the need for Socialist and Communist parties to reorient their strategies
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to take account ot the sociological mutation of their electorates, (a 
factor readily predictable from observation of global sociological 
change), but also to more unpredictable changes in recruitment patterns, 
such as the influx of professionals, especially doctors, into the RPR 
during the 1960s, (a development illuminated, as we show in chapter 9, 
by RPR members' activities in key doctors' organizations.) He refers not 
only to what can be the important organizational consequences of changes 
in electoral fortunes at local level, but also, unlike Panebianco, to 
the role ot chance in organizational change, citing the tact that Jacques 
Chirac was able to turn the Paris town hall into an important power-base 
tor himself only because a rival from another party, Giscard d*Estaing, 
decided to amend the status of the Paris city government.
In using the synthetic approach to explain the RPR's programmatic
development in the first half of the 1980s, we bear in mind that, as
Lagroye himself notes, "external" developments only have an effect on
party behaviour in so far as they are taken note of and brought into play
by specific individuals or groups inside given parties.Sl* We were able to
confirm this by means ot interviews with a score of middle-ranking party
leaders. Thus, when Lagroye evokes
the weakening of the grip exerted by certain 
organizations liable to socialize and mobilize 
individuals,
we think ot the transformation of the RPR's Associations Ouvri&res et 
Professionnelies which we describe in chapters 8 and 9. To this example 
can be added the role played by the two non-party political clubs which 
also form part ot the "organizational network" to which the RPR is 
attached. They are discussed in detail in chapter 8.
It now only remains to explain the order in which the issues raised
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in this introduction will be dealt with in the rest of the book. In 
chapter 2 we make the case tor the assertion that the Rassemblement pour 
la Republi que operated an unusually dramatic transformation of its 
political programme between 1980 and 1986, abandonning traditional 
Gaullist interventionism in favour of the brand ot economic liberalism 
contemporaneously in fashion in the USA and the UK. We also explain why we 
think this is interesting and important in itself. In chapter 3 we 
summarize the specifically French political context in which the 
transformation took place, beginning with the recent history ot the 
Gaullist party and expanding the focus to take in other political forces 
as the story moves into the 1980s.
Chapter 4, in line with Panebianco*s organizational approach, is 
devoted to an outline ot the RPR power struture. It makes little sense to 
embark on a study of the external tactors accounting tor programme change 
unless we are sure to begin with where power lies in the organization and 
which groups or individuals might be in a position to influence policy.
Our conclusion is that the RPR is a highly centralized party in which 
power is monopolized by a narrow leadership group. This implies that the 
party grass-roots had very little direct impact on programme content, so 
we consider, in chapter 5, whether there was an indirect transfer ot ideas 
and values associated with liberalism from the base to the apex ot the 
party during the period under consideration. Two broad themes are 
addressed. Firstly we consider evidence ot citizen dissatisfaction with 
the smothering of personal responsibility implied by the omnipresent 
state, and the impact on RPR local politicians ot citizen demands to take 
more control ol their own lives. This is relevant both to the hypothesis 
that a hitherto stable pattern ot politics in western democracies has been
disrupted by the rise ot "post-materialist" or "post-industrialist" values 
in the manner described by Inglehardt and to Dunleavy and Husbands' 
suggestion that "broader social movements elsewhere in the economy and 
social system" eventually spill over into the political arena. Secondly, 
we ask whether RPR grass roots politicians developed liberal economic 
ideas in response to the managerial problems involved in local government. 
In both cases, we show that the ideas of grass-roots politicians were to 
an extent affected by social developments external to the party, but this 
made no great impact on the party leadership.
In chapter 6 we test the market approach to party behaviour by asking 
to what extent the RPR1 s programme change was brought about by competition 
tor votes with other parties. We show firstly that the RPR did not really 
compete on economic issues with other parties in the 1980s, and secondly 
that some items included in the new programme published in 1984 were 
inserted against the advice of the party's specialist opinion-testers that 
they were vote-iosers. The market approach is unable to explain programme 
development, in this case.
In chapters 7 and 8 we therefore cast our net further afield to 
consider long-run changes in political ideas occurring at first outside 
the party system which may have infected society generally, and 
specifically the "organizational network" to which the RPR belongs, before 
having the delayed "specific political Implications" which Dunleavy and 
Husbands foresee. Here we find that ideas were imported not merely from 
outside the party system, but indeed from across the Atlantic, and 
introduced into the RPR both directly by leading party members and 
indirectly through the Club ae I'liorloge a political club specifically 
targeted on the right-wing parties.
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We continue the examination ot transformations which may have 
affected the RPR's "organizational network" in chapter 9, at the same time 
considering whether the party sought to act as spokesman for specific 
interests. We find both that the French employers' organizations for 
various reasons became much more overtiy liberal during the 19d0s than 
they had been probably at any time since 1945, and that some of these 
organizations supplied influential members to help draft RPR programmes. 
Nevertheless, the liberal impulse provided from this part ot the 
"organizational network" was partially blocked by the interests of a group 
ot technocrats present elsewhere in the network. In chapter 10, finally, 
taking the progressive enlargement ot tocus a stage further, we show that 
the reinterpretation ot their interests by both businessmen and 
technocrats in France was Itself only tully explicable when placed in the 
context ot developments in the world economy in the twenty years since the 
heyday of de Gaulle's presidency.
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Chapter 2 The Programmes Compared -
the transformation ot Gaullist economic policy.
This chapter examines the nature and extent of changes in the 
Gaullist party1s economic programme between 1979 and 1966. On February 
10th 1961 Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and leader of the Rassemblement 
pour la Rapublique gave his first press conference of the campaign tor the 
Presidential elections due to take place over two rounds of voting in 
early May. He surprised the political world by unveiling a programme which 
seemed to contradict the official position ot his own party elaborated 
only the year before in a book-length programme, Atout France1 
As the campaign progressed, the candidate repeatedly tackled two main 
themes; unemployment, and the growth ot income tax and social fund 
payments as a share ot the gross national product. For both problems,
Chirac had a single package ot solutions; cut taxes and social charges, \J 
balance the budget by reducing the number ot state empoloyees and ending 
subsidization of unproductive activities, and firms will automatically 
expand their activities and begin to take on more workers. -•:
The message was punched home in a series of poster and full-page
newspaper advertisements,
By looking after fewer things, the state will look 
after them better,
so the candidate proposed,
purely and simply to abolish the useless and 
meddlesome regulations which interfere with the lives 
of the people3
In the event, Chirac did not win in May, but the Socialist victory in 
the Presidential election left him unrepentant about his dramatic change
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of direction within months of the poll. In an interview during the summer 
he told Le Monde that he attributed his party's defeat to "inadaption to 
the evolution of French society." A
The Right's defeat nevertheless inaugurated a five-year period of 
reappraisal and reassessment which produced a flood of new books, 
pamphlets, conferences, debates and discussion circles, in which Chirac 
and the RPR played a prominent role, In a series of speeches and 
interviews, Chirac elaborated his new ideas on the best way to govern 
France. & Through a succession of working parties, journees parlementaires, 
national and extraordinary conferences, the RPR adapted what some had seen 
as a maverick Presidential election platform into the official party 
programme, Litres et Responsables, which appeared towards the end of 
1 9 6 4.
When compared to the last most recently published programme, that ot 
1980, and to past Gaullist practices during an unbroken spell of power 
from 1958 to 19/4, the new book revealed a considerable transformation in 
the party's thinking about economic policy, most especially about the 
proper role for the state in economic affairs. Indeed so sharp was the 
rupture with the past that, despite large elements ot continuity in the 
treatment of the two other major themes ot the programme - social policy, 
and foreign affairs and defence - the party deliberately gave the title La 
Revolution de la Responsabilite to its preamble, suggesting that the 
changes required in the 1960s were equal in significance to the revolution 
de la liberie which had inaugurated the rights of man in 1769, and to the 
revolution ae la solidarite which had marked the foundation of the French 
welfare state in 1945-b. 7
After presentation to the party congress at Grenoble in November, the
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programme was from January to May 1985 subjected to further amendment at a
series of meetings and debates around the country involving party
officials, the rank and file, and prominent non-party sympathizers. On the 
3rd ot May the fruits of these efforts were put into shape by a working 
meeting of regional charges de mission, and on the following day approved 
bv the party Central Committee.® On June 1st 1985, at the Parc Floral de 
Vincennes the leadership presented a distilled version of the new 
orientations for the official benediction of the rank and file at an
extraordinary party congress. Republished as Le Renouveau - Pacte RPR pour
la France they became the programme on which the party went into the 
campaign for the March 1986 general election.
The Programmes Compared - Planning
The Gaullists did not invent planning, nor did they have a monopoly 
ot enthusiasm tor it in France, where its suppporters have included 
socialists and trade unionists since the 1930s, a branch of Radicalism led 
by Pierre Mendes-France, and a group ot technocrats who coalesced around 
Jean Monnet to set up the first planning commissariat in the late 1940s. 
Nevertheless, the Gaullists took up planning so vigorously on their return 
to power in 1958, and their leading spokesmen referred to it so often, 10 
that it must be regarded as one of their key identifying characteristics.
According to de Gaulle himself, planning fixed objectives, set 
priorities, and compensated the disadvantages of free market economics, 
(without sacrificing the advantages). In a much-quoted phrase, the general 
referred to planning as cette ardente obligation. 11 For Michel Debre' the 
plan is not merely a useful tool of economic management, or an arbitrator 
between the interests of different groups, but a crucial bulwark ot 
national identity. In 1972 he wrote that if France rejected planning she
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would cease to be herself, and abandon the evolution ot her economic and 
social life to forces outside the state, even outside the country. ,;S
Faithful to these traditions, the RPR's 1980 programme, Atout France 
gave planning a prominent place. In a section headed Revenir a un plan 
digne de ce nom'A, planning is described as the application ot political 
will to economic and social problems, by the determination ot 'objectives, 
choices and methods'. The programme argues that planning serves to tree 
firms from red tape by driving through the bureaucrats' habitual 
hesitations and obstructions, while foreign experience shows that 'even in 
liberal countries' the state takes a role in remodelling economic 
structures. 1
By 1984, however, there was clearly a marked change in party 
thinking, for the new programme, Libres et Responsables contained no 
mention whatever at planning. Equally striking was its absence from the 
long speech to parliament with which Chirac introduced his government's 
programme on a full range of issues, on 9th April 1986. 1 i7j The standing of 
planning on the public policy agenda had fallen so low that Le Monde felt 
able to publish a kind of obituary in a short article entitled, "Once upon 
a time there was the Plan.
A Voluntarist and Selective Industrial Policy
From the moment ot his return to power in 1958, de Gaulle's 
commitment to an independent nuclear weapons capability for France 
intensified the national effort towards independence in the production ot 
weapons-grade plutonium and uranium enrichment, projects which had spin- 
ott consequences tor other industrial sectors such as computers and 
electricuty generation. Aside from these defence-related industries, 
however, Gaullist prime ministers have in the past spelled out much more
general aims for state supervision ot industry. Debre in particular 
detended a four-pronged role tor the state in industrial policy. He was 
against foreign domination in sectors affecting export capacity and the 
acquisition of technical expertise. He favoured state-organized mergers, 
on the grounds that only firms of a certain size could make the 
investments and rationalizations necessary to succeed in the export 
market, and achieve world rank. Thirdly, the state ought to foster 
specific advanced-technology sectors - atomic energy, aeronautics, the 
space industry, electronics, computers, and engineering. Finally, Debrd 
accepted the need tor state aid to "lame ducks", that is, firms belonging 
to sectors in difficulties, but where
the problems are not fundamental, but temporary and
circumstantial. 1 61
Jacques Chaban Delmas, prime minister from 1969-72, told parliament 
in September 1969 that the state must stimulate industrial restructuring 
with the aim of raising a few powerful groups to world rank, and helping a 
number of dynamic medium-sized firms to achieve national prominence, 
especially in exporting and new-technology sectors. 13
In Atout France none of these orientations and commitments had been 
abandoned - indeed a number of additional vital sectors were identified. 
The party’s overall industrial policy was characterized as "voluntarist 
and selective"-*0. Selected for special state-organized help were 
electronics, computers, and the aeronautical, oceanoiogical and nuclear 
industries-1', while it was stressed that France ought to make an effort to 
recapture certain domestic markets as well as continuing the drive lor 
exports. Existing resources, (forests and steel) ought to be defended 
and developed, and in shipbuilding, the state must intervene,
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it necessary with orders, in order to maintain 
productive capacity compatible with the demands ot 
national independence. ^
The programme called tor special investment help for the production 
goods sector, in which France was said to sutfer from import elasticity of 
demand, while in consumption Industries such as electrical white goods, 
furniture, leather, construction materials, mineral chemicals, paper and 
board, agricultural machinery and office equipment, the state must 
intervene to reverse consistent decline in shares ot value-added, exports 
and investment.
The orientations ot the 1964 programme were completely different. Far
from eulogizing the role ot the state, the party called baldly for the
supression of administrative tutelie (control and supervision) over the
nation's productive apparatus, since "liberal decentralization ot
production has become the condition tor economic progress. "a<* Not only is
administrative intervention regarded as meddlesome and harmful, but the
focus of interest switches from specified industrial branches to anonymous
individual firms as the carriers of French hopes for industrial
regeneration, tor
... it is only the periphery and not the centre, the 
base and not the summit, the firm and not the state, 
which can tap the information emanating from the 
market place in order to make the ten thousand daily 
decisions required by economic activity.
Only one sector is singled out for special mention - agriculture, 
which we shall come to below.
Selective Credit Subsidies
The methods by which the state ought to help selected industrial 
sectors were a subject on which the RPR’s 1960 programme showed some 
hesitations in respect of previous Gaullist practice. The party suggested
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that the blossoming ot structures tor assessing and handing out the aid, 
had turned into an impediment to the vital torces ot the nation, rather 
than a stimulant. They alleged that the multiplication of possible subsidy 
outlets (which ran to scores, if not hundreds, for any single 
industrialist in search ot funds) created stupetaction among' would-be 
claimants, while poor or contradictory targetting blunted the achievement 
ot desired aims. The party declared itself against state intervention tous 
azimutsP7, but did not question the principle of subsidized credit tor 
industry, nor the system whereby 90% ot deposits were in state-owned 
banks, while the government closely supervised the whole financial system 
through the Bank of France and the Conseil National du Credit and major 
investment projects were oriented through para-state institutions like the 
Caisse des Depdts et Consignations
The 1984 programme, like its predecessor, continued to identify the 
key problem for French industry as the crying need for investment funds, 
but the problem was addressed from a completley opposite angle. Investment 
is not to result either from state-targetted subsidized credit, or from 
direct state funding of investment programmes. Rather, a new, five-point 
plan of action is proposed. Firstly, there should be a reduction ot taxes 
and social fund contributions in order to increase disposable income and 
make it possible for firms and individuals to save more. Saving is to be 
encouraged by a reform of the approrpriate rules and mechanisms in such a 
way as to provide benefits commensurate with the length of investment and 
the type of risk. Thirdly, there should be special tax concessions tor 
investment in small and medium-sized firms. Workers are to be encouraged - 
by both fiscal and social means - to make medium term investments in the 
firms which employ them. Finally, there should be a general reform of the
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banking system to make it more competitive, decentralized and 
correspondingly more available to meet industry's needs.
In Libres et Responsables only agriculture was singled out for 
special government attention. The RPR wanted to advance mechanization even 
further, to induce young farmers to stay in the industry, to enable family 
firms to survive, and to promote product diversification.30. But even here 
there is no suggestion of subsidized credit, or other forms of state- 
organized transfer payments, (though the party acknowledges the help 
available through the European Common Agricultural Policy). As far as the 
French state is concerned, the industry must seek its salvation on the 
same terms as other sectors; the party calls for measures "to encourage 
savers to invest in agriculture..."31
State Ownership
Though defending the principle of state intervention in economic 
affairs, the Gaullists never argued that the state ought to own a 
strategic share ot the nation's productive capacity, in the same way that 
Socialists have called tor nationalization of the 'commanding heights'. 
Rather, the 1958 constitution simply took on board the preambule to the 
1946 constitution, which says that public services and monopolies ought to 
come under collective ownership. 33 In a 1977 speech against the 
nationalizations proposed in the Common Programme of the Left Chirac 
refused to rule out nationalizations in principle, suggesting that 
individual cases might be justified by circumstances, as at the 
Liberation, and cited the need to prevent important firms passing into 
foreign hands. 33
Debre believed that the state as a matter ot course would exercise 
power through its mastery ot energy, transport and credit.33 In practice,
however, the use ot public enterprises in counter-cyclical policy was 
patchy, while only Chaban-Delinas used state-owned firms in an attempt to 
propagate by example his enthusiasm tor collective bargaining, a tactic 
which was not popular among all Gaullists. At out France had nothing in 
particular to say about nationalized industry. It seems fair to say that 
the state-owned sector in 1980 was the subject of more or less complete 
national consensus, being regarded as the nation's inheritance from the 
Liberation, or even earlier in some cases.
By 1964, however, the RPR had taken up a position in sharp contrast 
to its previous attitude. Proceeding from a critique ot the bureaucratic 
character ot the Socialists' nationalizations ot 1982-3, the party 
proposed not only to undo this work, but to go further, re-examining the 
whole range of state-owned enterprises, "no matter what their nature" and 
promising to retain in public ownership
No definition ot the strict sense ot these terms was given in Litres 
et Responsables, but at the very least the criteria could not include 
Renault and one or two other firms nationalized at the Liberation because 
ot their owners* collaboration with the Nazi occupant.
The record after the return to power in 1986 confirmed how serious 
was the RPR's re-thinking ot the Liberation inheritance. With its loi- 
cadre ot 2nd July 1986, the new government launched a privatization 
programme which was to return to the private sector within one year as 
large a slice ot the nation's wealth as Mrs Thatcher's Conservative 
governments had achieved in seven. 3ib. Significantly, the seil-ott included 
Socidte Gen£ralet one ot the three big clearing banks which formed the
only those undertakings which constitute a monopoly 
and a public service in the strict sense ot the 
terms.
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Budgetary Policy
De Gaulle was a firm believer in financial orthodoxy and balanced 
budgets. This was evident especially during the period shortly after his 
return to power in 1958. At first, with Antoine Pinay, he resorted to a 
large public loan to restore government finances and public confidence in 
the franc, as he had done in 1945, and Pinay in 1952. But in December he 
accepted the recommendations ot a special economic advisory committee 
chaired by Jacques Rueff, which, as well as ensuring the opening up ot the 
French economy to foreign competition, insisted on a tight monetary policy 
which would require that state expenditure be kept down, in order to head 
off the risk ot inilation. These orientations were adhered to under
successive conservative finance Ministers, Baumgartner, Giscard and Debre, 
as long as de Gaulle remained President.
The last decade, however, has seen a sharp discontinuity in the RPR's 
attitude to taxation and government expenditure. In June 1975 Jacques 
Chirac, then Prime Minister, insisted on creating 15,000 jobs in the 
public sector in a classic Keynsian attempt to boost consumption and get 
the French people to "spend** their way out of the recession provoked by 
the first oil shock. Following disagreements over this and various other 
matters with President Giscard d'Estaing, he resigned and was replaced as 
Prime Minister by Raymond Barre.
During the period from 1976 to 1981 the RPR was partly in power and 
partly in opposition. While some Gaullists such as Peyrefitte and Guichard 
continued to hold posts in Barre1s governments, Chirac and the party 
centre vigorously denounced Barre*s 'gentle growth' strategy, and called 
tor a programme ot ref lation led by state spending.
By 1980, the emphasis had switched away from consumption as a 
mechanism for galvanizing the economy, and concentrated instead on state 
investment projects. Atout France attacked both Keynesianism and the 
Giscard-Barre slow-growth strategy and advocated a "third way" model of
v/
"structured growth", relying on a 5-year capital investment programme 
which would allocate some 20 billion francs per year more than Barre was 
planning to spend on industry, agriculture, housing, infrastructure and 
commerce. This package was to be financed partly by savings in other areas 
ot government spending, and partly by an emergency wealth tax, but 
additionally the party argued that at least a small budget deficit was 
'tolerable' as long as it was on the capital account and not on current 
spending. 41
Within months, in time for the Presidential election campaign, the 
party leader repudiated the wealth tax, denounced budget deficits, and 
proposed a cut in state expenditure of 30 billion francs in piace of the 
considerable increase which was the likely outcome ot the Atout France 
programme. It was a volte face which led observers to speak of Chirac's 
conversion to Reaganomics.
The party programme ot 1984 implicitly demanded this label. All the 
new orientations - the abandonment ot planning, ending investment 
subsidies, privatization of state assets, absolute cuts in taxes and 
expenditure, as well as the abolition of price and exchange controls, were 
given coherence by the insistence on the need to offer "deciders" and 
owners ot capital an incentive to apply their talents or their assets in 
pursuit of their individual benefit. The short-term fall in tax-yieid was 
to be compensated by the higher revenue arising from an expected up-turn 
in overall economic activity. This was the proposition integral to the
supply-side economics made famous by Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign tor the 
American Presidency.
Conclusion
Rarely has a party made such a sweeping break with its characteristic 
policies as the break made by the Gaullists so soon after their expulsion 
from power. The parallel with Reagonomics, and the contemporaneous 
experiment being made by Mrs. Thatcher in the UK led to suggestions that 
party policy-making had become a question ot rank opportunism, or ot 
toilowing the fashion.1** On the other hand, perhaps liberalism was 
enjoying a resurgence because it really was the only solution for the 
fitful economic pertormance ot the western industrial countries since the 
oii-shocks of the 1970s. Or maybe there had been a kind ot generational 
renewal inside the RPR, bringing to power new groups with economic and 
social philosophies different from those of their Gaullist elders, and 
provoking an unprecedented consensus on liberal values on the French 
Right? We will turn to each of these interesting questions in due course. 
But we must first outline the political events ot the 1970s and 1980s 
which formed the background to the Gaullists' development.
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Chapter 8 The Contexts ot Party Programme Change
we have identified the transformation ot the Gaullists' economic 
policy as being completed during the period 1979-86. Bet ore describing the 
political context ot those years, however, it is important to recount, 
albeit briefly, earlier episodes in Gaullist history which formed leaders' 
policy beliets and their attitudes to each other.
The Gaullist movement has gone through several 'ages' in its history, 
defined by the party's position in or out ot power, and by its acceptance 
or refusal ot the established regime. The first age belonged to the men ot 
1940, who rejected Retain, the Etat Francois and the Armistice. After a 
tew heady months in power at the Liberation, many ot them followed de 
Gaulle into the wilderness during the fourth Republic, believing as he did 
that post-war politics was proving as inadequate to France's needs as the 
politics ot the twenties ana thirties. A tew who were later to become 
pillars of the Fifth Republic did continue to sit in Parliament and play a 
role in public life, but they were disowned by de Gaulle and cannot be 
treated as representative ot "official" Gauliism.
There are two main reasons tor passing rapidly over the period ot 
'opposition Gauliism*. Firstly, the immediate post-war period is rather 
remote from the experience ot the majority of those who played an active 
role in the party at the turn ot the 1980s. Secondly, the policy 
pronouncements ot a party which has adopted a position ot anti-system 
opposition form a dubious basis of comparison with what they would propose 
in 'normal' party competition. This chapter, in tour parts, therefore 
takes up the story in 1958 and deals with de Gaulle’s decade ot power 
which consolidated the new Republic's institutions, the events ot 1967-9,
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and the struggle tor the succession trorn which Pompidou emerged 
victorious, the latter*s death in ottice (1974) opened up a period ot 
conflict and redefinition, (described in the second part ot the chapter) 
which ended with the toundation ot the Rassemblement pour la Rbpubli que by 
Jacques Chirac in 19/6. Next, we trace the RPR*s evolution in its role of 
junior partner in the Giscardian coalition, (1976-til), and in the forth 
and final section ot the chapter we signpost the most significant events 
during the period ot opposition to the Socialist government ot 19til-6.
Gauliism in Power
In 1956 the leaders ot the regime established in 1946 were unable to 
disarm a coup threatened by army otticers unhappy with the government's 
prosecution ot the tour-year old war against the Algerian National 
Liberation Front. In response to their call, General de Gaulle agreed to 
return to power after 12 years of political exile, on condition that 
French institutions be reformed to strengthen the executive's powers at 
the expense ot the legislature. Approved by a referendum, the constitution 
ot the Fifth French Republic came into torce on 1st January 1959.
In the 1960s the Gaullists formed a heterogeneous party. Success in 
ending the war (in 1962) and the durability ot the new regime attracted to 
their ranks politicians ot the Fourth Republic who had not previously been 
noted supporters ot the general, along with a generation ot young civil 
servants drawn to the new fields opened up tor their talents and ambitions 
by an increasingly interventionist state. The historic Gaullists had 
always differed amongst themselves, anyway, in their attitude to economic 
and social questions. This was natural in people who were originally 
brought together by a national struggle and a man who adopted a 
consciously cross-class rhetoric and appeal.
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The early Gaullist organisations, both the Rassemblement du Peuple 
frangais (RPF), and the Union Pour la Nouvelle Republique WNR), founded 
In order to contest the 1958 elections, represented an uneasy marriage 
between the traditions of the cadre party and the mass party. They 
consciously aimed at a mass membership, but their appeal was more closely 
related to their link with de Gaulle than to a clearly defined programme. 
To join an UNR list in the hope o1 being elected maire or councillor or 
deputy was to associate oneself with the work ol reconstruction and 
renewal which de Gaulle had set himself.
The cadre party tradition appeared also in the way that different 
'families' of Gaullists emerged and linked themselves to the UNR, but 
claimed to embody a particular and precious part of the Gaullist identity. 
The best-known French historian of Gauliism has listed more than thirty 
'Gaullist' organizations,
Some, like the Service d1Action Civique, which kept order at Gaullist 
meetings, had no particular ideological focus. Similarly, the Associat ion 
Rationale pour le Soutien de 1'Action du General de G a u l l e sprang into 
action for referendums or presidential elections but otherwise had no 
political life of its own. Of those which did represent a genuine 
contribution to a diverse Gaullist identity, however, two of the more 
important were on the left; the Union Democratique des Travailleurs (UDT>, 
and the "Groups oes 29". The first named, led by Rene Capitant and Louis 
Vallon, admired de Gaulle particularly tor his use of the techniques ot 
direct democracy - the referendum, and the election ot the President ot 
the Republic by universal suffrage. Capitant and Vallon were the leaders 
ot those who tried to make the general's promise ol a third way between 
capitalism and socialism into a reality. In i9b2 and 1967, the UDT
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contested the parliamentary elections on a joint list with the UNR, but 
the attempt to go solo after the death of de Gaulle in 1969 ended in 
t allure.
The "group ot 29" exemplified what united the disparate elements of 
Gauliism at this time. Consisting mostly ot people who came from the left 
- including catholic intellectuals and some prominent journalists - they 
were not in complete sympathy with the conservative social attitudes ot 
the mass ot Gaullists, but supported de Gaulle because they considered 
that toreign policy was the most important issue ot the day.3
In general, in the early years ot the new Republic, any Internal 
disagreements were more than outweighed by the Gaullists' common distaste 
for the "party spirit" which was held to be responsible tor the demise ot 
two previous regimes, and by their commitment to shared goals: 
consolidation ot the new institutions against the threat ol any putsch 
emanating from the armed forces, and against what was taken to be the 
threat ot the miners' strike of 1963, and to the resurrection ot French 
prestige and influence in the world, symbolized by the explosion ot the 
first atom bomb in the Sahara in 1960, and by de Gaulle's denunciation ot 
super-power domination.
The events of May 1968, when for a moment the regime itself seemed to 
be under threat, necessarily tested the cohesion ot the Gaullist elites. 
But a number ot separate issues of contention had been brewing for some 
time. The UNR's 196/ conference at Lille, where they came to the boil, was 
a significant turning point in the party's history.
On one level, there was a problem about regenerating the leadership. 
Some in the party recognized that the old guard could not go on for ever,
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and demanded that ‘new blood' be infused into the leading party organs, 
even though the new leaders might be people who had never been part ot the 
‘historic Gauliism' ot the 1940s. Others, tor whom Gauliism remained 
"first and foremost the flame of the Resistance"4, found this difficult to 
accept. The argument was sharpened by an element ot personal spite, in 
that the most energetic ’renovator* was Georges Pompidou, himself resented 
by the old Gaullists for remaining quietly in Paris during the Occupation, 
where he had worked as a school teacher and taken no part in the 
Resistance.B
Overlaying this dispute was the restiveness of the Gaullist lett. 
Tired ot waiting tor the great social revolution which they expected de 
Gaulle to impose by means ot a referendum, the UDT leaders themselves took 
the initiative by forcing an amendment to government legislation which 
laid legal obligations on some firms to share protits with their workers. 
Pompidou's hostility, given the discretionary powers at his disposal as 
prime minister, was enough to ensure that the amendement Vallon, first 
moved in 1965, had no practical consequences.b The UDT responded by 
issuing a declaration that they would not even go to the Lille congress; 
they disagreed in any case with Pompidou's project tor strengthening the 
organization and discipline ot the party, which they thought ought to 
remain as an amorphous 'movement*. In their absence, Pompidou consolidated 
his hold, had the party renamed Union Pour la Ddiense de la 
R&publique, (UDV®>, soon to become simply UDR, Union des Ddmocrates pour
ia Rdpublique., and secured the election as General Secretary of Robert 
Poujade, who had been only 12 in 1940, the first holder of the post who 
did not belong to the generation ot the 'histories'.'
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One ot the seeds from which flowered the events of May ‘68 was 
undoubtedly the Gaullists’ image of conservative authoritarianism in 
social policy. Only the year before a wide-ranging reform of the social 
security system had been pushed through against a strong parliamentary 
opposition by relying on a series of votes of confidence which effectively 
delegated legislative power to the government. This had already provoked 
the resignation of one of the Gaullists' centre-left fellow-travellers, 
Edgard Pisani. In 1968, he was followed by Capitant and Alain Peyrefitte.
The events of May and their sequel played an Important role in the 
way that Gaullist leaders and their rival supporters subsequently behaved 
towards each other, the start of the movement found prime minister 
Pompidou in Iran on an official visit; returning to Paris to find that the 
tactic of repression had not succeeded in cowing the students, he made a 
conciliatory gesture by ordering the re-opening of the campuses. As long 
as the issue of the conflict remained in doubt, Pompidou was the target ot 
Gaullist accusations of ' laxi6m' . He persuaded de Gaulle to shelve his 
plan tor a referendum, and instead dissolve the Assembly. As the summer 
progressed, and it became clear that the Gaullists owed their survival 
(.and perhaps more; to Pompidou's cool head and shrewd tactics, opposition 
to him took more subterranean forms. Held at arm's length by a de Gaulle 
mortally wounded in his pride, he resigned as prime minister and suffered 
a difficult few months in the wilderness while the hot story in the Paris 
scandal magazines was his wife's alleged implication in a murder-mystery 
involving f igures f rom the beau monde and the Paris underworld. s Once de 
oaulle had committed political suicide with his ill-judged referendum of 
April 1969, Pompidou's position became unassailable.
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Georges Pompidou's political and social itinerary was in a sense the 
reverse ot de Gaulle's. The son ot primary school teachers, from an 
obscure village in the Cantal, whose father was a card-carrying member o1 
the pre-war Socialist party, he made a career as a banker with Rothschilds 
bet ore taking up politics tull-time. Ironically, he never received as high 
a share ot the working-class vote as did de Gaulle, who had been termed by 
the austere environment of the northern industrial bourgeoisie, and the 
military academies.
It is with Pompidou, nonetheless, that we can situate the 
transformation ol a movement defined by loyalty to a charismatic leader 
into a political party occupying a detinite position on the electoral map. 
De Gaulle's personal electorate, in presidential elections, had always 
been both older and more masculine than the French population as a whole, 
and his appeal to the working class invariably pulled in between two and 
three million habitual Communist and Socialist voters, Pompidou's 
presidential electorate included fewer workers, a higher proportion of 
women, and was distributed fairly evenly through the age groups. In this, 
his profile of support was very similar to that ot the UDR's vote in the 
general elections of 1967 and 1968. By 1968 the UDR seemed to have 
acquired the socio-protessional profile it needed it it were to become a 
large, modern conservative party % and with Pompidou in 1969 it f ielded a 
presidential candidate in its own image.
Another indication that the UDR had consolidated its place in French 
political life was that the President did not seem to sacrifice any 
legitimacy in stepping down from his pedestal into the arena of party 
politics. Unlike de Gaulle, Pompidou did not hesitate to get involved in 
the spadework ot political organization. As prime minister in 1966-7 he
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succeeded in persuading the Giscardian Republicains Indgpendants to agree 
to a jointly-approved list ot candidates at the tirst ballot ot the 1.967 
elections. After the presidential election in 1969 he made an even bigger 
opening to the centre by incorporating the Centre Democratie et Progr&s 
into his majority. Even as President he maintained his interest in the 
sharing out ot constituencies between the various Gaullist hopefuls and 
their ailies.
The Gaullist Lett, meanwhile, were shattered by the retirement ot 
their hero, de Gaulle. They blamed the latter's deteat in the reterendurn 
ot April 1969 on the forces ot the right, who, allegedly, had nothing to 
tear from the likely programme ot the next President. In September, the 
UD i (which had merged with the UNR in 1962) was retorrned. Pompidou, sure 
of his position, soon replied by expelling Vallon from the UDR.
Pompidou's supremacy was not entirely welcome to the older Gaullist 
"barons", however. After the general's death a number ot them set up an 
amicale, a kind ot club for Gaullist deputies, dedicated to keeping the 
general's memory alive. Called Presence et Action du Gaullisme, it was 
chaired by de Gaulle's long-serving Defence Minister, Pierre Messmer. The 
parliamentary party itselt was divided informally into a number of 
'clans', each ot which grouped the supporters of a particular 'baron'. The 
Pompidolistes were the most numerous, naturally, but there were also 
groups of the followers ot Chaban Delrnas, Roger Frey, Maurice Couve de 
Murville and Michel Debre.'°
From these, Pompidou chose his first prime minister, Jacques Chaban 
Delrnas, who held the post from 1969-72. Relations between the two men 
rapidly deteriorated when Chaban made his tirst and rather controversial 
statement of general policy, christened the "New Society" programme, in
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the National Assembly on 16th September 1969, having neglected to send a 
copy to the President in advance. Nonetheless, Pompidou stuck with him tor 
two and a halt years, and some commentators have found that the period 
produced some useful reforms, despite the largely right-wing majority. 1-i;: 
There were increases in the minimum wage and pensions, together with tax 
and other benefit reforms, to compensate the large wage increases won by 
employed workers the previous year. The nationalized industries were used 
as a launching pad tor the modernization of industrial relations, 
including the transfer ot manual workers to monthly pay, the first 
distribution ot Renault shares to their employees, and a bigger role tor 
trade unions in organizing the labour market.
When the break with Chaban came it was attributed mainly to the need 
for a new face at the approach ot the 1973 legislative elections, and to 
allow Chaban to take with him some ot the discredit for the rather botched 
referendum on EEC expansion, which had attracted a less than 50% turnout. 
Pierre Messmer, Chaban’s successor, presented an altogether more cautious 
political persona, but nevertheless continued the main lines of policy, 
including the encouragement to collective bargaining. As it turned out, 
the departure of Chaban meant the end of policy innovatins, The President 
was increasingly disabled by a fatal blood disease, to which he eventually 
succumbed in the spring of 1974.
1974-6 Conflict and Redefinition
The President's premature death in office opened up a full-scale 
crisis in the UDR, which ultimately led to its complete transformation, 
the immediate problem was to find a candidate to run in the presidential 
election for which there was not much time to prepare. One obvious 
Gaullist candidate was Chaban Delrnas, a historic Gaullist, the mayor ot
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Bordeaux, with a flamboyant and dashing image, and recently a moderately 
successful prime minister. Chaban was distrusted by many ot the barons, 
however, precisely because he was able to think up his own ideas, or even, 
which was worse, import them from the left. His prime ministerial cabinet 
had included the Mendeslst Simon Nora, who was credited with writing the 
' New Society' speech, as well as Jacques Delors, who was keen on pushing 
industry into more consensual industrial relations, and who would later be 
minister of finance in a Socialist government.
It was widely known, moreover, that Pompidou had been preparing a 
younger man for the succession, not one of the barons, but a technocrat, 
and one whose attitude in 1968 had shown little evidence ot secret 
sympathy towards trade unions and Communists. Born in 1932, the product of 
a Parisian iycde, the Institut. a'Etudes Polit iques, followed by Harvard, 
military service in Algeria, and the Ecoie Nationale de I 1Administration, 
Jacques Chirac was the image of the socially privileged and ambitious 
young technocrat, who makes an early start to political lite, in his case 
as a member ot Pompidou's Matignon team in 1962. May 1968 found him at the 
Ministry ot Economy and Finances, where he was responsible for employment. 
"I have a gun,and I know how to use it, " he allegedly told the workers' 
envoys during the secret and sometimes risky contacts which preceeded the 
Crenelle negotiations. 14i Already in 1974, though only 42, he had had wide 
government experience, preparing the budget in 1969, responsible tor 
relations with Parliament (Chief Whip) during 1971-2, minister ot 
agriculture in 1973-4, before becoming, shortly before Pompidou's death, 
minister of the Interior.
Then there was the problem ot the finance minister, Valery Discard 
d'Estaing, who had skilfully built up his own parliamentary group, the
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R&publicains Independents, and taken care to disassociate himself from the 
general's disastrous 1969 referendum. He was given credit on the right for 
his decision not to challenge Pompidou in 1969, although he was already a 
well-known public figure. In 1974, he could legitimately claim, it was 
'his turn' .
An acrimonious debate broke out among the Gaullists, which on the 
surface was about which right-wing candidate was best placed to beat the 
Lett. Behind the scenes the debate was fuelled by personal rivalries, and 
by speculation about the attitude ot Giscard, who seemed unlikely to 
withdraw in favour of Chaban, but might do so in favour ot a more 
conservative Gaullist figure like Messmer.
Chirac*s problem was that he was not yet well enough known to the 
public to mount a credible candidature ot his own. Together with the 
others who distrusted Chaban, therefore, he tried to build up support for 
a Messmer candidacy. Though sharing their apprehensions about Chaban, 
Messmer declined, tearing that he would not. be able to beat Mitterrand. On 
the eve ot the tirst round vote, Chirac and his supporters published the 
signatures ot 43 deputies of the majority, mostly Gaullists, but including 
some Giscardians, with a last-minute appeal for more negotiations which 
would result in the presentation of a single right-wing candidate. Despite 
the strict neutrality ot the appeal's wording, the move was interpreted as 
a statement ot preference for Giscard over Chaban. This was felt by the 
Gaullist establishment to be an appalling piece ot treachery and, as the 
Appel des 43t became a part ot party folklore. 1s
Chirac argued that, since Chaban had no chance of winning anyway, it 
was better tor some Gaullists to be seen as having contributed to 
Giscard*s victory, tor then they would be in a stronger position to 'hold'
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Giscard and influence his policy when once he was elected. It may have 
been that some ot the Gaulists among the 43 simply preferred what they 
knew ot Giscard to the unpredictability of Chaban, or thought that their 
own careers had a more promising future with Giscard and not Chaban at the 
Elysee Palace. 1
That Chirac became prime minister when Giscard was safely installed, 
did nothing to allay accusations ot treachery and opportunism. Giscard 
declined to dissolve the Assembly, thus cheating the Gaullists ot an 
election campaign which might have helped restore unity. Deprived ot the 
presidency tor the tirst time since 1956, with its leading figures openly 
feuding, the party of Gaullism seemed set tor disintegration unless 
someone emerged decisively as the new leader.
It was in this period that Charles Pasqua played a key role in 
keeping Chirac on speaking terms with the rest of those who, like Pasqua, 
had reluctantly endorsed Chaban in the election rather than a non- 
Gauilist. Using the evidence ot opinion polls which showed that the party 
was seen as ieaderiess and drifting towards extinction, Pasqua persuaded 
Sanguinetti, then general-secretary, to resign precipitately in December 
1974, leaving the way clear tor Chirac to be elected to the post himself 
by a Central Committee of which Pasqua had adroitly calculated the balance 
of forces. 17
This manoeuvre was denounced as a 'coup', and provoked the departure 
from the UDR ranks of 'leftists' such as Jean Charbonnel and Ren£ Ribi£re, 
some of whom joined Michel Jobert in setting up a new 'left Gaullist' 
organization. ,a Chaban refused to vote tor the final motion at the conse.il 
national on December 15th, when Chirac's appointment was confirmed, and
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thereafter stayed away for two years from the ieadlng party organs ot 
which he was a member. Even a (then) relatively obscure figure like 
Bernard Pons, a friend ot Chirac, and a deputy from the same region, 
refused to speak to him as long as he remained Giscard's prime minister. '•*
The new general secretary's survival at this tricky moment was due in 
part to acceptance (even reluctant) that his technical expertise combined 
with charisma and great capacity for work did mark him out as a potential 
presidential candidate. But the other essential conditions ot his success 
were Pasqua's organizational powers, and the refusal ot old Gaullists such 
as Debre and Couve de Murville to lead a revolt against him.
As chief ot the party organization he launched sweeping reforms both in 
the field and at head office, but did not fail to build bridges towards 
the Chabanists by making Albin Chalandon, one ot Chaban's closest friends, 
one of five adjoints to the general-secretary. •i‘:0 The new team produced 
some useful results. Finances, controlled by Jean Taittinger, were put on 
a sounder footing as members actually began to pay their subscriptions, 
rather than relying on hand-outs from secret Matignon funds. Yves Guana, 
another of the ad joint s, organized a team ot study groups which within a 
year brought out L 4Enjeu, the LJDR's tirst ever full-length programme. 
Chirac's spell as general secretary lasted only until the July congress. 
Satisfied that he had made his mark, he stepped down at the request of 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing who preferred his prime minister to be tree ot 
partisan responsibilities. Andre Bord assumed the general secretaryship, 
until he was replaced by Guena in April 1976, when Giscard again pressed 
the claims ot Bord*s other job as secretary ot State tor war veterans.
Chirac had won control ot the party, but had to admit defeat in his 
duel with the new President. Giscard refused to allow the Prime Minister
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to govern by ordonnance, that is by securing the delegation ot law-making 
power from Parliament. He transmitted by open letter the list of affairs 
the government was required to deal with, not omitting to lay down the 
timetable. When new social policies were announced, such as votes at 18, 
or reform of the abortion laws, it was Giscard himselt who appeared on 
television to explain and defend them. In economic affairs, the prime 
minister's office, at the hotel Matignon was obliged to negotiate with 
Finances and Industrie, two powerful ministries held by loyal and long- 
serving Giscardians, Fourcade and d'Ornano. The ministry of the Interior, 
held by Giscard's lieutenant, Michel Poniatowski, was "ur/e torteres&e dans 
laquelle Jacques Chirac n'a pas son mot a dire". Some ot Chirac's 
supporters, even those who were relatively sympathetic to Giscard, urged 
him to issue an ultimatum to the President - "either Poniatowski goes, or 
I. do", but the prime minister either did not dare to resolve the matter' 
in that way, or he preferred to bide his time.
Meanwhile, Giscardian initiatives in three policy areas which were 
crucial tor the Gaullist identity did not tail to agitate the guardians ot 
orthodoxy, such as Debre, Messmer, and Guena. In December 1974 Chirac 
learned from the radio whilst shaving that the heads of government of the 
nine members ot the European Community had agreed to a system ot direct 
elections to the European Parliament. Giscard added insult to injury in 
the spring of 1975 by announcing the suppression ot a traditional annual 
military ceremony on 8th May, and its replacement by a sort ot European 
testival. He decreed the abandonment ot the construction ot a sixth 
nuclear-armed submarine, without consulting his prime minister. A defence 
review published an article by the army chief of General Staff, general 
Mery, which argued for stationing French Pluton tactical nuclear weapons
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on German territory, where they could have no purpose other than 
Integration with a joint NATO-inspired defence strategy. Finally, in early 
1976, Giscard signed the 'Jamaica agreement1 on international monetary 
policy, which seemed to abandon the resistance which the Gaullists had 
always maintained to the domination ot the dollar.*3
Not all Gaullists were willing to push defence ot de Gaulle's triple
anathema - supranational Europe, NATO, the dollar - to the point ot an
open break. Far more issues united Gaullists and Giscardians than divided 
them, especially relative to what was on otter from the left. What really 
determined the timing ot the break, was the manoeuvring within the 
majority for leadership ot the coalition in the run-up to the 1976
legislative elections. Chirac tailed to get Giscard to admit that co­
ordination ot parliamentary tactics, and strategy at local government 
elections, fell to the prime minister and leader of the largest party. 
Poniatowski made a number ot speeches looking forward to the day when the 
Rdpublicains Ind&pendant & would be as numerous as the UDR, and implied 
that Chirac had faithfully carried out the task ot ' Giscardizing' the UDR 
tor the purposes of lining it up behind the President in the event ot his 
standing for re-election. Even worse, the Giscardians began to imply that 
they would extend the majority to include the Socialists, reducing the 
Gaullists to the status ot a right wing <.arid dispensable) minority within 
i t. **
Faced with this barely disguised threat ot suffocation, some ot the 
Gaullist barons appeared happy to throw in their lot with Giscard, but 
Pasqua and Chirac, urged on by Chirac's advisers Pierre Juillet and Marie- 
France Garaud, preferred a spectacular gesture which would reinforce - and 
it necesary redefine - the clarity ot their image as a distinct political
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party before the next legislative elections. On 25th August 1976 Chirac 
resigned as prime minister, and the following week-end retired with a tiny 
group ol his closest supporters to a country retreat in the Massif Central 
to plan the relaunch of the Gaullist party with a new name and a new mass 
recruit merit dr i ve. 2S
In form, the launch of the RPR in 1976 was a repeat ol the dramatic 
Appel au Mass emblement which de Gaulle had - with varying success - 
addressed to the French people at three historic moments, 1940, 1958, and
1968. In 1976 the supposed imminent national disaster was the danger ot 
the left winning the 1978 elections, and the RPR was set to take the role 
of defender ol freedom against collectivism.2**
But the RPR planners made a deliberate effort to avoid being cast as 
purely and simply of "the Right". The keynote speech tor the launch, was 
delivered at Egletons, in Chirac's constituency, on October 3rd. The 
themes were fidelity to Gaullist institutions, a strong state to protect 
citizens against the violence ot the modern world, and a strong 
restatement ot the traditional Gaullist social policy, where the notion ot 
concertation with the unions was deployed alongside commitment to a wealth 
tax and to the profit-sharing and workplace democracy implied by 
participation. Chirac even said that the RPR would aspire to a sort of 
travai11isme trangais, which, with its overtones ol the British Labour 
Party, was later recognized by his entourage as a blunder.27 The classic 
Gaullist notion ot the Rassemblement - "we are neither ol the left nor ot 
the right" - was repeated at Perigueux on October 10th; at Epernay on the 
16th, Chirac called lor a campaign to ensure that"la participation au 
capital soit le plus large possible. ”2'3 The up-dated party programme,
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2'Enjep promised to abolish inequalities which arise from history, from 
birth, or simple chance. 33
Despite all this, the message did not get home. In November a poll
taken by SOFRES tor Antenne 2 revealed that 58% of the French people
thought the RFR belonged on the right, while only 38% thought the same ot
the R£publicams Independents. Giscard's strategy hinged precisely on such
a public perception, to which he had contributed by a press-conference
remark in September that Chirac was opposed to his reforms and "is
deliberately playing the conservative card tor the elections."30 To make
matters worse, the openly extremist Parti aes forces Nouveiles,
accompanied by Tixier-Vignancourt (who had stood against de Gaulle in the
1965 Presidential election, in defence ot Algerie Frangaise) weighed in
with support for Chirac's new venture, praising his qualities as a
rassembleur. Finally Chaban denounced what he saw as a rassemblement of
the Right, or ot a part of the Right, against the Lett.
This being so, no matter what the party's propositions 
are. ...one has left the path of Gauilism. 31
With all this stacked against it, the strategic aims ot the launch 
were not achieved. In the short term it stimulated the crystallization ot 
some of the social-Christian wing ot Giscard's supporters into the Centre 
aes Democrates Sociaux (CDS'), and the fusion ot the CDS and the Parti 
Republicain into a new Giscardian umbrella organization, the Union pour la 
Democratie Frangai se (UDF). In the meduim term, the RPR would prove to be 
a poor pole of attraction to various small groups ot left Gaullists who 
had split ot t from the UDR during the 1970s. J-;
In the organization ot the new party, on the other hand, Chirac had 
things more his own way. Already, during his own tenure ot the UDR
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general-secretarship, in the first halt of 1975, he had given a new 
impulsion to party education schools, deliberately taking Communist Party 
practice as a model. From December 1975 onwards, no one could become a 
candidate for elective office, or hold a party post, without having 
attended some training sessions, and during 1977 there was a proliferation 
of stages intended to equip the membership with information and arguments 
on selected topics. Special schools aimed at the needs ot particular 
groups within the membership, such as the departmental secretaries, or 
school-teachers, or party women. There were month-long courses for 
existing members of Parliament, run by professional journalists. At the 
end ot the summer ot 1977 there were halt a dozen week-long sessions which 
each "processed" 15-30 ot the candidates in the forthcoming elections. 
Eighty dossiers were made available by the party research team, headed by 
Alain Juppe. The party broke new ground in French politics by organizing 
correspondance courses, said to have been followed by up to five thousand 
students. 33
All this was accompanied by a sharp rise in membership. In September 
1977, the party claimed 500,000 members. This figure is widely 
disbelieved, but one commentator has put forward a figure of 160,000, 
compared to 60-70,000 tor the UDR in the early 1970s. Taking into account 
the inevitable exaggeration by party sources, and the difficulties arising 
from the fact that the UDR was notoriously inefficient in collecting dues, 
most commentators are agreed that party membership as a whole had 
certainly been doubled, if not tripled by the end of 1978. There is also 
agreement that the RPR in 1977 contained proportionately more women and 
youth than its predecessor. More difficult to assess is the degree to 
which membership ol leading bodies had been renewed by at least 50%, as
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the leadership desired, what is at least clear is that the new-look 
Gaullists now rivalled the Communists as the largest, most disciplined, 
and most centralized party in France.
Despite the rhetoric about the renewal of the Gaullist inspiration 
coming from the people, it seemed clear to outsiders that the new 
organization was a 'machine' constructed for the purpose of winning 
elections. To reduce this task to its simplest dimensions, Gaullism would 
now have two things it had never had before; a detailed programme which 
could serve as an arm of cornbat for the activists in their constituencies, 
and a leader directly elected by a mass ot the membership, several 
thousand of whom crowded into a congress hall in Paris in December 1976 to 
annolnt Jacques Chirac as their official presidential contender.
19/6-61, Junior Partners in the Coalition.
Chirac had been replaced as Prime Minister by Raymond Barre, a 
university professor ot economics whose past career included brief 
membership of the RPF in the 1950s and a post at the European Commission 
in Brussels. The choice of a non-political figure corresponded to 
Giscard’s ideal ot a de-politicized and pluralistic society, but it also 
served to paper over the cracks in the coalition, making it easier for a 
number ot Gaullists to continue in government.
By March 1977, Barre tound himself subject, just like Chirac bet ore 
him, to Poniatowski*s sniping and behind-the-scenes short-circuiting ot 
his policy. Unlike Chirac, he sought out the President, demanded an 
explanation, and effectively refused to continue while Poniatowski held 
otiice. fo cover the implicit abandonment ot his eternal right-hand man, 
Giscard arranged with Barre that, as well as Poniatowski, the two other 
members ot the government with the rank ot Minister ot State should also
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step down, The unlucky pair who paid the price tor this personal bickering 
were Oliviet Guichard and Jean Leeanuet. ~:'B Neither ever again held 
ministerial office. Guichard, who became the ever-present critic ot Chirac 
in the ranks of the Gaullist deputies, was replaced as Minister of Justice 
and number two in the government by Alain Peyrefitte.
A minister seven times under de Gaulle and Pompidou, and made general 
secretary ot the UDR by the latter during the period ot preparation tor 
the 1973 legislative elections, Peyrefitte had devoted his time to writing 
since Chirac's "takeover" ot the UDR in 1974, and was said to have 
impressed Giscard with his most recent book, Le Mai Frangais. 3f' He and 
V’von Bourges, at Defence, headed a list ot nine other Gaullists who stayed 
on in Barre1s government.
Having previously had the duty ot trying to channel the instincts ot 
the most orthodox ot the Gaullist tactions, led by Debre, into some kind 
of constructive reorientation ot Giscardian policy, Chirac now threw in 
his lot with them, and soon ran into conflict with the 1 Gallo-Giscardians* 
who had remained in office, the man in the middle was Claude Labbe, leader 
ot the RPR group in the Assembly both before and after 1976.
The first issue, outside Parliament, which soured relations between 
the two wings of the coalition, was the campaign for the Paris Town Hall, 
which ended in March 1977 with Chirac's election as Mayor and defeat for 
Giscard's preferred candidate, Michel d*Ornano. With the battle of Paris 
won, many Gaullists thought that the RPR ought to adopt a policy ot loyal 
collaboration with the Giscard-Barre governments. But this was acceptable 
neither to the Debre group, nor to Chirac himself. From 1977-61 he created 
many difficulties tor himself within his own party by his strident public 
criticisms of the President, the prime minister and their policies.
The government's decision that French representatives in the European 
Parliament be chosen by direct election came before the National Assembly 
for ratification in June 19/7. The RPR deputies were split three ways 
between those who supported the government, those who were relatively 
indifferent, and some 30-40 led by Debre, who were opposed at any price. 
The government eventually carried the bill by making it an issue of 
contidence.
For Chirac the situation became much more serious with the so-called 
Appel de cochin of 6th December 1978, which he composed in his bed in the 
Cochin hospital after a car accident. This document, the RPR manifesto tor 
the forthcoming contest, rehearsed the reasons tor Gaullist opposition to 
the direct elections, which were to take place in June; they would imply 
an increase in the influence of the supranational body twhereas the Debre 
and Chirac stuck rigidly to the general's formula of a Europe des 
Petries), there had not been enough discussion of the problems raised by 
the proposed adhesion of Spain and Portugal, and most ot the Community's 
economic policy was inadequate, apart from the CAP. But the most shocking 
and controversial part ot the Appel was the reference to the Giscardians 
as 'the foreigners' party', le parti de I1etranger, which was the formula 
used by de Gaulle against the Communists during the 1950s.3y
Reaction inside the RPR was no less scandalized than outside. 
Sanguinetti and a number of others announced that they were taking leave 
ot absence from the parliamentary party. Guichard spoke ot une declaration 
peu mesuree, but Peyrefitte launched an attack on Chirac's 'occult 
advisers', Juillet and Garaud, and became involved in a long-running feud 
which soured relations between most of the RPR ministers and the party 
leadership for the next two years. During the campaign a number ot RPR
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deputies openly dissociated themselves from their party's position.
Chirac's handling ot the whole issue was particularly maladroit in 
that the RPR clearly could not avoid standing in the elections in due 
course, they were still lett supporting Barre's government, and the public 
saw the affair as just another slanging match between rivals. On June 10th 
the party duly ran tor the European Parliament separately trorn the UDF, on 
a list headed by the arch anti-European, Debre, entitled Detense des 
Interets de la France en Europe. They inevitably came last ot the big 
tour, with 16,25% to the Giscardians' 27.55%, On the same evening, Chirac 
drew some conclusions, and informed both Juillet and Garaud, with whom he 
had had an intimate working relationship since the days ot Pompidou's 
cabinets at Matignon, that he would no longer require their services.
Nevertheless, his onslaught on Barre's economic policies was almost 
as destructive ot party unity. Soon at ter leaving the government, Chirac 
had announced a strategy ot 'permanent war' against the Giscard-Barre 
strategy ot gentle growth, moderate inflation and creeping unemployment. 3 * 
The main practical result of the continual series ot RPR amendments to 
government projects was to oblige Barre to make one alter another an issue 
ot confidence. The highpoint ot the campaign was in March 1979 when Chirac 
led the RPR in calling tor an extraordinary session of Parliament devoted 
to debates on the government's policies on employment and information. In 
this, he was energetically supported by the Communists and Socialists, a 
source of embarrassment to the RPR ministers and not a few deputies.
There was already tension between party headquarters and the RPR 
deputies, who complained that their traditional role of elaborating p>olicy 
3n specialist areas such as health, defence and agriculture was being 
usurped by a team of young technocrats installed at the rue de Lille. On
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March 5th Yves Guana, who, as the last general secretary ol the UDR, had 
acted as a loyal Chiraquian in smoothing the transition to the RPR in 
1976, resigned his membership ot the Conseil Politique in protest at the 
attacks on Giscard and at the leadership's failure to consult the deputies 
adequately before announcing policy. ,:l ' Undeterred, Chirac devoted a series 
of press interviews to explaining the case for a Keynsian-type reflation, 
import controls and government direction of investment funds.
This official line was contested in the press by two senior Gaullist 
figures, Guichard, and Aibin Chalandon, a former general secretary ol the 
RPF and minister under de uaulle who had since made a career in banking 
and industry. Chalandon's front page article in le Monde on 2nd October 
1979 was an undisguised critique ot the policies currently being pressed 
by his leader, and an argument tor the reduction ot the role ot the state 
in economic policy. Guichard's article,A's appearing on the front page ot 
the same newspaper at the end of the month, tried to get to grips with 
some more technical problems, ana, unlike Chalandon, implicitly accepted 
the need tor an industry policy. But both former ministers expressed 
their respect for prime minister Barre' a "tenacity, clarity, and spirit 
of responsibility", which was not exactly the message their party leader- 
wanted to get across.
A little over a year later, Chirac would make a lot of their 
proposals his own in the 1961 Presidential election campaign. Despite this 
conversion, however, right up until the election the party officially, 
through the mouths of Chirac, general secretary Bernard Pons, and Jean 
Mea, the expert on economic and social policy, never ceased to lambast 
Giscard's and Barre's policies. Time and again, they repeated that if 
Giscard continued on the same path he would have no chance of being re-
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elected. A minority, led by Peyrefitte, and consisting essentially oi most 
of the Gaullist ministers and their friends, openly declared their support 
tor Giscard.
Throughout 1980, however, the only Gaullist who announced that he 
would be a candidate tor the Eiysee against Giscard was Michel Debre. The 
6/-year— old Debre did not exactly break with Chirac for any doctrinal 
reasons, but regarded hrnself as the more uncompromising defender ot the 
faith, and better able to rally all ot the disparate Gaullist movement. 
Relations between Chirac and Debre, and especially between their 
entourages, became more and more strained as the year advanced, and Chirac 
refused to rule himself out of the race. (He eventually declared his 
candidature in February 1981.) This conflict, superimposed on that between 
the party and the Gallo-Giscardians, muddied yet further the pool of 
ideas, personalities and options from which Chirac and his friends would 
in due course fish the RPR version of economic liberalism.
1'he Socialists in Power, 1981-86.
In the first ballot ot the 1981 Presidential election Giscard and 
Chirac together out polled the left; Giscard was comfortably ahead with 
28.31% of votes cast, and Chirac, with 17.99% had the satisfaction ot 
beating the Communist into fourth place, effacing his party's lamentable 
showing in the European election two years previously. But the second 
ballot on 10th May revealed the price paid for their tour years ol public 
feuding. Giscard picked up an additional six and a half million votes, but 
Francois Mitterrand overhauled him with more than a million to spare, 
having gathered all the Lett's first ballot votes, and some ot Chirac's as 
wel 1.
In the June parliamentary elections which followed Mitterrand's
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Immediate dissolution, the RPR was well-placed to take the leadership oi 
the coalition; Giscard’s temporary retirement deprived the UDF 
simultaneously ot a single recognized leader ot national stature, and ot 
the 'cement' which would hold together the disparate ideological 
tendencies ot the federation. Even more important, the two parties had 
agreed on a single first ballot candidacy in two thirds ot the 
constituencies. From this the RPR, with more outgoing members who would 
become candidates by right, derived a built-in advantage, which was 
reinforced by their superior party organization. In the event these 
differences were put in perspective by the unprecedented Socialist 
landslide, which gave them 25/ seats in the new Assembly, a crushing 
majority over all parties, with the RPR on 55 and the UDF on 62.
At ter the two elections Chirac gave a long interview to Le Monde 
in which he spelled out his interpretation ot the result, and his plans 
for the future, indicating a desire to ’recentralize' the party on the 
political stage, after the attempts by both its enemies and friends to 
classify it on the right. In his view the defeat was not due to any 
particular decisions taken by Giscard, nor to the RPR-UDF rivalry, but 
simply to the wear and tear of office, and the Right’s "inadaptation to 
the evolution of society". To remedy this, he planned a rejuvenation and 
renewal of the party ranks, serious proposals for social reform, to be 
expressed in a new language, greater attentiveness to the needs of the 
electorate, a better understanding with the UDF, and greater openness 
towards other tendencies. An indication that a rather long-term "rethink" 
of policy was envisaged was the plan to create a new club de ret lexioni to 
build on the support from non-political sources tor the ideas raised by 
Chirac in the Presidential campaign. It would be led by two RPR loyalists, /
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Alain Juppe and Michel Aurillac, but it would have separate offices and , 
would not be a part of the of ficial Gaullist movement.
The first major party event after the defeat was the Assises 
Nationales, or party congress, in January 1982. Observers noted a change 
of atmosphere from previous such occasions. There were no giant pictures 
of de Gaulle, Pompidou, or even Chirac, no croix de Lorraine, and on the 
podium sat none of the revered old Gaullists, only the present party 
functionaries. Only one of the 'histories' made a speech, and others, such 
as Couve, Messmer, Guichard, and Guena could be seen mingling with the 
rank and file. Chaban and Debre were not even present. M';r
i he new slogan was nation, liberie, prog res. Although some commentators'*'3
thought that 'liberty' was now the dominant value, still Chirac's keynote
speech struck a note ot ambiguity with passages which would not have been
out ot place in a social-democratic party;
we are for the liberation ot the productive
forces... because we believe that efficiency, creation,
growth depend above all on initiative and
responsibility. It is not the state which produces the
wealth ot a nation; its role is only to collect part
of it in order to redistribute it and correct
i n j u s t i c e .  ,;l
Subsequently, although the party never denied the principle of social 
solidarity, they did not dwell on the merits of redistribution.
Meanwhile, the Socialists had begun pushing some sweeping reforms 
through Parliament. By raid-1982 they had passed the nationalization law 
which would result in the state controlling virtually all of French 
banking and insurance, 79% of steel, 75% of synthetic fibres, 74% of arms 
production, 71% of iron mining and processing, 42% of consumer 
electronics, and 34% of information technology. Ba The Right did all in 
their power to oppose this extension ol the state sector by sniping in the
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National Assembly, and by a referral to the constitutional court. They 
would have done this even It the RPR had not been launched on a 
reappraisal of its philosophy. What was new, and announced by Chirac tor 
the first time at the RPR's extraordinary Congress in January 19b3, was 
that when returned to power they would re-examine all nationalizations, 
even those dating trorn the liberation. "'1
It a set piece confrontation over nationalization had been 
predictable when the left won the elections, the event which worked most, 
powerfully to reinforce unity and confidence on the right was something ot 
a gitt. This was the proposed loi Savary intended as a step towards the 
Socialists' ideal ot a single national edcational system. In 1984, 
protests by parents in defence ot catholic education and by unions in 
defence ot existing conditions and financial arrangements were joined by 
the right-wing parties and turned into the most massive demonstrations, up 
to a million strong, seen in France since the Liberation. “  These events 
made it all the more plausible to present other Socialist measures as 
attacks on freedom. Thes included the reduction ot the age of retirement, 
the rather ham-fisted introduction ot the 39-hour week, and the lois 
Auroux which obliged employers to negotiate with their employees annually 
and to keep them informed of their firms' economic health.
The rebirth of co-operation between the mainstream right-wing parties 
was helped by their common assumption ot an all-embracing defence of les 
liberies against anything which seemed to threaten them, and by a certain 
re-drawing of their own organizational boundaries. The defeated President 
did not feel it appropriate to return immediately to day-to-day politics, 
and he was upstaged in ins own Parti R&publicain by its young president, 
Frangois Leotard, and in the UDF federation as a whole by Raymond Barre,
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who was quietly building a network ot personal supporters which would form 
the basis tor his presidential candidature in 1 9 8 8 . Differences over 
Europe were buried as the RPR and UDF contested the 1954 European 
elections on a the same platform with a joint iist of candidates headed by 
a former Giscardian minister, Simone Veil.
Within the RPR the ecumenical mood and an unaccustomed
intellectualism were fostered by the Club *89. Founded in September 1981,
by the following May it claimed 30 provincial sections, and was able to
organize a banquet for 1, 700 at which Toubon defined its mission to
contribute to the intellectual and cultural renewal 
which will help the opposition to win the next 
elections,
while Chirac took the opportunity to paint with a very broad brush his
conception of a ’new humanism* which would reconcile economic liberalism
and the Gaullists' traditional moral sense. Referring to Gide, Camus,
Giucksmann and Le Roy Ladurie, he appealed for a new order in which
society must become more just but without sacrificing 
treedom. . . The new humanism is not a woolly philosophy, 
it's not an archeo-liberalism which lets everyone do 
as he wants. We must have a code of conduct, a law 
which marks the dividing line between social good and 
social evil. We must have a State which incarnates the 
rule of law, and which controls the means of enforcing 
respect for the dividing line. ~,s
In February 1955, Club *69 held its convention rationale, to which 
Chirac and Giscard made speeches, while Barre sent a message which was 
read by one ot his lieutenants.^' In early summer, the follow-up to this 
meeting was the return invitation ot the Giscardian Clubs Perspectives et 
Pealites to Club '89. This time ail three ot the heavyweights were 
present. Billed as the Convention Liberale, the occasion was turned into a 
big media event, where the parties ot the Right were able to congratulate
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themselves on * une irapr essionante convergence de pensee'*before the 
parliamentary elections, which were now less than 12 months away.
As the Socialists' unpopularity mounted, it had long been thought 
that the elections ot March 1986 would result in an easy victory for the 
Right, out as the day drew near this was thrown into doubt by the 
Socialists’ unexpected resurgence in the polls and by the stabilization ot 
a regular 10% share ot voting intentions by the Front National. The first 
of these two developments was helped by the withdrawal ot the Communist 
party from the governmental coalition, and by the tirnely replacement ot 
Pierre Mauroy as prime minister by the younger Laurent Fabius, who was 
less associated in the public mind with previous ideological battles. The 
RPR countered by replacing its own veteran general secretary, Bernard 
Pons, with the 43-year-old Jacques Toubon at the end ot 1984.
As for the Front National, this party had progressively improved its 
showing at a series of municipal and by-elections since 1983, culminating 
in an average 10% in the 1984 Europeans, a significant national success, 
tor which some blamed the erosion ot differences within the mainstream 
Right.“  Accordingly, from 1984 to 1986 there was friction within the RPR 
on the correct attitude to take towards the FN. But, as we show in the 
next chapter, on this issue the leadership avoided making itself a butt 
tor the criticisms ot one section ot the party, as it had done with its 
attitude to Giscard and Europe, the Right were particularly critical of 
the Socialists for their decision (in conformity with their published 
programme) to change the French electoral system from a majorltarian to a 
proportional one in time tor the 1986 contest, which made it certain that 
the FN would gain seats and possibly threaten the RPR-UDF's ability to 
gain an overall majority. As it turned out, the FN gained some 35 seats,
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but the second danger was narrowly averted. The RPR (145.) and UDF (129) 
together with 14 independent conservatives, totalled 288 seats, a majority 
ot two over all other parties. With this mandate they set about 
implementing their liberal programme.
Conclusions
During the 1960s and early 1970s the Gaullists underwent a number of 
sharp internal conflicts as they tried to shake free of the head ot 
state's patronage and develop into an autonomous political party.
The expulsion ot the party's left wing by Pompidou resulted from a 
conflict over policy. From the mid-1970s onwards, however, policy 
conflicts were overlaid by personal ones, in that Chirac's takeover of the 
UDR and his foundation ot the RPR in 19/6 were interpreted by his party 
rivals as manouevres in the service ot personal ambition rather than as a 
strategy aiming at the victory ot his ideas. The personal conflicts were 
exacerbated by the party's ambiguous position from 19/6 to 1981, in 
opposition to the state President, but half in and halt out ot government.
It was only after 1981 that the party as a whole - in opposition tor 
the first time in a generation - was faced with the task ot closing ranks 
and developing a programme, or at least a strategy, which could lead to a 
set urn to power as soon as possible, Opposition to the Socialists, and 
sympathy tor the contrasting policies pursued in the USA and the UK, 
seemed to point in the direction ot liberalism. In the next chapter, we 
consider how the RPR's organizational features, partly inherited from the 
past and overlaid with past conflicts, and partly newly invented, affected 
the way it faced up to the new challenge.
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Chapter 4 Organization and Power
In Chapter i we suggested that political parties are complex 
organizations, whose strategy may be derived from many points ot contact 
to the wider society, and influenced by rivalries within and between party 
bodies with more or less institutional power. In this chapter we focus on 
the party’s internal life. We describe the formal structure ot the RPR and 
attempt to pin-point where power lies by examining a number ot cases ot 
inner-party conflict which occurred during the period 1978-86.
In the first section we show how elements ot the party's structure 
have their origins in the old UDR's role as parliamentary "cannon fodder'* 
tot de Gaulle. Only when lie departed trorn the scene did the party 
gradually recognize that representative institutions would help it to 
assert a degree ot autonomy against the dictates ot the new President, 
Georges Pompidou. This movement was distorted by the foundation ot the RPR 
in 1976 with a populist constitution which allowed the party leader to use 
his support among the mass ot the rank and file as a counterweight to the 
party committees and other notables.
In the second section we describe the role ot the party president's 
personal advisers, especially those grouped at the Paris town hall, who 
sometimes acted as a screen between the leader and the party and sometimes 
as rivals oi the headquarters officials, whose functions we outline in the 
third part ot the chapter.
Fourthly, we turn to the parliamentary party, enumerating the 
occasions when the deputies have resisted dragooning by the leadership, 
sometimes succeeding in Influencing party policy as a result. The final 
part ot the chapter is devoted to a comparison ot the effective influence
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wielded by these different sources ot power in the party.
The Search for Autonomy, and the Constitution ot the RPR
During the Gaullists' years ot power nothing illustrated better both 
the government's grip on the UDR and the ramshackle party 'structure* than 
the articles (28 and 29) of the statutes which specified the composition 
of the Central Committee, the sovereign decision-making body, (Table 4. 1)1
Table 4. 1
Composition of the UDR Central Committee in 1973 
The prime minister
All former Gaullist prime ministers
A minister of the day, designated by the prime minister
The president and former presidents of the National 
Assembly
The presidents of the two Gaullist parliamentary groups
40 deputies or senators, elected by their peers
10 members elected directly by the party congress
23 members elected by specially mandated delegates of the 
regions, also at party congress
A number ot members co-opted "with regard to their 
competence or their standing", up to a limit ot 15% of the 
total of the elected or ex officio members.
The UDR also had a Bureau Execut.it whose mode of selection reflected 
the domination of a virtually self-perpetuating elite. Half its 36 members 
were ex officio, owing their places to their status as deputies, senators, 
former prime ministers, or holders of some other post in the state or 
Gaullist hierarchy, ihe other 18 were elected by the Central Committee,
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doubtless alter suitable consultation with the 'permanent- members. The ex 
oificio element in these two leading committees effectively ensured that 
power stayed firmly within the small area of Paris bounded by the National 
Assembly* the prime minister's office and party headquarters, while the 
modest number of elected members provided enough sops to buy off the 
opposition ot any outsiders wanting to rock the boat. In 1974 the 
parliamentary groups forced a partial breach in this cosy arrangement when 
the composition of the Bureau Executif was changed so that 9 ex officio 
members and 9 elected by the CC taced a further 9 elected from among their 
own number by the deputies and senators.
Demands for more party democracy had been containable as long as de 
Gaulle remained to exert his all-class electoral appeal. But soon after 
Pompidou's election as President there were some among the rising 
generation who suspected that the rank and tile membership were beginning 
to articulate aspirations tor social progress which the establishment did 
not share. i: In discussion prior to the party congress in 1971, voices
were raised to ask whether it was not now time tor the party to elect its 
own president, democratize its structure and debate policy.3 Jacques 
Chirac, minister responsible for relations with parliament, put. the 
establishement' s view: the President of the Republic is our leader, even 
if his official function prevents him identifying himself with a political 
party. A
During 1973 and 19/4, however, Pompidou was visibly seriously ill, 
and hie new prime minister, Pierre Messmer, never succeeded in 
establishing his popularity in the opinion polls. Realizing that a leader 
with a poor image risks dragging his party down with him, & some prominent 
party members began to call for the UDR to be 'restructured',
(Sanguinetti), or to rise above its purely electoral function 
<Peyretitte). *
As general secretary, Sanguinetti organized an opinion poll in 1974 
of both party members and the 'man in the street*, in order to find out 
what the members arid electors thought about the image and prospects ot the 
UDR. The most salient finding was that the party was seen as leaderless, 
and therefore condemned to inevitable decline. 71 But there were also 
demands for a new party title, for the departmental secretaries and the 
general secretary himself to be subject to election by the inemernbership, 
for changes in the way deputies were represented in the party deliberative 
bodies, and for a reduction in the large number of ex-officio positions in 
the hierarchy.*3
The leadership responded with a new set of statutes, ratified by the 
party congress at Nice in June 1975, which increased the proportion ot 
elected to non-elected members on the three existing deliberative bodies, 
and spelled out the rights and duties ot the 95 fedSrationsi the units 
which correspond to the essential unit ot French local government, the 
department. The federations' domain was defined as being the electoral 
problems and internal affairs ot the movement; all applications for 
membership had to pass through the federal committee; the federations 
alone had the right to communicate with the national centre, and they had 
the right to call regional conferences, with the consent ot the central 
committee. •' The post of federal secretary did not become elective, 
however, remaining subject to appointment by the general secretary, 
himself designated by the party's central committee, a body now containing 
slightly more than 50% of elected members. 10
The incremental changes ot the years 1970-76, then, which spanned the
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death ot the founding father and the movement’s loss oi the state 
presidency, had seen a partial democratization of the Gaullist movement. 
Jacques Chirac’s resignation as prime minister in August 1976, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, led to an altogether more dramatic rupture with the old 
forms of organization.
In the UDR, legitimacy was inherited from personal contact with the 
general; in the RPR in theory it belongs to the mass membership, and 
behind them, to the voters. In the UDR, power belonged to a ramshackle
Table 4.2
Power of the Party President in the RPR Constitution. 1976 
Leads the Rassemblement
Takes the chair at meetings of the national deliberative 
bodies
Ensures the execution of their decisions
Represents the Rassembiement in all political events or 
situations
Appoints the general secretary
Appoints the members ot tire Executive Committee, on the 
proposal of the general secretary
Defines the size of the Executive Committee, and the 
functions of its members, in consultation with the general 
secretary
Appoints directly to the Political Committee an unlimited 
number of members of his own choice
May propose candidates for election to the Central 
Committee (approx 2b0 members)
May appoint directly to the National Council, (approx.
1,000 members), whomever he likes, in accordance with 
their competence and their national reputation.
majority among the historic elite; in the RPR, power is vested in the 
party president and an appointed executive committee.
The functions ot the RPR president are defined in article 23 ot the 
statutes (table 4 . 2 1 ' Like his UDR predecessor, the RPR general- 
secretary directs the work of the Executive Committee, appoints all 
departmental secretaries (subject to ratification by the tedreal 
committees; and appoints, where the need arises, a number ot regional 
charges ae mission. The duo ot president and general secretary, provided 
they get along well together, therefore represent, along with their 
appointed executive committee, an enormously powerful core executive with 
the party's system of government.
As for the rights ot the grass-roots members, the 1976 statutes made 
a number of changes to the status ot the local party organizations, some 
ot which were in the direction ot democratization, while others were the 
reverse. Among the first kind was that the post ot secretary ot the 
constituency parties, the unit below the federation, was made elective tor 
the first time, l'he federations lost their monopoly control ot 
communication with the centre, and of membership applications, which could 
now be made at any higher or lower level, even to workplace groups (which 
it was intended would be revitalized and grouped in the so-called Action 
Quvri&re et Pratessionnelle).
It these changes could be seen as a welcome treeing of grass-roots 
party life from the strangle-hoid oi networks ot local notables, there 
were other ominous signs. The federations were no longer allowed a role in 
the calling of regional conferences. Although they retained the right to 
ratify the centre's choice ot their departmental secretary, this was in 
effect no more than a right oi veto, The centre now had the right to
remove - without appeal - even those secretaries which their local members 
felt were doing a good job. (This was in line with Chirac's ambition to 
ensure the replacement ot at least 50% ot all departmental secretaries who 
had been appointed betore 1974.) As tor the newly elective constituency 
secretaries, in the 1976 statutes these were subject to arbitrary 
dismissal by the departmental secretary, but in 1978 an amendment to the 
statutes increased central control even more; the prerogative ot sacking 
the duly elected constituency secretary no longer belonged to the next 
highest rung in the hierarchy, but was transferred to the general 
secretary himself. 1 -;-:
In short, the members may elect, their constituency committees, and they 
have a role in electing the departmental committee (two-thirds elected), 
but the secretaries, the executive officers of these grass-roots units, 
are strictly controlled by the centre.
We have not yet reached the heart of the 1976 statutes' conception of 
inner-party democracy, however, for the RPR*s great innovation in this 
field was to expand the role of the mandated delegate, imandataire). There 
are two kinds of mandataire - some ex officio, and some elected by the 
grass-roots members,
the first kind are members of Parliament, of the Conseil Economique 
et Social (CES), or outgoing members ot the Central Committee. In 
exercising their chief function, that ot electing the party president, the 
ex ot'ficio mandat aires are always swamped by those elected from the grass 
roots. Each federation has a right to a certain number of mandataires, 
which are attributed as a result ot two different calculations, one of the 
number of members in the federation, and the other ot their number of 
locally elected councillors. At the first and founding congress of the
RPR, held in Paris on December 5th 1976, Charles Pasqua had managed to 
organize some 14,000 ol these mandataires, out ot fifty thousand members 
present, 10
The mandataires' other main responsibility is to elect, at the 
congress, 100 members to the new Central Committee, who then form that 
traction ot the committee known as elected 'on the national list', as well 
as another /0 or so on the so-called "regional list', whose nomination 
emanates from the party's regional organizations. From time to time the 
mandataires may be asked to do other jobs, such as endorsing the party's 
presidential candidate.
The grass roots elect the party president, then, and they have a role 
in electing a portion ot the Central Committee, (officially the sovereign 
decision-making body of the party). On paper these are large steps in the 
direction of democratization, But the delegates cast their votes at a 
week-end outing, in an atmosphere of warm emotional solidarity induced by 
rabble-rousing speeches, drum-beating, flag-waving, and the close physical 
proximity of fifty thousand fellow members. They often have only a vague 
Idea ot the ideas and achievements of those tor whom they are voting. The 
candidates who regularly top the poll in the Central Committee elections 
are singers, sportsmen or other entertainers. 1A
This applies in a magnified way to the leadership election. The 
relationship between leader and members in the RPR mirrors traditional 
Gaullist populism. As in the general's referenda, there is no other choice
but tor or against, there is no room in the RPR for 'yes, but...... ’ The
members are not asked to initiate, to debate, or to lead; these things 
will be done tor them. They are expected to execute, to endorse, and to 
t ol iow.
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For many years the system seemed to work to perfection. In 1976* 
Jacques Chirac was elected p a r t y  president by an overwhelming 96% ot the 
mandated delegates; his candidature for the presidency oi the Republic was 
endorsed by similar huge majorities at extraordinary national congresses 
in i981 and 1986. 1a Should Chirac's decisions ever be questioned by 
colleagues in the hierarchy, he could always point to his popular mandate 
as a crushing final argument. For their part, the RPR activists, alone in 
France in having a share in the designation of their party's presidential 
candidate, had political issues simplified for them, had their fanatical 
loyalty to Chirac reinforced, and got a tremendous boost from the feeling 
of belonging to a solidly united movement. It was subject to this rather 
large constraint that the party's representative committees accomplished 
their assigned tasks.
fhe Central Committee is a body which the RPR inherited from the UDR. 
In 1976, as we have seen, it surrendered to the party president the right 
to designate the general-secretary, out remained formally very powerful.. 
According to the RPR's 1976 statutes (article 24); "Following the 
directives laid down by the national congress or extraordinary congress, 
the Central Committee is in overall charge of the movement and takes all 
decisions which the circumstances may require." On the recommendation 
ot the general-secretary, the Central Committee may decree the dissolution 
oi a federation or constituency party. It meets at least once a year, when 
called by the president.
The composition ot the Central Committee in 1976 is shown in table 
4.3. (The Political Committee, whose members sat by right, is a smaller 
policy-discussion committee ot variable size which we deal with in a 
moment. ) In 19/8 an amendment to the statutes made ex ofilcio places open
to all deputies and senators, and ail departmental secretaries* This had 
the eitect ot increasing the overall size ot the Central Committee from 
266 to 4d2, if one counts 95 departmental secretaries, 153 deputies, and 
just 28 senators (1977 had been a bad year in the senatorial elections) 
and it increased the representation of the group who were always likely to 
be the most articulate and independent, the parliamentarians. 17
In 1976 they had 60 ot 266 members, or 22%; in 1978 they had 181 of 
482, or 37.5% In 1981, ot course, the Socialist victory at the polls 
decimated the RPR group in the National Assembly. The 88 deputies and 44 
senators now made up exactly 30% of a Central Committee ot 
430.10
Table 4. 3
Composition of the Central Committee, 1976 
Ail members ot the Political Committee
the iOO members elected on the national list at the party 
congress
/0 members elected (also at the national congress) on the 
regional list, in proportion to the number of constituency 
parties in each region
60 members oi Parliament, elected by their groups, in the 
proportion oi 6 deputies to one senator
In 1984, more amendments to the party statutes opened up Central 
Committee membership ex officio to all Euro-MP's, (20), all regional 
councillors (373), and, tor good measure, former general secretaries of 
the Gaullist movement, if there were any who somehow did not have a 
mandate on any other count. This brought the total up to a possible 831,
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but the actual figure would have been leas than that, given the large 
number ot people who would have qualified under more than one head. In 
size the Central Committee now resembled the old UDR Conseil National, a 
collection of notables numbering about 1,000. But that body was always 
merely advisory, while the RPR's Central Committee in 1984 was still 
formally decision-making. From that date, it was no longer the 
parliamentarians, but the regional councillors who formed the largest 
single group, but clearly there is no sense in which such an amorphous 
group could form a blocking minority.
These calculations imply that the Central Committee was hardly likely
to have played a crucial role in policy making. It has certainly never
operated as a representative decision-making body. In theory it meets over
two days, with the first day devoted to discussions in six standing
committees, but already in the 1970s it met in practice lor only a few
hours at a time to listen to speeches before voting unanimously for the
resolutions drawn up by the leadership. One member confided to an American
researcher that he didn't bother to attend any more for he preferred to
sleep at home. 1 ' More recent conversations with Central Committee members
con! ii rn the lack ot internal debate.
Its just rhetorical tor us. Its a shame. But the 
Central Committee is tactical when its a question ot 
the distribution of power, its rhetorical for anything 
connected with ideas, and it has no practical 
inf luence.
Some younger deputies expressed disappointment at the prostration ot 
the grass-roots federations whose influence was "more or less zero".
Others accept it as a matter of course. Yves Guena, though he resigned 
from the Political Committee in 1979, and lost his parliamentary seat in 
1981, remained a member of the Central Committee, and president of his
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federation, the Dordogne. Nevertheless, at the end of 1981, he decided to
set up his own political club, the Club Perikles,
because I wanted to have ray own means of putting ray 
ideas across, given that, in the central Committee, 
you don' t have much chance of doing anything.
Guena explicitly compares the operation of the RPR Central Committee
and that ot the French Communist party, quoting with approval the
judgement of the historian Philippe Robrieux;
There are three types ol members. There are those who
know, and therefore keep quiet. There are those who
know that they don't know, and are prudent enough to
keep quiet. And there are those who don't know that
they don' t know, and speak, but it serves no purpose.
Well in the RPR its the same, its what you'd expect;
its the same in every party. ^
These members versions of the low level of genuine debate at CC level 
are echoed by the findings of a group of researchers from Grenoble who 
interviewed over 2,000 delegates when the National Congress was held there
in 1984, and found that only 6. 5% claimed to have spoken during trie
proceedings. ":,J
The 1976 statutes changed the old UDR's Bureau Executif into the 
Conseil Pol itque. Article 31 states that, "The Political Committee assists
the president. It meets at his request. The resolutions or recommendations
which it thinks useful to make are transmitted to the Central Committee by
the president."^-' The ex officio members remained at 9; these were the
president hirnsell, the other 5 surviving former Gaullist prime 
m i n i s t e r s , t h e  two heads of the parliamentary groups, and the party 
general-secretary. In addition, 15 members were to be elected by the 
Central Committee and an unlimited number appointed personally by the 
president.
In practice the Political Committee was often called in conjuction
with the bureau oi the parliamentary group, and frequently shortly before 
a meeting ot the Central Committee. As it had no executive role Chirac had 
no incentive to ”pack" it, and when it was working well he was able to use 
it as a sounding board to keep him in touch with feeling in different 
sections ot the party. -'-7 His personal nominees tor the first Political 
Committee numbered 12, ot whom 9 were parliamentarians. At least tour, 
Andre Bord, Yves Guena, Georges Gorse and Jean de Lipkowski had at some 
stage been connected with the left, and could thus balance up the former 
prime ministers, most of whom had not.-26*
fhe status ot the Political Committee remained unchanged for the next 
eight years. In November 1984 it was suppressed and replaced by a new 
body, the Bureau Politique. The president's personal nominees were 
abolished, and the number elected by the Central Committee rose from 15 to 
20. The party treasurer was added to the list of those with an automatic 
right to a seat, but the number remained at 9 because, among the former 
prime ministers, Edgar Faure had left the RPR by 1984 (and has since 
died). 29
The democratization ot the old Political Committee came after a 
period ot agitation by what the press called a group oi ’young Turks’ 
within the party led by Alain Juppe and Jacques Toubon. The impression ot 
a victory tor the forces vives was reinforced when Toubon at the same time 
replaced Pons as secretary-general. The new body also found favour with 
some ot the old guard. Early in 1985 le Monde reported that Chaban Delmas 
and Debre, who both had reasons for bitterness at Chirac's past actions, 
would be attending meetings, having for many years boycotted the party's 
leading committees. Toubon even announced that the Bureau Poli tique would 
have a mote decisive role than its predecessor. Instead ot being merely
consultative, it would "define the movement's actions, and take decisions 
to this end.”-'0 There was apparently no intention that the new body would 
encroach on the Central. Committee’s sovereignty, however; the latter body 
was still referred to as the organe de direct ion du mouvement in a 1988 
party hand-out. It was not likely, on the other hand, that a 29-member 
body meeting infrequently could act as a working executive, especially 
when an appointed executive committee based at the party head office 
existed at the same time.
The Party President's Advisers
The decision to launch the RPR was taken on 29th August 1976 at a 
meeting attended by Jacques Chirac, Pierre Juillet, Marie-France Garaud, 
Jerome Monod, and Jacques Friedman. Chirac had so tar pursued his rather 
controversial career with such obvious relish, and his close associates 
were so little known to the public, that French observers have often been 
unable to resist the image of a highly strung political animal, and his 
handlers or trainers. 31 The journalists who wrote the story of the 
transition from the UDR to the RPR referred to a closely knit cellule 
poiitique who took all the key decisions. In English, the most appropriate 
idiom seems to be the 'kitchen cabinet’.3*
It is part ot the definition of kitchen cabinets that journalists or 
political scientists never find out all there is to know about the 
influence ot this or that individual, when it began or ended, and its 
operation on specific decisions. A study ot their membership should not be 
neglected, however, because it can reveal the unexpected influence of 
people who have no official, role in a party or government.
juillet, who hosted the gathering at his farmhouse in the Creuse, was 
a former resistant arid RPF member. Apart from the Gaullist orthodoxies
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relating to the national destiny* his political views were founded on old- 
style authoritarianism, faith in market forces and an appropriate hatred 
ot trade unions. Since 1962 he had been continuously in Pompidou's 
cabinets, where his slow accumulation ot immense irresponsible power 
encouraged the French press to treat him as the power behind the throne. 
Juillet and Garaud, who also had an office at the Elysee, made a 
particular enemy ot Pompidou's first prime minister, Jacques Chaban 
Delrnas, whom they regarded as a crypto-socialist. 3:3 Sharing with Chirac a 
devotion to Pompidou's memory, they had helped him to set up the Appel des 
43 which blocked Chaban's presidential chances in 1974. When Giscard 
replaced Pompidou in the presidential palace, both Juillet and Garaud 
immediately transferred their otiices and their allegiance to Chirac and 
Matignon.
Up to .1976, Jer6me Monod had made a successful career as a model 
Gaullist technocrat. Trained at the Ecole Nationale d'Administrationt he 
worked in Debre's prime ministerial cabinet from 1959-62, and thereafter 
spent 10 years as a servant of the state, turning the regime's industrial 
ambitions into reality, especially as director of the powerful regional 
planning body, DATAR (Delegation a 1 *Amenagement du Territoire et A 
1'Action Regidnaie) In i974, he returned to politics as director of 
Chirac's cabinet at Matignon.
Oi the four, Jacques Friedman was the one who had worked most closely 
with Chirac in his successive ministerial cabinets, and who has remained 
closest to him as personal friend and adviser. Soon after the founding 
operation was completed, however, he withdrew from his party role, such as 
it was, and concentrated on a business career in which he has acted as an 
invaluable bridge between Chirac and employers' organizations. :J4
}o this group should be added the names ot Yves Guena and Charles 
Pasqua, two rather different figures with long Gaullist pedigrees. Guena, 
a Breton* joined the free French in London in 1940 at the age ot IS. He 
was a haut tonctionnaire with a long African career and a taste tor 
literature who owed his start in politics to a family connection with 
Michel Debre. 3S F'asqua, son of a policeman* one of Marseille's numerous 
Corsican Immigrants, had a couple ot years in the inaquis, organized for 
the RPF in Provence, and graduated from commercial traveller to marketing 
director during a long career with the firm ot Ricard bet ore founding his 
own business. His reputation was indelibly marked by his creation ot the 
Service d'Action Civique, an organization of strong-arm men originally 
intended to defend de Gaulle's supporters against threatened GAS 
terrorism, but which later degenerated into an all-purpose goon-squad. He 
and Guena did not always see eye to eye.
Chirac's kitchen cabinet did what was necessary to launch a new 
party, including writing the new party's statutes, duly ratified by the 
founding rally of December 1976. 37 In order to emphasize the break with 
the past, Monod became RPR general secretary, with the task of bringing 
modern-style management techniques to bear on party organization. Guena 
accepted the post of d£legu& politique, while Pasqua was content with the 
title ot seeretaire national a l 1animation which he had enjoyed since 
1973.
Monod at least had a clear title and a job to do, and at first he was 
left all the power he needed to get on with it. His collaborator© soon 
realized, however, after a poor showing in a television debate with Michel 
Rocard, that Monod was not the man they needed as a leading spokesman. 
Already by July 1977 Guena had replaced the general secretary as leader of
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the RPR side in the negotiations with the UDF over the choice ot 
candidates tor the impending municipal elections. Meanwhile it was 
Juillet and Garaud, already credited with persuading Chirac to resign as 
'discard's prime minister, who induced him to delcare open war on the 
President by contesting the Paris municipal elections, resulting in his 
installation as mayor in the spring ot 1977. Conscious that his authority
was dwindling away, Monod was ready to resign by the end of the year, but
held back until after the March 19/8 general elections, so as not to 
damage the party's chances.-*'3 His turn to private industry, however, in no 
way weakened, any more than did Friedman's, the value ot the services he 
would be able to render Chirac later on.
The new general secretary was Alain Devaquet, a university research 
scientist who, it was widely recognised, was not old enough and not
abrasive enough to face down the prestige ot a Guena on the one hand, or
counter the subterranean manoeuverings of Pasqua, Juillet and Garaud on 
the other, these now achieved notoriety in the press as "Chirac's occult 
advisers", and by the beginning ot 1979 were regularly referred to as the 
RPR's "gang ot Four. "
By the end ot that year, however, only Pasqua was left. Guena had 
come round to the view ot his parliamentary colleagues, complained that 
the party's attacks on Giscard were far too sharp, and resigned his seat 
on the Political Committee in March in protest at the exclusion ot the 
deputies from the decision-making process. Juillet and Garaud were 
disgraced by the party's disastrous result in the June Euro-elect ion, 
though it is not entirely clear whether their departures were due more to 
their own volition or to Chirac's.*10 Pasqua, in the meantime promoted to 
the rank of assistant general-secret.ary in charge ot organization, was the
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great survivor, In June 1979 he was caught so blatantly by the deputy
Andre Fanion in an entirely gratuitous act ol fraud in the counting of CC
ballots for the Political Coramitte election that Chirac was obliged to
annul the results of the election and order a re-run.41 In October his
name was removed from the party's organigramme. Neverthiess the press 
continued to speculate about his real behind-the-scenes influence, and, 
sure enough, the same Charles Pasqua appeared towards the end ot 1980 in 
charge ot a suite ot oft ices rented tor the staff HQ of the presidential
campaign which Chirac was yet to announce. Clearly he was a man whose
organizing powers were difficult to do without, but at least one of the 
inner circle, Jacques Boyon, who was treasurer of Chirac's 1981 
presidential campaign, describes Pasqua as incomparably the most 
influential of the team as far as ideas were concerned at that time. 4 4 
Among other ways oi fostering his influence, Pasqua made an alliance with 
a number of young proteges who would eventually all become deputies and 
mayors in his own power base, the Hauls de Seine department, which borders 
the west end ot Paris."14 For good measure, he had himself elected to the 
presidency ot the RPR group in the Senate, an exploit which struck some of 
his colleagues as particularly audacious.41’ All in ail Pasqua so carefully 
built his own network ot supporters inside and outside the party, that he
lias almost never been absent from the highest party conclaves, In 1986 he
duly took his place as minister ot the Interior.
On April 11th 1979 a communique announced Chirac's appointment ot a 
new personal * adviser for economic and social affairs' This was Jean Meo, 
a state-trained technocrat who had worked in the oil and newspaper 
industries. From 1974-8 lie was managing-director ol the state-owned 
advertising group, Havas. In the autumn of 1979, Meo became assistant
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secretary-general at the rue de Lille. For two years he would be the
party's main spokesman on economic and social policy, taking charge ot
the party programme Atout France, launched at a press conference in
October 1980.4 r But at the end ot 1981 Meo was thanked tor his services
and rewarded with one ot the party’s seats in the European Parliament,
where he was to deal with ’European economic problems' . He stayed at
Strasbourg only during 1982, however, and the following year was elected
as a Paris councillor, indicating that he was still available tor use by
Chirac in whatever capacity need might dictate.
By this time the Paris town hall had become an important power-base,
which some regarded as the site of Chirac's new kitchen cabinet. It was
the ideai place to accommodate a number of private study groups which the
party president might desire to be set up on any Parisian, national or
even international topic which interested him. Since 1939 the budget tor
councillors’ expenses had been subject to no state auditing procedure, and
was a virtually limitless source of finance for ample research services
including secretaries, telephones and even cars, ■so
Members of the town hall groups talk about them with discretion and a
certain amount of hesitation, but do not disguise the fact that the party
president does not rely on the party alone for the ’ ressourclng’ which
makes his public role possible;
Q. Did you work with M. Chirac at the town hall for a 
while?
A. At the town hall? No. . .not.. . oh, at the town hall 
... not really at the town hall, yes I was part of a 
small personal study group which worked for him on 
local government questions. ... It was in no sense an 
RPR group, it was completely outside. . . The group was 
made up essentially of a tew personal advisers and a 
few people from the town hall.
But at that time, anyway, there was a parallel system 
of study groups. Jacques Chirac has always wanted
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there to be RPR study groups and at the same time more 
personal ones tor himself.*1
Among others, the Paris payroll covered the activities of Robert 
Pandraud, for a while the mayor's nominal directeur de cabinet, but In 
reality the RPR's key contact with all branches of the police. Bernard 
Pons and Daniel Naitalski had charge ot French overseas territories; Jean 
Colonna's tield ot competence included New Caledonia, Corsica, the 
preparation ot the 1986 parliamentary elections, and a study group dealing 
with local government questions. From 1977 to 1984 the Paris information 
director was Denis Baudoin, torrner head of Pompidou's press of t ice; his 
brief extended to the party's and Chirac's global communications 
strategies. In the run-up to the 1986 elections, Maurice Ulrich headed a 
group which mapped out what would be the future government's policy on 
broadcasting. ^
The town hall was not the only place where the RPR president was able 
to find groups of faithful sympathizers organized outside the party 
apparatus to study and advise on questions he might submit to them. He 
also listened to a group ot personal friends, mostly businessmen, who 
themselves preferred not to get involved with party or administrative 
problems. The most influential were generally agreed to be Jacques 
Friedmann and J6r6rne Monod; others included Michel Franpois-Poncet and 
Elie Crespi. 1 Yet another group of businessmen and technocrats, headed by 
Edouard Balladur, spent the months preceeding the March 1986 elections 
drafting the privatization and tax legislation introduced as soon as the 
new government took office. Among the participants were politicians like 
Nicole Catala and Alain Juppe, but the group operated entirely outside the 
official party organization.
Chirac also habitually requested written analyses ot particular 
questions irom individual specialists not connected with study groups. ' 
Finally, the RPR leader is inevitably subjected to a cacophony ot 
unrecorded and unquantitiable verbal advice. Bailadur claimed to see him 
on average twice a week during 1965-6; their conversations covered the 
tull range ot domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as the more 
prosaic questions ot party strategy. Jean Charbonnel, an old lett 
oauilist who had little taste tor Bailadur*s privatizing schemes, tried to 
counter them during fleeting contacts with his party boss at the 
fortnightly meetings ot the consei1-generai of the Correze, ot which they 
were Doth members.
Party Headquarters
For a brief period in 1977, in order to emphasize the break with the 
UDR, the RPR national ortice was situated in the ultra-modern skyscraper, 
the iour Montparnasse. The price ot modernity, measured in physical 
distance from the centre ot power, was soon judged too high however, and 
the party returned to its old buildings in and around 121 rue oe Lille, 
literally next door to the National Assembly. Hence the common 
journalists' shorthand use ot la rue de Lille to refer to the staff, the 
party machine, or simply the general secretary and his closest colleagues.
The first general secretary of the RPR was JerGme Monod, brought in 
tor his competence as an administrator. He held the job only until early 
1978, when he was forced out tor political reasons by other members ot 
Chirac’s entourage. Monod was succeeded by Alain bevaquet, a recent 
recruit with little political experience who from March 1978 to October 
i979 tried in vain to face up to the forces which had removed his 
predecessor. During the first 2-3 years ot the new party’s existence,
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then, the rue ae L i l l e  sheltered a less than closely-knit team.
Devaquet's successor, Bernard Pons, was a completely different 
personality. A hardened veteran of tough electoral battles with the 
Communists in their Limousin stronghold, he was one of those Gaullists 
who, from the beginning, had realized the contradiction between his own 
values and Giscard's 'advanced liberalism'.-’® This conviction, and his 
unconditional loyalty to Chirac, were soon put to use in fustigating the 
President's policies during his numerous tours of the party branches, as 
well as at every available press conference and television programme.
Far more visible than either Monad or Devaquet had been, Pons effectively 
took over a great deal oi the dirty work, and of the consequent 
unpopularity which had devolved on Chirac as the chief party spokesman 
since Guena's departure. There were advantages too, in having this role 
played by Pons rather than by Guena's replacememnt, as aei 4gue politique, 
Claude Labbe, wno was president of the parliamentary group and had to 
preserve a certain minimum of good relations with the Giscardians.
as a political figure, Pons was the ideal general secretary - able,
it need be, to state the party's position himself in response to new or
unexpected circumstances, and never once during his five years tenure 
publicly in conflict with Chirac.**0 Above all, however, Pons has been 
described by those who worked closely with him as a tine team-leader who 
succeeded in inspiring the rank and tile members with whom he came in 
contact, both by his own example of hard and uncomplaining work, and by
his knack ot finding the time to listen to grass-roots problems and
complaints, kAi
Pons was replaced by jacques Toubon in November 1964 when he and his 
friends had convinced Chirac that Pons' prolonged political exposure had
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begun to give him the air ot a has-been whose image compared badly with 
those ot the new, young prime minister, Laurent Radius, and the new, young 
president ot the Republican Party, Francois Leotard.
Toubon was an enarque who had gained profitable experience in 
Chirac's cabinets during the Gauliists' years in power, and had spent the 
first lour years ot the party's existence at the rue de Lille in charge ot 
rhe elections department. He justified the immediate reason tor his 
appointment in that he proved an effective and reasonably sympathetic 
television performer. Toubon is generally considered to have been an awful 
secretary general, however. He was unavailable to the grass roots members, 
usually abused them roundly whenever he aid see them, and was notoriously 
unable to keep his appointments even with his most senior colleagues.4"* 
the structure ot the the head office organization is revealed from 
time to time, usually when there is a change of general secretary and the 
press lists the names and repofisibillties ot those who are to be his most 
important colleagues.^* The first important distinction to make is that 
between the traditional 'services' and the portfolios attributed to 
different oeidgues or charges de mission. The service divisions have 
changed little in ten years. In 1977 they were animation, research 
\etuaes>, elections, communication, press, and membership.'1^ 1 Research 
disappeared altogether from the organigramme in 198.1 when leading party 
members set up the club '89, intending to dream up new policy ideas 
without the inhibitions which sometimes result from too close an 
association with a party.
m e  definition of the political portfolios, unlike the services, has 
varied frequently. The traditional Gaullist preoccupations with war 
veterans, the family, or overseas territories rub shoulders with more
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mainstream policy areas, such as youth, foreign policy, defence. But both 
kinds ot portiolio change hands frequently, and they sometimes share 
office space with more ephemeral and idiosyncratic-sounding departments. '
Some policy areas are divided and regrouped with every re­
organization, Michel Giraud was responsible tor local authorities from the 
beginning ot 19/7 up to October 19/9, when he departed the rue de Lille 
and was succeeded by Jean-Pierre Cassabel. In October 1951 the portfolio's 
title was changed to eius locaux, and Cassabel was obliged to work as 
assistant to Jacques Boyon. The team ot twenty national secretaries formed 
in November 1954 contained no less than three responsible tor this area, 
one for el us locaux, one tor £Ius departementaux and one tor 
decentralization. By 19BB elus departementaux had given way to regional 
ait airs, the same to-ing and tro-ing has gone on in the general area ol 
commerce, artisanat, independent workers, professionals and managers, and 
the traditionally semi-independent Action Ouvriere et Protessionnelle 
<AGP), whose function, since de Gaulle's day, has been to provide a 
transmission beit. into the factories in search of working class recruits.
It is open to the occupants ot these posts how much effort they put 
into them, depending on how interested they are in the subject, whether 
they are paid, what stage they have reached in their career, and so on. 
Sometimes they are mere window-dressing, sometimes they represent 
efficiently existing party views, but they have rarely succeeded in 
elaborating original policy positions.
Only a small group can be said to make a career at head office. These 
are the professionals, without a high political profile, who usually work 
in the services. Mmes Lydie Gerbaud and Marie-Antoinette Isnard ran their 
respective press and public relations offices in the mid-eighties, as they
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had in the mid-seventies. Their colleague Jacqueline Crepy has held the 
pensioners' and handicapped portfolio without interruption from 1977 to 
1988, a teat almost matched by Georges Repeczky, a retired former 
industrial manager who brought his skills to tighten up the AOP 
organization in 1978, and was still there ten years later, after surviving 
a succession ot different bosses with sharper political profiles. From 
1977 to 1954 neither Hubert Buchou nor Jean Mouchel was absent trom the 
staff dealing with agricultural questions. All these are the people who 
perform, away from the limelight, the vital work of keeping records up to 
date and producing newsletters and bulletins on time, without which no 
party can function efficiently.^-'
Another group consists of those who are interested more by ideas than 
by the nuts and bolts ot party organization. In this category one could 
place Alain Juppe, head of research in 1977, and Nicole Chouraqui, who /  
began in 1978 responsible for vie associative, took over the research 
department in October 1979, and switched to employemnt in October 1981. 
Another is Michel Auriliac, a retired prefect who worked on defence policy 
for id months in 1980-1 before joining Juppe in setting up the new think- 
tank, Club '89.
Perhaps the most vital groups of workers at head office are those 
concerned with elections, animat ion and membership (or i'ederat ions, as 
this department is now called.) Jacques Toubon headed the elections 
department from 1977 until October 1981. In French parties this post 
requires an encyclopaedic knowledge of the electoral map in order to 
prepare one's arguments for the frequent negotiations which take place 
between coalition partners in order to decide which party has the right to 
a jointly agreed candidate in the various constituencies. Toubon's
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successor* Jacques Chartrcn, a retired prefect brought in from outside the
rue de Li lie also held the post for four years, before passing it on to
Dominique Perben, one ot the stars ot the Right's triumph in the municipal
elections in i383.
Between them, the animation and t dddratioins ser vices are concerned
with making sure that the local party organizations are adequately staffed
and led, and are supplied with the material and ideas appropriate to
carrying out the tasks assigned to them by the centre. The overlapping of
the field of operations of these two departments sometimes in practice led
to them pursuing different or even conflicting strategies. In October
1979, when Pons took over the rue de Lille he installed Alan Marleix at
federations and Michel Noir at animation, but neither could ignore the
fact that Noir's predecessor, Charles Pasqua, had no intention of dropping
his close contacts with the grass-roots party organizers. Jean-Franqois
Mancel, who was Noir's successor and secretaire national a 1'animation
(torn October 1981 until October 1984, illustrates how one rnay occupy a
post without performing its functions;
Pasqua always dealt with it (party organization), in 
practice if not in name, Pasqua was a man who was 
permanently in touch with local problems. There was 
always someone else nominally in charge, and then 
there was Pasqua, who was more often on the 'phone to 
the departmental secretaries than the person in charge 
of the federations at the rue de Lille 
I think that, and anyway it's what Michel Noir told roe 
often, being in disagreement with Pasqua on a few 
points, he found himself short-circuited by Pasqua, 
and he couldn't really do his iob; and the result was,
I think, and in fact I've seen it for myself, as far
as the members are concerned, at the departmental and 
constituency level, Noir never existed as the RPR 
party organizer. ,2>'
In speaking of his own work as party organizer, Mancel went on to
reveal conflicts and ambiguities which doubtless exist in all parties, and
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offer a useful corrective to the RPR's reputation as a superbly drilled
machine;
There was always an ambiguity at that time, which 
already existed when Noir was there, which was that 
the federations and animat ion were not in the same 
hands, and, at the time 1 was secretaire national a 
i'animation and Marleix looked after the life of the 
federations, So it was a bit ot 3 bastardized 
solution, in the sense that one couldn't exist without 
the other. Marleix dealt often directly with Bernard 
Pons, and doubtless directly but unofficially with 
Charles Pasqua, on questions affecting the 
organization ot the tederations, the appointment ot 
departmental and constituency secretaries, and rny job 
was to activate things. Well, it wasn't always easy, 
its true, because it would happen that, coming back 
trom a trip to a federation, I would say, 'We’re going 
to have to change this departmental secretary sooner
or later, because he's not very dynamic, he's not
active enough. ' Then I would often run into obstacles, 
because the reasons why this or that departmental 
secretary were kept in power had nothing to do with 
their organizing abilities, but were more complex; it 
was a question of putting or retaining in leadership 
positions people we wanted to keep on account of the 
ideas they might express or not express. ,d>&
As an example of the damage caused by this subtle rivalry ot 
influences, Mancel cites the case ot Marseille and the surrounding 
department, the Bouches du Rhone, where, despite his urgings, the party 
leadership did not foster the emergence ot a talented local leader who
could adequately champion the RPR against the other parties present
locally.
what we have said so far argues against the idea that the rue de 
Lille exercised a coherent independent influence on policy. Sometimes even 
the general secretary was not sure of his position, his chief 
collaborators might find themselves undercut or neutralized by activists 
whose power-base was elsewhere, and the more permanent HQ workers 
performed mainly routine tasks. Furthermore, a substantial number ot those
-104-
Table 4. 4
Proportion ot Parliamentarians holding main Head Office posts 
Monod
total size oi team; 37
serving parliamentarians; J2 (32. 4%)
del &gues; 12
saving parliamentarians; 5 (41. 6%)
Devaquet
total size of team; 26 
serving parliamentarians; 9 (32. IX) 
assistant g~s, national sec, and d&l&guer, 17 
serving parliamentarians; 5 (29. 4%)
Pons I
total size of team; 42
serving parliamentarians; 1.7 (40. 5%)
asst gen-sec, national sec. and del&gu&, 20
serving parliamentarians / (35%)
total newcomers; 1G, of which serving parliamentarians; 1J (69%)
Pons II
Total size of team; 37
serving parliamentarians; 9 (24. 3%)
+5 who lost in most recent election 
= 14 (37.6%) 
national sec. and d^legue, 9 
serving par liamentarians; 3 (33. 3%)
+3 who lost seat in most recent election 
=6 (66. 6%)
Toubon
national secretaries; 20 
serving parliamentarians; 10 (50%)
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who nominally held political posts, the secretaires nat i onaux, d41£gu£s 
and charges de mission, simultaneously pursued other occupations and/or 
held other important positions in the party.
By far the largest such group were parliamentarians (overwhelmingly 
deputies), whose importance in the rue de Lille organigramme has steadily 
increased, as shown in table 4.4.**“* During the periods of office of Monod, 
Devaquet and Pons I, parliamentarians were always between 30% and 40% ot 
the total team. During this period, parliamentarians appeared to shrink as 
a proportion ot the highest-ranked staf f at the rue de Lille, but this can 
be explained by the inflation of the number ot these posts for protocol 
reasons. In tact Pons I can be seen as a period of massive re-entry of 
parliamentarians, after a relative loss of influence during the E>evaquet 
term; ot lb ot Pons’ colleagues who had not previously held office at 
party headquarters, no less than 11 (69%) were serving parliamentarians. 
Pons II seems to mark a sharp decline in parliamentarians' influence, but 
if we include in the count those deputies who had lost their seats in the 
disaster year' of 1981, then it is seen that parliamentarians again make up 
37% of the total team, and no less than 66. 6% of the highest-ranked 
officials. The growing influence ot parliamentarians was confirmed by 
toubon, who filled 50% of the national secretary posts with deputies or 
senators.
From this it- seems that possession of a parliamentary seat is an 
asset for those who covet a place at head office. In 1978, when Devaquet’s 
team took over from Monod, Le Monde suggested that five of those who were 
dropped had been sanctioned for their failure to win seats in the recent 
general election. Among them was Alain Juppe. ?r° In fact it is just as 
likely, in the case of sitting deputies, that the loss of their seat will
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result in the otter ot a place at the rue de Lille as in their sacking.
For example Jean-Pierre Cassabel became deldgud national tor local 
government in October 1979, eighteen months alter he had lost his seat at 
Castelnaudary, Two years later he was demoted to assistant, to make way 
tor Jacques Boyon, who in turn had lost his parliamentary seat in June 
1981. In 1979 Andre Fanton, another ex-deputy, was made d£l£gu& national 
tor communication in rather unusual circumstances which we discuss below.
Another case is that ot Jean—Francois Mancel, who was charge tor 
commerce and artisanat during Pons' first two years. Far from being 
sanctioned after electoral deteat in 1961, he was promoted in October to 
be one ot tout' national secretaries, in charge of animat ion. Jean-Pierre 
Delalande was elected to parliament in the Oise tor the first time in 1978
at the age ot 33. He lost his seat to the Socialist landslide in 1981 just
4 months alter he had started work as delegud for Action Ouvriere et 
Proiessionnelle. In October, at Chirac's prompting, he accepted promotion, 
like Mancel, to the post ot national secretary for foreign attairs. In so 
doing, he displaced Jean de Lipkowski, scion ot a noble family which 
claimed friendship with de Gaulle himself, and who had for many years 
followed toreign attairs tor the party both at the rue de Lille and in the 
relevant committee ot the National Assembly.
Some, such as Andre Fanton, a former barrister and secretary of
State, and Boyon, who chose to return to work at the Cour des Coropt.es gave 
their services tree at head office.'-71 But tor Mancel and Delalande, who 
were much younger (33 and 36 respectively) promotion to secretaire 
national carried with it a salary which compensated them for the loss of 
then deputy's wage. Delalande soon found that multiple toreign trips 
jeopardized the regular work needed to win back his parliamentary seat,
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and during 1983 left the rue de Lille lor a job in the private sector.
Mancel, who was delighted with his new job, stayed on until his boss,
Bernard Pons, was replaced by Toubon in October 1984. For these young ex-
deputies, who in due course would win back their parliamentary seats, the
periodic reorganizations at the rue de Lille helped them over a difficult
patch in their careers. As Mancel put. it;
(Chirac) wanted to take the chance, presented by the 
move into opposition, to reshuffle his party workers 
around Bernard Pons, and, inevitably he turned to the 
one or two young parliamentarians who had lost their 
seats in 1981, which meant that at the same time some 
new blood could be brought into the RPR, while the ex- 
deputies themselves would not have to give up
politics, but could be paid in return for their work
f or the party. ;c30ther cases illustrate the willingness
of Chirac and his general secretaries to use the attribution of the rue de
Lille portfolios as rewards for past services or continuing loyalty. ?,i
Although in theory the official spokespeople tor their subjects, the
cial&gue& ot national secretaries at the rue de Lille have rarely had 
decisive influence on the development ot policy, partly because they have 
typically changed often from one field to another. They can usually only 
aspire to be the unquestioned party spokesperson in their field it they 
speak on the same subject in parliament, preferably as a member ot the 
ielevant commission in the Chamber or the Senate. In the second halt ot 
the seventies this was relatively rare. Philippe Seguin was promoted to 
aelegud and given the unemployment portfolio at the rue de Lille shortly 
after he had introduced the unemployment debate at the journees 
parlementaires in September 1979. During the previous session he had been 
rapporteur ot a special parliamentary committee ot inquiry on the subject, 
nevertheless Seguin did not decisively influence the party's policy. When 
he became minister for social affairs and employment in 1986 he was
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obliged to implement abolition of administrative control of redundancies, 
a step which he had always argued against, Etienne Pinte combined the 
'family and social policy* portfolio in parliament and at head office 
during 1977-9, until he resigned his place at the rue de Lille in protest 
at Chirac's anti-Giscard polemics. Jean de Lipkowski, deldguS and 
parliamentary spokesman on foreign policy from the beginning of 1977 to 
October 1931, is always listened to with respect when he speaks at the 
Central Committee or the journees pariementaires, but there is no way 
that, on such an Important subject, he could pretend to make policy 
independently of Chirac. Michel Giraud, long-time senator and president ot 
the regional council ot H e  de France is unquestionably one ot the people 
in the whole of France best qualified to speak on local government 
matters, but his views have long been far in advance of the rest ot his 
party on decentralization, and hence it did not make sense for him to 
remain for long at the rue de Lille.
Some members of the head office staff, finally, were members ol the 
commission Executive, which was in theory responsible tor day-to-day 
management ot the party, though not all its members enjoyed equal 
influence. The existence of the Executive Committee is enshrined in party 
statute, albeit with its size, members and functions defined by the 
president. A 1977 account suggests that its members were all those at the 
rue de Lille with a political title. Seven years later, announcing 
loubon's appointment of 13 secretaires nationaux, each of them responsible 
either tor a major policy area or for an important political function, 
such as communication, federations, or relations with other parties, Le 
Monde informed its readers that, with the general secretary himself and 
the national treasurer, these constituted a 20-strong Executive Committee
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which reputedly had a working session with Chirac every Tuesday morning. 
whatever the intention, it is doubtful if such a large body could play the 
same role as the working Executive Committee which ran the party during 
Pons’ general secretaryship - the period which was crucial to the 
transformation in economic policy.
Its membership was very restricted, but nevertheless included people 
from outside the rue de Lille. As well as Chirac and Pons there were the 
four secretaires nationaux appointed in October 1981, Mancel, Marleix, 
Delalande (later replaced by Kocsiusko-Morizet> and Chouraqui; Elle 
Crespi, a marketing specialist with little political experience recruited 
\ rorn the business world especially to brush up Chirac's image, and also 
given the title of secretaire national for Communication; Lydie Gerbaud, 
the party's professional press attachde; Claude Labbe, president of the 
group ot deputies; Charles Pasqua, president of the group oi senators, and 
Yvan Blot, who was the directeur de cabinet of Bernard Pons, and therefore 
had an uni ivalled knowledge of every issue dealt with by the general 
secretary's office. 73
It is unlikely that all ot the Executive Committee's members met 
every week, and doubtless some important affairs were dealt with elsewhere 
by other groups directly responsible to Chirac. Some of its members were 
perhaps rather lightweight - Delalande, Chouraqui and Gerbaud; but there 
were enough ot the people who really counted in the party at the time to 
arbitrate in the continuous problems ot day to day management, and to have 
a serious discussion - even if they did not have the last word - ot the 
tactics to be adopted in the daily battles with their rivals on television 
and in the press.
In theory the Executive Committee should not trespass on the
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territory of the Political Committee, which had the right to take 
positions on the important national questions, while the Executive "looked 
atter the shop". In reality, the Political Committee was an unwieldy 
body which met only 6 or a 6 times a year, and then sometimes co- 
ordinately with the bureau of the group of deputies. Between those 
meetings, and to an extent despite them, the Executive Committee was the 
one official party body where the top leaders made their decisions.
the Parliamentary Party
In December 19/6 ail the existing members DDR parliamentarians became 
members ot the RPR, The other party power-centres had therefore to deal 
with a group of deputies whose self-confidence and experience made them a 
powerful force especially during the period 1978-81, when they numbered 
148, and rather less afterwards, when they were reduced to 88 by the 
Socialists' landslide, the group soon split three different ways in votes 
on certain of the Barre government's proposals, and later clashed with 
Chirac over the choice ot the party's candidate for the presidency ot the 
Assembly, At the end of the 1970s Chirac was unable to impose on all the 
deputies his line ot unremitting hostility to Giscard and became embroiled 
with some ot them in a polemic about European policy and about the correct 
amount ot deference towards a sitting President required by the 
constitution ot the 5th Republic. Unable, as we have seen, to .influence 
policy through the party's representative institutions, dissidents 
resorted to vantage-points in the press from which to denounce their 
leader pubiiciy. Worse still, as the 1981 Presidential election 
approached, many deputies and most ot the Gaullist ministers made it clear 
tnat they would consider voting tor Giscard or tor the RPR's own Michel 
bebre rather than tor Chirac. At least one of the ministers treated the
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clashes as a struggle lor the leadership of the party.
these conflicts abated after 1961 with Giscard removed from the scene 
and the deputies chastened by the sweeping Socialist victory; they were 
further mollified by Chirac's amendment of his European policy, and his 
new willingness to co-operate with the UDF. After 1984, however, one or 
two deputies again had the temerity to contest publicly what they regarded 
as an unsatisfactory party line on the question oi the Front National.
A significant clash between the deputies and the party president 
arose immediately after the parliamentary elections ot April 19/8. In the
traditional election ol the president of the National Assembly, which
takes place at the start ot every session, Chirac wanted the RPR to 
support a recent convert to party ranks, the outgoing president, Edgar 
Faure. A more authentic gauilist candidate was Jacques Chaban Delmas,
Chirac's bete noire, who had himself occupied the president's rostrum, the
per choir, from i956-69. The uiscardians deliberately presented no
candidate ot their own, and had the satisfaction ot seeing Chaban elected
with the support ot at least 30 RPR deputies.**11
Later in the month Claude Labbe, president ot the RPR deputies'
group, explained to the press that the group did not consider itseli bound
by any committee, even the RPR Central Comittee; "a deputy, once elected, 
has responsibilities towards his constituents which are not the same as 
those ot a party activist, At the same time Labbe stressed that Chaban 
had been present at a recent meeting ot the parliamentary group's bureau 
(executive committee), in conformity with the bureau's statutes, just as 
he attended group meetings like any other deputy, despite a recent party 
statute change which aimed at excluding government ministers and 
presidents ot the chambers from the RPR leading bodies.
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there were a number at occasions in the iate 1970s when the RPR
deputies’ unity was threatened by the intransigeance of a group ot
traditionalists led by Michel Debre, This occurred on issues such as
ratification ot direct elections to the European Parliament (June 1977)
and ot new statutes for the International Monetary fund (April 19/6). In
the following autumn session, Debre and nine others refused to vote tor
the 1979 budget. In i960 the group was again split on whether to vote tor
Peyretitte's law and order bill.
These were rather minor parliamentary revolts, however. In a sense,
they did no more than retlect the leadership's own ambiguity. Throughout
the parliamentary sessions trom 1976-61 Chirac stuck to a contradictory
strategy ot attacking publicly government policy on a wide range ot
issues, Doth domestic and toreign, while equally publicly pledging that on
no account would the RPR vote a motion oi censure and provoke the
government's tall. Small wonder that with such a guarantee ot their
met feetivenees some ot the Gaul11st deputies occasionally allowed
themselves the luxury ot a vote ot conscience.
Conflict on the party's European policy flared up immediately after
Chirac's Appel de Cochin ot December 1976 set out the leader's platform
tor the European elections due in June 1979. Aiain Peyretitte, t.be senior
Gaullist minister reacted by sending to all RPR councillors, deputies and
senators a letter which drew attention to what he believed was the
excessive power ot Chirac's personal advisers. He denounced
these outrageous statements., (and).. certain occult 
i igures who seem to have taken control ot our 
movement®3
and invited Chirac to put the house in order when he had recovered trom 
the results ot his car accident. Chirac replied that Peyretitte had no
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place in the RPR, and had him suspended for 6 months by his local party in 
Seine-et-Marne, whereupon Peyretitte received a letter ot support trom the 
other ten Gaullist members ol the government.
The end of March saw the publication of the names ot 80 candidates 
who would run on the party's platform entitled, 'Detence of the Interests 
ot France in Europe' (DIFE). Of those elected, it was intended that ail
except Debre would sit only tor a tew months before passing on their
mandate to another trom the list, under a controversial arrangement 
christened the 'tourniquet' .
the tone of the proposed RPR campaign was soon criticized by Antoine 
Rufenacht (Seine-Maritime); there was no need for such a blanket rejection
ot direct elections, and it was wrong ot the RPR to attack the European
commissioners directly. • Joseph Coiniti, (Bouches du Rhone) distributed a 
Leaflet to the press denouncing Chirac's separate campaign as a helping- 
hand for the Soci alo-Communists.
The composition ot the DIFE list was attacked by Michel Cointat, 
Breton deputy and former minister, who complained that European Gaullists 
had either been caretuiiy eliminated or had refused to stand, 30% ot the 
chosen candidates were from the Paris region (like 69% ot the current 
Central Committee), and the tourniquet would prevent deputies from 
learning the ropes and doing a useful job. Rejecting the UDF list as 
supranational, Cointat briefly envisaged forming a list ot European 
Gaullists. :i3lS In the event nothing came ot this, but he wrote to all RPR 
deputies denouncing the fact that the DIFE list had been drawn up without 
consultation either ot the party or ot the parliamentarians. a-’ The same 
day Le Monae published extracts from a letter of resignation sent to 
Chirac by Etienne Pinte, until then the RPR dei&gue national tor family
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policy, the young deputy gave as hie reasons tor quitting both the 
inadequate internal debate in the party and the tact that the euro-
campaign
seems to me to go against Franco-German rapprochement 
and the construction ot Europe begun by general de 
Gaulle. 30
Within two weeks Cointat was back, with a longer article in which he 
again deplored the lack ot a real choice tor Gaullists in the forthcoming 
election, and called on European Gaullists to work against 'useless 
ideological quarrels' and tor a 'Europe ot realities'.31 Meanwhile another 
group ot 11 RPR parliamentarians, probably co-ordinated by Guichard, had 
written to the Figaro to say that, unlike Cointat, they would support the 
DIFE list, but would express their disagreements with Chirac's conduct ot 
the campaign as and when they arose.33
While by no means involving a majority ot the parliament.ary party, 
opposition to Chirac's European policy was clearly widespread, and 
attracted enough interest from the press to hamper the party president's 
efforts to get his message across. During the same period the latter's 
exaggerated attacks on Giscard and Barre were disavowed equally publicly 
and embarrassingly. .
A major grievance was Chirac's insistence on calling for an 
extraordinary session oi parliament in March 1979 to debate the 
government's employment policies, lire deputies were also complaining about 
the conduct oi parliamentary tactics generally, and that their role ot 
elaborating policy was being usurped by the rue de Lille,-"1 Yves Guena, 
one ot the RPR's founding cellule politique, resigned his membership ot 
the Political Committee, and sent a letter to his constituents in the 
Dordogne, explaining that
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relations between the leadership and the deputies have 
deteriorated completely. . . . (It is) . . a mistake to 
force the hand of the parliamentary group...always 
without consultation.
Guena was echoed by Rene La Combe, (Maine-et-Loire) who publicly 
criticized the idea of the extraordinary session on the grounds that the 
government ought to keep the initiative in parliament, otherwise there 
would be a return to rule by parties, while Ruftenacht deplored the 'state 
ot war' between the coalition partners, and stressed that the RPR, as a
rassembl ement, should respect diiterences,
Later, in the middle of the Euro-elect ion campaign, Chirac received a
setter signed by nine previous general secretaries ot the various
incarnations oi the Gaullist party who complained that
the movement has fluctuated and lost its good standing 
in public opinion. . . We disapprove ot the policy which 
consists in assaulting the government and the 
President daily., (the latter’s legitimacy;.. should not 
be challenged before the expiration of his mandate.
A desire to defend Giscard’s integrity was natural among those who 
already enjoyed state office, or who hoped to do so. But Chirac and his 
friends could not make this accusation of opportunism stick against all 
his critics; logic was with them when they argued that de Gaulle's
reverence for the state required that they give all their support to the
sitting President. The approach ot the next Presidential election in 1981 
served to harden the positions ot those on both sides ot the argument.
In June 1980 Le Monde published extracts oi a letter to Chirac trom 
yet another deputy, Jean Bonhomrne (Tarn-et-Garonne), who called on his 
leader not to attack Giscard, not to be an agent of discord, and to put 
his trust in p a t i e n c e . A  tew weeks later, Pons warned the RPR ministers 
not to support an eventual Giscard candidature, for all members were bound
by official party decisions, and to flout them would bring automatic 
expulsion. This threat did not dissuade Robert Galley, the RPR minister 
ior the Post Office, from promptly announcing his full support for 
Giscard. Peyretitte and Bourges had already made up their minds to 
campaign tor the outgoing President, but were spared having to commit 
themselves until the turn ot the year when Giscard officially announced 
his candidature. '00
The issue remained a source ot tension even after the first round ot 
the election in April 1981, when the outgoing President faced Francois 
Mitterrand in the decider. Chirac persuaded the Central Committee which 
met on the 29th April to adopt a motion which refused to express a 
preference tor either ot the remaining candidates. The atmosphere was 
heavy with attacks by the Chiraquian young turks, including Toubon and 
Juppe, on the rival candidature 01 Michel Debre, which had given the 
Gallo-Giscardians an excuse lor not supporting their hero. Some of the 
Debreists walked out, None ol the Gallo-Giscardians plucked up the courage 
to speak, but two oi them, Adrien Gouteyron and Jose Frezal, abstained on 
the final vote. 101 In the country, some began to campaign for 
Mitterrand10 '^, but the Gailo-Giscardians fought back, demanding, through 
Bonhomme, that the entire parliamentary group be called together before 
the second round in order to endorse the President.103 This was rejected 
by Labbe,1°jl but Michel Giraud, RPR Senator and president of the lie de 
France region succeeded in gathering together all 22 regional presidents 
for the same put pose. lo&
By the 5th ot May the press were listing those Gaullists who were now 
actively campaigning tor Giscard, but to the end Chirac resisted the 
pressure on him to endorse Giscard publicly and unequivocally. There were
- 117-
some among his entourage who clung to the illusion that it Mitterrand were 
elected and dissolved the assembly, then the electorate, shocked by what 
they had done, would seek shelter trom the Socialist menace by returning 
to the RPR in the ensuing legislative elections. It was better, then, to 
maintain the cordon sani taire between the defeated Giscard and the 
potentially victorious Gaullists. On the other hand it was thought that a 
number of Chirac's closest colleagues (Pons, Aurillac, Lipkowski) who had 
announced their personal support tor Giscard would not have done so 
without his knowledge and agreement. 10tr"
Debre*s presidential candidature was another issue which revealed the  ^
less than total support for Chirac among Gaullist parliamentary notables, 
including some who had no particular hope ol Giscsrdian patronage. On 2bth 
April 19& 1, ue Gaulle's former prime minister received 481,821 votes in 
the first round of the presidential election. At 1.65% of the popular 
vote, this was fewer than the scores of two extreme left candidates,
Ariette Laguiller and Michel CrSpeau, each ot whom received over 600,000, 
and it was tar behind the ecologist, Brice Lalonde, with 1,126,254.
Compared to Chirac's five and a quarter million, (17.99%), Debre's 
candidature seems like an irrelevance,
Although he was a derisory candidate on the day, throughout :1980 
Debre was a serious source ot embarrassment to the RPR president. By 
upstaging his leader at crucial moments, he effectively set the agenda, 
taking tor himself the defence and illustration ot traditional Gaullist 
principles, and adding to serious doubts among Chirac's advisers as to 
whether the party president ought to stand.
That his share ot the vote ultimately gave no hint of the 
determination and professionalism ot his campaign, and of its consequences
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tor the RPR, was due essentially to two reasons. Firstly, although Debre 
gathered the support ot about one fifth ot the Gaullist deputies, and ot 
practically all the associated movements ot the Gaullist diaspora,
Chirac's own candidature was enough to deprive him ot the transmission 
belt to the popular vote which is the RPR. Secondly, as even his best 
friends admit, Debre had "plenty ot things to say, but he says them very 
badly,"lo; repelling the average voter by his didacticism, self- 
sufficiency and his apocalyptic visions oi national disaster round every 
corner.
In August 1979, when the RPR was still reeling from the shock of the 
electoral defeat of June, Debre held a press conference at which he 
unveiled a veritable platform for government, containing all the points he 
would reiterate at every stage ot his campaign; the laxism and complacency 
of the government in face of the 'economic war' ; the need for European, oi
even French protectionism to beat back foreign competition, along with an
incomes policy, and a wealth tax; the protection ot the welfare state, but 
a reduction in the expenses borne by businesses, and hence the necessity 
tor a thorough reorganization ol the state budget to tree ressources tor 
investment; expansion and improvement of the French nuclear deterrent, a 
solution to the demographic crisis, and strengthening ot the teaching ot 
French history in schools. 1 °'a
Debre's proposals were received with a certain amount ot scepticism 
by the press, because ot his failure to spell out where he would make cuts 
in the budget, but this did not alter the fact that when Jean Meo and 
Jacques Chirac in turn presented the rapport MPo on economic and social 
questions, it, was seen as "following the thread ot M. Debre's
analyses", 1! ' and "partly inspired by M. Debre's August 28th press
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conference. 10
in January 1980 when Debris addressed a meeting in Nice, attended by 
1,000 people, and chaired by the local RPR deputy, Emmanuel Aubert, the 
press began to treat him as a potential presidential candidate, 111 and 
reported on the deterioration ot his relations with Chirac. 11^
At the end oi May the two rivals rnet, and agreed not to do anything 
without informing the other in advance. 113 A month later, on 30th June, 
without informing Chirac, Debre made a tormal declaration ot candidature 
with the lull panoply ot press conference11* and campaign platiorm. 1 1 
Chirac was once again placed in the situation ot replying to Debre's 
initiative. He issued a rather vacuous formal statement which tried at the 
same time to denounce the premature opening ot the campaign, to imply that 
he had not yet made up m s  mind, and to keep alive the possibility oi his 
own candidature. 1
with Debre now out in the open, civil war broke out in the party.
Pons issued his statement warning the RPR ministers to support only the 
party's officially designated candidate. Debre, in an (8 page) letter 
appealing tor the support of his parliamentary colleagues, denounced the 
'atmosphere oi threats and even oi excommunication*. 117 Antoine Rufenacht 
lost no time in declaring 'all my support' tor the outsider, while 
Chiraquian loyalists began to set up local 'support committees' appealing 
for their idol to stand. ' "fJ Labbe made a thinly veiled attack on Debre in 
Le Monde, in the shape 01 praise tor the rejuvenation oi the Gaullist 
movement, brought about by the RPR. 1 ' and his appeal tor a Chirac 
candidacy at the September 1980 journees parlementaires sparked oit some 
highly personal mud-slinglng.130
(Tie Hebraists began to 1 eel that their campaign was building up
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momentum in the country. On 23rd ot Gctobei the campaign published the 
names ot 150 prominent personalities endorsing their candidate, and 
followed up with 150 more on 20th December. 1 1 Among them were a selection
ot compagnons trom earlier days; six former ministers, seven former 
deputies elected in 1953, and six ol de Gaulle's ambassadors. 1^  One by 
one the small associations dedicated to fostering their own special brand 
ot Gaullisrn gave him their support; Pierre Lefranc's Association Nationals 
d* Action pour la Ficielitd au General de Gaulle, 1 L6o Hamon's Initiative 
Rdpublicaine et Socialiste, ' Gilbert Grandval's Union Gaulliste pour la 
adrnocrat ie, IJ2li
These adhesions must have been especially galling to Chirac, In 
September 1979 he had secured the agreement ot Jean Charbonnel, leader ot 
another left Gaullist. splinter, to act as an intermediary in bringing the 
diaspora closer to the RPR. 1 Charbonnel himself duly rejoined the RPR in 
January i960, and was given a prestigious title at the rue de Lille,'2/'
At ter a year’s effort, however, not only did he have to report his mission 
a complete failure, but he himself announced his ' total support' for 
Michel Debre after a vain appeal to the rivals to compose their 
differences. 1
Twenty-eight RPR deputies and tour senators had been included among 
the first list ot 150 Debreistes. 1 - * There were plenty more who would have 
preferred Chirac not to stand but, unable to convince him, preferred not 
to flout the party leader openly. More independent spirits like Messmer 
and Seguin chose a less than whole-hearted formula to endorse their 
president - they would vote for whichever candidate was chosen by the 
extraordinary congress scheduled tor February 7th 1931. 13,0 The adherence 
m  December ot a filth senator was highly symbolic. Christian de .la
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Malene, premier adjoint to the mayor ot Paris trom 197? to 1983, had owed
hie start in politics to Michel Debre, and worked with him in the 1950s
and 1960s. the private dinner which he offered to Debre and Chirac towards
the end oi January was the ultimate and vain attempt by a mutual friend to
get one ot the two to desist in favour ol the other. 131
All in all, Michel Debre had put the Chirac camp on the defensive,
costing them a good deal ot time and nervous energy, and ultimately
winning the declared support of about one fifth of the gaullist deputies
and one eighth ot the senators. He had set the campaign time-table; he had
made Meo* s social and economic ideas look like pale imitations ot his own;
he had articulated more eloquently than any other Gaullist could the faith
in French greatness which Chirac claimed inspired his own criticisms ot
discard; in so doing he captured the historic legitimacy distributed among
the various organizations of the diaspora and reduced the RPR president's
candidacy to a paltry party at fair. His presence in the field complicated
the most agonizing oi decisions - to stand, or not to stand. 13:2 The
Chiraquian leaders themselves rated extremely highly the damage done by
the maverick Debi e candidacy and t.he much less significant campaign oi
Mari e-France Garaud;
Their stabs in the back were atrocious. They cost
Chirac very dear. Infinitely more than the the 2% of
the vote they won. '
Some of the dissident deputies' who defended Giscard, or supported
Debre's presidential bid were also prominent in demanding a more
democratic internal party regime. On April 9th 1978, in an atmosphere
with Chaban*d recent successful defiance of Chirac over the el eel. ion
to the percholr, an extraordinary Party Congress had ratified changes in
tne party statutes. In order to erect a barrier between the RPR as a party
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and the government whose decisions it was now regularly criticizing, 
membership or any RPR committee, whether departmental or national, was 
made incompatible with the holding of any ministerial portfolio, the 
presidency of either the Senate or the National Assembly, or membership of 
the Conseil Constitutionnel. ia4-
The measure was not aimed exclusively against Chaban, however', as 
Guichard had claimed in a sharp exchange with Chirac at the congress, 1 
for Chaban was not alone in losing his seat on the party Central and 
Political Committees. So also did Maurice Papon, who accepted the post ot 
minister tor the budget in April 1978, while Peyrefitte (Justice) and 
Bourges (Defence) were both excluded from the Central Committee.
The statute-change, resented as an infringement of party democracy, 
achieved by the steamroller ot an extraordinary congress, was the subject 
ot a running battle between Chirac and his critics during the run-up to 
the European election. In a television interview on 2nd April 1979 Chirac 
told the ministers they would have to choose between their party and the 
government in deciding between the RPR and UDF lists. 1 ■■**» The eleven 
ministers responded with a joint statement read to the press by Yvon 
Bourges. Defending their own integrity and the government’s record in the 
light of Gaullist ideals, (including the rassemblement of the French 
people around a majority resulting from the presidential as well as 
parliamentary elections) the ministers admitted that their instinct was to 
support the list which was most representative ot the Gaullist family. But 
there must be a stop to certain behaviour which was harmful to the country 
and contradicted the traditional Gaullist concern tor the primacy of the 
executive and the cohesion ot the parliamentary majority in support of the 
executive's actions. Ihis listing ot principles not to be transgressed was
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interpreted by the press as the ministers’ laying ot conditions for their 
eventual support ot the RPR list. *37
The ministers’ defiance was in turn immediately taken up by several 
deputies at their group meeting. Among others, Labbe, Guena, and one ot 
the eleven, Jean-Paul Mourot, secretary ot state at the ministry of 
Justice, demanded the readmission ot the ministers to party committees. 
the Political Committee on 10th April implicitly disavowed Chirac by 
issuing a statement noting that the government, being supported by a 
coalition ot the Right, had no reason to opt tor one list or the other. '
At the beginning ot May, the Gaullist minister of Labour, Robert Boulin, 
defended his record in a radio interview, and Insisted that Giscard, as 
legitimate President, was deserving ot all loyalty. '4,0 After further 
warnings from Peyretitte “l 1, on May 31st the ministers again collectively 
reaffirmed their solidarity with Raymond Same, in view of the "repeated 
attacks on his government and his person", and stressed the need for unity 
in the majority "more than ever" in view ot the problems faced by the 
country. 1
with the Luropean election out oi the way, however, Peyrefitte 
continued his campaign against Chirac's leadership. In September his call 
for a special etats generaux ot Gaul1ism implicitly contested the RPR's 
claim to be the main source ot Gaullist legitimacy. ''4-3 In the same month 
he turned up at the journees pariementaires and demanded that PasquaVs 
departure should follow those of Juillet and Garaud. 1/t4- But, like his 
target, the minister apparently also had a weakness for more clandestine 
forms of political struggle. In April 1950 the satirical paper Le Canard 
trnchaine gleefully published extracts from an alleged leaked memo from 
Peyrefitte to Giscard, in which the minister oi Justice explained to the
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President of the Republic how he should go about destabilizing the RPR and 
securing Chirac's removal as leader. I'he memo referred to Peyrefitte's 
previous efforts to convince Giscard of the benefits of such a course of 
act ion. ... 1 4- -’
Such a document, greeted by a lame and unconvincing denial of its 
authenticity from Peyrefitte, did not call for a political response. It 
gave Chirac and his friends the chance to claim the higher moral ground, 
particularly as the press simultaneously harried Giscard's close friend 
Poniatowski over a property scandal.
The endemic conflict between the party and its ministers was finally 
buried by the 1981 election results. It was still a live issue, however, 
in July 1980 when Pons' spoke ot the 'divorce' between the government and 
the RF'R, prompting yet another Gaullist minister, Maurice Papon, to issue 
a statement to the press which reaffirmed his total solidarity with his 
colleagues and questioned the Gaullist character of Pons' defence of party 
interests. 1 **5
The rights and duties oi the ministers were not the only cause ot 
complaints about the functioning ot party democracy. The long-serving arid 
hitherto loyalist deputy, Roland Nungessor announced on 17th May 1979 the 
creation of a new Gaullist umbrella organization, the Garret our du 
Gaul lisme which was immediately seen by the press as a vehicle lor a 
number oi disparate Gaullist personalities whose only common point was 
their hostility to Chirac. i'17 Nungessor summarized the group's aims more 
innocently; to foster co-operation between Gaullists both in and outside 
the RPR.
We would like to see changes in the structures and 
methods ot the RPR with a view to more democracy and 
participation. 1
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A week latex-, Michel Cointat demanded a better definition of the 
powers ot the party leaders, more co-ordinated management ot the party, 
and clarification or the relationship between the party and the group ot 
deputies. 1 f L In July, in a long interview with Le Monde, Rutenacht 
reported that the parliamentarians thought the party machine was too 
cumbersome, neglected their problems, and alienated the voters by too 
enthusiastically coat-tailing parfcy-activists; there was an atmosphere oi 
monol.ithism, harmful to the free circulation of ideas, while the continued 
attacks on Giscard turned away grass-roots right-wing voters. 1 At the 
end of the year he openly called tor anti-Chiraquians to organize more 
effectively in the parliamentary group and in the party, in order to make 
their voices heard.1-1
After i9frl, with the simultaneous defeat oi Giscard and Debre, and 
the Socialists' victories which cut a swathe through the ranks of the RPR 
deputies, there were tax fewer conflicts between the party leader and the 
deputies. One oi these, however, concerned the party's attitude to the 
National Front (FN>. Dissent was less widespread and vocal than opposition 
to Chirac's 1979 European policy. One reason tor this was doubtless that, 
while the trenchancy of the Appel ae Cochin lei t no room for 
misinterpretation, the leadership's attitude on immigration and race, both 
practically and ideologically, was shrouded in ambiguity.
In the spring of 1953 the eight-vote Socialist-Communist local 
election victory at Dreux, a dormitory town to the west ot Paris, was 
annulled tot irregularities. After the first round of the re-run in 
September, the three main right wing contestants fused into a single RPR- 
UDF-FN list on which Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the FM secretary general, was 
given fourth place. The defending left-wing team was defeated and the FN
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took three seats on the new council.
The only nationally known right-wing politician to protest vigorously 
against the opportunistic alliance was Simone veil of the UDF. In excusing 
themselves, her prominent colleagues suggested that she had her reasons 
... she was the only member ot her family to have returned from Auschwitz 
in 1945. 1 * • • Chirac, for his part, had refused to fuse the right-wing lists 
m  Paris in March, where the FN leader Le Pen was standing. In the face of 
the national publicity focussed on the Dreux by-election, he chose to 
extol! his colleagues’ choice, on the grounds that a one-off alliance with 
a handful of fascists was less dangerous than the Socialists’ alliance 
with the Communists nationally. 1
The solidity of the FN*s implantation, soon confirmed by a national score 
ot 10% in the 1964 European elections, eventually brought the RPR 
leadership into simultaneous conflict with opposing groups ot their own 
members. Impressed by Le Pen’s puiiing power, and by his visceral hatred 
ot the left, pockets ot the rank and file began to demand that Chirac 
abandon the ‘soft centt isrn' which led him to form a joint list with the 
UDF (headed by veil) tor the European poll. Unsatisfied with the response 
to their appeals, sometimes trustrateed by the attitude ot their local 
leaders, they began to vote with their feet, deserting the RPR for local 
FN sections, in some cases, setting them up themselves. 's,:l
For the 1965 cantonal elections, the party issued a formal 
proscription against alliances with the FN, even at the local level, '£;> 
while Chirac’s public statements, responding to the worrying loss of 
members and votes, more and more frequently adopted the FN's anti­
immigrant themes. 1 with this kind of ambiguity it is not surprising that 
RPR members on the whole failed to denounce Chirac’s betrayal of de
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Gaulle's multi-ethnic vision oi a Communautd in which citizens ot ail 
French-speaking countries would have equal rights. i&r
Only Michel Hannoun, the obscure mayor ot Voreppe in the Isere (who 
became a deputy briefly only alter 19ti6> had publicly defended the rights 
ot immigrants, ‘ It was not until 1967 that RPR trade minister, Michel 
Noli', made headlines by arguing in Le Monde that it was better to lose an 
election than to lose one* s soul by allying with the racists. Later in 
the year, Philippe Seguin, minister tor social affairs, said on television 
that if the RPR ever made a political deal with the FN he would 
immediately leave the party. 1150
Although pressure was exerted on Noir to retract, his and Seguin*s 
behaviour could oe interpreted by the leadership as a public airing ot 
differences between party comrades which was perhaps regrettable but did 
not present them with a direct challenge in the same way that opposition 
on the European issue had. In the 1966 election the leadership effectively 
called Seguin*s blutt by concluding a deal with the FN wherein five RPR 
candidates withdrew from the second ballot in certain constituencies and 
allowed the FN to go forward as the only representatives of the Right.
Seguin is still a member ot the party.1^ 1
Conclusion - Power in the Party
We can now identify three different but sometimes overlapping
sources of the inputs trom which policy and strategy were eventually 
elaborated. These ai e the parliamentary party, the rue de Lille and the 
party President's adviseis. The RPR*s official deliberative bodies have 
never counted as more than rubber-stamps to register decisions arrived at 
unofficially elsewhere.
1‘he meetings of the parliamentary group provided the rare party
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occasions at which diverse, at times critical, views could be expounded 
spontaneously with no pre-programming, and a minimum ot psycophancy. the 
refractory deputies, not always able to swing a majority ot their 
colleagues behind themselves, used the press and television to undermine 
Chirac's authority. Those who showed most independence usually controlled 
soJid local power-bases. Chaban Delmas, as mayor of Bordeaux tor three 
decades, disposed ot a network ot power and patronage which conditioned 
the careers ot succeeding generations of Gaullist militants in Acquitaine. 
No-one couid get on in the party or in local government without Chaban's 
acquiescence. Guichard disposed oi a similar, it smaller, bastion ot 
support as mayoi ot La Baule in Brittany, while in the 1960s Michel Noir 
bound the local party to himself through his emergence as credible 
candidate tor the mayoralcy of Lyon.
From time to time the deputies were able to set limits to the 
arbitrary behaviour of Chirac's advisers and to iorce changes in the way 
the party operated. Andre Fanton, a deputy tor twenty years before 
voluntarily abandoning his Paris seat in 1978 in search of another in the 
provinces, was one ot those who had openly called tor Pasqua's departure 
from the rue ae Lille. At the end ot the June 1979 Central Committee, 
astounded to find that he had not been elected, as usual, to the Political 
Committee, he went to Chirac with proofs of a simple fraud involving the 
addition ot 100 votes to the totals obtained by more modest candidates. 
Chirac was obliged to annul the elections, sack one of Pasqua's henchman, 
Poland Vernaudon, and call an extraordinary CC for the autumn, billed as 
the occasion when the leadership would announce a reorganization at the 
national office, and new policy initiatives. Fanton himself was given the 
task ot preparing a report on the party's press and publicity work. 1 e,-r;
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when the CC met again in September Chirac admitted that in the 
European election campaign "mistakes may have been made in the 
presentation of our ideas; I am the first to admit it. M MS3 The general 
secretary, Devaquet also admitted errors, and a week later was replaced by 
Pons, 'whose new team at the rue de Lille included a significant number of 
deputies. 1 ,1 Pasqua disappeared from the organigramme, and Fanton became 
aeiegue national for communication.
During 1979-81 Chirac was subjected to perhaps the most sustained 
attack by his own deputies which a modern party leader has ever survived. 
The tact, that he aid survive illustrates the limits of the 
parliamentarians1 power. Despite their victories of the autumn of 1979 
they could not persuade Chirac to mend his fence© with Chaban and 
Sanguinetti, even though the CC accepted a report from Fanton calling tot 
their reinstatement in the leadership. Pasqua, the deputies' bete noire 
soon returned from exile. Furthermore, although most of the deputies were 
too legitimist to stomach easily Chirac's cavalier attacks on the prime 
minister and the President, their instinctive Gaul1ism made them wary of 
those whom, like Guichard, Rufenacht and their friends, they suspected ot 
wanting to dissolve the party's identity into the Giscardian amalgam.
Their disagreements with Chirac concerned less his basic political line 
than his tactics, the tone of his attacks on the UDF, and the fact that 
decisions often seemed like improvisations. '■ s In 1979 their mood of 
frustration tempered by rueful deference to the leader was summed up 
memorably by Robert Poujade, deputy and mayor of Dijon, and a former party 
general-secretary, "Chirac est a ia tois impossible et irremplapable, et 
11 t aut vdvre avec” 1fe’6,
when Chir ac returned to Matignon in March 1966, he took with him from
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the Paris town hail Maurice Ulr ich as his aired ear de cabinet. Denis 
Baudoin returned from a brief idyll in Strasbourg to become the prime 
minister's official spokesman. Colonna and three or four others of the 
Paris backroom staff made the trip across town. At the same time Pandraud 
and the town hall’s chief executive, Camille Cabana, entered the 
government, where they joined Devaquet, now mayor of the 11th 
arrondissement, and Didier Bariani, mayor of the 20th, as well as 
Juppe, Balladur , Barzach and Catala, all holders of Parisian mandates.
There was a general rush by other new ministers to secure the services of 
many of the talented backroom staff who had worked in the Paris 
administration or in the mayor's private think-tanks. ,,c;a
We should beware of concluding from this, however, that the town hall 
staff or the "Parisian connection" had become the real motor force which 
ran Chirac and the RPR. Devaquet*s history of activity in the party did 
not depend only on Ins association with Paris. Juppe was someone in whom 
Chirac had had confidence for many years, deliberately using the patronage 
resources of Paris to make him budget director in 1980 (a paid post in the 
city administration), before iris election as councillor in 1983. Balladur, 
like Barzach, became a Paris deputy for the first time only in 1986, the 
same year in which Catala entered the lie de France regional council.
Paris has affected the party and general political careers of two 
different groups of RPR members in two different ways. On tire one hand it 
has provided soft landings for loyal Chiraquians who have already served J  
tire leader in some way. Balladur, Juppe, Pons, Barzach, Catala arid Jacques 
Toubon, all gained elected office at some level in Paris during the 1980s, 
and their progress was sometimes at the expense ot existing Gaullist 
notables, such as Pierre Bas and Christian de la Mal&ne1*^
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On the other hand Paris has been a proving ground and field ot 
advancement for recruits taking their first steps in politics, who should 
accordingly be seen as policy executants rather than influential advisers. 
After 1981, when Gaullists no longer controlled even the meanest junior 
minister's portfolio, Paris provided the last remaining supply ot the 
sorts of jobs which ENA graduates and other would-be politicians had 
usually found in the cabinets rninist driels of their patrons. It was to be 
expected both that the quality ot Chirac's new young collaborators was 
very high, and that when the portals of power opened again in 1986 there 
would be competition amongst the new ministers to secure the services of 
the brightest and best. Chirac even had to intervene at the last moment to 
retain Daniel Naftalski, whom Pons wanted to take to the ministry ot 
overseas territories, as his directeur de cabinet, at the town hall. 170
By the turn of the 1980s, the activities of men like Pons, Maneel and
Marleix had won tor the rue de Lille credibility with both the leadership
and the rank and tile, and head office emerged as influential force in the 
party. Pons was fat more than just an adviser, but he was in no sense 
Chirac's rival. Publicly, their views were never at odds, but in private 
the general secretary had to tight for the leader's ear just as his 
advisers and other party figures did. Sometimes he won, as when he 
favoured Chirac’s candidature in 1981; sometimes he lost, as when he urged 
the formation of a separate RPR list for the European elections in 1984.
A good Indicator of who had conquered positions ot influence in the 
party during the years of opposition was the list of RPR members who 
joined the government which took office in March 1986. As table 4.5 shows, 
the top ministerial posts, Finance, Interior, Justice, went to the 'lone
rangers', Balladur, Pasqua and Chalandon, who all had rather different but
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effective claims on Chirac's loyalty. After this, the most striking 
feature of the allocation oi posts Is that 9 of the 20 went to a solid 
cohort ot aspirants who had either accomplished long spells of service at 
■ he rue de Lille, or were actually in post there when the government was 
formed. No less than b oi these took a portfolio corresponding exactly or
Table 4. 5
Previous activities of the 20 RPR members in the 1986-88 government.
Loi lej ange r s
Edouard Balladur 
Charles Pasqua 
Albin Chalandon
PflT.JjL Town Hall
Camille Cabana 
Robert Pandraud 
Alain Devaquet 
(Juppe)
(Boyon)
C l u b . 1 8 9
Michel Aurillac - president 
Nicole Catala - first vice-president 
(Juppe - secretary general)
O verseas Territories
Lucette Michaux-Chevry - deputy ior Gaudeloupe 
Gaston Flosse - deputy for* French Polynesia
Reitegade trout the Socialist Party
Geor ges Font es
fc denotes secretaire national at the rue de Lille immediately before being 
appointed to government
f denotes someone responsible for the same or closely related field in 
government as at the rue de Lille
Rue de Lille
Michele Alliot-Marie * + education 
Michele Barzach + health 
Christian Bergelin * + sports and youth 
J acques Boyon
Alain Carignon * + errvironment 
Michel Noir * + foreign trade /industry 
Alain Juppe t + economy / budget 
Bernard Pons 
Philippe Seguin *
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closely to the policy area tor which they were responsible at party head 
ottice, 5 with the rank of secretaire national. 171 Four ot the 9 had never 
previously held a seat in parliament; Carignon, Juppe and Barzach were /  
elected for the first time in 1986, and Alliot-Marie not until 1988.
Naturally there are one or two personalities who cross the frontiers 
ot these categories. Boyon and Juppe were equally at home in the town hall 
or head office, and Juppe was additionally the general secretary ot Club 
'89. Pons, who sat tor a Paris constituency, had moved unofficially to the 
town hall after leaving his party job. Nevertheless, the clear conclusion 
to be drawn from these figures is that the surest route to the top for 
ambitious young politicians in the RPR was not through the Paris town hall 
but through the rue de Lille.
it they did not stand out numerically, the 'Parisians' did not shine 
qualitatively either, Pandraud fitted in well with Pasqua, his boss at the 
Interior Ministry, but Cabana fared less well. While he had apparently 
been a dominating, some said dictatorial, chief executive in the Paris 
administration, he tailed to impress Balladur, and soon left tire ministry 
oi the Economy, Finances and Privatizations tor a vaguely defined post as 
minister oi administrative reforms and rapatries. '7* Alain Devaquet, a 
luckless secretary general who had loyally fought in the ranks since 1979, 
was handed the poisoned chalice of university reform which rapidly brought 
about his own ignominious resignation after only nine months in office, 
and soured the entire government's image in the country.
The groups of advisers based at the town hall were subject to the 
same play of influences as any others. They had to compete for Chirac's 
attention with the staff ot the rue de Lille, the deputies and other 
outside figures. As we show in chapter 6, Denis Baudoin from the town
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hail, along with Fanton at national office, had less influence on Chirac's 
eoiarnuni cat ions strategy than did Elie Crespi, who was brought in l rom the 
advertising industry, In chapter 5 we show that the Paris privatization 
strategy was by no means a model fot all party members who wielded power 
in local government.
As for the president's other advisers, some Individuals like Meo 
tailed to impose themselves, Juiliet and Garaud dominated for a while, but
succumbed to the failure ot their strategy and the hostility of the
deputies. Pasqua succeeded in entrenching his position, though 
significantly he only sealed his victory by himself becoming a 
parliamentary notable. Balladur, on the other hand, had no party position, 
and no electoral mandate to speak ot, when he was propelled into the
Ministry ot Finance in 1986 to take charge ot policies ot which he (as we
show in chapter 9) was one ot the principal architects.
On the basis of our study ot the RPR what appreciation can we make ot 
Angelo Panebianco's idea that, in every party, it is organization which 
determines power and policies:' Organizationally, nothing very significant 
had changed in the period between 1978-80, when the RPR still embraced 
state intervention, and 1964-6, when they had become enthusiastic 
liberals. The same man was still at the head of the party, still relying 
on the Paris town hall to provide him with tremendous resources ot 
patronage, prestige and money. His sweeping formal powers within the party 
were unimpaired, although his style of leadership - while stubborn - had 
never been dictatorial. 1;3 In the mid-1980s, as in the late 1970s, 
national pat ty behaviour and career prospects were the outcome ot the same 
three-cornered light between the president's personal advisers, head- 
on t ice, and the parliamentary party.
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Each oi these had experienced modest and ultimately circular changes 
in their fortunes. Bet ore the summer ot 1979 the personal advisers seemed 
to carry ail before them, only to be checked by the parliamentarians, who 
were in turn brought low by the decimation of their ranks in 1961. In 
formal terms, they were given greater influence by the expansion ot the 
Central Committee, but the more ambitious of them found in head office 
important resources for career advancement. Yet they in turn had to yield 
the greatest position of influence, and ultimately the major prize, to 
Balladur, the private adviser.
fhe passage from power to opposition in 1961 had affected Chirac tar 
less than his opponents; he retained Paris, while they lost all their 
ministerial portfolios and any chance of regaining them. This would seem
to provide a thorough refutation ot Panebianco*s thesis that programmatic
change is always a function of corresponding organizational reform. As we 
show in chapter 6, the formei ministers and secretaries of state were 
impotent witnesses ot the victory ot their ideas!
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Paris, Ramsay, 1988 pp 27-29,
61, Interview with Jacques Boyon, 27-4-83, (Q) "vous avez t ra v a i l ld  a vac If, Chirac a 1 ’Hdtel
ae C i l ia  pendant un certa in  te w s? 1' (R) "A 1 ‘Hdtel da C i l ia ?  Non. Pas , , ,  ah, a
1'Hdtel da C il ia , non, pas vra intent a 1 'Hdtei ae v i l la ,  qui je  fa isa is  p a r t i  d un p e t i t
groups ae re f le x io n  personnel la  qui t r a v a u la i t  auprds da lu i  sur las prod lames des
c o i ie c t i  v itas  loca les,,,, Ce n 'p ta i t  pas du tout un groups RPR, i l  eta i t  tout a f a i t  an
marge  i i  y ava i l  notament dans ce groupe un ce rta in  no/nd re ae conse i/Is rs
personnels ou aes gens de 1'HdteI ae C il ia , dais a catte  epoque d 'a i l le u rs ,  i l  v aca it
egah ta  ae ce i lu ie s  ae reflex ion, Jacques Chirac a toujours souhaita avoir a la fo is  tine
c e l lu le  ae re f lex ion  au RPR e t  une c a i iu ie  de re f lex ion  plus personnelle, pour l u i . ‘
62, Lift ran op c i t  pp 59-61
60. ^ i n  Friedman and Fran^ois-Poncet, see uiesbert op c i t , p 623, i am indebted to rvan Blot 
(interview 28-4-89) tor the suggestion that Crespl, as well as advising Chirac on his 
linage, was also an influential advocate of liberalizing economic policies,
64 Edouard Balladur, Passion a t  Longueur ae femps, P a n s ,  Fayard 1989 pp 37-39,
65. Philippe Auberqer, a rank and tile deputy and mayor of a small town in the Yonne, sent a
number ot papers on economic questions to Chirac during 1930-8!, shortly atter his 
return from a trip to California where he had studied the tax-reform movement agitating 
that state, (interview with Philippe Auberger, 6-1-89) Yvan Blot sent a large number ot 
snort notices a o r ien ta t ion  icteologique to the party president during the period (1978-
84) when Blot was employed at the party office in the rue ae L i l le , In his case, the
notes in question were likely to have been influenced less by discussions with his head 
office colleagues than by his participation in the work of the Club ae 1 'Rorloge which
he had founded in 1974 precisely in order to foster the development of new ideas within
the French right, (Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89) Much less significant, but typical 
of the contacts which Chirac encouraged, was a case like Philippe Dechar ire, whom I met 
in December 1983 when he had just returned from a three-month trip to Africa, resulting 
in the compilation of a lengthy report delivered to the RPR president, (interview with 
Philippe Dechart re, 6-12-88)
66, Balladur, op c i t ,  Passion  p37
87, interview with Jean Charbonnel 17-4-89
68. 3ee the portrait in Ihierry Desjardins, Las Chiraquiens, Paris, La lable Ronde, 1986, pp 
105-130
59. Figaro 12-2-80; le  ffonue, 1-3-80, 11-3-80 (Lille and Nantes), 25-3-80 (Toulouse), 16-4- 
80 (Hontpel 1 ier); La Croix, 14-5-80; Le Quotidian ae Pans, 12-7-80; Le tionde 24-9-801 
Le da t in  7-11-30
&o Although it later emerged that he himself had wanted to lead an RPR list at the 1984
European elections, rather than making a joint list with the UDF, under Simone Veil's
leadership, (Desjardins op c i t ,  Les Chiraquiens  p 127)
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&1 Interview with jsan-Fransdis Mancel, 20-4-89; interview with t'van Slot, 28-4-89; Pierre
dauritf Jpg cues teuton, "'premier p im s t re ^  de Jacques Chirac, Paris, Cinq Diaiaants,
1986, pi7, While doing justice to Pons,this book does not rise above hagiography where 
loubon is concerned,
62. Interview with Jein-franfois Nancei, 20-4-89; interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-89. See
also the portrait in Desjardins op cit, Les Chiraquiens,, t , pp 21-4,15,
63. The following account of the rue de L i l l e  teams which served each of the general 
secretaries is based on, tor' Monod, Crisol et Lhomeau op c i t , pp 118-126! tor Devaquet, 
le  donee 13-4-78, tor Pons 1, Figaro S - 10-79; tor Pons ii, Le Monde 6-10-81 and
15-1-82, and, tor loubon, Le ftonde 23-11-84
64. Crisol and Lhomeau op c i t p p  175-182
t5, Thus Madame Solange Troisier was chargie de mission tor prison administration during
1976 and 1979, Nicole Chouraqui was in charge of me associative from April 1 978 to 
October 1979, while civil liberties were inaugurated in 1981, alter the Socialists came 
to power, and given to Noelie Dewavrin in October 1981, after she had lost the women's 
portfolio a couple or years earlier to Mademoiselle Frangoise Seme,
Almost equally part of the furniture are a small category whose special personal
qualifications fit them tor one roie more than any other, but who do not earn their
living exclusively in the rue ae L i l le , Oho better to be charge oe mission tor the sea
than 6uy Quermer, deputy for the sea-faring constituency ot Finistere? Who better to
advise on science and technology than Andre Turcat, the Concorde test-pilot, or on
sports than (auy Drut, the former Olympic hurdles champion?
67 interview with Je»n-Fr*ngois Nance 1, 20-4-89, "Pasqua s en est toojours occupe cue ce
s o i t  en l i t r e  au en r'aite, Pasqua S ta i t  un home qui S ta n  const ament au contact oes 
oroclPmes aes federations, i i  y a v a i l  toujours ce lu i qui a v a i l  la  respons ib i l i ty ,  e t 
puis i l  y a v a i l  Pasqua qui ava i l  les secretaires ddpartemenlaux plus souvent au bout du 
t i l  qua ce lu i qui en a va i l  la resp& nsao il i t i  rue ae L i l l e  A lors je  crois, d 'a i l le u rs  
r est ce quo ftichel fl/oir me d isa i I  souvent, e 'es t que, b lent en dbsaccord avec Pasqua 
sur un ce rta in  nombre ae points, i l  se trouva it  co u r t -c icu i te  par Pasqua, e t i l  ne 
pouvait pas v e r t i  tab lenient accompli r  sa mission, c test ce qui f a i t  que, la  je  crois,
vrawent je  I ' a i  constate• au niveau oes m il i tan ts , au niveau des dPpartements et des
secretaires de ci/ 'conscription, /Voir n a jamais ex is t#  en tant que responsable de
1 animation au ftPfi," Mancel went on to explain that he wasn't sure that there was a
single definite reason why Noir did not do more; it might be because he didn't want to, 
becasue he preferred to devote himself to his own constituency and legislative 
questions, or simply because he wasn't given enough resources by the party leadership,
68, interview with Jean-frangois Mancel, 20-4-89, " I I  y a toujburs eu une ambigui te a ce lts
epoque, qui ex is ts  i t  d 'a i l le u r s  au moment ae die he/ iVoir, qui S ta n  que les federations 
e t /a n im a t io n  n e ta ient pas dans les mbmes mains, e t J 1 'epoque j e t a i s  secreta ire  
national a 1 animation et Pla in f ta r le ix , lu i ,  s 'occuoait de la  vie des rederations, 
Alors, c 'b t& i t  un peu petard come solution, pans la me sure ou J'un n 'a l l a i t  pas sans
1 autre Aloes f ia r ie ix  s occupait en d irec ts  souvent avec Bernard tens, et sans d&ule en
d irec te  m i s  plus o ff ic ieuseaent avec Charles Pasqua, de 1 'organisation oes federations, 
de la nomination oes secretaires d&parte&entaux, oes secreta ires de c irconscnption , et 
moi, je  mteccupais d'ammer les choses. Alors, ce n 'e t a i t  pas ton jours simple, c a s t  
vrah parce que, i l  a rn v a i  t  que, covenant d'un voyage dans une federation, je  dise, 
bah, ce secreta ire departmental, i l  vauarait meux quand mdme le  changer un jou r ou
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r  autre, pare# que, u  t re a t  pas tree dytmique, jtJ ne bouge pas asses, * £ t M  je  m  
heurta is  a oes blocages pares pus U s  raisons pour U s  quel U s  on m in te n a i t  au pouvoir  
te l ou te l  secreta ire oepartemntal ne tenaient pas ii U u r  capacite d'ammateur, m is  
tenaient «f oes raison plus complexes, qui H a u n t  ceux, vPn tab lament, oe m e tt re .d e  
m in te m r  Pans les places oes responsables, oes pens quon vou la it  garder pour oes 
raison peut~Hre oe precaution au niveau Oes idbes q u ' i l s  pouvaunt emetine ou ne pas 
erneiire,"
63, The figures in table 4,4 are based on the sources cited at note 63, I he information
appears in the press usually shortly after the new general secretary has been appointed, 
It is not accurate indefinitely, as there was a continual turnover at the fringes and 
one or two appointments often remain to be made when the main list is announced, In 
particular, the figures tor Devaquet are incomplete, For each team, deputies are shown 
both as % ot the total, and as % of those holding the more important titles - secreta ire  
or oeiegue national
JO, ce Monde I he others were Robert Srossmann, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Pierre
Mazeaud and Jean-Claude ServarrScreiber
?!, Interview with Andre Fanton, 2I-4-89; interview with Jacques 8oyon, 27-4-83
72. Interview, Jean-Pierre Oeiaiande, 21-12-88
73, interview with Jean-Fran^ois Nance!, 20-4-83, "11 vou la it  done, a cette  occasion U ,  
come on e n t ra i t  dans 1 ‘opposition, renouveier un peu les cadres de son mo overrent autour 
oe Bernard Pons, et, mPluctablemnt, i l  s e t a i t  tourne vers les quelques jeunes 
oarlemenataires qui n 'avaient pas retrouve leur siege en 1981, ce qui pouvait a la to is
oermettre d'amener un peu oe sang neur au sem au PPR, et pu is d 'autre  pa r t  p e rm t t re  a
ceux-IS de ne pas q u i t te r  la vie p o l i t iq u e , et none d 'e tre  paves pour assrner des 
responsabi 1 r tds dans le movement,*
H. When Oeiaiande returned to the private sector, he was replaced as secietary for foreign 
affairs not by Lipkovcki, but by Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, one of those who arguably 
had been dropped in 1978 for his failure to win a parliamentary seat and who now, at 
seventy, was hardly likely to get one, In due course, three more of those dropped in 
1978 found their way back, Jean-Claude Servan-Schreiber as charge for the audio-visual 
industry in 1973, Pierre Mazeaud in 1986 tor legal affairs, arid Alain Juppe for economic 
affairs in 1984,
I he same principle is at work in the occasionally labyrinthine protocol, When Devaquet 
took over in 1978 he was flanked by tour assistant general secretaries, these were 
loubon, Nicole Chouraqui, whose title was both compensation for her defeat in the P a n s  
council elections the previous year, and a reward tor betrayal of the Radical party, 
which she had left in order to support Chirac in that ejection, Pierre Charpy, director 
of the party's daily newssheet, La Le ttre  oe la Motion, who had converted fairly 
recently from professional .journalism, and Philippe Oechartre, a historic Gaullist and 
prickly defender of the prerogatives ot what passed tor the left in the party,
Eighteen months later, with Pons replacing Devaquet at the top, the choice of Meo as 
sole assistant general secretary emphasized the independence ot the new leadership, and 
indeed it was the only fitting position for a man who had lately been managing director 
oi one of France's largest firms, immediately below these two Devaquet and the sensitive 
Dechartre were dignified by the largely meaningless title ot delbgue aupres ou 
secreta ire general. To obviate the sense ot deflation which all this implied tor loubon 
and Chouraqui, they were styled secreta ire  nations:, an appellation which they shared 
with Nichei Moir [animation) and Jean de Lipkowski, (foreign affairs), Below them again
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ii tfoieguis nstion iux lord«d it over 22 charges ae mission,
Pons next e a r n e d  out a r eo rg a m z t i o n  in October i9 8 i, to take account ot the party's 
relegation to opposition in national politics, Ihings were made somewhat easier by M^o's 
departure for btrasbourg, and the i&ct that Dechartre had been manouevred out his pre­
eminence at the AGP, while Devaquet had tactfully faded from the scene, Along with the
job of elections organizer Chartron inherited Toubon's title of national sec res try,
which he shared, as we have seen, with Mancel and Delalande as well as with the 
decidedly tenacious Chouraqui. !he rest ot the team formed up as 5 aeieguOs and 24 
charges,
loubon in 1984, managed to simplify things so that anybody who was anybody got to be a 
national secretary, This was a move resisted by Pons, despite Chirac's urging*.
According to him the RPR didn't need as many generals as the Mexican army, (Desjardins 
op c i t , Les Chi ragmens,, , , p 129)
75, thus Philippe Sequin made his debut as charge for raps trues with Devaquet's team in 
April 13/8, the month after he was first elected to parliament. When Pons took over at 
the end ot i979 Seguin was promoted to dPIPgue and put in charge of employment, He seems
to have disappeared at the end of 1981, but reappeared in Toubon's 1984. executive
committee responsible for decentralization, before entering the government in 1988 with 
responsibility for social affairs and employment, Jacques (iodfrain was in charge ot
ctarts , from October 1979 to 1984 when he switched to law and order. In 1988 he became
national secretary for re la t ions  sociales ana professions l ihers les , Another loyal 
Cniraquien, Oidier Julia began in October 1979 with overseas departments, added overseas 
territories in October 1981, and by 1988 was aeieaue tor regional affairs,
78, Le hands 28-4-79
77, Crisol et Lhomeau op c i t  pp 144-6
78, Le Hondo 8 - 1 1~84
79, f hi a account it from Jean-Frangois Mancel, who as secreta ire  a 1 'animation was a key 
member of the inner party circle from October 1981 to October 84, Interview, 20-4*89
80, In the words of Jean-Frangois Mancel - interview ot 20-4-89,
81, Le tlonde 5-4-78
82, Le honde 20-4*78, "Un depute: une to is  Phi, a des responsabiiites vis-a~\ns de ses
Piec tours, qui ne sont pas ce l les  d*un m il i tan t ,  H
88, finer ry Desjardins, o p e n ,  Un Inconnu Homme Chirac   p899, ",,,, propos
outranc ie rs ,, . certa ins persomiages occurtes qui semblent s 'Ptre eoparPs de 1 ’apparelJ 
oe notre mouvementh Alain Peyrefitte confirmed the accuracy of this account in an 
interview on b-12-88
84, ibidem Chirac s long wrangle with the party's ministers went on until the end ot their 
tenure in 1981, and is further dealt with below.
85, Interview in L'Aurore, 12-4-73
8b, Interview in Je honae, 12-4-73
87, Le honae 24*4-79
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88. le Monde 26-4.-79
89
90
91
92
93
94
3S
Le Monde 28-4-79
"## #//#/• & re n co n tre  mu rapprochement franco-allemand et Me la construction
europdenne, te ls  que les a v§ it engages Je general Me Gaulle, " Le Monde 28-4-73
Le Monde, 12-5-79
Le Point 30-4-79
Le Figaro 27-4-79. the 10 deputies were Ruftnachi, Barnier, Cressard, Delalande, 
D'hinnin, Goulet, Missotfe, P*ric»rd, Pint®, Pringalie, and the Senator, Chaumont,
Crisol et Lhomeau op c i t , pp 147-154
" les rapports entre la  d ire c tio n  e t les  deputes sont profonddment degrades ,,, c 'e s t une 
erreur Me fo rcer la  main ou groups pa elemental re,,, toujours sans consu lta tion,,,,, * 
Ihese extracts cited in Jean Peltier, 1 Jason-Chirac", in B e n ts  de Paris March 1979
pp 21-26
9b, Mamtenant 9-4-79
97, " Is  uouvewnt a flu c tue  e t perdu sa bonne p o s itio n  dans 1 'op in ion,,,, Nous reorouuons la
p o lit iq u e  qui consists a pourfendre quotid iennem nt le  gouvernement e t le
President,, dont la  lo g it im i t d l ,, ne sau ra it i t  re mise en cause ju s q u J  1 'expi ra tio n  
ae son mandat, "cited iri Desjardins, op c i t , On Inconnu  p 410,
9b‘ Le Monde 14-6-80
99, La L e ttre  de la  Nation 4-7-80
‘100, interview with w o n  Bourges, 11-1-89; see also Le Monde 4-3-8! for Bourges' eventual 
statement or his support for Siscard,
101, Le Monde 2-5-81,
102, In the country, Chirac's support committees were officially dissolved, and the party
machine demobilized, Philippe Dechartre, lately deprived of his imposing title at the
rue de L i l l e , but still a member of the Political Committee, issued thousands ot 
leaflets to the local branches calling tor a vote for Mitterrand, (Interview with
Philippe Dechartre, b-12-88, and Le Monde 2-5-81,) rts a result, a number of his former
colleagues cut oft relations with him including Jean-Pierre Oelalande, (Interview, 21- 
12-88) but he was echoed by a number of other left Gaullists, including Pierre 
Emmanuel, the RPR's oildgue na tiona l for culture, and by only one deputy, Joel le lac,
103, Le Monde 3-5-81
104, Le Monde 5-5-81
105, Interview with Michel Giraud 10-1-89
106, Le Monde 5-5-811 the areas in which Chiraquians campaigned for iiscard were Dijon, 
Bourges, Cagnes-sur-Mer, the Seine-Maritime, the Yvelines and Ile-et-Vilaine,
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10/, Interview with Yves 6u6na 5~ 1 -8
106, Le Monde 30~8~79
103, L ''Aur a re 2 1-3-7 3
MO, Le Monde 22-9-79
M l,  Le Monde 14-1-80
M 2 ,  Is  Croix 18»j-80.i
M 3,  Le Monde 23-7-SI
M  4, Figaro I —7—80
M S,  Que vou ions "nous fa ir s  de is  France? Que voulons nous fam e ae nos l ib e r  tes? in
supplement to no 45 oi La Let t re de Micbel Debre, Peris, 1981 (no page numbers.))
M b,  Le Monde 23-7-80
117, Le Monde 26-7-81
118, Le Monoe 5-7-8! the suppert-Chirac committees were set up in Bas-ftbirt, (by MU Bord,
Sprauer and Ourr), ftude (Cassabel), Eure Ctonatsini), Seine-et-Marne (Didier Julia),
rtllier (Hector Roll and), and in the Pas-de-Calais, Puy-de-D6me, Sa6ne-et*-Loire, Loir - 
et-Cher, the Landes ana the Lot
119, Le Monde 9-7*80
120, L§ Matin 30-9-80I Le Figaro 2-10-80; The former minister Jean Foyer, trying to pour
oil on troubled waters, stressed that Debre's candidature was valuable as a kind of
"bearing witness" to Qaullist ideals, even if he had no chance ot winning, Calling on 
Chirac to "think ten times" before declaring himself, he argued that it the party
leader stood and got 157* Qaullism was finished, whereas it Debre stood and got 5X the
set-back tor the movement would be less serious, this in turn was rejected by Debre and
his closest supporters who insisted that he had taken the field 'to convince and to 
win', Rurenacht, the Qallo-Siscardian, justified his support for Debre, while admitting 
that he didn't agree with him on ail points, this was putting it mildly, since Debre's 
attacks on Siscard were even more severe than those of Chirac and Rons, Incensed by 
this display of opportunism, Didier Julia accused Rufenacht of being an "a n t i-
Chiraquien p rin ts ire ", and Mme Hissoffe felt impelled to appeal for calm,
121, Le Monde 24-10-80 and 2! 72-12-80
122, Le Monde 9-12-80
123, Le Monde 23-10-80
124, Le Monde 31-I-81
125, Le Monde 2 4 H 0 - 8 I
12b, Le Monde 19-9-79
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12?. Le Figaro 8-1-80
128, Le Monde 6-2-8!
123. I h e M  were mainly old friends ilk® Quina, the group around Quiehard, the sup p la n ts ot 
the RFR Ministers, and deputies from the two areas where Debre hanselt was influential, 
the Loire valley, where he was a mayor, and the island of Reunion, where he had his 
parliamentary constituency, t i e  flonde 24-10-80,) The deputies were; MM, Beaumont (Val 
de Marne), de Benouville (Paris), Berger (.Cote d ’Or), Bizet (Manche), B o m v i l l i e r s  
(Cher), Castagnon (Indre-et-Loire), Cressard (Ile-et-Viiaine), Delhalie (Aube), Dhinniri 
(Nord), Oruon (Paris), Eymard-Duvernay (Seine-et-Marne) Foyer (Maine-et-Loire), de 
Qastines (Mayenne), Sodetroy (Mane he), Buena (Dordogne), Qui chard CLoire-AtUntique), 
Hamelin, < Ile-et-Oilaine), La Combe (Maine-et-Loire), M a n e  (Pyrinees-Atlantiques), 
Moulle (Cher), Neuwirth (Loire), Roux (Paris), Rufenacht (Seine-Maritime), Sourdille 
(Ardennes), laugourdesu (Eure-et-Loire), Thibault (Indre), Voisin (Indre-et-Loire), The 
senators were MM, 6a.uti.er (Maine-et~Loire), Moreau and Portier (Indre-et-Loire), and 
Repiquet (Reunion),
180, Le Montis 23-1-81 for Messmer; 27-1-81 tor Seguin
131, Lb Honae 21/2-12-80
132, Debre was 67, Chirac not even SO, The graceful thing for the younger mart would have
been to hold back, and wait tor 1988, just as his closest friends advised, With or
without Debre in the field, they argued that if Chirac stood and discard lost, Chirac 
would be to blame, But if he stayed out, he won ail round, It Siscard won, it was 
thanks to Chirac; if he lost, it would be despite what Chirac did for him, This advice 
came from Denis B au dom, as well as Friedmann, Juppe and Chirac's wife Bernadette, 
(Qiesbert op c i t  p 327) from Balladur, (op c i t , Passion , , , p  30! Lues Pert, op c i t  pp 
328-9) and from Andre Fanton, (Interview with Andre Fanton 21-4-89) It was no accident 
that those on this side of the argument were mostly, with the exception of Fanton and 
Juppe, non-party advisers, lo those most closely associated with the RPR machine, chief 
among them Pasqua, the opposing argument was decisive, and ultimately won the day; if 
Chirac didn't run, Debre would score between 8 and 128, which would be disastrous for 
the party. (Siesbert op c i t  p 329)
133, Cited in Desjardins op c i t .  lbs Chiraquiens  p 129, "Lours coups de poignard ont
etfr&yabl&s, U s  ont codte trBs cher £ Chirac, in f  im  pent p lus quo Jes 2% qu U s  
ont recoites. “
134 The last prohibition was somewhat redundant, as c o n se ilie rs  are banned from political 
activity by the state constitution, Le Fionde 20-3-78 and 11-4-78
1:38, This interpretation is accepted by Kay Lawson ( loc  c i t  “The impact " p 41 i)
13b. L ‘floral's 3-4-79
137, Figaro 10-4-79
1:38, Lb Honae I2-4-79
139, L Express 14-4-79
140, Le honde 2-5-79
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41, Le Monde 9-S-79
42, Le Monde 2-6-79
43, Le Matin 24-9-79
44, Le Monde 17- 10-79
4.h Pfyrtfitte*& proposed method essentially consisted in discard being nice to RPR
deputies suspected of not being Chirac's iriends, and in giving the Sauilist ministers
more oi the appearances oi power, (Le Canard incfw inb 16-4-80)
46, Le Monde i7-7-80
47, Figaro 12-6-79
48, "■ Mous souhai tons une M odification des s tructu res e t des >vet Modes du RPR en vue de
advantage de pa rtic ipa tion , de de/»ocratie, " Figaro 12-6-79
49, Le Monde 19-6-79
50, Le Monde 10-7-79
51, 4s? Matin, 18-12-79
52, Edwy Plenel et Alain leli&t, L !£ t r e t  Je Pen Paris, Le Monde/L& Q#couverte, 1984 p 99
53, Martin Sc ha in, Racial P o li t ic s  in  France: the Rational f ro n t  and the Construction o t
Po l i t i c a l  Le g itim c i', Paper presented to the annual meeting of the British Political 
Science Association, Nottingham, April 198b, pp 14-15; Plenei et Rollat op c i t  pp 98-
103
54 In January !984 a Strasbourg member, Hare Hitz became leader of the local FN
departmental committee, Shortly afterwards, in loulouse, the FN claimed the adhesion at 
the former RPR departmental organizer, Jean Pingauit, with several ot his comrades; in
Roanne, in the Loire, Pierre Place, of the RPR departmental committee, deserted the
party of which he h&a .been a member since 1978, along with some of his colleagues, arid
some from neighbouring St. Etienne, At SAte, on the Mediterranean coast, 15 or so went
from one party to the other, in the Vaucluse, Avignon and Isle-sur-Sorgue were
affected, (Plenei et Rollat, op ci t , pp 68-71)
55. Schain op c i t ,  Racial P o l i t i c s , , , , ,  p 16
56, Libera tion , 30-10-84! Colette Ysmal, "Le RPR et I 1UDF face au Front National,
concurrence et connivences", in Revue P o lit iq u e  e t P ari e/sent a ire , November-December
1984, pp b-20
57. Charles de Saul le Mbmires a 'Espoir, Le Renouvea u, 1,9SR~61\ Pa n s,  Pion, 1970, p?2
58, Michel Nannoun, L 'autre cohab ita tion Paris, L'Harmattan 198b
59. Le Monde 15-5-87
60, Questions M domicile, IF 1 24-9-87, Quoted in Le Monde 27/28-9-87
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h i , L i  fam e  16-S-SSi Piter Pysh, "Oiteat and Reconstruction - th* RPR in 1988"., in Modern 
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Chapter 5 Grass Roots
The subject of this chapter is the connection between grass-roots
politics, attitudes to the state, and the making of national policy in the
RPR during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The attack on the state mounted
by the party during its years of opposition was inspired by diverse and
sometimes conflicting conservative ideologies. Some came to the vjew that
the state ought to concern dtselt solely with internal policing and
external defence, since its expansion into welfare was always a mistake,
resulting from the political victories of socialism, which should be
rolled back as quickly as possible. 1
Alongside this unambiguously Hayekian version of liberalism, a
decentralizing current developed in the party in the 1980s, holding that
the state's involvement in welfare is not illegitimate but may become more
burdensome than helpful to its citizens if it fails to take account of
widespread social changes fostered by the economic success of the 1960s
and 1970s. As the party's 1984 programme put it;
The French people are today wealthier, better educated, 
have more free time, and thus desire more autonomy and a 
bigger share in decisions that affect them than they did 
in the past. Because of this they aspire to a 
transformation of their relationship with the all- 
protective state.
Their critique of the state works on three levels.
Firstly they denounce the soaring cost of the welfare 
system and public services which can no longer be 
financed from the surplus of an economy which has
stopped growing.......Secondly, our citizens are worried
by the frequently inferior quality of public provision 
in the fields of health, education and help with finding 
work, for example, Finally, they are irritated by the 
persistance of authoritarian and bureaucratic behaviour 
which prevents them sharing the running of things and
the solving of problems which concern them Like the
customer, the user wants to be king!2
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All tendencies in the party at least agreeed that government, both
local and national, needed competent management within given budgetary
constraints which they accused the Left of ignoring. But the last sentence
of this passage contains at least a latent rejection of the traditional
Gaullist acceptance of hierarchy and the state’s right to command. Its
author believed that the Left parties had cleverly taken advantage of
citizens' increasing demands for autonomy, foolishly neglected by the
Right in power, and that the "Socialo-Communists" were only narrowly
beaten in the 1978 elections, and won in 1981, because their promises of
administrative decentralization and work-place democracy seemed to tit
with the voters' evolving aspirations.3 Once in power, however, the
bureaucratic mentality and authoritarian behaviour of the PS and PC showed
that l.heir promises were lies and the voters' hopes merely illusions;
Instead of the dawn ol a society of responsibility
expected by an impatient France, we were given a
bureaucratic, archaic and moralizing centralism, the 
gloomy victory of a stagnant France without imagination 
over the ambitions which could create a new society.
It therefore fell to the Right, argued the "communicators" in the 
RPR, not necessarily to re-emphaslze the repressive role of the state, but 
to adapt redistributive or egalitarian ideals to the requirements of what 
they supposed to be the more educated and autonomous citizens of the 
1980s. They began to call for decentralisation of power from national to 
local government, to denounce the "mass" character of industrial society, 
to praise citizen involvement in a plethora of local associations which 
were thought to be the future channels of political expression, and even
to call for the use ol binding referenda in local politics.
The results of the 1983 local government elections gave the Gaullists 
the chance to demonstrate in practice both their management skills and
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their sensitivity to grass-roots demands for greater democracy. The 
combined popular vote of the two Lef t parties fell to 44% from the 53. 8% 
recorded in 1981, and the opposition won in 31 towns with populations of 
more than 30,000 which had been controlled by the left since 1977. Some 
startling victories by young and untried RPR challengers In Socialist or 
Communist bastions seemed to confirm that voters were tired of being taken 
for granted by remote and routinized municipal governments and were 
prepared to transfer their support to candidates talking a new language of 
responsibility, accountability and participation.
These developments suggest three questions, to which we seek answers 
in this chapter. Firstly, was it true (as the 1984 programme implied) that 
the RPR locally was becoming more attuned to citizens' frustration with 
the bureaucratic state? Secondly, was concern with "value for money" at 
the grass roots associated with the adoption of liberal and privatising 
policies by RPR local politicians? Thirdly, in either case, did grass 
roots politicians spread this awareness into the party leadership in such 
a way as to bring about a change of policy at national level?
We begin by showing that at least some Gaullists had already 
protested against excessive centralism in the 1970s. The local experiences 
of two senior party figures had led them to campaign for decentralization 
and "citizen power", but for different reasons neither enjoyed good 
relations with the Chiraquian leadership, and neither had enough influence 
to make a difference to national policy.
During the mid-1980s, however, commentators began to focus on the 
emergence on to the political scene of a new generation of young right­
wingers bearing values different from those of their elders. Two related 
propositions were advanced; first that the representatives of the "private
sector” (owners and managers of private firms) gradually took over the 
institutions of local power, and secondly that this generational renewal 
necessarily had an impact on the RPR national policy stance.^
In the second part of the chapter it is argued both that the 
quantitative dimension of the alleged "invasion of the private sector" has 
been exaggerated, and that a. closer examination of the attitudes of the 
individuals included in the "renewal" reveals a certain heterogeneity of 
experiences and ideas, not always in conflict with existing Gaullist 
orthodoxies, and in any case not directly attributable to their work 
situations.
Next, we suggest that some RPR local politicians have been willing to 
engage in more open-ended two-way communication with the voters, and that 
some tried to participate in the revival of community and interest 
associations which expressed citizen discontent with conventional 
politics. However, the RPR's failure to channel this discontent back to 
themselves and the other opposition parties was a measure of the limited 
nature of their conversion to "grass roots liberalism".
In the fourth and final part of the chapter attention is turned to 
manager!al practice at the local level. First, it is accepted that 
Chirac's "liberal" management of Paris after 1983 (albeit with a heavy 
residual dose of interventionism) was a political option, designed to 
demonstrate at a local level what could be done nationally if the RPR were 
to return to power. 7 But we go on to show that, while the Paris experiment 
has been taken as a model by some, others have treated it as an exception, 
dependent on particular conditions which do not exist elsewhere. The party
V
did not tight the 1983 local elections on a liberal platform, and the 
attitudes and management practice of RPR mayors then and since have
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continued to range between the poles of intervention and disengagement.
The party leadership made no particular attempt to generalize from 
examples of successful local liberalism, nor did it specifically 
reccommend liberal solutions to local problems. Our overall conclusion, 
therefore, is that there was no process of transmission, whether upwards 
or downwards or between generations, by which liberalism was transferred 
from one level to another or from periphery l.o centre within the party.
Early critics of the State
During the 1970s the two most prominent critics of the state within 
the Gaullist party were Alain Peyrefitte and Michel Giraud. For different 
reasons, however, neither of these talented and capable men achieved 
positions in the party which they could use to achieve the victory of 
their ideas. Like many of their colleagues, their positions in national 
politics have been buttressed by local careers. Peyrefitte has been deputy 
and mayor of Provins (Seine-et-Marne) and Giraud the mayor of le Perreux 
CVal-de-Marne) for two decades. Both have attacked the delays, waste and 
injustice which arises when the insensitivity of remote officials is 
turned into arrogance by the absence of any popular check or control on 
their activities. Giraud, President of the Paris regional council from 
1976-1988, has occupied a special position in the party as the chief 
proponent of decentralization and the defender of local interests.
In 1976 Peyrefitte published what became a celebrated book, Le Mai 
Fran$ais, in which he identified the cardinal vice of French society, 
arising from its catholic culture; the dictatorial tendencies at the top 
and the centre, frequently mirrored by the cravenness and lack of 
imagination of the base and the periphery. Telling examples were drawn 
from routine work in his own constituency. It took local china-clay miners
25 years to win part of the pension and early retirement rights enjoyed by 
coal-miners since 1945, because of the mindless obstructionism of the 
civil service.® The author and some of his local government colleagues 
from the Seine-et Marne spent five years trying to prevent an unnecessary 
and expensive scheme to tap underground drinking-water in the Paris 
region, again dreamed up by an irresponsible bureaucracy.*
The combination of immobility and injustice highlighted by Peyrefitte 
was counted by many sociologists as a prime cause of the mounting 
frustrations throughout French society which culminated in the explosion 
of May ' 68. The following year there were signs of recognition, even among 
the Gaul list establishment, that something had to be done. Chaban Delmas'
1 New Society' programme contained as eloquent a summary as any other of 
the accumulated dysfunctions of the over-centralized bureaucracy.
Chaban was brought down not so much for that as for his suspected 
friendliness with the left. Clearly, however, Peyrefitte's later proposal 
to devolve as many decisions as possible to the level of the department, 
with the consequent break-up of the Paris-based administrative corps and 
the reconstitution of the civil service itself at the departmental level10 
was unlikely to find favour with the political elite of the 1970s, the 
vast majority of whom were products of the same training schools and 
socialization process as the bureaucrats who were under attack.11 
Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, Peyrefitie's role In
Giscardian governments ensured that, like Chaban before him, his ideas 
were either ignored or combat ted by the Chlraquian power system. 1 -£
If Peyrefitte was in a sense a traitor l.o his own technocratic 
upbringing, Michel Giraud is an eloquent and authentic representative of 
the grass roots in conflict with the state. Author of a number of books
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which are hymns to the co-operative virtues of provincial France, he has 
vented his frustration with interfering bureaucracy by recounting the 
history of the steps involved in the provision of an elementary piece of 
social equipment in his commune of Le Perreux. 13
While not so overtly Giscardian as Peyrefitte, Giraud has been 
suspect within his own party for a number of reasons. To begin with, his 
career was an oddity at a time when the elite of Gaullist politicians was 
formed by privileged young technocrats used to serving their 
apprenticeships in ministerial cabinets before a carefully arranged soft 
landing in a safe Parliamentary seat.
Born in 1929, Giraud did not become mayor of his town until 1971, 
after being encouraged to enter politics by the local deputy. Founder of a 
successful business (importing exotic wood), father of a large family, in 
line with his catholic convictions, his role in the comunity made him a 
catch for any party. Re was the founder and leader of an amateur choral 
society which won a string of international prizes for its singing, bui 1 I. 
a holiday village, and spawned a variety of charitable activities. 1/1
Drawn by his grass-roots commitment into defending the interests of 
small communes within the Paris region, he was rapidly projected, as a 
compromise candidate, to the regional presidency. 1s Elected to the Senate 
in 1977, the same year in which he was president of the F£d£rat.ion 
Nationals des Elus Locaux, he specialized in all local government 
questions and enthusiastically defended, in his own words, "the respect 
for man, the diffusion of responsibilities, decentralization in all its 
forms, participation...."'"5 At every stage in the stumbling devolution 
process from de Gaulle's defeated referendum in 1969 through to the 
Socialists' law of 1982, Giraud sought to increase the powers and the
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budgets of the regional councils. In 1986 he had the satisfaction of being 
designated president of his beloved lie de France by the regional 
councillors themselves elected by universal suffrage for the first time. 17
Another reason why Giraud was never fully integrated into the party
leadership was that his formidable and restless energies were not and 
never could have been entirely channelled through his own party. From 
1982-4 he was president of the Union of Capital Regions of the European 
Community, in 1983 president of the Association des Maires de France, 3nd 
in the same year he founded and became the first president of the 
Associat ion Mondiale des Grandes Met ropoles. His latest venture, the 
Fondat ion pour la Comrnunicat ion Locale, was set up in April 1987 with 
eight partners drawn from business, the press and local government 
organizations, with the aim of ensuring that the grass-roots get the full 
benefit of the social and technical revolution in comrnunications.
Giraud's greatest pride and joy, however, is the Institut du Citoyen, 
founded in 1982 with Alain Chevalier, a self-styled progressive among the 
leaders of the French employers. The Institute's activities are perfectly 
tailored to the needs of the society in search of participation evoked by 
the RPR programme which we quoted at the start of this chapter. Its aim is 
"to help citizens in general, and business and community leaders in 
particular, to participate more actively in public life.""3 For the 
general public, the Institute holds evening lectures on a variety of 
social science topics at the rate of 3 or 4 per week, 3nd an astonishing 
range of one-day or half-day guided tours; of firms (IBM, Renault, etc) of 
parts of the state apparatus from Parliament, through the Atomic Energy 
Commission to the Bank of France; of the public hospitals, the law courts, 
the Paris Opera; and even a two-day tour of NATO installations in Belgium.
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The Institute's most serious work, however, is reserved for would-be or 
actual local councillors, who can attend a variety of specialized courses, 
short or long, held either in the evenings at the Institute or frequently 
for a full day at town halls within the Paris region, designed to equip 
councillors with the knowledge and skills necessary to grapple with the 
bureaucracy at succeeding stages of their careers.
Despite this fine record in the service of decentralized democracy, 
Giraud's ideas and talents have undoubtedly been underused by his party. 
One or two RPR mayors figure among the personalities running the 
Institute's practical sessions and on its management board. But the party 
nevertheless provides its own separate training programme tor local 
candidates and party full-timers. There is a de facto division of labour; 
for the rue de Lille, training with a distinctly partisan flavour; for the 
Inst itut du Citoyen a more general civism within an ideological framework 
set by conservative and private enterprise values.
Overall, Giraud's position in his own party has been that of a
prophet without a following. To the leadership, he is a disconcerting
outsider who made his own way without the benefit of contacts forged in
the grandes ecoles. In 1978 he even turned down the offer of a government
post in order to pursue his ideal of grass-roots democracy. 1 a This did not
prevent his coming under attack from his own colleagues tor being too
ecumenical because he insisted that the RPR and UDF contingents should sit
as one group in the Paris regional assembly.
I had some difficult moments. You know from time to time 
they used to say - but I don't bear any grudges - that I 
was too soft, that I was a disguised centrist, that I
was a Trojan horse, that I put unity before the
interests of the movement. And when it carne to 
fustigating the 'foreigners' party', well I can't say I 
was in favour of that. My relations with Chirac are very
open, sincere and direct, but there were times when
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really I was thoroughly unhappy.
Likewise his avant-garde ideas about decentralization made him in hi
own words something of a 'lonely pilgrim' in the party. The occasional
support of Guichard and Chaban did nothing to recommend his views to the
Chiraquian leadership.
There were times when I suffered, because I was a 
decentralizer before it was fashionable, because, 
well... sometimes they made fun of me in the central 
committee, saying I wanted to break up the state. 3:1
Like other Gaullists before him, then, and long before the 
Socialists' victory in 1981, Michel Giraud had raised the question of 
excessive deference to the State in French political culture, and the 
imbalance in institutional power between the centre and the periphery.
Two of his fellow-thinkers, Chaban Delmas and Peyrefitte, were 
deliberately excluded from the party leadership by Jacques Chirac. Giraud 
himself probably did as much as anyone in France, both before and after 
1981, to awaken and sustain grass-roots political activity, but he was 
regarded with suspicion by the leadership. Giraud's activities were 
carried on as much outside as within the RPR, and although in 1984 the 
party adopted positions which were close to his own, there is no sense in 
which he, any more than Peyrefitte or Chaban Delmas, swung the party to 
his own way of thinking.
Mayors: a new generation?
Given the poor reception reserved by the RPR for the decentralizing 
and participatory ideas of Peyrefitte and Giraud, it was not surprising 
that journalists and political scientists seized with interest on evidenc 
that technocratic training and dirigist ideas were less widespread among
the younger generation who spearheaded the Right's come-back in the 1983 
local elections than among the Gaullist elders. There is no doubt that 
there was a certain renewal of local political leaders, and that it was 
much more marked in the RPR than in the constituent parts of the UDF. But 
we argue here that this renewal has been both quantitatively exaggerated 
and politically misinterpreted. Generational renewal cannot be counted a 
major cause of the RPR's turn to liberalism.
Within the overall swing to the right, the RPR made vastly more gains
than the UDF. A centralized party, mobilizing the mass of their members 
around national political leaders and issues, the Gaullists had always 
been underrepresented in provincial town halls in comparison with their 
UDF colleagues whose traditional loyalty to local notables was frequently 
handed on, along with their local mandates, from father to son. Precise 
comparisons are difficult because mayors who nationally identify with the 
UDF contest local elections under a variety of different labels. However, 
a detailed study of local politics completed in 1987 gives an idea of the 
orders of magnitude; the total of Radical, Christian Democrat and 
Independent mayors in towns with a population of 15,000 or more in 1977
was 106 to the RPR's 49; in 1983 it was 112 to the RPR's 98.**
The closing of such a large gap implies that the RPR provided the 
largest share of the 118 right-wing mayors elected in 1983 who had not 
previously held such a mandate; 48, against 38 UDF, and 32 independent 
conservatives (divers droite). The RPR newcomers were also on average 
younger than their conservative colleagues; 23 of the 48 RPR newcomers 
C47. 9%) were born after January 1st 1940, compared to 11 UDF (28.9%), and 
6 divers droite (18. 75%).-£3 According to Y'smaT2'1 30 of the 47 RPR mayors 
of 'big' towns (over 30,000 population) in 1983 were newcomers, (63.8%),
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compared to 9 out of i? (52. 9%) for the Parti R4.pubiicain and 5 of 15 for 
the Centre des D4mocrates Sociaux.
Having established that there was a high rate of replacement among 
the RPR local elite in 1983, one author went on to claim that this was a 
qualitative as well as a quantitative renewal. In a 1983 study devoted to 
the RPR he stressed the business background of nearly 40% of a sample of 
young RPR deputies and mayors, and concluded that he was observing "a 
profound sociopolitical mutation; the progressive take-over of local power 
by the private sector. "2e In 1984 the same author, Jacques Fr^montier, 
published the findings of a series of in-depth interviews with all 33 
right-wing deputies born after 1940, and 28 of the 40 right-wing mayors in 
larger towns elected for the first time in 1983 who fell into the same 
age-group. Finding that 34.4% of his entire sample (38.2% of the RPR sub­
sample) either owned their own firms or worked in managerial grades in
business, he concluded that;
this massive breakthrough by the business world cannot 
but transform the younger generation's relationship to 
politics. A whole statist ideology which was rife among 
the Gaullists at a time when senior civil servants had
everything their own way, is beginning gradually to look
like a kind of "socialist" antiquity. The macroscopic 
vision of society is giving way to an obsession with 
everday matters, to a philosophy of the concrete which 
stresses the micro-social at the expense of the grand 
design.26
These judgements were echoed, almost in the same words, though with a
good deal more value-loading, by the political scientist, Colette Ysmal;
The rise of liberal thinking and liberal solutions, 
along with authoritarian, anti-cultural and anti-social 
practices, is being consolidated by the employers' 
gradual take-over of local power, giving a foretaste of 
what may soon be in store at national and state level. 2:7
We deal later with the mistaken notion, explicit in Ysmal, and
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implicit in Fr^montier, that ideas and attitudes developed in a local 
context could or did easily become guides to national political action.
It is more urgent to demonstrate that Fr£montier's suggestion of a 
"massive breakthrough" by the business world is an exaggeration not 
justified either by his own sample, or by other available research. 30 
Firstly, Fr^montier's own sample of RPR interviewees (34 in total) counts 
17 who work in the public sector (50%), 4 professionals (11. /6%) and 13 
who work in business (38.2%), of whom 7 own their own firms and 6 are 
managers. It follows that mayors or deputies with business backgrounds are 
not a majority even in the younger generation, or even when amalgamated 
with the professionals. No matter what "massive" progress they may have 
made in 1983, the business elements had hardly become a dominant force in 
the party by 1984. 33
Other research has shown, furthermore, that local notables with a 
business background had not in fact become very much more numerous in 
Gaullist ranks since the early 1970s. From 1968 to 1981 the proportion of 
owners and managers amongst Gaullist deputies was consistently around 29- 
30%, while the liberal professions contributed around 25%.30 The latter 
group, as Fremontier himself concedes, seems to be on the retreat in his 
own sample. 31
In other words, in 1978 business already accounted for just under 
one-third of Gaullist deputies. Its progress to 38.2% among a specifically 
young sample in 1984 seems to have been at the expense of the liberal 
professions, while the public sector maintained its dominance. It is very 
hard to see how this change deserves to be called a "massive breakthrough 
of the business world".
More grounds for scepticism are provided by research on the
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occupational profile of all 49 Gaullist mayors elected in 1977 and all 98 
elected in 1983 in towns with a population of 15,000 or more. 33 In this 
study we do not have separate figures for those employed in managerial 
grades in the public and private sectors. We know that the category 
including all cadres increased in number from 22 (44.9% of the total) in 
1977 to 54 (55. 1%) in 1983, and within it there may well have been an 
increase in the proportion of private- relative to public-sector managers. 
But we know equally that both the other private-sector categories declined 
in importance; owners from 16.32% to 14.28%, and the professions from 
28.6% to 23.5%. Interestingly not a single Gaullist categorized as 
cominergant or artisan was elected mayor in a town of more than 15,000 
either in 1977 or in 1983. There is little comfort here either, then, for 
the thesis that developments in grass-roots politics were producing a 
massive change in the occupational profile of Gaullist notables in favour 
of managers and patrons, whether large or small.
If Frernontier's quantitative statements are unsound, his conclusions 
are further undermined by the heterogeneity and small size of his 
sample. 33 Both Frernontier and Ysmal have explicitly presumed a link 
between private-sector employment and the breakdown of previously dominant 
dirigist ideas. However, when the actual cases which Frernontier has 
classified as the "business" element are examined, we find that important 
differences between them preclude such a sweeping generalization.
The sample includes Michel Noir (born 1945, RPR deputy for Lyon since 
1978) Alain Carignon (b 1949, RPR mayor of Grenoble since 1983) Odile 
Proust (b 1941, RPR mayor of Louviers since 1983) Christian Bergelin, (b 
1945 RPR deputy for Haute-SAone) Charles Hochart (b 1944, RPR mayor of 
Nemours) and Jacques Godfrain (b 1943, RPR deputy for Aveyron since 1978)
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It is true that before becoming a full-time politician Michel Noir 
ran a business consultancy, yet he is probably one of the most eclectic 
intellectuals among the generation of RPR young turks, whose interests 
range far beyond those referred to by Frernontier and Ysmal. When 
Carignon ran for mayor of Grenoble in 1983, the other candidates on his 
list included half a dozen colleagues from the local Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, of which he was deputy-director. But his election hardly 
Inaugurated a regime of antisocial, anticultural and authoritarian 
practices. On the contrary, after holding a local referendum the new mayor 
carried on many of the projects begun by his Socialist predecessor.3E;
Like Carignon, Odile Proust who formerly worked for one of the 
research groups attached to the CNPF, the main French employers' 
federation was obliged in her professional activity to take a wider view 
of things than Bergelin or Hochart who inherited their haulage and antique 
businesses from their fathers; yet all four are lumped together with Noir 
in Frernontier's business category.
Godfrain, an even more revealing case, sold aero-engines for SNECMA, 
and later travelled the world for the privately-owned French airline,
(JTA3* but that did not make him a carrier of new ideas into the Gaullist 
movement. In fact, like many of Frernontier's young generation, he had been 
around long enough to have fought two parliamentary seats, in 1968 and 
1973, before his safe landing in 1978. That he had fully absorbed the then 
dirigist orthodoxies was soon shown by his demands that the state should 
take a leading role in organizing pork production and the pigmeat market 
and that it should subsidize the merchant navy.3'7 It was only later, after 
the Socialists' 1981 victory that Godfrain came out as defender of free- 
market principles. He explicitly acknowledged his "conversion" from
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dirigism to liberalism, and publicly attributed it to a spell of "work- 
experienceM in an ICI research laboratory organized for him by Entreprise 
et Progres, an offshoot of the employers' movement. 3Q Given that he was 
already an experienced industrial salesman, it is more likely that his 
views had been changing gradually, with the transformation completed in 
order to suit the new political situation which required that the RPR 
attack the Socialists, even if the latter were in some areas applying the 
policies which the Gaullists themselves had operated when in power. 33
This heterogeneity of outlook among the new mayors, obscured by 
Frernontier's and Ysmal's generalizations, is illustrated by my own 
Interviews with a trio of the younger generation, whom I asked directly if 
their choice of liberalism or interventionism in local management was 
linked to their own ideological convictions. The interest of the replies 
given by this micro-sample lies in the fact that one is a would-be 
pragmatist, one calls himself an "old Gaullist", while the third is a 
long-standing liberal. All three had no difficulty in drawing "liberal" 
lessons which matched the party line from their own experience of public 
office, yet one has been a professional politician since his early 
twenties, one is a technocrat, and the third a barrister.
Francois Fillon, deputy for the Sarthe since 1981 and mayor of Sabl6- 
sur-Sarthe since 1983, claims that no particular credo or worked-out view 
of the world governs his political choices - which is entirely appropriate 
in view of the way he drifted into politics following the premature death 
of the sitting deputy. <1° His management of Sable is therefore a prudent 
mixture of economies which helped him keep down the rate of local taxation 
- essential to attract new businesses - although he was one of the first 
RPR mayors to introduce a local income supplement, and chooses himself the
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adjective * interventionist' to describe the commune's involvement with
cultural and sports facilities.
Despite all this, Fillon has no difficulty in drawing from his own 
experience two anecdotes which justify his adhesion to the de-regulatory 
programme developed by the party nationally.
Le Mans, a large city not far from Sabl£, is home to important production 
units of the state-owned car-giant, Renault. Fillon sent to Renault a list 
of local firms anxious to do sub-contracting work for them. He attributes 
the fact that he has never had a satisfactory response to the dead weight 
of Renault's bureaucracy and its remote, centralized management.
The second example is drawn from Fillon's role as parliamentry 
spokesman on defence; a French aircraft producer was ready to export 
twenty or so machines to the kingdom of Jordan. The French ministry of 
Finance, sceptical of Jordan's ability to pay, limited the number to 
eight; enough to convince Fillon and the industrialists involved of the 
superfluous and harmful character of a lot of the ministry's 
regulations. 41
If Fillon, the pragmatist, does not even try to fit his local
policies into an ideological mould, Jean-Fran^ois Mancel, an active and
rather statist Gaullist already in 1968, when he was twenty, believes that
his ideas were changed by his local experience;
At first I was rather hesitant, since I was an old 
Gaullist militant, and, for example, planning is 
something very important to me. . . Incontestably, I had a 
rather statist outlook on politics, and I was a bit 
shocked when liberal ideas first started to make their 
appearance. I used to say 'Can't we reconcile the two?
See if they can work together somehow?' , and in the end 
my ideas changed quite a bit, through contact with the 
real world. I noticed that, the more responsibilities I 
took on, the more I realized that the administration's 
grip was too tight, and in the end it wasn't the state 
which was in charge, but without question the
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bureaucracy, and I think it was that which made rae 
realize that the Gaullist conception of the state had 
been perverted to a large degree by the development 
of a suffocating bureaucracy, and therefore we should 
not hesitate, if we wanted to loosen up French 
society, to go in a more liberal direction, which, 
after all, didn't really go against de Gaulle's 
ideas, since he wasn't a great fan of bureaucracy.
These convictions became even stronger after Mancel took over as
president of the conseil general of the Oise in 1985, although ironically,
like some of his colleagues, he was demanding liberalism nationally in
order that he himself could practise interventionism locally;
It's staggering, for example, that in order to fight 
effectively against unemployment I had to set up an 
association, not an arm of the conseil g4n£ral, but 
an independent association, to have a bit more 
expertise, a bit more flexibility... that it was 
impossible for me to do a certain number of things 
and stay within the existing laws and regulations, 
that if I wanted to make it possible for a firm to 
come and set up in our department by giving it an 
inducement, I had to dress up this inducement in a 
variety of arguments, to avoid being dragged up 
before the administrative courts, effectively by the 
prefect, because it contravened the laws and 
regulations..... /,:2
While Fillon came to local office as an agnostic, and Mancel as a 
"statist", Patrick Devedjian already regarded himself in 1983 as one of 
the most liberal and one of the most pan-European members of what he saw 
as a new generation with less of the traditional Gaullist complexes 
regarding the unique legitimacy of the state and the grandeur of France.
In his commune of Antony (Hauts-de-Seine) he rapidly closed a health 
centre and family planning clinic and two cultural centres, privatized the 
school meals service, and managed, "by a devious method, because it is 
against the law", to convert his staff's traditional thirteenth month of 
salary into a performance bonus. But like many of his more right-wing
colleagues he found that his most popular measure was not disengaging the
local state from the lives of his constituents, but rather the reverse -
the creation of a small communal police force. The new mayor also found
that there were problems he had wanted to resolve by privatization, but to
which, despite his efforts, the private sector offered no solution. One of
these was the poor quality of local public transport. Another was a
scheme, advertised in his manifesto, to privatize the municipal garages,
responsible for maintaining the commune’s modest fleet of vehicles;
We planned to privatize it, and we studied the thing 
very carefully, and, bearing in mind what French 
dealers, French garagists are, they are often behind 
with the work, it wasn't worth it. Because, for
example, I discovered, to my great surprise, that
French garages don't have spare parts. If you take 
them a broken-down car, they say, 'Right, we'11 order 
the part, we'11 have it in a day or so, ' but they 
don't have the part to do. ... On this point, we're
ahead of them, we have a stock of spare parts....
That represents an immobilization of capital, and 
perhaps the private sector can't afford it. 4:3
This episode is trivial in itself, but interesting in that it reveals 
a degree of realism in even the most enthusiastic of the RPR's young
liberals, especially in view of later laments, after the defeats of 1988,
that the party in power had sacrificed its social image to it economic
dogma. It was not enough to dent Devedjian's ideologically grounded
liberal convictions. For the mayor of Antony, the great reform which the 
1986-88 government shied away from was that of the regulations governing 
employment in the civil service, which "have been re-written twice in our 
country by the Communists; once in 1946 by Maurice Thorez, and once in 
1982 by Anicet le Pors."
The civil servants' special status, which Peyrefitte had proposed to
reform back in the 1970s, had also become a major target for Mancel;
And for me, the dead weight of the bureaucracy is 
also bound up with rny civil servants' contracts. When
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I see how I am tied, bound hand and foot, if I want 
to recruit, to reward, to compensate, I think it's 
absolutely mind-boggling, and I'rn campaigning more 
and more for the terms and conditions of civil 
servants in France to be completely re-written. It's 
an aberration, the system is completely crazy.AA
We can now summarize our interpretation of the 1983 municipal 
elections as follows; the results marked a sharp swing in favour of the 
parties of the Right, with the largest share of younger mayors and of 
mayors elected for the first time going to the RPR. Contrary to what some 
have argued, however, the new generation of RPR mayors did notdramatically 
shift the numerical balance among all RPR local politicians in favour of 
representatives of business. An examination of the history and activities 
of a sample of younger business representatives made clear that not all of 
the group shared a common outlook moulded by their business associations, 
nor did they all adopt an aggressively liberal style in their management 
of local affairs. Finally, interviews with a microsarnple of younger RPR 
local politicians showed that all had a general hostility to the 
excessively powerful central civil service, which fitted well with the 
party's new attitude to the state, despite a variety of professional 
backgrounds and loyalty to different ideological traditions.
The Communicators
Having rejected the notion of generational renewal as an explanation 
of the RPR's conversion to liberalism, we next turn to evidence that some 
RPR local politicians - both old and young - responded with modest success 
to mounting citizen dissatisfaction with authoritarian and bureaucratic 
politics. Some exploited new techniques of political comrnunication in 
order to listen to and to win over their constituents. Others tried to
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stimulate or at least join in the expansion of interest in non-party means 
of political expression and mobilisation. However, the party's failure to 
halt the decline of citizen interest and involvement in conventional 
politics, or even to turn dissatisfaction with the Socialists to their own 
account, is a sign of the limited spread of this type of "grass roots 
liberalism" within their ranks.
One aspect of political comrnunication at local level has been simply 
the adoption by local politicians of the same electioneering techniques 
pioneered in the USA and progressively transferred to national European 
politics during the 1960s and 1970s; panel surveys, in-depth interviews, 
frequent opinion polling aimed at carefully identified segments of the 
population, followed by telephoning and direct mail-shots. AS 
The use of these techniques at national level is occasionally the subject 
of heart-searching by commentators, political advisers and politicians 
themselves, who realize that democracy degenerates into demagogy when the 
outcome of elections hinges on the spending of huge sums of money to get 
the candidate's message across, or when the message itself seems too 
closely tailored to what the voters want to hear.
Such guilt feelings are less acute at local level where decisions 
have more direct and palpable effects on voters' lives than those taken at 
national level, and local politicians use the comrnunications industry to 
engage in direct two-way comrnunication with their constituents in order to 
test opinion and explain or justify their actions. One French pundit has 
coined the term equilogue to use in place of dialogue, in order to stress 
the equal status of citizens and politicians in this process.
It is common for a municipal council to consult the local population 
when deciding whether to build, with the same money, a swimming-pool or a
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car-park, a sports centre or an old persons' home. The consultation may be 
purely informal, using radio 'phone-ins'and public meetings, or conducted 
more formally through an opinion poll, in which case the council must 
decide whether to regard the outcome as advisory, or to accept it as 
binding, thus turning the consultation into a local referendum.
Among a few RPR mayors, there is an honourable tradition of 
consultation of their citizens' wishes between elections, headed by one of 
the older generation, the former environment minister Robert Poujade. 
During the 1980s there have been many examples of RPR mayors using the 
opportunities offered by the new technology of comrnunications in order to 
get their messages across, but very few have been willing to empower their 
citizens directly through local referenda.
As Robert Poujade, mayor of Dijon since 1971, progressively endowed 
the city with 300 hectares of public gardens, a public meeting was 
organized to explain and get residents' opinions on each new project as it 
was begun, and grass roots democracy included asking local children to lay 
out the games. Each time a piece of urban development was undertaken, an 
office near the building-site was turned into an annex of the town hall, 
with an elected councillor on hand to deal with citizens' enquiries. <1- 
Like Poujade, Michel Hannoun, mayor of Voreppe CIsere, population 8,000) 
since 1975, built his political base on strong contacts with local 
community groups, believing it is the commune's job to help them stimulate 
local social life. He himself was first elected to the council on the 
strength of his position as the local doctor and founder of the rugby 
club. In 1980 he invented the Stats-generaux de la commune, a week-long 
conference open to all citizens, with discussions devoted to local 
finance, the environment, and "miscellaneous questions."so
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Extending this tradition, Alain Carignon used the procedure of a 
local referendum in deciding whether to continue a transport system begun 
by his Socialist predecessor as mayor of Grenoble. In April 1984 he hosted 
a gathering of mayors of towns won from the left the year before and 
allowed the liberal economist Guy Sorman to outline his ideas on the place 
of liberal management in local government. A measure of agreement was 
established on privatization and non-interventionism in the local economy 
but, to Sorman's chagrin, only Carignon committed himself to the principle 
of direct democracy with citizens themselves able to call for referenda on 
topics which concerned them. B1
Outside Paris, the man most responsible for popularizing 
sophisticated comrnunications techniques within the RPR was probably 
Thierry Saussez, a political comrnunications consultant and himself an RPR 
councillor in Rueil-Malmaison (Hauts-de-Seine). Shortly before the 1983 
local elections he was contacted by a senior conservative mayor who 
informed him that his latest six-monthly poll showed a loss of 3% of 
favourable voting intentions amongst women. Saussez immediately organized 
an enqu£te de motivation, that is, a series of open-ended in-depth 
interviews with 30 local women, conducted by a psychologist. From these it 
was discovered that the mayor was considered a good manager, but rather 
predictable, and was thought to spend insufficient time among his 
constituents; the female electors apparently felt a certain cooling in his 
ardour. This disenchantment was quickly remedied by an expansion of the 
resources going into the campaign, more visits and walkabouts, and the 
projection of a warmer image, with more appearances by the mayor's wife 
and family.
Saussez further recounts how he was able to organize an opinion poll
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which confirmed another conservative client's determination to bid for 
leadership of the right-wing lists, in spite of doubts associated with his 
pied noir and Jewish origins. He went on to become mayor of Mulhouse. In 
another case clever tactics allied to efficient technique helped the RPR 
candidate Raymond Lamontagne to capture the Communist town hall in 
Sarcelles, a working-class suburb of Paris. Helped by the fact that the 
election was re-run in the autumn in a less political atmosphere than that 
surrounding the nation-wide contests in the spring, Saussez eased his man 
home with a telephone campaign among the existing conservative supporters 
and a series of personalized letters which won over the floating 
pensioners' vote. '53
The pundits of political comrnunication stress that their methods 
differ from simple electioneering in that they are global and ongoing. A 
successful campaign must be a whole in which each element, a single 
coherent message, an active candidate, teams of helpers, a newspaper, 
posters and personalized letters, are all equally important and 
interdependent.BA Once elected, the mayor uses a variety of techniques to 
carry on the campaign between elections. The citizens' lettej— boxes are 
regularly stuffed with the colourful free-sheets with titles like Vivre a 
Antony, Notre Quartier, etc. Their texts are scanned by computer to 
eliminate words which are not part of the stock of basic everyday French, 
and they carry a blank page in which readers can inscribe their reactions 
to the message, or express their own concerns. Prominent photographs show 
the mayor opening the latest cr&che or meeting one or the other of the 
local community groups. A classic of the genre is the monthly Ville de 
Paris, set up in 1980, the 200,000 print-run distributed via the mairies 
d' arrondissernent. Between March 1986 and June 1988, while Chirac was prime
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minister, an increase in paid advertising allowed it to expand from 6 
pages to 41, and a few weeks before the first round of voting in the 
Presidential election a six-page spread celebrating 'Paris, international 
capital' featured twenty photographs of the mayor greeting foreign 
leaders.ss
Besides the printed word, many municipalities have adapted their 
messages to more avant-garde technology, such as television screens 
installed in the local buses, the luminous electronic signs which have 
taken their places alongside the familiar billboards, and telematic 
information systems with terminals in public places from which citizens 
can inquire about the council's achievements and intentions.
It is local radio, however, which is perhaps the most prized means of 
two-way communication between citizens and local government. Indeed, 
during the last four years of the Giscard presidency, the government's 
repressive attitude to the largely illegal flowering of commercial radio 
was an important dimension of the would-be liberal President's slide into 
authoritarian isolation. This was highlighted by the Socialist party's 
broadcasts from a Paris flat which led to a famous incident in which 
Mitterrand and other party leaders were confronted by the police.'57 Even 
after the Socialists came to power, however, they were slow to liberalize 
the system, and the right-wing parties in turn took up the agitation 
demanding that the government abandon its paternalistic restrictions and 
allow French broadcasting to grow up.
Local radio was used effectively by Dominiques Perben, one of the 
stars of the 1983 local elections, who captured for the RPR by 102 votes 
the former Socialist bastion of Chalon-sur-Sa6ne. His victory, aided by 
the depressed state of the local textile and iron industries, and by the
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Socialists' clumsy ditching of their sitting mayor, could justifiably be 
regarded as "marginal".
After the election Perben continued to hold every month, in each of 
the town's 12 wards in turn, a public meeting at which his constituents 
were encouraged to air their complaints, criticisms and suggestions. He 
booked a monthly slot on the local commercial radio and for an hour 
replied live to questions put to him over the telephone by the citizens of 
Chalon. This apparently proved effective in encouraging the town-hall 
staff to avoid the kind of dismissive behaviour towards users of the local 
services which might end up being discussed over the air-waves. The new 
mayor ran in the departmental elections in March 1985 with the slogan, "He 
does what he says", and was elected with 53% of the vote in a part of 
Chalon where he had managed 40% two years earlier.Having entered 
parliament at the top of the RPR's list in the election run under the 
proportional system in 1986, he sailed in again two years later, and in 
1989 was re-elected mayor, running up a 59.32% score for his list on the 
first and decisive round of voting.
By 1983, RPR-controiled councils were working a variation on Perben's 
strategy by operating their own radios stations in Aix-les-Bains, Saint- 
Germain-en-Laye, and Digne; in Evry and Bourg-en-Bresse RPR municipalities 
were active partners in broadcasting ventures, and the technique was 
copied by conservative colleagues in a dozen other towns. 59 Paris 
naturally has its own municipal radio, Radio Tour Eiffel, but it is not a 
great commercial success, and its sloppy financing at one moment led to 
rows among the members of Chirac's entourage.60
Cable television is the latest technical development with potentially 
enormous consequences for grass roots political communication. Although an
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arm of the civil service, the Direction Ggnerale des T£14cormunicat ions is 
responsible for supplying and fitting the cable, the town halls will have 
a key role in deciding whether to have cable, and in running and paying 
for local systems.*'1 Paris launched an ambitious plan to connect every 
household by 1992, a target which had to be abandoned because of technical 
difficulties. Despite this flop, the parties of the Left have continued 
to stress the democratic potential of a publicly funded system open to 
locally-made programmes and available free to all households. s53 For the 
Gaullists, Lyonnaise Communication run by Chirac's old friend J6r6me 
Monod, has joined local councils in cable ventures in the Paris suburbs of 
Boulogne-Billancourt, Neuilly, Levallois, Saint-Germain-en-Laye and 
Vincennes, as well as in Cannes, Dijon, Bordeaux, Saint-Mand£, Chambery, 
Epinal and Tours. In each of these cases except Tours the council is 
controlled by the RPR. C/l
As well as attempting, through their mayors, to become a more 
"listening" party, the RPR during the early 1980s began to look more 
favourably than formerly on the activities of non-political community 
associations. Good grass-roots politicians had always known how to build 
and use personal contacts in the local community. Before Michel Giraud 
became mayor of Le Perreux in 1971 he had assembled a local team who 
eschewed the RPR label, calling themselves C E R E S . T h e y  organized 
themselves into a series of work-groups each of which systematically built 
contacts with different categories of residents, in due course producing 
reports of their studies on different local questions, such as the sports 
and cultural facilities, the means of attracting industry to the area, and 
environmental protection. rSS If a party does not set up its own 'front 
organization' of this type to cultivate the grass roots, it must fall back
on its links with local associations. Giraud himself had no doubt that the 
Right's defeat in 1981 was due in large measure to the tendency of both 
Gaullists and Giscardians to abandon to the left this potentially valuable 
electoral terrain. ,5'7'
Opinion polls taken in the late 1970s showed that younger voters in 
France believed participation in consumer organizations, tenants 
associations, environmental groups and so on was a more meaningful form of 
direct democracy than voting in national referenda. A majority of all 
voters, but especially those on the left, thought that this type of 
association did not play a big enough role in French life. RPR 
sympathizers were the only politically identified group amongst whom a 
relative majority thought such associations played just about the right 
role.
By 1983 there were signs that others had come round to Giraud's point 
of view. Alain Juppe wrote that the annual rate of creation of new 
associations in France had increased from 30,000 in 1977 to over 40,000 in 
1982, reaching a total of half a million, covering some twenty million 
members. He believed that, by 1983, 47% of the population were involved in
such groups, compared to 28% in 1967. 69
In contrast to this, the standing of political parties in public 
opinion declined steadily during the period 1977-84. Whereas in 1977 53% 
of those asked had a globally favourable view of politicians, by 1985, a 
clear majority thought they were liars who didn't care about ordinary 
people.ro
Once the Socialists were in power, many commentators noted signs that 
the Right had rediscovered the value of community activism. In June 1982 
the RPR organized a series of workshops (.carrefours) for liberty and
progress in each department, and launched themselves into a range of new
organizations, including local radios, consumer and professional
organizations and the more overtly political clubs, all of which were to
act as transmission belts between party and society.^1
One of the longer-standing enthusiasts for this type of grass-roots
politics was Jacques Baurnel, a former general secretary of the party.
Ruei1-Malmaison, of which he is deputy and mayor, figures frequently in
the programme of the Inst it ut. du Citoyen as a venue for the training of
would-be mayors; it counts the publicist Thierry Saussez among the mayor's
adjoints, and is associated in a local radio station with neighbouring
Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Baurnel's Association pour une t£l£vision de libre
expression CATELE) was founded in an attempt to canalize widespread
conservative outrage at the new government's re-allocation of the top
television jobs in the state system it had inherited from Giscard. In
association with Solidarity et Libertds, a grouping of conservative
parliamentarians headed by Charles Pasqua, ATELE organized a study group
of media workers to keep a close watch on programme content.12 Aside from
his specific interest in broadcasting, Baurnel sees an important general
role for community groups in local politics;
It's the end of the reign of the notables. From now
on, politicians will not be able to function without
the support of associations which constitute 
irreplacable links with public opinion.73
Bernard Debr£, son of Michel, who himself became an RPR deputy in
1986, founded Solidarity Mydicale in November 1981, to campaign against
the Communist health minister's threat to end private practice in public
hospitals. The organization fused with the Union National pour 1'Avenir de
la Mydydne to form Avenir et Liberty in January 1982, which was intended
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to help service and organize any profession which felt itself to be under 
threat. 7"'1 The doctors' defence organiztions rapidly hit the headlines 
with noisy demonstrations and sit-downs on the railway lines. They also 
formed an effective transmission-belt for the mobilization of the immense 
demonstration against the Socialists' education reforms in June 1984.
Also present on that day was UNIR, the Union Nationale pour 
1'Initiative et la Responsabilitd, founded in May 1982 by Jean-Maxirne 
Lev&que, the former managing director of a recently nationalized bank, the
Credit Commercial de France. L£v§que aimed to organize a coalition of 
businessmen, farmers, managers, professionals and investors which would 
make its presence felt in local institutions like the chambers of 
commerce, and the conseils de prud'hommes, 7B as well as in the municipal 
and cantonal elections. By October 1982 UNIR claimed 11,000 members and 
the affiliation of a number of representative organizations. ^
Meanwhile the indefatigable Michel Giraud had joined Alain Chevalier 
and others in trying to bring together each week some 50 or so fellow 
members of the same economic elites addressed by L6v6que, in order to 
outline the avenues of participation in public life, and to encourage them
to consider standing for their local council. Yet another such 
transmission belt between politicians and the business class was Oxyg&ne, 
formed in September 1981 by 20 or so Parisian young patrons with no 
previous strong attachment either to the RPR or the UDF. Their aim was to 
drum up support among their fellow employers for right-wing candidates at 
election times - a role they performed successfully on behalf of Alain 
Peyrefitte, whose narrow parliamentary defeat in June 1981 was annulled on 
a technicality and refought in January '82. The following March Oxyg&ne 
campaigned for four candidates in the Val d'Oise. In between elections
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they intended to meet monthly to dream up new political themes. 77
Some of what the press called the opposition's "new circuits"7® were 
especially concerned with ideas and programmes, and were set up in an 
attempt to re-invigorate the parties rather than by-pass them. Devaquet 
founded Science et Social 6, Juppe and Michel Aurillac founded the Club 
'89; a UDF politician, Georges Mesrnin, became the president of GRALL 
<Groupe de Reflexion, d'Animation et de Liaison des Lib6raux) These 
organizations completed a range of right-wing think-tanks already in 
existence, of which the most influential were GRECE <Groupement de ;
Recberches et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Europeennes), the Club de 
l'Morloge, CIEL (Coinite des Intellect uels pour 1' Europe des Libert 6s), and
I / '
the Giscaidian Clubs Perspectives et R6alit6s. The Cercles Universitaires 
aimed at the "rehabilitation of the intellectual's status as an academic", 
which was allegedly threatened by the fashion for political commitment.7®’ 
More than a hundred of the Cercles' members planned to be candidates at
the March 1983 local elections.
Despite the efforts of Baurnel and Giraud, however, and despite the 
party's official recognition of citizens' growing demands to be involved 
in decisions which concern them, by 1984 the RPR was not using
associations to build bridges between itself and the voters any more than
it had in the past. While 54% of delegates to its 1978 congress were 
members of associations, only 41% of delegates to the 1984 congress 
were. One reason could be that the 1978 congress was a special one, 
called at short notice, and contained a larger proportion of higher level 
party officials than the 1984 congress; the 1984 study itself found that 
association membership was higher (at 48%) among those holding public 
elected posts and national or departmental responsibilities in the party
-179-
than the average for the whole sample. 01 The party leadership ought 
perhaps to have been worried, however, by another finding that, among 
delegates to the 1984 congress, the rate of association membership was 
between 45% and 53% for those who had joined the Gaullist movement before 
1976, whereas the rate was at 40-41% among those who had joined since 
1976.
There are other signs of the party's inability to tap into a new 
layer of supporters at grass-roots level. The new think tanks were often 
limited to a narrow circle of Parisians, many of whom held joint 
membership in several of them. Corporatist organizations like Solidarity 
M^dicale inevitably evoked no long-term sympathy or support outside the 
ranks of the doctors themselves. Most significantly of all, as the result 
of the 1986 legislative elections showed, grass-roots disenchantment with 
"official" politics worked to the advantage of the Front National, rather 
than that of the established Right. Jean-Marie le Pen and his friends not 
only picked up the protest vote, but also achieved a genuine federation 
of diverse political forces, Including catholic integrists, and one or two 
of the leaders of the Paris-based clubs, such as Jean-Yves le Gallou, of 
the Club de l'Morloge, who figured among the speakers called on by the 
Giraud-Chevalier circle. Significantly, however, Le Pen also drew recruits 
from the ranks of the RPR itself.
At the beginning of 1986, he announced an alliance with the CAR 
(.Comitys d'Action Rypublicaine), led by Bruno Megret, who had been an RPR 
candidate in the legislative elections of 1978 and 1981. 6,3 The CAR claimed 
to be neither a party nor a study circle, but adopted a genuine grass­
roots strategy, each local group being supposed to develop into a contre- 
pouvoir, the nucleus of popular opposition to the Socialists. In the
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autumn of 1982, Megret claimed 100 committees and some 4,000 member®* 
Whatever the truth of this, or of the CAR’s potential ability to channel 
local discontents, during 198G it was effectively swallowed by the FN, 
while Megret himself emerged as a ubiquitous and effective television 
performer for his new party, especially during the two election campaigns 
of 1988. As an ingenieur des ponts et chaussees, he was one of the narrow 
circle of top civil servants who have dominated political life in the 5th 
Republic, and had been in the ministerial cabinet of the Gaullist minister 
Robert Galley in the late 1970s. His career is an eloquent symbol of the 
RPR's difficulties. Far from expanding its audience among new activists in 
grass-roots politics, the party was unable to hang on to some of those who 
were its classic source of leadership recruitment.
By writing in favour of greater citizen participation in local 
politics, we may say in conclusion, RPR intellectuals like Alain Juppe and 
Michel Moir have followed the modest lead of party mayors such as Robert 
Poujade and Michel Hannoun. This tradition has been taken up and amplified 
in practice in different ways by people like Carignon, Perben, Baurnel and 
Bernard Debit, supported by the activities of the publicist Thierry 
Saussez. But this current remains a minority within the RPR. Only Carignon 
deliberately bound himself in advance to the verdict of a local referendum 
on a major issue.
Meanwhile, citizen discontent with establishment politics has spawned 
a variety of new community and interest groups, and a new party, the Front 
National. This, and the RPR's lack of success in turning anti-Socialist 
sentiment to its own advantage, is a sign of the relative weakness of the 
party's swing in favour of decentralisation and communicative politics.
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It follows that, If citizen rebellion against the over-mighty state 
played a i olt in provoking tire RPR leadership to attack what it had 
previously r sver ed, this should not be seen as their response to an impulse
the state, and although these wei e set ious concerns tor some in the party, 
they should be seen as minor conti ibutions to a transformation brought 
about laiguly by other causes.
T h e  M a n a g e r  s
In France, as in Britain, collective public services in towns and 
villages have been made available over tire years by both public 
intervention and private enterprise; often by the two together. In Britain 
irr the 1980s central government has striven to swing the balance in favour 
of the pr ivate sector for two reasons; fir stly there ought to be a global 
reduction in public spending, because it is inflationary; secondly, local 
government ought only to provide the services which citizens are willing to 
pay for, prefer ably at the point of distr ibution - failing that, by means 
of a f1 at—rate local tax,
In France the context has been completely different, Socialist central 
government did cut back on subsidies to local government for budgetary 
reasons from 1932-8G, but this was not accompanied by a strongly anti- 
interventionist message, and indeed the government was probably only too 
glad when some local authorities did their best to fill the gap and 
maintain existing services. In towns where they held power, RPR mayors were 
able, if they wished, to test liberal and privatizing policies in practice 
before they returned to central government in 1986. The decentralization 
laws passed in 1982 and 1983 provided a new insitutional framework in which
working its way up from the lower ranks. Although the party programme cites
citizen responsibility and participation as reasons for the turn against 
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the application of modern management techniques in local government could 
flourish - irrespective of the political colour of the local council.
In this last part of the chapter we first outline the new 
institutional framework of local government, and then show that the RPR 
nationally apparently made no allowance for this in the limited 
preparations made for the 1983 local elections. The readiness of some 
mayors, consciously or unconsciously, to adopt a liberal rhetoric at 
national level at the same time as interventionist behaviour at local 
level, indicates that there Iras been little attempt by the party to co­
ordinate the two, and no obvious impetus given by the grass roots to 
national policy formation. In Paris a swing towards privatisation, already 
discernible as early as 1972, was accelerated after 1981 alongside 
continuing Interventionism in some policy areas. The Paris policy lias not 
been slavishly imitated by other RFR mayors, some of whom believe that it 
was based on unique circumstances not easily reproduced elsewhere.
A large part of the insitutional entanglements which had hitherto kept 
local government in thrall to the centre were swept away by the first 
Socialist decentralization law of 2nd March 1982. From that moment the 
mayors and presidents of the departmental and regional councils each became 
the effective executive officers of their respective tiers of government. 
They could borrow, make loans or grants to local firms, and sign contracts 
with other public or private economic actors without the prior permission 
of the prefects which had always been necessary previously. In future, the 
appropriateness of their action would be judged by their electors, its 
legality by the cour ts.
There is plenty of evidence that the new freedoms and responsibilities
have led to a change in style in local government, for so long symbolic of 
the unchanging parochialism of the French provinces. Change has been 
actively sponsored by the Association des Mai res de France, which in 1984 
inaugurated an annual week-long Liade-fair aiming to bring some of France's
36,000 mayors into contact with a large number of public and private 
agencies from which they could buy hardware or hire expertise, or to whom 
they could sell the franchise on airy public services they no longer wished 
to run directly. The titles of some of the seminars on offer at the 1985 
Mair ie-Expo give an idea of its ambiance; "Office automation for the town 
hall: how to choose what's best for you", "Cost control: new accounting
methods for everyone."®*7 Naturally these subjects are of interest to mayors 
of all political persuasions. Tn similar vein are the activities of the 
Fondation pour la gestion des villas, set up in 1983, and run jointly by 
businessmen and mayors or councillors of both Right and Left.®^
One way to improve the commune's performance is to call lit outside 
help. Christian Dupuy, RPR mayor of Suresnes, (Hauts-de-Seine) is one who 
ordered an independent audit from a firm of consultants soon after taking 
over in 1983, arid Ire would do the same again if re-elected in 1989.®® The 
mayors also call on experts in money management to help them raise loans 
for new projects, or, more frequently, re-negotiate uncomfortable existing 
debts contracted at high rates during an inflationary period at a time when 
the communes were more or less obliged to borrow their money from para- 
state organizations like the Caisse des Dep&ts et Consignations.
Ironically, the relatively sudden freeing of local authorities from tire 
state's financial tulelle turned them into potential gold-mines for private 
(including foreign) banks which competed furiously to win a share of this 
lucrative and safe market, with the result that the town halls found
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themselves in a borrowers' market.®®
Although mayors may hire business expertise from time to time, their 
major challenge lias been to inculcate in the municipal workforce itself the 
understanding that its job is to provide the best set vices at the lowest 
prices. This could lead to pruning, but equally, to a search for more and 
better qualified staff whose tasks would include devolving decision-making 
to the lowest possible levels, isolating cost centres, managing the debt, 
making sure that contracts with local firms are agreed at a time when their 
order-books are depleted, and avoiding paying taxes arid bills before it is 
necessary.®0 This is reflected in demands for on-the-job training. In 1987,
130.000 of the 800,000 strong municipal work-force took courses of one kind 
or another at the Centre de Formation des Personnels Communaux (CFPC). Of 
the 35,000 highest grade staff, 10,000 applied to do courses for which
6.000 places were available. In 1984 the CFPC had tried to fill the gap by 
opening the Institut des Hautes Etudes Territoriales at Fontainebleau. The 
45-day r_our ses spread over 6 months wei e beseiged by the town halls' chief— 
executives, the secretaires generaux, who had arrived at the summit of a 
careei traditionally considered secure and unexciting, demanding with one 
voice training in le management.
Aftei the removal of prefectoral interference In their decisions, a 
second institutional reform which helped foiward the communes' ability to 
streamline their budgets and 'improve' their provision of local services, 
at the same time strengthening co-operation with private industry, 
concerned the regulations governing Societes d*Ecanomie Mixte. CSEM) 
Literally, 'mixed economy company’, the SEM is a commercial and legal 
framework which covered the par tnership between local authorites, the state 
and pr1vate industry in the massive construction and development effort of
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the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, when Ft ance underwent a rapid
industrialization accompanied by a shift of population from the countryside 
to the towns.
The status of the SEMs, altered in piecemeal fashion since they were 
created in 1926, was given a new dimension by tire law of 7th July 1983, 
deliberately conceived to fit in with the ongoing decentralization process. 
Before, they had been forbidden to distribute profits, and their activities 
had been limited strictly to the construction of roads, bridges, and other 
transport facilities, the building and servicing of factory and housing 
estates, or the management of such completed Installations. After' 1983 they 
could be set up without the pr lot permission of the state, wer e free to 
involve themselves in a much bigger range of economic activities, and could 
decide whether to redistribute the benefits of collective activity to their 
constituent partners.
The result was a flowering of new types of SEM concerned with a new 
range of activities, such as tire installation and/or management of car- 
par ks, municipal computer arid cable networks, transport systems, concert 
halls, exhibition sites and sports complexes. '•Sk® During the 1980s the number 
of SEMs in existence, which had stagnated during the 1970s economic slump, 
grew rapidly to reach 925 in 1987; meanwhile the proportion of management- 
only SEMs increased from 19% of the total (in 1980) to 32%.
Tire rebit th of the SEM r epresents an addition to the range of models which 
a local authority can choose from in deciding how to run its local services 
or develop the local environment, It takes its place alongside the regie, 
which means simply dir ect ownership and control by tire local authority; the 
concession, whereby tire franchise on a former ly municipal operation, such 
as the school dinners service, is sold to a private firm which is itself
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responsible for the capital investments necessary to keep the operation 
pr ofitable; and af f ermage which is similar, but the local authority 
guarantees the investments.
The popularity of tire SEM is due to several advantages; it allows a 
number of communes to associate together or with tire department as well as 
with a private partner, thus allowing them to undertake fairly large 
projects; since Lire SEM operates according to financial and legal rules 
similar to those governing the private sector', the commune can get round 
the regulations governing its own employees' conditions of service; but 
since, by law, the local authority is obliged to contribute between 50% and 
80% of the SEM's funding, control of decision-making rests with elected 
officials.
Politically, tire use of the SEM highlights the convergence of 
attitudes of both Right and Left to relations between the commune and the 
local economy. The creation of a SEM to take over- previously fully 
municipal services is a useful option, short of full privatization, which 
could enable an aggressively liberal mayor to reduce the commune's wage 
bill and rate of indebtedness, and subject local ser vices to tire discipline 
of the market place. Such an interpretation could be put on Chirac's 
decision to create a SEM to run the Eiffel Tower; full privatization was
not art option because no pr ivate company was willing or' able to meet the
large investments needed to turn it into a profitable operation.
But the SEM formula in another situation looks different; the
management of the Far is underground car-parks, which could have been 
completely privatized, was given to a SEM because it was felt that tire 
questions of public safety involved required tire city to retain the 
deciding voice. -,G On the other hand, when Communist-run La Ciotat, uses a
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SEM to manage the local water supply, and another to set up business 
parks®** this can be seen either as a 20% privatisation, or alternatively as 
the council fulfilling, by up-to-date means, the traditional Communist 
policy of public intervention in the economy.
The use of the same interventionist tools by authorities of different 
political complexion, and the spread of a "management culture" in local 
government has inevitably blurred differences between party policies, A 
Socialist mayor, Jacques Chantrot of Poitiers, could tell Le Monde in 1988 
that it was perfectly acceptable to run public transport according to 
market principles, and even to privatize it;®'7 Jacques Boyon, RFR president 
of the conseil genSral of the depar trnent of Ain, believes that, since 
public transport always runs at a loss, it belongs in the public sector,®0 
With this thought, we turn to Jacques Chirac's activities as mayor of 
Par i s.
Tire commune of Paris in its present form dates only from 1977. It was 
therefore the state itself, in the shape of the prefect, who authorized the 
council to give permission to the firm of Decaux to supply and erect 1,800 
bus shelters in the city in 1972, followed by 1,200 information boards in 
1976. The town paid and received nothing; Decaux took his profit from the 
commercial advertising sold on the installations which he maintained 
himself. In 1981 private enterpiise began to cater for even more vital 
needs of the people of Paris with the first 400 fully automatic public 
conveniences, complemented by 78 motor-cycles and r iders r eady to clear up 
after the city's dogs. Maintenance, as before, was guaranteed by Decaux, 
but tliis time, the city had to pay.®®
In 1975 the city and the prefect decided, against the advice of the 
pi ime minister of the day, Jacques Chirac, to begin the payment of a
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supplement to Far is pensioners to ensure that all had an income at least 
equal to the state-decreed minimum wage, When Chirac left Matignon and 
ar i ived at the town hall, the pensioners looked less like an administrative 
anomaly and more like 30% of the electoi ate. He increased the number of old 
persons' homes and instituted a means-tested free-travel entitlement for 
senior citizens. The city's supplementary family allowance to non-working 
mothers of I In ee or more childr en, begun in 1980, was followed in 198G by a 
housing benefit, payable to families of four children or more, which was 
meant to defray part of the increase in rents produced by the Chirac 
government's own new housing law. 100
As these examples demonstrate, when Chirac became mayor in 1977 he 
inherited a tradition in the management of Paris which combined 
paternalistic and electorally useful interventionism with a willingness to 
turn progressively to the private sector when it was enterprising enough - 
dh it was in the person of Decaux - to anticipate new needs. This 
I netementalism was evident in the other 'privatizations' of the period
1981-83. Iti line with the 'less-state' platform on which lie had contested
the 1981 presidential election Chirac encouraged his staff to turn more and 
more to the private sector as opportunities arose.101
When lie 1 an for mayor the second time in 1983, however, on a platform
which praised the efficiency of the town hall staff, Iris expansion of their 
number by 6,000 (21%), and the important investments undertaken by the 
city, 103S this was consistent with the modest extension of the private 
domain up until then. Likewise, interventionism was not limited to a rather 
grubby scrabbling for votes. The city's public housing budget was tripled 
during the first mandate, and Chirac complained of not being able to build 
more houses because of a fall—off in government subsidy. The city gave a
subsidy to the Orchestra de Paris, created a new chamber ensemble, and 300 
new studios for art and dance, as well as 16 special workshops where young 
people could practise a range of activities from computing through motor­
cycle maintenance to kayaking. In the six years from 1977 to 1983 five of 
the twenty planned arcondissment theatres were opened, along with ten 
conservatoires for music, dance and acting. The number of municipal cr&ches 
was doubled, and seventeen municipal short-stay child-minding centres 
opened, along with a dozen assorted private child-care centres subsidized 
by the city. 103
Despite his election platform, however, the beginning of Chirac's 
second mandate as mayor marked the rapid acceleration of the privatization 
programme. In 1984-5 the municipal undertaking service was scrapped 
following a fire and a corruption scandal; maintenance of the cemeteries 
and the Pure-Lachaise cremator i urn went in 1986; by the end of 1987 refuse 
collection was 20*% private, with the final target given as 50%. In 1985 the 
incinerator plants w e r e  handed over by Electricity de France to a joint 
venture of public and private shareholders. The biggest and most lucrative 
contract of all was also signed in 1985; tire transfer of the revenue from 
the distribution of the Paris water supply to two private firms for 25 
years in exchange for their promise to make whatever investemnts would be 
required. Two years later the same companies got a second bite - 15% each 
of the joint venture which tire city created for the purification plants, 
despite an earlier decision to keep them in public ownership.
Altogether some 27 of the city's depar tments and wot kshops wer e 
af fecLed by the privatization programme1'’'1 which ended, logically, with the 
closure of the city's depar tment of "commercial and industrial services" 
and tire r utir ement of its head in 1907. The only group of wor kers to mount
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d hal I ser i o u s  protest against this vast, pt ogr amme wera the dustbin-man; 
the size of the Paris work-force - about 37,000 ~ and the legal protection 
at 101 ded woikers by their status as public servants meant that 11, was 
neither necessary nor legally possible to sack them. Some 2-3,000 jobs were 
shed by natural wastage, the rest of those affected by the closures re­
deployed within Paris.10-
Though defended by the mayor and his team on the ground of prudent 
management, the acceleration of privatisation in Paris was motivated by a 
mixture of ideology, political strategy and clientelism. The firm which 
benei'itted most from tire process was Lyonnaise des Eaux, run by Chirac's 
old Friend Jer 6me Monod. The water privatization seemed particularly 
gratuitous; though old, Paris' water pipes were in good condition, having 
been tire object of a complete overhaul in 1965, arid, uniquely, were 95% 
accessible through tire wide drains built during Haussmann's redevelopment 
of Paris in I.he 19th century. The price paid for their water by the 
consumers rose steeply by one—third between 1984 and 1987, and was expected 
to rise overall by 50% by 1990. The city budget gained little, 106 and the 
winners were tire companies, but the affair did not lead to any serious 
political protest probably because of its technical nature.
Tire same was not true of the closure, from 1983 to 1988, of half of 
the health centres run by city's Bureau d'Aide Soclale, which the tiny 
opposition in the town lrall alleged was inspired by a doctors' campaign 
against "unfair" competition. The clinics' traditional role was to cater 
for that part of tire city's population not covered by the social security 
system, and ther efore not able to secure reimbur sement of tire fees charged 
by a GP. They were also resorted to by poorer citizens unable to pay the 
one-third of GP's fees required of those in work. The centres represented
expenditure of the tax-payers* money within the Paris system of "municipal 
socialism", analagous to the income supplements already mentioned. The 
council argued that tire clinics were no longer needed since the whole 
population and the majority of GP's were now conventionn€s, that is 
tegistered with tire social security system. The opposition replied tIrat in 
the 1980s a significant and growing minority of Parisians were not 
registered, and could not be because they had never worked; as fast as the 
centres were closed, the gap in provision was filled by clinics opened by 
two voluntary organizations called Remade and Medecins du Monde. ""-'7
Whatever the true extent of Lire doctors' influence on the mayor's 
pulicy, the authors of two rather different studies of Chirac's Par is 
detected an ideological-political impetus in the timing of the 
privatisation programme; the idea was to get rid of part of the city's 
investment budget, reduce t unning costs, and make it possible to cut local 
taxation while maintaining services intact. Then Chirac would be able to 
present himself to the country in 1986 with the argument — 'What T have 
done for Par is, I can do for Fr ance. ' 1
In the event, Chirac did keep tire rise in local taxation below tire 
rate of inflation in his second mandate, (it had risen faster' than 
inflation in his interventionist first mandate) but it was meaningless to 
use this as an argument in national politics. Paris is by far tire 
wealthiest city in France, deriving a large income from the hundreds of 
company hesdquar lets and international agencies which it shelters, and has
always, with or without Chirac, err joyed an extremely low rate of local
taxation, 1 os*
From this follows a double conclusion; firstly, Chirac would find it
hard to do for the country what Ire had apparently "done" for tire city;
secondly, viawed strictly from the point of view of providing good-quality 
services from a balanced budget, the privatizatons were unnecessary. Except 
when it tepresented a potential market coveted by private lobbies, tire 
city's social programme lias not suffered fi cm budgetary constraint. Apart 
from tire introduction of private capital into its construction programine, 
the council did not seek to privatize public housing, either by the sale of 
individual flats or by the signing over of entire blocks to new landlords, 
as in the UK. Tire only time it attempted to reduce payment of its income 
supplements, it was in order to withdraw the third-child allownce from 
immigrant families, a move which was annulled by tire courts in 1984. ' 10 In 
short, the management of tire capital - as we discover next - had no 
compelling lessons for RFR mayors in tire rest of the country.
The difficulty of comparing the political choices made in Paris and in 
other towns, given the discrepancy in their means, is increased by the 
territorial ramifications of French local government. In many of tire larger 
French cities, as in tire capital, tire extent of the commune which gives its 
name to tire whole is often quite small. Par is itself is confined to the 
relatively small area bounded by the boulevard peripherlque and containing 
a met e two million residents - small for a capital city. Itr the same way, 
the communes of Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux, and Strasbourg cover- only part of 
the areas to which they give their names; neighbouring former villages 
enclosed by urbanization have kept their independence and identity as 
separate communes. In these cities, but not in Paris, a special tier of 
local government was invented in 19GG to deal with problems affecting the 
whole urban area and best dealt with jontly - the communaute urbaine, These 
bodies can raise their own taxes, and they have wide powers in tire areas of
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town planning and industrial development. ! !1 Although these larger units 
have the!i own councils, in which the pai ticipant communes are represented 
proportionately to their population, the decisions which they arrive at are 
often the result of complex bargains in which communal loyalties may cut 
across political affiliation. In tire mid-1980s, conservative Strasbourg had 
to co-operate with socialist Schiltigheirn, conservative Lyon with socialist 
V'illeurbane; in 1983 socialist Lille was faced, unusually, by conservative 
Roubaix and Tourcoing. Because of these configurations it is impossible to 
read off from say Strasbourg's or Lille's record on any one subject what 
attitude has been taken by the local councillors of different parties.
With this proviso entered, it is clear the RFR did not fight the 1983 
local elections on a liberal platform. Jacques Boyon, Dglthgue national for 
local government at the rue de Lille from 1981 to 1984, had prime 
responsibility for preparing the party for this contest. He is less of an 
ideologue than a cautious technocrat, an exact contemporary of Chirac's at 
the Ecole Nationale d' Administration, who was sufficiently in his leader's 
confidence to have been a member of his election campaign committee in 
1981, and to have worked, as we have seen, in an unofficial capacity at the 
town hall as well as in an official one at party headquarter s.
In the run-up to the elections Boyon organized tire production of a 
popularly written book, Un Homme et sa Ville, containing interviews with a L 
varied selection of some 14 RFR mayors, together with some background 
information about their achievements in their communes, varying in size 
from Boyon's own hourg to Chirac's Far is. 1 1 - Tire images given pr iority are 
reassurance and continuity rather than rupture and reform; the local state 
is pictured as protective as well as efficient, the mayors avuncular rather 
than thrusting and dynamic. There is hardly a mention of privatizations or
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streamlining of lowri-hall budgets in the entire book, except perhaps for 
Chirac's plans for private co-operation in providing more creches in-Faris 
during his next mandate. 113
Boyon's choice of the candidates who would speak for the party in Un 
Homme et sa Ville, was clearly guided by their interventionist records as 
much as by the representativity of their communes. In Boulogne-Billancourt, 
the old left Gaullist Georges Gorse, prides himself on two minibus services 
paid for by the commune and provided free to 2,000 residents making daily 
north-south trips not covered by Paris transport's normal services.
Boulogne fully funds tire municipal theatre and runs a cultural centre 
which, in addition to the usual conference halls and exhibitions, houses a 
conservatoire where 30 disciplines are taught to 1,500 students. Inside the 
town hall there is a kind of mini-university where every day 50 to 200 
people receive free lessons in subjects such as English, law and 
1 i t er at ur e. 1 ! 4
L-iaini-Ger main—en—Laye, another of the ur ban communes ringing Far is,
has a social pr ogt amine r ivalling that of its large neighbour, with a
pensioner s' income supplement, municipal transport services after 9.00
p. m. , and a special minibus for the taxi - ing of handicapped people. 1 f
Like Par is, Boulogne, and Valenciennes (RFR mayor; Pierre Carous) Saint-
Germain has not been afraid to spend public money on cultural projects,
despite the generally austere economic situation of the early eighties.
Michel Per icur u, RPR mayor since 1977, a former broadcaster, pr omised a
municipal museum and a theatre for his next mandate, if re-elected in 1983;
I think that in a per iud of economic cr isis, everything 
which seems superfluous becomes even more 
indispensable. The more fraught life is, the more 
ardent is the need for cultural activities. 1 1 ^
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The commune oi' Digne, (Alpes—de-Haute-Provence) not only took over a
moribund thermal spa with the help of government subsidies, turning it into
a going concern attracting 4,000 visitors a year, but bought, renovated and
for three years managed directly a local hotel. According to tire RFR mayor,
Pierre Rinaldi;
The communes are being brought more and more often to 
intervene in the economy; it's not their main role, but 
there are opportunities which shouldn't be missed. 1 1
Without the advantages of alpine scenery, mayors recognize that one of 
their essential tasks is to attract industry to their commune. This can 
involve quite a degree of interventionism even when the commune is not 
itself aiming to manage anything. In the planning of a new industrial 
estate, the commune of Joigny (Yonnne, population 12,000, RFR mayor, 
Philippe Auberger ) buys the necessary land, chooses the architect together 
with prospective firms, and finances the necessary construction; the firms 
lease or buy back the completed sites over fifteen years.11e
If, for one reason or another, a commune can' t pay its way, there is
always subsidy. By 1983 some RFR mayors had not sufficiently absorbed the 
new liberal orthodoxy to hide their tendency to view the central government 
budget as a bottomless gold-mine. Paul Kauss, RFR Senator and mayor of 
Bischwiller (Vosges, population 10,843) engineered a syndicat 
in ter communal, a grouping of his own commune with neighbouring smaller 
ones, which helped win exceptionally high 50% subsidies from the state and 
the department for the cost of a stadium and sports centre, cultural 
projects and road improvements. 1 {B Per icard claimed that attention to all
possible opportunities enabled him to multiply several times the total of
subsidies which Saint-Germain was able to obtain from the state, the region 
and the depar traent. 1 ,:r’ Hector Rolland, RPR mayor of Moulins, (Allier,
population 2G,90G) has endowed his modest town with an immense sports
centre allowing it to stage European basket-ball matches, international
table-tennis and the world trampoline championships. The secret?
I am one of the mayors who has got the most subsidies 
for his town, but I never gave them any peace, so to 
get rid of me, they finish by giving me what I'm asking 
for.
These were the reflections on management style in local government 
which the RPR leaders wished to place before the elctorate in 1983; my own 
interviews carried out since then confirm that a pragmatic blend of 
interventionism and liberalism is still followed by Gaullist mayors of 
different generations, while there has been a mixed reception for the Paris 
experiment which was then getting under way.
Fhilippe Auberger, tire young mayor of Joigny, and Andre Fanton,
adjoint to the mayor of Llsieux from 1903 to 1989, both believe that
successf ul pr i vat icat!oil depends on size. Fanton, though in favour of the
communes shedding some of their managerial functions, thought that it was
too difficult to redeploy locally the staff displaced by the transfer of
their work to the private sector. He believed that Pat is, where the
workforce numbered over 30,000, had an exceptional advantage. Auberger's
objection is based more on the 'personal' character of many of tire services
performed by the communal workforce. Confounding them both, Jacques Boyon,
mayor oi Pont d' Ain, population in 1983, 2, 2GG) believes that Far is
Iras "not gone vtr y far", since the city's household t ubbish is etill
collected by tire municipality, while itr Font d1 Ain it has been handed over
to a private firm,
which picks up all the r ubbish in two hours with two 
people, (whereas before) ...It took four hours and 
three people, which goes to show that even in a small 
commune it's not always best to do everything 
your sel f. 1 23
The privatizing trail has been followed avidly by a number of RPR 
communes which have conceded their school meals' services to piivate 
opei atoi s, and closed down cultural and health centres which were regarded 
as loss-making. Tn some respects, one or two mayors have wanted to go 
further than Paris. Patrick Devedjian, elected mayor of Antony (Hauts-de- 
Seine) in 1903, hoped to sell off during his second mandate, beginning in 
1989, 500 of his commune's 7,000 public housing units. 1:23
In the case of health ot family planning clinics, closed in Antony and 
in Noisy-le-Grand CSeine-Saint-Denis), the argument usually deployed has 
been that there is no reason wiry the commune should finance something which 
is available through local doctors registered with the social security 
system. 1 :"'i- In the case of cultural centres tire budgetary argument is 
deployed in conjunction with the suggest ion that they would make money if 
they stopped showing communist propaganda and started putting on things 
which people wanted to see. Some closures therefore excited sharp protests 
and were given wide publicity, as was the case in Saumur and Chalon-sur- 
Saone. 1
These attitudes of younger RPR mayors elected for* tire first time in 
1983, contrast with the more pragmatic approach still followed by more 
experienced figures. Dinard, in Brittany, has had a privately run water- 
system for GO year s, but the commune has a stake in the local casino, and 
in 197G did not demur at buying a large hotel which came on to the market, 
and turning over its management to a mixed public-private company. In 1989 
Yvon Bourges, the mayor for 2G years, still saw no reason to privatize tire 
school meals service, since it was managed competently by a man 'himself 
risen Irom the ranks.' 1
As we argued at the start of this chapter, however, it would be a
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mistake to attribute too much importance to generational renewal. Francois
Fillon in Sabl£-sur-Sarthe, and Alain Carignon in Grenoble were among those
instituting municipal income supplements when they took over in 1983.
Furthermore, even those concerned above all with prudent management did not
set out to achieve their aims with wholesale cats. 127
Belying the RPR's image as a ceiiti alized party, the rue tie Lille made
no attempt to orient the progt amines presented by the candidates locally. An
association for local politicians, (the Association des £lus locaux
adherents du RFR el sympathisants) which might have played a xole in
harmonizing approaches acxoss the counntxy, was founded only in May 1983,
too late to influence that year's campaign. As Boyon put it;
. . . we don* t intervene much at national level. The 
municipal elections are local elections, and anyway, 
since the lists were nearly all joint ones at that 
time, between the RPR and the UDF. ..Let's say the lists 
axe hardly supported at all from Far is. If you like, an 
RFR mayoi who had UDF people on his list didn' t 
especially want to label himself RFR at municipal 
level, given that evexyone had their own campaigns in 
their own towns or departments, 12,5
Even amongst the? most enthusiastic pr ivalizers there was apparently no
attempt to work out <n national strategy for the par ty. Devedjian admits to
pr epar ing a liber al manifesto with tire colleagues who shared his municipal
list, but was not at all involved in discussions with RPR members from
elsewhere concerning the content of local manifestos. He had looked around
'a bit* in France for examples of successful local privatizations, but not
abroad; his was mor e or less an ' individual initiative' (.demarche
individual 1&). Asked to name other RPR communes which had privatized, Ire
could think only of Mimes, which had pr ivatised the school canteens, (and
which had attracted national attention, because the new mayor was a local
employer who had defeated a Communist incumbent. )
In the Hauts-de-Seine department, where Devedjian's victory in Antony 
coincided with those of Satkozy in Neuilly, Dupuy in Sax esnes and Balkany 
in Levallois, all RPR members of his own generation, their "natural 
affinity" did not involve them in discussions of an ideological nature, but 
were putely tactical, xelated - for a while in conjunction with Pasqua - to 
the means by which they would conquer public office or positions of 
responsibility in the party. !:S®
Even in Paris itself, Chirac and his closest advisers tended to play 
down the element of choice in the post-1983 privatizations, stressing the 
continuity with the incrementalism that had gone before. Others, more 
convincingly, emphasize the t uptur e and the acceler at ion of the programme 
after the election. '30
At the rue de Lille, as part of his coaching of new candidates in how 
to present themselves and how to campaign in 1903, Boyon wrote a number of 
short notices on the different piactical problems a mayor could expect to 
encounter in the exet cise of his mandate, but these appeared to have almost 
no ideological content. Pressed on this, Boyon explained that Iris advice to 
mayors not to undertake expenditure resulting in an increase in local 
taxation, and not to hand over parts of their responsibilities to local 
associations, sexved to distinguish his party's positions from those of the 
Socialists
Given this only moderate interest in the degree of interventionism or 
disengagement which might be practised by the party's local 
representatives, Boyon readily admitted that the mayor's personal choices 
could lead them into contradiction with the orientations contained in the 
party's programme for national government. More, he believes that mayors 
often contradict themselves;
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It’s U ue that a mayor in his commune, or a president 
of the conseil general in his department, sometimes
tends to indulge in public interventionism ......  And
it's true that I was often one of the first to 
criticize, to say that.., we had a critique of what I 
call municipal socialism, but that many, at the same 
time as they put forward this critique, were acting in 
their own local authority in a way which was not 
coherent with that message, its true. Its true!131
Our conclusion must be that the managerial aspects of local government
experience did not contribute significantly to the RFR's programmatic 
development. As a result of institutional reforms in the early 1900s local 
government executives were given more freedom from the state, while mixed 
public-private companies were allowed to undertake a wider range of 
functions, and to make a profit for the first time. There is evidence that 
these changes fostered the growth of a management culture in local 
government, whether of the Right or of the Left. Privatization of local 
services was pushed energetically in Paris after 1903 for a variety of 
reasons. This example was followed by some provincial mayors, but others 
retained a mixture of interventionist and liberal attitudes, and there was 
disagreement about tire conditions required for successful privatization. In 
any case, the party did not deliberately fight the 1903 elections on a 
liberal platform, and there is no clear pattern either of liberal 
management precepts adopted nationally and reccommended for local 
application, or of lessons learned locally which fed into programme 
formation at national level.
A similar conclusion emerges from our consideration of grass roots 
politics as a whole. During the 1970s two Gaullists, Peyrefitte and Giraud 
made outstanding theoretical and practical contributions to the debate on 
the balance of power between centre and periphery in French institutions. 
But neither held a strong position in the party, so the national
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leadership’b unprecedented championning oi’ local and personal 
responsibility in the early 1980s cannot be attributed directly to their 
influence.
Nor should the reason for the transformation of the party programme be 
sought in the coining of age of a new generation of local activists, 
allegedly impregnated with business values. While there was considerable 
generational renewal during the period, its political significance has been
misinterpreted.
There is some evidence that both new and established local party 
leaders tried to adapt their style of political communication to less 
hierarchical relations between government and citizens, but as this current 
was rather weak in the party as a whole, it is unlikely that they had much 
impact on national policy.
Finally, some RPR-led councils, notably Paris, Introduced private- 
sector management techniques into local government and began to privatize 
local services both before the 1984 party programme was published and 
before the wave of pr ivatization at national level which began in 190G. 
Again it is difficult to see in this a major factor in the transformation 
of policy at national level, for a variety of interventionist attitudes and 
practices persisted in local government, and even the most enthusiastic 
liberals did not act in concert with like-minded colleagues.
Necessarily, the reform of the institutional framework of local 
government and the appearance of new community and interest associations, 
expressing tising citizen demands for consultation, participation and 
autonomy, affected tire par ty's work in ways which this chapter has 
r ecorded. But within the RPR these demands were not strong enough or 
consistent enough to reveal a pattern of influence emanating from the
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gi ass-r oots to the national leadership. Therefore we must look elsewhere 
for more decisive causes of the leadership's transformation of the parly' 
traditional attitude to the state.
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Chapter G The Market
This chapter is about the influence on programme-making of the 
competition for votes. Vote-winning is so crucial an activity for parties 
that it seems reasonable to assume that it must, sooner or later, override 
all the other factors which influence programme content.
However, the theory and practice of modern political communications 
shows that a party's ability to attract votes through its programme and 
leadership statements is not straightforward. It is structured by three 
variables, which can have an independent or cumulative influence on 
programme content. First, there is the question of what is on offer from 
the competition. A party could choose to draw up its programme solely, or 
at least mainly, with a view to what the other party or parties are 
saying. Alternatively, it could decide to ignore other parties, and 
concentrate solely on what it believes to be the aspirations of the 
electorate - matching its own programme to the known opinions of a 
possible winning coalition of voters. Thirdly, ignoring both other parties 
and known opinions, the party could concentrate its strategy not on the 
content of its programme, but on the way it puls the message across. In so 
doing, it stakes its chances rrot on a correct reading of voters' opinions, 
but on insight into their attitudes, moulding the message according to 
whether it thinks key groups of voters appreciate masculinity, optimism, 
selfish, and so on.
A party may choose any one or a combination of these approaches, 
according to the context it is working in, or the preferences of its 
leaders or professional advisers. This points to the limitations of 
statements like - 'He's only saying that because he wants to win votes.'
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If a party leader has concentrated his strategy on the 'attitude' 
variable, he may indeed say anything at all, believing that people vote 
for him on account of his image, rather than his programme.
As political scientists have absorbed insights from other branches of 
knowledge, such as social psychology, they have adapted their 
understanding of the party-voter-programme relationship, moving from an 
Initial 'party-competition' explanation through an emphasis on 'opinion- 
voting', to the most recent accounts which stress parties' relative 
freedom of manoeuvre and ability to manipulate the electorate.
In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the most popular view of the
way that vote-winning affected programmes was that most voters effectively 
identi fled with one party or another, often because loyalties reflecting 
long-standing social or cultural cleavages were passed on from one 
generation to the next.1 It followed that the only available reserves of 
votes belonged to those with no strong party-identifications, who voted 
rarely or not at all, or floated from one party to another at succeeding 
elections. Their median position was thought to reflect their political 
moderation, and commentators concluded that parties would have to blunt 
the edges of their own ideologies, positioning themselves in the centre, 
in order to shut out their competitors hunting in the same area for extra 
votes. a Tliis version of party competition, which came to be called the 
'catch-all* thesis, viewed party behaviour as responding to long-term 
social changes; as social cleavages blurred, so would party identities, 
and this in turn would reinforce their propensity to search for supporters 
among all sections of the population.
The return of economic difficulties in the 1970s, suggested that 
these earlier commentators had been premature in hailing the end of
ideology and progress towards a seamless consensus. 3 When attention was 
turned to less socially homogeneous societies than the USA, the U.K. and 
West Germany, which had been the subjects of the earlier studies, some 
commentators invented broadly 'system-determined' models of party 
behaviour in which social conditions were all but ignored,'1 while others 
turned away from the * Identification' explanation of voting, towards a 
stress on voters' individual opinions on particular issues. In the low 
countries or’ Northern Ir eland, tr aditional cleavages were found to be just 
as persistent as ever,s and to these were added newly perceived sources of 
cleavage, such as unusually salient single issues, like NATO or EEC 
membership, new religious movements, and attitudes to the environment, to 
the social position of women, and to taxes and public spending.
These developments led to a new burst of theorizing about the party- 
voter-programme relationship. On the one hand it was felt that a process 
of "r ealignment'* was under way - a change in the shape of the party system 
resulting from the substitution of new for old cleavages. G But going 
beyond this, some pointed to a number of long-term social changes causing 
what they called "dealignment”, tire erosion of traditional party- 
identification. This is consistent with the blurring of existing social 
cleavages, but implies that these will not be replaced by new ones;
Instead, individuals rarely belong to a single identifiable group, as they 
did in the past, but are now more likely to be involved in several social 
networks simultaneously. Furthermore, the general improvement in 
education, together with the continual multiplication of alternative 
sources of information by tire mass media, allows individuals to make up 
their own minds about political issues, dispensing with and even 
coirtradict,ing par ties' tr aditional linkage of potentially discrete issues
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lo a common programmatic or ideological thread.7
These conclusions about the erosion of party-identification were 
paralleled by the rise of the ’issue-voting' school, which explains voting 
behaviour by the aggregation of voters' opinions about party stances on 
the issues which particularly concern them. 9 Does this mean that 
successful parties will in the future be bound to adapt their programmes 
to what they believe to be most citizens' opinions on certain Issues?
Not necessarily, for some voters are clearly less informed than 
others; and even amongst the best-informed, it is not certain that their 
vote is determined by rational appraisal rather than prejudice or 
tr aditional allegiance. Furthermore, there are ways in which parties can 
resist the trend which threatens to deprive them of their traditional role 
of agenda-set ting and the explanation of issues. They can refuse to debate 
issues on which their positions do not accord with public opinion, by 
'talking past them* , and concentrating on issues on which they do well. 9 
In some cases they can resort to clientelism, or they can even provoke or 
invent issues and exploit them in a way which they hope will win favour 
with certain voters, and generally exploit state or sub-state resources in 
order to weaken their opponents.10 Political scientists have, then, 
developed a vaiiety of explanations for what political parties were trying 
to achieve. Often, however, the models have relied heavily on methematical 
aggregates, such as the sum of changes in party voting strengths 
(electoral volatility), or the number of times an issue is mentioned in 
party pr ogrammes. All too rarely have they been supported by hard 
empirical evidence.
Yet, to each of these models corresponds a particular type of 
empirically verifiable behaviour which a party could adopt. If competition
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with other parties is thought to be the key variable determining programme 
design, a comparison of the sociological profiles of support for rival 
parties will reveal to party leaders and to observers the degree to which 
par Lies are competing for the same electorate. If citizen opinions on 
given issues are what counts, opinion surveys will reveal the gap between 
party positions and public opinion; it is for the party, then, to decide 
whether and how to close the gap. Underlying citizen attitudes, which 
structure opinions and ultimately voting behaviour, can also be gauged, 
thanks to techniques bor rowed from commercial marketing, and which reveal, 
voters’ response to qualities which politicians try to project, like 
strength, openness, caring about the family, etc.
In the next three sections we tackle each of these questions in turn. 
It is argued firstly that party competition appears to provide no 
incentive whatever for the RPR*s liberal turn. Secondly, it is shown that 
RPR leader s were slow to accept the usefulness of opinion surveys, and 
survey evidence was ultimately ignored both in deciding strategy and in 
writing the programme. Thirdly, the party's political communications 
advisers attached excessive importance to the question of image, basing 
their strategy on 'sociological* evidence of doubtful validity.
Votes
It is tempting, when dealing with multi-party systems, to assume that 
each party occupies a certain political space within a 'spectrum' ranging 
from one extreme to another, so that parties always compete directly for 
votes with those placed on either side of them in the spectrum. This is 
broadly the view elaborated by Sartori, who consequently concludes that 
party competition consists of continuous 'positional' adjustments at the 
margin;
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the competitive preoccupation of party leaders bears 
precisely on the position manouevrings that are 
believed not to disturb the party's identifiers and, 
at the same time, to attract new voters, Cor to retain 
potential defectors.)11
Populai accounts of the French party system nearly always follow this
line of analysis, usually referring to the UDF as 'centre-right', and the
RFR as their 'conservative allies.'1- An explicit link between position in
the spectrum and competitive strategy is made by the Ella Searls;
In 1981 the Gaullists, with a vague set of doctrines, 
found themselves sandwiched within an opposition right 
part of which were already committed to many of the 
tenets of 1tbetalisme, and flanked by an Extreme Right 
which was pressing for hard-line policies to maintain 
social order and security. The options for the party 
were either to move towards the Centre to capture some 
of the Centrist votes or to adopt a more distinctive 
right-wing package of policies in order to win votes 
from those who were alienated from the experience of 
the Socialist government, whilst at the same time 
trying to stop the seepage of votes to the Extreme 
Right. Chirac chose the latter option. 13 Because of
the use of the 'sandwich' metaphor, this passage seems to imply that the
choice for the RPR was between competing with the UDF on the one hand
(that part of the right already committed to liberalism), and the Front
National on the other. In fact, as Searls made clear earlier in her
article, the fact that the RPR took liberalism to its bosom in the period
1981-3, was part of, not an alternative to, the party's shift to the
right. Furthermore, at cornmodation to the FM's anti-immigrant platform did
no violence to the convictions of many supporters, members and leaders of
the RPR. The FN's basic ideas are shared equally by many in the UDF, and
economic, liberalism has supporters and opponents among all parties and
tendencies on the right, including the CDS, so that a 'spectrum' view of
the right-wing part of the French party system serves only to confuse the
issue. These parties are better seen as different branches of the same
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family, separated by history, personal antagonisms and opportunism rather 
than by Ideological boundaries. If there was any move towards the centre 
to be made, this would involve - as Searls does not make clear - 
competition not with the UDF, but with the Socialist party.
This is an important passage, however, for Searls regards 
'electioneering rhetoric' as the 'most important' of four factors which 
contributed to the RPR's liberal turn. The other three were the activities
i S / '
of the clubs and think tanks, the experience of the Socialist government, 
and the opportunity for reflection afforded by a period of opposition.
Here it will Le argued that, on the contrary, there are no grounds for fvthinking that a search for votes under the pressure of party competition 
with its right-wing cousins was an important factor in the RPR's 
pr og r arnma tic develop men t.
The argument involves three propositions. First, the unique 
institutional structure of the Fifth Republic means that party stances are 
influenced by presidential as well as party competition, and since victory 
in the presidential election requires an absolute majority of votes cast, 
a move to the right cannot possibly be reccommended for electoral reasons. 
Secondly, at the turn of the 1980s, the RPR and UDF electorates were 
broadly similar both in sociology and in values, and the two parties 
deliberately avoided competing with each other in most of the non- 
presidential elections between 1976 and 1986. Thirdly, the electoral 
threat represented by the FN was neither clear-cut nor consistent; it was 
complicated by the FN's appeal to the protest vote, and in consequence the
RPR leaders' attitude to the FN swung in one direction and then another
during the whole period 1981-86.
The most important feature of the entire period 1981-6, however, was
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Is
that the unique target for the RPR's most hostile and consistent criticism 
was the left government. We link this to the question of opinion research 
in the second part of this chapter.
The American researcher Kay Lawson has produced perhaps the most 
subtle synthesis of political and institutional factors structuring the 
French party system at the turn of the 1980s. 1/1 In a quasi-presidential 
system, parties were obliged to combine with each other in order to 
produce a coalition leader, yet the prime minister and the government 
retained enough power independently of the President for it to be 
worthwhile for parties to seek to maximize their own party strength in 
parliament. At the same time, according to Lawson, the divided French 
political culture implied an incentive to maintain ideological purity, 
while the two-ballot electoral system put a premium on vote maximization 
at the first ballot, in order to be the coalition's candidate at the 
second. There was a built-in pressure on parties to re-organize themselves 
in otder to pursue the presidency most effectively; as all parties became 
more and more centralized, with a single pre-eminent leader, so did 
alliances become more brittle, and their, construction fraught with 
increasing distrust. In short, the combination of peculiarly hybrid 
institutions with a divided political culture moulded a system marked, for \/ 
the parties, by conflicting centripetal and centrifugal forces.185
The difficulties experienced by the RPR in presidential elections 
illustrate marvellously Lawson's thesis. In 1981 the opinion polls implied 
that in no possible scenario could Chirac be ahead of Giscard on either 
the first or second rounds. As we saw in chapter 4, many of Chirac's 
entourage were fully aware of this, and so wary of splitting the right-
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wing camp that they opposed their leader's candidature. But the struggle 
for hegemony between the right-wing parties came into play; supported by
keep alive his own and, indirectly, the party's future Presidential 
pietent ions.
Both Gaullist orthodoxy and the custom and practice of the Fifth 
Republic, however, implied that a candidate for tire highest office need
drafting of programmes very seriously, believing that they were a 
superficiality, necessary for purposes of presentation, but committing 
nobody. 1 * These factors, together with the almost non-existent chance of 
victory, explains a certain ambiguity, or perhaps coyness, among senior 
party members about what the candidature was trying to achieve.
Some believed that Giscard had disappointed his potential supporters 
on both left and right. The Chirac team's idea was to find an angle which 
distinguished the RPR leader from both Giscard and Mitterrand, fighting 
them both for the centre ground, and to this end they borrowed ideas
fairly freely from Ronald Reagan's successful first campaign for the US
^  1 u v,
Presidency. 1 ' \&W
The suggestion that there was a strong American influence on the 
choice of themes is disputed by others who were close to the campaign. For 
Jacques Boyon, Chirac stood ' because he had the feeling that the policies 
being followed ignored the real problems of our electorate, ' which, 
according to him, was made up of business, and the self-employed, 
especially Iai mer s, small-scale retailers and artisans.
those most closely bound to the party, Chirac entered the race in order to
not be bound by his party's programme. Chirac in any case did not take the
i/
So it wasn' t at all a campaign on the theme of 
liberalism. It was a campaign based on the theme, "The 
economic strength of France must be rebuilt, certain 
traditional values have to be restored... we must
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think of' France before thinking of Europe." It was ^  
themes like that.19
There is some evidence that a "liberal" turn was spotted by the 
television-viewing public1'5’ and that it was linked to "Reaganism" by 
academic commentator s:2°, but a full discussion of the American influence 
on the RFR*s programmes is reserved for chapter 8. As for the electorate 
mentioned by Boyon, poll evidence showed that when the campaign began 
Chirac was certainly more strongly supported by them than were the left 
candidates, but not significantly more so than Giscard, In October 1980 
46% of small shopkeepers and artisans and 38% of a group containing 
higher-grade managers, Industrialists, professionals and large-scale 
retailers expressed their intention of voting for the sitting President if 
he was a candidate in the forthcoming election. Thirteen and 12% 
respectively of the same groups opted for Chirac, at a time when his 
average support was hovering around 9%. He thus had above-average support 
among the urban petty-bourgeois, but the bulk of them were lined up 
massively behind Giscard, and their support for Chirac was at nowhere near 
the same level as among farmers, of whom 23% were supporting him already 
in October 1980. 3:2
However, there was considerable evolution of voting intentions right 
up until polling day. Support for Chirac among farmers moved up from 23% 
to a massive 36% when the votes were cast on 26th April; 26% of small 
shopkeepers and artisans were intending to vote for him by mid-April, and 
29% actually did so on the day. Progress was most rapid of all among 
higher-grade managers, businessmen and the professions; from 12% in 
October Chirac's support grew to 20% by mid-April and reached 36% by 
polling day. If one remembers that Chirac's overall vote was just under
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18%, these figures show that his personal electorate had become massively 
concentrated among particular social groups. He polled more than any other 
candidate among farmers, executives and professionals, and only Giscard, 
with 35%, scored more among shopkeepers and artisans. Even more striking, 
Chirac was the only candidate who scored significantly better among the 
wealthiest fifth of the population than among the less well-off*®3
If Chirac went into the 1981 election without a specific electorate, 
he certainly had one at the end of it. This was not lost on French 
commentators, who speculated on the in-built weakness of such restricted 
support; a return to power depended on the conquest of blue- and white- 
collar workers, who constitute 'the immense majority of the electorate', 
and who were not at all impressed by the liberal message. 3/1 Worse, if the 
attack on state interference in the economy, understandably popular with 
the poorer parts of the small business fraternity who hated struggling 
with their tax-returns, were to develop into the dropping of all 
constraints on market forces, then those who would suffer most in the long 
term would be the same small shopkeepers which had become the bedrock of 
Chirac's support. The RPR and its leader were beginning to look distinctly 
like giants with feet of clay.®*
These fears and predictions were strikingly vindicated in 1988. In 
the first round of voting Mitterrand held his own or progressed in all 
categories except farmers. Chirac's overall score was up by a meagre two 
percentage points. He scored the same share of the vote among farmers as 
he had in 1981 (36%), tire same 3G% among professionals, and 27% among
executives, well above his average share. He had once again polled more 
than any other candidate among professionals and farmers. Among executives 
he was outdistanced only by Mitterrand. But among small shopkeepers and
artisans his vote fell back from 29% to 23%, (now only 3 points ahead of 
his average score, instead of 11, as it was seven years previously) on a 
par with Barre, and way behind Le Pen, who, with 31%, scored more votes 
than any other candidate in this category. as;
Viewed as a vote-winning strategy, then, Chirac's programmatic stance 
from 1981 through to 1988 must be counted as stunningly inept. Why did he 
do it? No doubt on both occasions, once lie had entered the fray he and his 
closest advisers managed to convince themselves that they were running to 
win. Chirac said as much even in 1981, and shortly before the 1981 poll 
Pasqua began to put it about that private surveys showed the RPR leader 
running foui points ahead of the real figure, in a last-ditch attempt to 
make believe that he was rivalling Mitterrand for a place in the second 
round.3* Chirac's worst Giscardian enemies suggested that he always hoped 
Mitterrand would be elected, leaving himself as the tallying point for the 
future opposition. Others were simply baffled.3'®’
We are left with two other hypotheses; either Chirac's 1981 platform 
was simply a shopping-1ist of opening demands to be deployed in a 
bargaining session with the sitting President, or a variety of different 
influences not directly connected with elections combined to convince the 
RPR leadership that liberal economics formed a coherent set of ideas which 
would be of benefit to the French people.
The first suggestion fits in with Lawson's account of the French 
party system which we outlined above, and there is some evidence for it,30 
but if Lliis was the strategy, it was a rather forlorn one, inspired more 
by a noble sense of duty than any hope of success. It required a lot of 
faith in Discard's willingness to compromise for he had already spurned 
the opportunity to change his line in similar circumstances after the 1978
elections. Furthermore, even after its failure in 1901, the RPR continued 
down the liberal road. It is therefore towards the second hypothesis - 
that, irrespective of electoral considerations, most of the party turned 
to liberalism out of conviction - that we adress ourselves later in 
chapters 7 and 8. But first we turn to the non-competition between the RPR 
and the UDF.
The Rassemblement pour la R&publique and the Union pour la Democratie 
Fran^aise, the allies which have represented the 'respectable Right' in 
all the electoral contests since 1978, were both formed relatively 
recently. The RPR was founded in 1976, while the UDF was born in February 
1978 of the union of a collection of disparate forces. These were the 
Parti R&publicain (PR), formeily a parliamentary group, the Independent 
Republicans, led by Giscard himself in the 1960s, when it habitually 
formed a pre-electoral pact with the gaulllst UDR; the Centre des 
Democt ales Sociaux (CDS), an indirect but not too distant descendant of 
the MRP, the great social Christian party of the Fourth Republic; the 
Radical par ty, a meagre remnant of the once dominant party of the Third 
Republic; the Clubs Perspectives et Real!t£s, which were more interested 
in reflection than action, and finally the tiny so-called Parti Social 
Democrats, originally a split from the Socialist party in 1972.
Despite these different traditional loyalties, throughout the 1970s 
and the first half of the 1980s, there were hardly any Ideological
b
differences within the respectable Right's electorate, not many between 
their leaders, and even when a modest degree of sociological 
differentiation between RPR and UDF supporters emerged in the early 1980s, 
party leaders consistently avoided a real contest for votes.
That there was no such thing as a 'Gaullist' electorate was shown by
the remarkable variations in the votes cast for Gaullist candidates at 
different times in the same constituency, depending on the nature of the 
election. In March 1973 Olivier Guichard was elected deputy on the first 
round in the Loire Atlantique with an absolute majority; after resigning 
to take a short-lived cabinet post, he was re-elected with a similar score 
in a by-election in September 1974. In between these two dates his 
Gaullist colleague and close friend Jacques Chaban Delmas won only 17.3% 
of the vote in the first round of the Presidential election. Despite the 
same party label, Guichard had the benefit of endorsement by a 'majority' 
alliance, while Chaban did not.
In 1973, the UDR went into the parliamentary elections in alliance 
with the Centre D&mocratie et Progrtts (CDP, a link in the genealogical 
chain uniting the MRP with the CDS) and the Republicaina Independents. 
Electoral competition was somewhat limited by the fact that in 87% of 
constituencies there was no CDP candidate and in 76% of constituencies 
there was no RT candidate. Between the rounds of the election, President 
Georges Pompidou summarized what was at stake - "On the one hand,
Communism and its allies, on tire other hand, all the rest." Right wing 
electors were not supposed to be too bothered about the identity of the 
particular representative of the "rest" for whom they were called upon to 
vote.
The power of this reductionist alliance system was further emphasized 
by tire results of the odd by-elections which took place in the mid-1970s 
in which an independent Gaullist stood without the alliance's backing. In 
November 1976, in the Allier, a Gaullist candidate gained 5. 4% of the vote 
in a contest led on the first round with 46.2% by Gabriel P6ronnet, a 
Radical, whose party nationally represented almost nothing. On the same
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day in the Yvelines a Gaullist candidate won 4.4-% in similar 
circumsrtances. 31
The same researcher who unearthed these facts, the author of a 
monumental thesis on electoral Gaullism since 1958,33 had the curiosity to 
study the turn-out in all 1,800 cantonal elections which took place in 
1976, in evety parliamentary constituency contested in 1973, and in all 17 
of the parliamentary by-elections fought from 1974 to 1977. There was no 
significant variation between turn-outs in the contests in which Gaullist 
candidates were present, and in the 1300 cantons, the 27% of parliamentary 
seats and the 8 out of 17 by-elections from which they were absent. 
Conclusion; there was no such thing as a structured Gaullist electorate 
loyal only to its own candidates.33
In 1977, the newly formed RPR seemed to go over on to the attack 
against their traditional allies. Jacques Chirac fought the President's 
nominee for the Paris town hall, and a year later followed up by running 
more than 400 candidates for the 491 seats in the National Assembly. 
Whereas ever since 1962 separate candidates in the first round had been 
the exception and not the rule, in 1978, only 118 seats, or 24% of the 
total, offered no choice to the right-wing electorate. In 1979 rival 
Chiraquian and Giscardian lists confronted each other head-on in the 
proportional European elections.
One should beware of exaggerating the political character of these 
contests, however. In March 1977, 44% of a sample of those who voted the
Chirac list in the Paris election said they were principally motivated by 
its leader's personality, while only 17% attributed their vote to 
attachment to his political ideas, in a contest where not only the 
Giscardians, but also the left were present. 3/1 Ironically, 1977 was also
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the first yeat in which systematic pacts were made between the Gaullists 
and the rest of the right in the local elections. In previous years they 
had been held at arm's length by centrists and independents who preferred 
local alliances with the Socialists, a hang-over from the 'social 
centrism' of the Fourth Republic.
In the parliamentary elections, a confrontational debate of issues 
was necessarily constrained by the parties' prior agreement that, in each 
constituency, whichever candidate came out in front on the first round 
would be supported on the second by his erstwhile rival. It would have 
been hard to have an ideological contest, in any case, with a President 
who delibeiately eschewed ideology, believing there were no conflicting 
social interests in society, only 'problems' to solve.®6' In 1977 Giscard's 
own Fai ti Rgpublicain gave itself a thoroughly undemocratic set of 
statutes which ensured that it would rely for electoral mobilization on a 
traditional network of local notables rather than an organized membership. 
To one observer, this meant that it had already given up the attempt to 
compete for members with the RPR.33 To another it was clear* that tire PR 
never campaigned on its programme, but concentrated on supporting the 
Pr esident. 33
The Gaullists' critiques of the Giscardians in government were mainly 
concentrated on 'managerial' questions, such as how to deal with the 
economic crisis and fight unemployment. In 1979, however, at least as far 
as the leadership was concerned, more political questions seemed to be 
raised. In the campaign for the European elections the RPR generally 
fulminated about the sell-out of French interests, denouncing the UDF's 
federal aims, the (extremely modest) powers of the parliamentary assembly, 
and the putative entry of Spain into the Community. This programme, as we
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see below, failed to identify a distinctively nationalistic electorate.
The 1978 parllamentary contest made possible the carrying out of 
detailed opinion surveys which confirmed that the right-wing electorate 
had become homogenised by being accustomed to cast their votes 
indiscriminately foi Gaullist, centrist or 'independent* candidates, 
depending on how tire share-out had affected their particular constituency. 
A poll of 4,500 people carried out in the days just after the second round 
revealed that, of the two, the UDF electorate was slightly older, with 
correspondingly more retired people (25% of their electorate to 22% of the 
RF’R's), and slightly more catholic (54% practising regular ly or 
irregular ly to tire RPR's 50%. ) Among occupational groups, both parties 
performed well among housewives (25% of the RPR electorate, 23% of the 
UDF), badly amongst workers (8% and 7%), with the biggest gap appearing in 
the UDF's "success" among white-collar workers (17% to the RPR's 11%).'3-' 
If, as other studies confirmed, there was "no real difference" 
between UDF and RPR in terms of sociological support, and the two parties 
were "hunting the same electorate", <to there seemed also to be a 
convergence in terms of ideology and values. RPR supporters were slightly 
more to the right than those of the UDF in their attitudes to the 
Socialist party, the right to strike, and left-wing leaders, but the two 
electorates shared a common hostility to the extension of nationalizaton, 
to the Communist party, and to free contraception for teenagers.'11 They 
also gave similar replies to questions on the functioning of political 
institutions, their attitudes to work, nuclear power, and the education of 
children, but the UDF sympathizers were less keen on the continuation of 
the death penalty (59% in favour) than those of the RPR (75% in favour. )4::2 
One of the discoveries which most surprised commentators at the beginning
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of 1979, was the convergence in views between RPR and UDF supporters on 
questions concerning foreign policy, and especially Europe. While a large 
minority of RPR sympathizers (37%, to the UDF's 23%) thought that French 
prestige had declined in recent years, yet they were not nearly so many as
sympathizers of the left, where a majority of each party's supporters held
this view. A quarter of the friends of the RPR thought that France should 
be absolutely neutral in military afairs, (UDF 13%), but as many as 32% of 
Socialist and 47% of Communist supporteis thought the same. More 
remarkable still, 76% of RPR supporters declared themselves in favour of 
"building Europe", (UDF 79%), while 44% thought the abolition of the EEC 
would be a bad thing (UDF 54%); 41% of the RPR sample would be willing to
pay slightly higher taxes for the sake of building Europe, rather less 
than the friends of the UDF (51%), but still considerably more than 
Socialist and Communist supporters, (31% and 10%). Finally, the RPR 
supporters were not unduly worried by possible Spanish entry into the EEC.
(56% in favour, compared to 61% of UDF supporters, 59% of Socialists and 
38% of Communists. /!3
These figures, collected within two months of tire infamous Appel de 
Cochin, go a long way to explaining the RPR's disastrous performance in ^
the European election on 10th June 1979. The leaders were playing to an ^ i
74% of RPR sympathizers had confidence in the President.'1'1
Despite the heightened competition between the two parties in the 
years 1977-9, then, there was little evidence at that time of the 
existence of distinctive electorates favouring either the RPR or the UDF. 
This picture seemed to change in the early 1980s, in line with the
which didn' t exist. They were also out of step with the voters L1
in respect of their attacks on Giscard. A poll in January 1979 showed that
. V.«i
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increased differentiation induced, as we saw, by Chirac's 1981 
Presidential campaign. An exit poll carried out as people voted in the 
first ballot of the June 1981 legislative election showed that, 
sociologically, the RPR electorate appeared to resemble Chirac's personal 
elctorate. The RPR had gained a slight advantage among the retired; the 
tJDF held theii stronger position among white-collar workers, with 18% 
support (compared to an average vote of 19%) to the RFR's 14%, (against 
21% of the overall popular vote), but the RPR were way ahead amongst 
shopkeepers and artisans (winning 31% of their votes to the UDF's 19%), 
and amongst business, executives, professionals and large-scale retailers 
(28% to 19%). d!5 This pattern was repeated in a poll carried out in urban 
areas dur ing the municipal elections of 1983. **
The evidence of neither of these polls can be taken as conclusive, 
although they point to the same orders of magnitude, because in the 
legislative elections of 1981 and the municipals of 1983 the right-wing 
parties had once again resorted to tire tactic of joint first-round 
candidatures, in which the bulk of the electorate was given iro opportunity 
to prefer one to the other.
We saw in the chapter on grass roots politics how senior RPR leaders 
avoided central interference which might disrupt the important business of 
constructing local lists. As for the parliamentary elections, whereas 
there had been well over 300 'primaries’ between the components of the 
right-wing coalition in 1973, in 1981 there were only 86, and the voters 
in 385 constituencies in metropolitan France were offered only one 
conservative candidate on the first round.
Tn these circumstances the great majority of voters would have had to 
rely almost completely on messages diffused nationally, principally via
the television, in deciding which party had earned their ' sympathy' . This 
lias important consequences for the notion of 'party competition'. If a 
party relies on passing its message via the television, then its content 
may be obscured, or at least denatured by the panoply of techniques used 
to wrap it up, with hours of thought devoted to lighting, clothing, the 
tone of voice, and so on. '1'7
For the grass roots voter the confrontation of rival candidates in 
his or her own locality provides the best, usually the only, opportunity 
to witness and take part in organized debates in which the airy television 
pronouncements ate given a more down-to-earth interpretation. When such 
local confrontation does not take place, it makes no sense to pretend that 
programmes are constructed with the aim of winning votes. If the RPR and 
UDF do compete with each other, the competition is not for votes, but for 
invest i t ut es.
This takes place at centrally organized negotiating sessions which 
take some account of the national political conjuncture, but much more of 
the potential supply of local candidates and the minute details of local 
rivalries which allow a trade-off here in exchange for consideration there 
- a parliamentary investiture today in exchange for a free run at the town 
hall tomorrow.
There were only 67 seats in which the UDF and the RPR opposed each 
other in pi imaries both in 1978 and in 1901, The RPR had been in the lead 
in 42 of these in 1978, and took tire lead in 46 of them in 1 9 8 1 . Clear ly 
the sample is too small for any conclusions about the attractiveness of 
rival programmes to be based on it. Tire parliamentary election in any case 
took place, far too soon after Chirac had first articulated his new liberal 
programme for it to have been absorbed and reproduced by tire party
candidates with a suitable local veneer.
Most other commentators have endorsed the view that in 1981, as in 
1978, the votes cast for the anti-left candidates were distributed 
according to the local celebrity and the implantation of the individual 
candidates, whatever their partisan label. These same criteria, allied to 
pragmatic trade-offs, decided which seats in 1981 were to have RPR 
candidates, and which UDF. ** The same story was repeated five years later.
The 198G parliamentary election, fought under proportional rules with 
departmental lists, could in theory have provided some room for open and 
honest RPR-UDF competition. This was again avoided, for a number of 
reasons. The most obvious was that, even before a vote was cast, the two 
parties had signed and sealed a common programme of government. Whichever
of the conservative lists the voter opted for, the result would be the
same. Secondly, in GO of the 96 departments, the RPR and UDF presented 
joint lists whose composition was worked out in national negotiating 
sessions. In 33 departments there were rival lists, and in 3 more there 
were official 'joint* lists rivalled by dissident lists in which UDF 
members took some of the places. 550
It is true that these figures could seem to understate the degree of
competition, since the joint lists were run in smaller departments with 
not more than four or five seats each, where proportionality did not work 
very effectively, while the rival lists were run in 30-odd heavily 
populated departments which together provided more than half of all seats.
But here again appearances are misleading, for most of the RFR-UDF 
contests were won by large margins by the party already dominant locally. 
In 22 of the 35 clean-cut contests, one of the parties was ahead of the 
other by at least 10 percentage points, (tire RPR in 14 and the UDF in 8).
In a further 8 cases the winning margin was between 5 and 10 points. In 
some areas not much effort was made to get out the 'party' vote. In the 
Bciuches du Rh&ne, where the RPR party centre had made no effort to groom a 
local leader who could challenge the UDF 'boss', Jean-Claude Gaudin, the 
RPR vote collapsed to 9.47%, only just ovei half the combined scores of 
Chirac, Debr 6 and Garaud in the 1981 presidential election.®1 In Faris and
the surrounding region, the RFR lists scored 27.32% of the vote to the
UDF's 12.96%. 63
The parties had once again ensured that the cream of the local elites 
would get home safely, irrespective of any developing sociological or 
ideological differentiation between the national parties' electorates. In 
the 60 departments where joint lists were run, the most common tactic for 
ensuring amicable relations was for one party to head the slate for the 
legislative elections, and the other to take first place on the lists for 
tire regional elections which were field on the same day. A total of 41S UDF 
candidates (including 56 of their 63 incumbent deputies) were offered 163 
safe or winnable seats, while the 424 RFR candidates (including 69 of 
their 88 incumbent deputies) were offered 169 safe or winnable seats. In 
the event the RPR won 145 and the UDF 129. The difference was almost 
entirely accounted for by RPR dominance in the Paris region, where it had 
netted 31 seats to the UDF's 14. In 25 contested provincial departments, 
the score worked out fairly evenly, as planned; RPR 19.83% of the vote and
40 seats; UDF 20.85% and 42 seats.s3
Throughout the 5th Republic, with the partial exception of the period 
1977-81, the main families of the French Right have usually avoided direct 
electoral competition with each other. On tire one occasion when the 
Gaullists launched a clear-cut ideological contest, they met with disaster
because their ideas were not shared by a corresponding and identifiable 
group of voters. In the 1980s, when a new RFR programme seemed to attract 
interest from a potentially distinctive electorate, the party deliberately 
avoided using the programme for direct open competition with the UDF. It 
follows that, while electoral motives could be held responsible for the 
dropping of a strident anti-European plank from the RPR's platform, the
adoption of the new liberal economic programme cannot be attributed to
competition for votes with the UDF. There was no decisive evidence that 
the programme was a vote-winner, and the RFR in any case avoided competing 
with the UDF except in Presidential elections.
It has already been suggested that it is a mistake to imagine the RPR 
as somehow sandwiched between rival forces on its right and left. Within 
the French Right, the values of leaders and supporters have for a long 
time varied within a range common to all the parties. As the 1980s 
progressed, however, many within the RPR, the FN, and the UDF frequently 
expressed their views on the role of the state in economy and society in a 
single reactionary proposition; in the past the state has intervened too 
much in the economy and not enough in repression of crime; it ought to
redress the balance and concentrate on what it is good at, and what, in
reality, is its I.rue vocation; less nationalization, less social security, 
and more policemen!
How it was that all three parties came to endorse the formula of less 
welfare and more social control is discussed in chapter 7. But that this 
consensus certainly represented a rightward drift is a good reason why we 
should examine tire elector al impact of the Front National Here it will be 
argued that it is inappropriate to define the RPR's response to tire FN, as
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Searla does, as a 'choice' made mainly for electoral reasons. On the key 
social issues, concerning immigrants and law and order, the RPR leaders 
leaned towards the repressive measures which were already part of their 
repertoire, but stopped short of some of the FN's demands. On economic 
issues, although both parties developed similar policies, the new RPR 
programme owed nothing to electoral competition with the FN. The new key 
ideas on the role of the state in the economy were first clearly 
articulated by Chirac in the 1981 Presidential election campaign, at a 
lime when the FN was so irrelevant to national politics that Jean-Marie le 
Pen could not even secure enough official endorsements to mount his own 
candidalure.
On the RPR leaders' approach to the FN itself, both their assessment 
of FN values and tire FN contribution to French politics, and in particular 
on the question whether the RFR ought to make alliances with them, it is 
clear that there was never a "choice", but rather a refusal to choose.
They swung first in one direction, and then in another. In 1983 Chirac 
defended the RPR's alliance with the FN in a local election at Dreux. In  ^
1985 he insisted that there must be no local deals with the FN in the 
cantonal elections, In 1986, because of the proportional system, he was 
spared having to make an announcement before the elections, but made no
presidencies of at least five regions by agreements with the FN. In the 
run up to the Presidential election, he alternately denounced the FN's
them. In the 1988 legislative elections, deals with the FN were banned 
everywhere except in Marseille, where they were strong. This was not a 
choice, but a refusal to choose.-'1
objection ufterwai ds when the respectable right was helped to the
policies and said that Ire 'understood' the concerns of those who voted for
The party leadership's balancing act ieffected the uneven pressure of 
FN electoral competition. There was occasionally a serious threat to RPR 
candidates in parliamentary and especially in local elections, but Chirac 
could not forget that Presidential elections are won in the centre, not on
the right or the left.
The governmental programme and the record in office were subject to 
the same cross pr essures. Tire 'respectable' conservatives promised to 
tighten immigration controls and to deport more 'troublemakers', but they 
stopped short of promising the restoration of the death penalty or the 
deportation of unemployed foreigners, as Le Pen demanded. In office, they 
duly restored the judicial situation of illegal immigrants to what it had 
been before the Socialists repealed the loi Peyrefitle of 1980, and made a 
great show of deporting several hundreds of mainly African workers, not 
all of them clandestine, but this repressive drive was slowed when public 
opinion was outr aged by the death of a student demonstrator at the hands 
of riot police, and public sector workers went on the offensive with a 
series of strikes. The gover nmerit abandoned a planned special session of 
parliament which was to have considered a reform of the nationality law,
and effectively buried this issue by handing it over to the deliberations
of a committee of experts.
The parameters of competition for votes between the RFR and the FN, 
are complicated by the fact that tire FN's electorate demonstrably evolved 
during the period in question. In late 1983 and at the start of 1984-, FN 
support seemed to be concentrated among the young and was fairly working- 
class and petty-bourgeois. At this stage there was not much for the RPR 
leaders to worry about, but four months later, tire sociological structure 
uf FN support had shifted dramatically so that it now ressembled much more
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closely that of the respectable Right, being more concentrated among the
old than the young, and among the self-employed than among workers.5"7
Three more years passed before the same researcher, J<§r6me Jaffr£ found
that it had changed yet again, with the under-35s now making up 43% of Le
Pen's support, (against 31% in 1984), while the poorer social categories
now made up G3% (37% in 1984). If the FN had at one time threatened to win
away RPR voters, this was no longer true;
It is no longer a case of "lost sheep", but of an 
electorate which is young, proletarian, and fairly
apolitical, with a variety of previous political
sympathies. It is not easily winnable by the RPR or 
UDF, whose sociological make-up is strictly the 
opposi te.
If this sociological fluidity made it difficult for the RPR leaders
to gauge the true electoral threat to their positions which the FN
represented, the evidence was no easier to interpret when one turned to 
the attitudes and ideology of FN supporters. On the one hand there was 
cleat evidence of shared opinions among supporters of the "respectable" 
and "extreme" branches of the Right, on such issues as the death penalty 
and the repatriation of immigrants,55’ but on the other, FN supporters were 
much more hostile to the existing political establishment, so that, 
irrespective of its sociological profile, a large part of the FN vote 
could be characterized as a "protest" vote, difficult for one of the 
established parties to recapture, even by means of an opportunistic switch 
of policies. 50 Furthermore, contrary to popular assumptions, FN voters are 
not motivated exclusively by anti-immigrant feeling. A study of the FN 
electorate in the 1984 European election found that only 40% gave 
immigration as the sole motivation for their vote, while 28% did not 
mention immigration at all, but cited economic reasons as decisive.*1
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Clearly, in assessing and countering the electoral challenge of the 
FN, RPR analysts would have found a mass of confusing and potentially 
contradictory evidence to choose from, and they would not have found it 
easy to make recommendations to the party leaders as to how to combat the 
influence of lean Marie Le Pen and his friends.
Opinions
A detailed case has been made i.o support the suggestion that
programmatic change in the RPR during the period 1981-8 owed something to
Chirac's positionning in relation to Giscard in the presidential election 
of 1981, but little or nothing to competition for votes at other elections 
between the RPR on the one hand and the UDF or the Front National on the 
other.
In this section attention is turned to the Socialist party, where it 
is again argued that the economic and social parts of the programme cannot 
be attributed to competition tor votes between this party and the RPR. In 
consequence, we examine the possibility that the programme content was 
determined by an attempt to align party policy with voters' opinions, 
irrespective of what other parties were doing. After a brief survey of the
importance attributed to this sort of opinion research by political
scientists, it is shown that, firstly, the Gaullists were for a long time 
very suspicious of opinion research techniques, beginning to make 
systematic use of them only after their debacle in 1979, but, secondly, 
even when they did carry out such research, they took hardly any notice of 
the results when drawing up their programme.
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After a brief honeymoon period the Socialist-Communist government soon 
ran into public opposition. Trade unionists struck against the loss of pay 
implied by the shortening of the working week, doctors demonstrated against 
a feared attack on private medicine, while proposed educational reforms 
mobilized a vast coalition of opposition including teachers' unions, 
parents and the church. Many policies were either reversed or abandoned, 
while international constraints soon turned the reflationary economic 
policy into the kind of 'austerity' more usually associated with the Right, 
accompanied by a string of devaluations. From simply abandoning their own 
leftward drive, the Socialists seemed to begin a charge to the right after 
the summer of 1984 when the massive demonstration against the educational 
reform forced the replacement of prime minister Mauroy by Fabius, and the 
Communists' departure from office. The new government set about de­
controlling the banking industry, re-introducing the share-capital 
principle into the nationalized industries, and making working hours more 
flexible to suit the needs of the employers.
In these circumstances, with public opinion apparently on their side 
and the Socialists rapidly moving to the right, it seemed that, to be 
returned to power, the right-wing parties had only to stand firm, say ' we- 
told-you-so* , and aim to pick up from where they had left off in 1981. With 
the Socialists apparently now committed to managing capitalism rather than 
overthrowing it, this would have meant an electoral battle for the centre 
ground, with both left and right wooing the same voters in an attempt to 
convince them of the superiority of their management skills.*^
Far from preparing for such a battle, the Gaullists abandoned the 
centre ground and themselves moved to the right. Their speeches, articles 
and books attacked the nationalizations, bitterly denounced the breakdown
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of law and order, and warned of certain disaster resulting from the 
mistaken economic policies and the regimentation of social life implied by 
reforms in education and in workplace relations. The party continued to 
attack the Socialists even after the advent of Fabius, and gained ample 
space in the media to debate the extent Cnot the principle) of the liberal 
reforms which they hoped to implement when the Right returned to power.
The RPR's own Club '89 rapidly produced a stream of booklets each 
devoted to a separate area of policy such as public ownership, education, 
social security and Immigration. As early as 1983, one of these, written by 
Alain Jupp6 and prefaced by Jacques Chirac, openly announced a ’double 
break' with the past, not only undoing the work of the Socialists, but also 
going back on the policies followed during what was seen as the period of 
'creeping socialism' in the second half of the 1970s.
Socialist sympathizers had no difficulty in polarizing political life 
by mounting a counter-attack on elements of the various drafts put forward 
during the public debate which culminated in the RPR-UDF joint programme of 
government. Privatization was to go beyond the enterprises nationalized 
since 1981, to include some of those which had been publicly owned since 
1945; repeal of Socialist legislation, would include the lol Qullllot, the 
first measure since 1948 to control rents, the lols Auroux on workplace 
relations, and a law which had given workers seats on the boards of the 
nationalized industries; 'flexibility' in the definition of the working 
week would be taken even further, along with part-time and temporary 
contracts, and wage-scales would be amended to take account of personal 
'merit'; the wealth tax would be abolished, there would be an amnesty for 
those who had fallen foul of the Socialists' exchange-control rules, and 
anonymity in the gold market would be restored, while social security
reform threatened to extend the use of personal pension plans. 66
Although some of these projects were jettisoned when the Right faced 
the test of office'15,6 the RPR's promise to do so much that was further to 
the right than what the Socialists were doing shows that they did not 
design their programme in an attempt to engage in direct competition with 
the Socialists for the votes of citizens who were uncommitted or occupied 
the centre ground. Nor does it make any sense to suggest that the programme 
intended to appeal to those who were disappointed by the Socialists' record 
- anyone who was 'disillusioned' with their efforts must have had 
aspirations which were at the antipodes of those articulated by the Right.
This is not necessarily to say that the RPR had given up all hope of 
competing for votes which might go to the Socialists, for they might hope 
to win them not by the actual content of their programme, but by the way 
they would present it, appealing not to the voters' opinions, but to their 
attitudes. We address this question in 6.3.
It could be, however, that the RPR had deliberately decided to
discount the appeal of all other parties, and concentrate on aligning their
own programme with what they thought were the opinions of a majority of
voters. In doing so they would have needed the services of a professional
marketing organization. As the man who was then officially in charge of RPR
campaigns wrote in 1980;
Since 1965 in France, there has been a general move 
towards reliance on these firms of specialists for the
conduct of campaigns and the work of analysis....
It can be taken as given that 99.9% of the important 
decisions taken during the pre-campaign are only 
arrived at after research has confirmed their 
correctness and their coherence with the overall 
strategy. 67
Belief that such research techniques were widely employed is reflected
L - " " '
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in a journalist’s suggestion that it was "political marketing men" who, in 
the two days before the first press conference of Chirac's 1981 campaign, 
persuaded him to adopt the liberal platform which contradicted the party's 
of f icial programme.
There is a certain diversity of opinion among those involved about 
what is the true influence of marketing techniques both on the content of 
programmes and on the outcome of elections. These are in fact two distinct 
questions, to which two different sets of activities correspond; in the 
first phase, detailed studies of the 'market', to see which issues are most 
important to the voters, and what their opinions on them are; in the second 
phase, the elaboration of a global strategy which involves the 
identification of a 'target' audience, and a choice between different ways 
of contacting and convincing the target. The research phase and the 
persuasion phase are now accepted as forming two halves of the same 
discipline practised by professionals in all parliamentary democracies - 
"political communications. "
Observation of the use of marketing techniques in the USA, convinced 
Michel Noir that "the analogy is total" in the relationship between product 
and market in the commercial sphere and between candidate and voter in 
p o l i t i c s . I n  the French context, this is certinly an exaggeration. 
Although it is generally agreed that political marketing made its d&but in 
France in the Presidential campaign of 1965, when opinion polls and 
television broadcasts were used for the first time, nevertheless, the 
French have only reluctantly moved to systematic use of politcal 
marketing, 70 and more recent studies have contested the 'total analogy'.71
Among politicians, Michel Noir is full of enthusiasm for the 
techniques which will allow his colleagues to see the voters' point of
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view, and become less dominants and more communi quant s. In this he is 
supported by the PR's Jean-Pierre Raffarin, for whom human sciences and 
marketing are 'indispensable' for the phase of analysis and research, while 
politics governs the strategy, and "communications and advertising transmit 
the messages to the their targets."7S
A very low-key evaluation of their own worth is given by two
successful French communications consultants, Jacques S6gu61a, author of
Mitterrand's winning force tranquille slogan in 1981, and Thierry Saussez,
who has done a lot of work with right-wing local politicians, and handled
the RPR's 1983 Paris campaign. According to S6gu61a,
An advertiser has no power to transform anybody, 
whoever it is, Our friends call us creators, our 
enemies, mystifiers; in fact, all we do is reveal what 
exists. 74
For Saussez, in politics, as opposed to commercial marketing,
..the product is not created according to the needs of 
the market. Made up of the man and his ideas, it is 
imposed on the communications specialists. We can only
improve the wrapping, give it a pretty ribbon and
multiply the selling points.
A certain scepticism is in order in reading these excessively modest
evaluations of the communicators' own roles. What more natural for them but
to polish the image of their clients at the expense of their own, which
could be tarnished by the suspicion that these unelected advisers played an
important role in decisions which affect thousands of lives? At least one
member of the profession, G6rard Demuth, of COFREMCA, a research institute
which produces sociological analyses for both political and commercial
clients, admits that in his work he sometimes has to solve the problem of a
disjunction between political supply and social demand;
In order to succeed, a political idea must be in phase 
with a number of elements forming a synergy. .. we have 
to find points of adjustment, which could include
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modification of doctrine...this idea, in the stock of 
ideas in the programme, is at the moment in 25th 
position, it ought to be in the front rank.7®
Such an admission evokes concern in those who approve of politicians 
using opinion surveys to inform themselves more accurately than they would 
by talking to family, friends, and caf£ acquaintances, but believe that 
they must not give up their role as inventors of new ideas for future 
social development.77
What can the RPR's experience tell us about French politicians' 
reliance on opinion surveys? In an earlier chapter we described how in 
1974, after the death of President Pompidou, the UDR general secretary 
Alexandre Sanguinetti had organized an unprecedented (for the Gaullists) 
opinion survey which revealed that the party was suffering badly from not 
having a recognized leader. Ironically, in 'correctly' applying the message 
of this poll, by resigning and making way for Chirac, Sanguinetti ensured 
that his initial work would not be continued, for Chirac and his closest 
advisers were irremediably hostile to opinion polling. One of the few 
leading members who believed that systematic polling was indispensable for 
a modern political party, the deputy and central committee member Andr£ 
Fanton, claimed that the atmosphere in the prime minister's office around 
1974-5, was such that to read opinion polls was regarded as "like reading a 
pornographic magazine. " ye>
Rather than give their trust, and their money, to charlatans, the RPR
leadership for the rest of the 1970s adopted the solution of Marie-France
Garaud who, notoriously, had said in a press interview that she had no need
of opinion polls, because if she wanted to know how people were thinking
she had only to ask the gardener who looked after the grounds of her
provincial chateau. Chirac's theory was that;
if you put 100,000 francs on the desk in a polling
- 246-
organization, you get an extra point in the popularity 
ratings. . (And if you offer 200,000. . ) you get two 
points.73
It was uphill work convincing Chirac of the value of polling,
especially as all except one of the French polling organizations had
wrongly predicted he would lose the 1977 Paris council election. Fanton had
to explain "twenty times" that they had mistakenly run only a single Paris-
wide survey comparing Chirac with d'Ornano, his main rival, instead of a
ward-by-ward survey which would have revealed RPR support among the
councillors actually charged with electing the mayor.
I explained to him a hundred and fifty times that 
polling institutes don't make a living out of 
politics, as he seemed to think, but they lived from 
commercial work, and if their polls were not very 
good, well that cost them a lot of money. And you 
wouldn't make them change their mind by giving them 
100,000 francs extra, because the 100,000 he kept on 
about would make them lose 10 million.®0
A change came in 1979, however, when Fanton half-convinced Chirac that
if opinion surveys and a gentler style of presentation had been used, the
party would not have developed a policy and strategy for the European
elections which so lamentably missed its mark and left them languishing at
the bottom of the poll. Aided by the passing disgruntlement of rank and
file deputies fearful for their seats and annoyed by the high-handed
behaviour of Pasqua within the party, Fanton persuaded Chirac to appoint
him as d£ldgu£ national at the rue de Lille, in charge of party
communications;
The 'communications' title was the first time that we 
adopted a policy tending to put over an image either 
of the movement or of its president which would be
improved in so far as possible. And in
'communications', according to me - that's what I 
said, anyway, and he accepted it - naturally, there 
was opinion polling.®1
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Fanton never forced his way into the leadership inner circle, and 
failed to endear himself to certain of it members, such as Pasqua and 
Boyon, by advising Chirac not to stand in the 1981 presidential election, 
eventually announcing his own support for Debr£. 6,2 At the 1981 legislative 
election he stood as a candidate in the Calvados, having already in 1978 
renounced his seat in Paris, in response to the allure of the provinces. 
Unsuccessful, he nevertheless made his home and his political base in 
Normandy, where he was adjoint to the mayor of Lisieux from 1983 to 1989. 
Because of this move, Fanton scaled down his Parisian commitment. Elie 
Crespi was appointed to a position over him with the title of secrdt aire
national for communications, but Fanton remained as d£l£gud until early
1985, responsible solely for opinion polling.
Thus from the autumn of 1979 to the autumn of 1981 Fanton was the 
senior official at party headquarters responsible for the whole of the 
party's communications effort, and afterwards he continued to carry out 
opinion surveys for the party, communicating their results to Chirac, 
during the entire period in which the party transformed its approach to the
role of the state in the economy. Undoubtedly, he has a unique insight into
the degree to which survey findings influenced or failed to influence the 
party's new thinking.
Fanton brought to his work a very clear idea of what polling can tell
the politician, and what the politician has to decide for himself;
There's a limit, you can't follow the polls. Just now
I said that de Gaulle created the French nuclear
deterrent. If he had taken a poll, there would have
been no chance of it being accepted - none whatsoever.
It's just the same as when Mitterrand abolished the
death penalty......So, as for me, I don't criticize a
politician; I would even say that I prefer a 
politician not to follow the polls.
But, if you like, the point of a poll is that it 
reveals the disjunction which exists in public
opinion, between what you are going to say and what 
people want. So, that means that you have to put a bit
of pedagogy into the ideas you believe in. "33 As
d£l£gu4 national from 1979, in association with Denis Baudoin, the town
hall press chief who largely shared his ideas, and was a public relations
professional, Fanton subjected Chirac to a number of practice sessions in
front of television cameras with the aim of adapting his appearance and
body language in such a way as to get rid of the image of aggressive
agitator which still clung to him. Recorded cassettes of the sessions were
shown to selected audiences who were invited to write down their
impressions of the man and his performance.
More importantly, throughout 1980, in preparation for the Presidential 
election, he commissioned one opinion poll per month, in an effort to cover
a large number of issues, and discover the themes likely to be popular with
the voters. They were devoted in turn to a different general topic, 
beginning with reactions to some of Giscard's reforms, such as votes at 18 
and abortion rights, and moving on to themes like education/training, 
housing and the world of work. From the end of September, when Chirac 
decided (but did not yet announce) that he would be a candidate, a second 
series of polls was added, in which the bulk of the questions remained the 
same, relating to opinions on the various candidates and their chances of 
being elected, along with a few which varied according to the topical items 
of the moment.
The view of polling as a scientific and neutral tool, potentially 
useful in showing the areas of policy where a degree of persuasive power 
needed to be applied, had still not fully penetrated the candidate's 
entourage, however. On the eve of the vote, Charles Pasqua told the press 
of the 'results' of some imaginary private polls, hoping to create a
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bandwagon effect by convincing the public that the RPR leader was running 
four points ahead of his actual score.,ae Not only did the tactic fail, but 
Fanton found himself after the election yet again having to convince Chirac 
that the real polls had accurately predicted his score, and that he 
wouldn't have been disappointed if he had not listened to made-up stories.
The results of his in-depth polls, duly evaluated, convinced Fanton
that Chirac was mistaken in running against Giscard, and especially in
running with the liberal platform which he had chosen for himself;
I told him so all the time. I told him afterwards, 
right up until 1986, and especially in the period 
1983-4, when we were trying to develop a platform.
Er. . . I said to him, "Everything shows that the French 
are people..." - you can't say that they are not 
'liberal', because when we asked them the question 
just like that, they all say that they are liberal -
but, deep down, they are not. 86
On certain questions this conclusion was not immediately obvious. For
example, the idea of being able to live in one's own house was very
popular, and by association, the proposal to sell off public housing, but
this attachment to home ownership was nothing new, and had been known since
opinion polling began in France, in the 1950s. But on certain topical
political issues the message was inescapable;
I mentioned the wealth tax because it was clear. We 
did some polls on the wealth tax. We asked the 
question. Always, always, always, people, the French
people replied; "It should be kept!" Always!  But,
in 1986, we couldn't abolish it fast enough, when it 
was the opposite of what French people wanted. In all 
the opinion polls which have been done, private or 
public, the French people said that the wealth tax was 
a good thing.07
As some commentators had foreseen, among the most hostile to the 
liberal programme as it developed were the self-employed craftsmen and 
traders who had hitherto been solid supporters of the RPR;
V
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When you're on an election campaign, and you go to see 
the shopkeepers, what do the shopkeepers tell you? The 
shopkeepers never tell you that there's not enough 
freedom. They always tell you there is too much. They 
ask you, all the butchers who are already set up, all 
the hairdressers, the bakers...they don't want any 
more butchers, bakers or hairdressers to exist. They 
tell you there should be a diploma. Their dream is to 
run a chemist's shop, that is, one for every three 
thousand people, end of story.
The surveys also predicted that Balladur's scheme to encourage 
personal pension plans would be the failure which it was. The idea was to 
draw more private savings into the stock exchange, at the same time 
relieving pressure on the social security budgets. But, according to 
Fanton, those who bought shares for the first time in the privatization 
programme were not concerned about retirement, for most people expect and 
want the state to take care of their pension. Rather, as in Britain, they 
were attracted by the thought that they could make a killing, and buy 
themselves a new car. As for the social security system, the verdict both 
of opinion surveys, and the 6tats-g£n£raux de la s£curit£ sociale organized 
by the Gaullist social affairs minister Philippe S6guin was blindingly 
clear;
It was "hands off!", and all the ideas which had been 
put about such as "The French people will have to pay 
for a part of their sickness benefits," were swept 
aside. From the most liberal of employers to the 
poorest sweeper, the ambition of all the farmers and 
shopkeepers who are not already covered by the social 
security system, is to be in the social security 
system. S'B
Similar results from opinion polls on the social security system were 
made public by other organizations from time to time. Philippe Auberger, 
the party's tax expert cited them in justification of his prudent reform 
proposals,'*0 and Gaullists other than he and Fanton must have been well 
aware of them.
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Yet in the preparation of Chirac's 1961 Presidential candidature, and 
during the re-writing of their programme after the Socialists came to 
power, the RPR as a party had placed little priority on opinion surveys. 
The person in charge of this activity was not a member of the inner circle 
of leaders. He warned that the themes which were part of a coherent 
'liberal' programme for the transformation of the relationship between 
citizens, state and the economy, were not popular with public opinion, 
which remained attached to progressive taxation and a comprehensive social 
security system. The party leadership took no account of these warnings in 
drawing up the programme, and they very definitely did not try to align it 
closely with what seemed to be the preoccupations of public opinion. In 
fact, as we show in 6.3, in so far as they tried to find out what the 
public was thinking, this was with the intention of reforming their 
leader's image, rather than meeting voters' aspirations.
Att itudes
In the construction and marketing of an image, whether commercial or
political, marketing professionals usually delve deeper into the buyer
(voter)'s subconscious than is implied by answers to a number of
programmatic questions on the size of the minimum wage, or the number of
nuclear submarines a country ought to have. One marketing manual's
definition of image is;
a complex of emotional and rational representations 
resulting from the confrontation of causative events 
(demonstration of the brand, personal experience, 
rumour) with pre-existing dispositions, and which is 
spontaneously associated with the brand as soon as it 
is evoked.31
These pre-existing dispositions, or "motivations", which form the
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buyer's psychological frame of reference, have been categorized by 
marketing into 'positive' and 'negative' impulses. Among positive impulses 
- those which incite to purchase - are the hedonistic impulse, the oblative 
(the desire to give), and the desire for self-expression. Among negative 
impulses are fear (the fear of being robbed), and inhibitions of the kind 
which are expressed by the thought, 'this product is not for people like 
us. ' It is this battery of socio-psychological concepts which 
communications advisers, assisted by psychologists, make use of when they 
organize games among a panel of party supporters or group discussions about 
their client-politician. 32
These techniques are especially suitable for leader-dominated 
campaigning, and their prevalence is unsurprising in American politics, 
where argumentation is regarded as useless; the important thing is to know 
how to manipulate symbols, key-words and key-images. ~,S) The UDR had 
discovered already in 1974 that a party's following was apt to suffer if it 
did not have a recognized and authoritative leader. A decade later, more 
poll evidence revealed the continuing close link between a party's 
popularity and its leader's standing. In the regular SOFRES-Figaro Magazine 
barometer, the gap between the average 'good opinion' rating of the RPR and 
the average of positive responses to the question whether Chirac ought to 
play a role in the future in French politics was always less than three 
points, except during 1985, when Chirac stood at 36. 5% and his party at 
41%. Significantly, when Chirac's rating jumped 11 points during 1986, the 
year in which he was appointed prime minister, the party moved up in his 
wake, achieving a surplus of good opinions over bad (46% to 40.6%) for the 
first time since 1981. When Chirac's stock plummeted after his government's 
Christmas crisis, the party's popularity fell once again, although not by
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so much. 3/1 Even in a political system without presidential elections the 
leader's image is often important for party success; in the presidential 
5th Republic it is crucial.
These considerations no doubt weighed a lot in Chirac's decision, 
shortly after the 1981 elections, to appoint a communications specialist 
with the specific task of fashioning an image 'for the 1990s'. The choice 
fell on 59 year old Elie Crespi, a stranger to politics, who had won prizes 
from his professional colleagues for his work in advertising the Club 
Medlterran4e. As we saw earlier, with Fanton's retreat to the provinces, 
Crespi was soon given the formal title of secretaire national for 
communications, and took his place on the RPR executive committee alongside 
the other key party officials. He retained this position after Toubon 
succeeded Pons in the general secretary's job in November 1984.
Crespi's research methods did involve in-depth analysis of the sub­
conscious attitudes of individuals, correlating them with their responses 
to the Chirac persona,following the pattern established in American 
politics, and reccommended by Michel Noir among others, but deprecated by 
Fanton, who preferred to work "99% with opinion polls".
But Crespi was chiefly influenced by another methodology originating 
in the USA, which was transferred to France at the start of the the 1970s 
by a commercial market research organization called the Centre de 
Communication Avanc£, (CCA) and elevated into a quasi-intellectual school
of thought in a number of works by its director, Bernard Cathelat. This was
the so-called sociology of life-styles, premised on rejection of the
'traditional' classification of social attitudes within a familiar left-
right continuum.
Cathelat claims that the double axes of a more accurate map of social
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attitudes oppose change and stability on the one hand, and pleasure and 
asceticism <rigueur) on the other. 37 He distinguishes four or five large 
"mentalities" or "sociotypes" within the population, depending on whether 
individuals are drawn to one or the other of these "horizons", and claims 
that most individuals can be assigned to groups which are called 
"adventurist", "utilitarian", "withdrawn" Crecentr&) etc. Each mentality in 
turn can be broken down into two or three sociostyles, or "micro-climates", 
constructed by computer treatment of the answers to hundreds of thousands 
of questions aimed at cross-referencing objective sociological data about 
respondents' material circumstances with their secret motivations, 
ambitions and patterns of consumption, leisure and family life.
The CCA, which is part of Havas, one of the largest European 
communications groups, earns its living by making its data and analyses 
available to those engaged in commercial marketing, and refuses on grounds 
of professional secrecy to make even old data available for inspection by 
academic sociologists, who consequently regard the 'findings' of the life­
style school as of rather dubious intellectual status. 3-3
The validity or otherwise of the "lifestyle" conclusions concerns us 
less than the use to which they were put in French politics. The election 
of Francois Mitterrand in 1981 gave a great boost to the life-style 
approach to political communication since the architect of his advertising 
campaign, Jacques S£gu£la, was known to have used it to adjust Mitterrand's 
speeches to the 'mentality' of the target groups among whom he needed to 
increase his share of the vote.100 The success of the 1981 slogan la force 
tranquille (quiet strength), deployed on a background of sleepy provincial 
village with church steeple, and designed to convert the weak points of the 
candidate's image into his strengths - age into wisdom, powerlessness into
sympathy with the grass roots - seemed to show that a majority of French 
people subconsciously yearned for a return to the security of the ‘deep 
heart of France', and feared the openness to the world urged by Giscard and 
Chirac.
This interpretation fitted that of the CCA, which already by 1977 had 
suggested that the 'adventurist' cultural model, dominant in the media and 
with a relative majority of French people in the 1960s and early 1970s, was 
on the decline, under threat from a wave of retreat or withdrawal 
(recent rage), a mentality which was neither radically progressive nor 
radically conservative, but was "balanced, calm, prudent, patient", longing 
for communities "on a human scale", in which they could "participate, but 
not lose themselves."101 Whereas the CCA's 'map' of lifestyles in 1977 had 
shown 42% of the French people to be withdrawn (recentr^s) as against 38% 
adventurers, the map for 1980-83 showed the recentr£s at between 49 and 
52%, covering an absolute majority of all French people, while the 
adventurist current had broken up, with 20-22% of French people becoming 
"alienated" Cd£cal£s), leaving only 14-15% faithful to the outward-looking 
spirit of the sixties.102
A vital problem for campaign strategists concerns the answer to the 
questions - "Where do 'sociotypes' come from? What causes one or another to 
become dominant at any particular time?" One of the mentalities in the 
original model - the utilitarian - seemed to have been formed since time 
immemorial by the struggle for existence in a closed, usually rural 
subsistence economy, in which neither social structure nor the boundaries 
of the imagination were disturbed by shocks coming from outside. The 
shrinking of its natural habitat could adequately explain its declining 
hold on the French people.103 Other sociostyles, however, are subject to
- 256-
the buffeting of flux culturels, whose action can be compared to that of a
"social wind";
it's a current, a gust of public opinion, "a fashion"
(in the noblest sense of the term), often cyclical, 
which influences society for a few years or decades 
before weakening or reversing direct ion. 1OA
Several cultural fluxes can blow in the same society during the same
period; by their actions on sociostyles they are regarded as components of
1i f estyles;
in this way they compose a compass card of winds which 
disperse the different sociostyles and mentalities to 
the four corners of the social horizon, according to 
their predispositions. 1os
Cathelat's sustained metereological metaphor neatly avoids the 
question of identifying the particular combination of elements to which the 
winds in turn owe their origin. In this passage, they appear to be 
autonomous, whipped up by forces which, if they exist at all, are invisible 
to the self-styled cartographer's telescope. Elsewhere, however, he 
suggests that the wave of tremulous insecurity on which Mitterrand rode to 
power was fed by unemployment, the dangers of nuclear technology and the 
crowded, noisy, polluted atmosphere of modern life.106
In either case, for the RPR to espouse lifestyle sociology amounted to
something of a paradox. For whether the mood of retreat and retrenchment to
which their opponent allegedly owed his success was a nebulous symptom of
unplumbable planetary forces, or whether it was set in material conditions
which remained all too concrete, how could Chirac and his friends, whose
economic programme stressed activity, risk and self-reliance, possibly hope
to reconquer power? Crespi sought refuge in the metereological reading of
long-term cultural cycles;
... the change of majority which took place on 10th u
May (1981) did not come about suddenly. The election
campaign could do nothing to change the course of
events. The change is the result of long-term
causes.107
He pinned his faith on the evolution of the political market. In six 
or seven years people would be fed up with Socialism, so there was no need 
to tinker with the product he had to sell. Eventually Chirac's faults would 
appear as virtues.1os In the meantime, the important thing was simply to 
"make known the RPR's choices for society" and to stress Chirac's national 
stature.103
Crespi's attitude might have seemed extraordinarily complacent for the 
man charged with fashioning the image of the hyperdynamic RPR leader, but 
before discussing the influence of his lifestyle sociology on the RPR's 
self portrayal, a word ought to be said about the objective limits within 
which he had to work.
In general, any politician's rating in the polls depends far more on 
the position he occupies on the political stage than on the efforts of his 
advisers to touch up his image, and Chirac was no exception. As prime 
minister from 1974-6, the evolution of his popularity followed (at a 
distance) that of Giscard, the President who appointed him. From the moment
he left Matignon until the end of 1979, his rating was characterized by
plateaux of stability punctuated by sharp falls which corresponded to his 
challenges to the sitting President. His image improved somewhat during 
1980 when Pons took the bigger share of confrontations with the UDF, and in 
April 1981, on the eve of the Presidential election Chirac stood as high as 
he ever had in a poll asking respondents if they wished him to have a 
future role in politics.1,0
During 1982-3, his rating profited from his position as de facto 
'leader of the opposition', 111 but sank again when he appeared to abandon
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this role by agreeing to run a joint list with the UDF in the 1984 European 
election.112 His rating shot up again when he became prime minister for the 
second time in March 1986, and profited from the mood of national unity 
created by the struggle against the September terror— bombing campaign in 
Paris.
As well as being subject to the same pressures as other leaders,
however, Chirac's image also had some permanent features of its own.
Already in 1975, the two qualities which respondents thought best described
him were stubborness (65%), and toughness (64%); in the early 1980s,
determination and energy113 were still ahead of competence and honesty in
citizens' images of him. Furthermore, he was seen as cold, and distant from
everyday problems. 114 A certain aggressiveness was sometimes attributed to
the unsettling attention of the media116, but it seems to lie deeper than
that. Once, for a debate on one of Barre's budgets, Chirac's staff prepared
him a speech which was agreed should be balanced and statesmanlike, if
critical. Afterwards, all the press found Barre*s speech constructive, and
Chirac's polemical. In preparing to deliver it, Chirac had subconsciously
added words and phrases here and there, in all amounting to no more than a
page, but consisting almost entirely of negative adjectives or adjectival
phrases.11s Another communications adviser bemoaned the fact that it was
impossible to control his client;
We have made a tremendous effort to rid him of his 
image of ultradynamic, almost fascistic action-man. We 
have given him stature and a degree of serenity. And 
every time we are really on the right path, and the 
opinion polls start to swing our way, bang!, he makes 
some earth-shattering declaration without warning us 
in advance.117
Crespi's attempt to file off Chirac's rough edges began with 
reccommendations for different suits and ties, an experiment which was
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"neither successful nor prolonged" according to one Chirac admirer.11® It 
provoked a sharp polemic inside the party between those who were for 
"gentle Jacques" with a new image tailored by Crespi, and admirers of the 
old "macho Jacques" and denied that any changes were necessary. Pons and 
the parliamentary leader, Claude Labb6, were hostile to Crespi's insistence 
that Chirac needed to cultivate a more youthful "look".11®
In June 1984, worried about his dive in the polls, Chirac asked Pons 
to sack some of his national secretaries and replace them with younger 
people. But Pons refused, contrasting Chirac's rating with the superior 
performance of the party, which at the time had a 'tougher' image than its 
president. Fuelled doubtless by the ambitions of the younger members in 
question, as well as by the emergence of Fabius and the PR's Lyotard in 
national politics, the argument dragged on until November, when Pons 
himself offered his resignation, and left the way open for Toubon to 
introduce the changes Chirac wanted. 120
Even Fanton and Baudoin thought that it had been a mistake to appoint 
Crespi, mainly because of the difficulty of transferring to politics 
experience gained in the commercial use of marketing techniques. For Fanton 
this view was confirmed when he encountered Crespi's methods, which he 
recalls memorably;
He thought it was wonderful. . . . he would gather 
together 23 people. ... I myself read, I don't know 
where I've put it, an extraordinary document.... He. . he 
asked people that he chose at random, in Orleans or 
some such place, he asked them, "Who is Chirac?" So 
the answers were something like, "Chirac is a 
polytechnician", "His son is a polytechnician...."
Chirac hasn't got a son, but Crespi would say, "Ah, 
its interesting, you see; people think he's got a 
son!" That was Crespi for you!
And I said, "That means what, exactly? What 
political conclusion do you draw from that?"
But he would say, "It's interesting, that's his 
i mage!".......
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Crespi's panels, it was all Cathelat. He was 
thrilled because there was a d£centr£, there was a 
recentr£, etc. It was just a fashion, because nobody 
talks about Cathelat any more today, except in the 
sociology faculties.121
Conclusions
The market approach to political behaviour cannot help us to
understand the RPR's abandonment of traditional Gaullist interventionism. 
The party had not been used to competing electorally with the other main 
French conservative party, the UDF, before Chirac began the programmatic 
transformation in 1981, and - until the 1988 presidential election - did 
not do so again afterwards. Surveys of the similar sociological and value 
profiles of the two parties' supporters show that they had not much 
incentive to do so.
Rather than contesting the middle ground with the Socialist party in
the 1980s, the RPR incontestably moved to the right, a process which was 
under way before the Front National emerged as an important electoral 
rival. Analyses of the support going to the latter party showed that it was
had not traditionally voted for the mainstream Right, so that there was no 
market logic in any RPR move to cover FN policies. In any case, on economic 
issues, the two parties offered a similar programme, and the FN had no 
strong profile in this area.
The party leadership made only halting use of modern political 
communications, of which they were suspicious. They ignored the advice of 
their specialist opinion researchers, and put most of their effort into 
constructing a sympathetic image for the party leader. The person in charge 
of this work was a stranger to politics whose understanding of the way
initially unstable and eventually concentrated in sociological groups which
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cultural or political ideas are changed led him to interpret very 
fatalistically the chances of influencing election outcomes by 
communications techniques, His methods were treated with frank scepticism 
by party communications colleagues, his client's personality was 
particularly unamenable to his efforts, and his one successful initiative - 
the rejuvenation of the executive committee - was operated at the cost of a 
row in the party.
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taut trouver des po in ts  d'ajustements qui pen vent a l le r  jusqu'O des mflechissements de
doctr ines,,, ce tte  idee-lH •• dans le  stock programmatique - on la met au v ingt-c inquiime  
rang, i l  faudra it  la  mettre au premier rang, "
77. "accoucheur de pro je ts  de dOveloppement pour la s o c i e t e Roland Cayrol, La Nouvelle 
Communication P o li t ique  Paris, Larousse, 1986, p 124
78. Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-39, Panton was so concerned that the party was not 
properly organized in this respect that he was the only person ever to stand - 
unsuccessfully, because independently of the ruling clique - in the 'election1 for 
general secretary under the old UDR rules,
79. "11 avast une thdorie, en disant, 'On met 100,000 francs sur un bureau devant I ' m s t i t u t  
de sondages, et i l s  augmentent votre cdte d'un point, ,, <Et si on mettait 
200,000?),,, "On a deux points, etc, etc, " Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-89
50, interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-39, *Je lu i  as exphque cent cmquante fo is  que les
i l i s t i t u t s  de cordage ne v iva ien t pas de la p o l i t iq u e , ft? q u ' i l  avart 1 'a i r  de cro ire ,
q u ' i l s  v iva ient du commerce et s i lours sondages n 'b ta ien t pas trds bans, eh bien, ga
leur codial t  trds Cher sur le  plan commercial, t t  ce n eta i t  pas avec 100,000 francs
qu ‘on les fa is a i t  changer d 'av is , pare e que les 100,000 francs dont i l  par la i t ,  ga leur  
f a i s a i i  perdre d ix  m il l ions, "
51, Interview with Andre Fanton, "La communication, c 'e t a i t  la premiere fo is  qu'on imagmait 
une p o l i t iq u e  tendani J fa i re  passer une image, sort du mouvement, s o i t  de son 
president, s i possible amehore, Et dans la communication selon moi •• e 'e s t  ce que, en 
tout cas, j '  avais P it, e t i l  l ‘a accepts - i l  y ava it  natura l lament, les etudes
d'opinion, "
82. Interview with Jacques Boyon, 27-4-89
-269-
§3, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4*89! ”11 y a une mesure, on ne pout pas suivre les
sondages, rout 4 Uheure, j ' a i  d i t  que le  general de Gaulle a f a i t  la force de 
dissuasion frangaise, S'11 ava it  f a i t  un sondage, i l  n 'y  a u ra i t  eu aucune chance que ce 
s o i t  accepts aucune, C'est exact e m i t  come quand M itterrand a supprme la  peine de 
wort , Done, m i ,  je  ne c r i t iq u e  pas un home p o l i t iq u e ;  je  d i ra is  mtme que je  
souhaite qu 'un homme p o l i t iq u e  ne suive pas les sondages, Mai s. s i vous voulez, 1 'm te rA t  
du sondage, c 'e s t  de fa i re  apparaltre le  decal age qui ex is te  dans 1 'opinion, entre ce 
que vous a l le z  dire, et ce que 1 'opinion cro it,  Done, ga veut d ire  q u ' i l  fau t un peu de 
pidagogie dans ce que vous defended, "
84. "APus avons essayP de delayer un p e t i t  peu 1 'ensemble du te rra in  pour vo ir les themes
qui e ta ient les p lus porleurs, " (Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-39)
89, The incident is recounted in Philippe Boggio and Alain Rollat, Ce fe r n b le  Monsieur
Pasqua, Paris, Olivier Orban 1933, p 170, and confirmed by Andre Fanton, (Interview of
21-4-89)
88, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-83; uJe le lu i  ai d i t  tout le  temps, le  le  lu i  ai d i t
aprps, no teamen t jusqu 'en '86, notament cans les anndes '83-84, quand on essayait de 
mettre en place une p la te  forme, Ah,,, je  lu i  ai d i t ,  "Tout montre que les franga is ,, , ,  "
- on ne pout pas d ire  q u ' i l s  ne sont pas l i t e r  aux, parce que, si on leur pose la  
question come ga, i l s  repondent tous q u ' i l s  sont l i t e r  aux, inais que, au fond des 
choses, i l s  ne le  sont pas, "
87, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-39] "J 'a i par/e de 1'impdt sur ies grandes fortunes, 
parce que c 'A ta i t  c la i r ,  On a f a i t  des sondages, IP, avec I ' im pd t sur les grandes 
fortunes, On a post la  question, Tou jours, toujour s, toujours, les gens, les f  rang a is  
repondaient, "11 faut le  garder/ ” Toujours! , , ,  Mais en '38 on s ’est p re c ip i te  pour 
Uabroger, alors, c 'A ta i t  con tra ire  4 ce que pensaient les frangais, Dans tous les  
sondages d ' opinion puthque qu'on a f a i t s , priyps ou publics, les frangais consider a len t 
que 1 ' lmptt sur les grandes fortunes e ta i t  bon, *
88, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-39, "Quand vous fa i te s  un campagne electorate, et vous
a l ien  chez les comergants, que vous disent les comergants? Les cosmergants vous disent 
jamais q u ' i l  n 'y  a pas assez de h b e r te , U s  vous disent toujours q u ' i l  y en a trop, 11 
vous demandant, tous les touchers qui sont en place, les co if feurs , les boulangers,, , ,  
i l s  veulent q u ' i l  n 'y a pas p lus de boulangers, de touchers, de co if feu rs  qui existent, 
U s vous disent q u ' i l  faut un dipldme, Leur rtve, c 'e s t  d 'e t re  des pharmacions, c 'e s t -4 -  
d ire  un pour t ro is  mi l i e  habitants, po in t  f ina l,  "
89, Interview wi th Andre Fanton, 21-4-89, "La conclusion a ete eda tan te ;  qu'on ne touche 
pas 4 ga! Et toutes les idbes qu ’on pouvait avoir sur, ”11 faut que les frangais paient 
une p a r t ie  de leur maladie, " ont Ate balayees, Alors 14, du patron le  plus l i t e r a l  
jusqu'au balayeur le  moms fortune, 1 'ambition de tous les a g r icu l teurs e t de tous les 
comergants qui ne sont pas 4 la s tc u n te  socials, c ’est d 'e t re  4 la securi te sociale, "
90, Philippe Auberger, L 'A l le rg ie  Eiscale, Paris, Calmann-Levy 1984, p 123
91, Noir op c i t ,  RPussir une campagne, , , , ,  p 40, ”, , ,  une complex? de representations
e ffec t ives  e t ra t ionne lles  resu ltan t de la confrontation de causes generatrices  
(manifestations de la marque, experience propre, rumeurJ avec motivations pre-  
existantes, e t qu'on assoc le spontanement 4 la marque d4s 1 ‘Avocation de ce l le -c i , "
32, ibidem, pp 33-9
-270-
93, In the USh , th* absence of an ideological element in party traditions has led to 
candidate-centred campaigning which both reinforces citizens' tendency to determine 
their vote according to candidate rather than party label, and induces campaign 
strategists to devote vast resources to studying the components of 'image' in the hope
of reproducing them to order, Noir, op c i t , pp 73-83 and 121
94, Le Monde 24/5-5-87
95, Huet et Langenieux-Viilard op a t , p 41
96, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21-4-89
97, Bernard Cathelat, Styles de Vie, vol 1, Cartes et Portra its , Paris, Editions
d ’Organisation, 1985, pp 34-37, For Crespi's adhesion to lifestyle sociology, see Boy,
Dupoirier et Heynaud, Joe c/i p 127
98 In the mid-1980s this information was drawn from a panel of 3,500 people interviewd six 
times a year, backed up by a one-off sample of 4,000 every two years, Another French
organization using the same methods, C0FREMCA, uses an annual poll of 2,500 people, As
the CCA's data bank lias grown, the separation of the population into identifiable 
sociostyles has become progressively wore sophisticated, In 1972, they claimed to 
distinguish three mentalities and nine sociostyles, five years later the sociostyles had 
expanded to ! I, and by 1984 there were five recorded mentalities and 14 corresponding 
sociostyles, Cathelat op c it , pp 18-21; Boy, Dupoirier et heynaud, loc c i t  p 125
93, fhey have also condemned the lack of any methodological commentary to justify lumping
together the result of different types of research -• including interviews and auto­
administered questionnaires - and demanded details of the method of interpretation which 
allows Cathelat and his friends to go from raw facts to t h e i r  colourful 'maps' See f o r  
example Nicholas Herpin, "Socio-style", in Revue Franfaisa de Socwlogie, XXVII 1986 pp 
265-272
100 J-P Bobin, Le Marketing Po lit ique , vendre 1 'home at 1'idee, Paris, hilan Hidia, 1938 pp 
75-6
101, Cathelat op c i  t p 75
102, ibidem pp 71-79; in this passage we have left out of the account the "utilitarian" 
mentality, corresponding largely to the low incomes and organicist conservatism of 
isolated rural areas; these represented 20% of French people in 1977, according to the 
CCA, and 14-15% in 1982-3
103, ibidem pp 64-7
104, ibidem d 19 , c 'e s t  un courant, une poussde cl1 opinion pubhque, une 'mode', (au plus
noble sens du termed sou vent cyclique, qui influence la  socie ty pendant quelques 
annees ou d i iam es  d'annees avant de s 'e t io le r  ou oe s ' inve rse  r, "
105, ibidem o 20, , i l s  composent am,si une rose des vents qui d ispersent les d i f f& ren ts
sociostyles e t mentali tes aux quatre coins de 1 'horizon social, selon lours
sens ib i  l i  tes",
106, ibidem p 78
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107, Cited i n Huet et Langenieux-Vi 1 lard, op a t ,  p 40, " ,,, Is  changement ds m j o r i t s  qui
ss t  mtervenu Is  fO mai ne s 's s i  pas p rodu it  brusquement, La campagne e lec to ra l#  ne
pouvai t pas modifier le  coups des choses, Le changement v ient de Join, "
108, Crespi cited in Saussez, op c i t , p 198
109, Huet et Ungenieux-Villard, op c i t , p 41
MO, Jean-Luc Parodi, "Jacques Chirac devant 3'opinion (1970-85)“, in Pouvoirs 34, 198,5 pp 
157-165,
111, That is, between the moments when Siscard sank without trace and Barre made his
breakthrough as a potential winner against the left; Colette Ysmal, Joe c i t , “La
Resistible Ascension,,,,"; Chariot loc c i t  "Les consultations,,,,,,"
112, Parodi loc c i t
M3, ibidem, But there was ambiguity here; a private poll run by Saussez in 1984 found that
in Paris energy was a quality which made Chirac a good mayor, while in the provinces it
was seen as a negative quality, (Saussez op c it , p 192)
1U, Despite the advantage he enjoyed during the "leader of the opposition" period, an
average of the monthly “good opinion" scores recorded between June 1981 and March 1986 
gave Chirac 36ft, less than all of his main rivals, (discard 40ft, Barre 44ft and Veil 
48ft) (Philippe Habert, “Jacques Chirac k 1'Gpreuve du pouvoir", in Pouvoirs 41 1987, 
pp 185-200)
MS, Ironically, while Barre is often thought of as testy and schoolmasterish, Chirac is a 
relaxed and unceremonious personality who, by his own admission, has not learnt to 
perform well with the media, becoming tense and aggressive when the microphones are
switched on, < Li f f ran op c i t y  100; Saussez op c i t  p 191)
! 16, Saussez op c i t p 195
M7, Cited in Cayrol op c i t  p 88; “On a f a i t  un e f f o r t  formidable pour l u i  f a i r s  perdre son 
image de f  one ear ultradynaonque s t  presque facho, On lu i  a donna du poids, de la
se ran l id ,  f t ,  cheque fo is  qu'on est v raiment sur la  bonne voie, que les sondages
commencent J bouger., bang/, i l  f a i t  une declaration a 1 'emporte-pidce sans nous 
prdvenir, "
118, Thierry Desjardins, On Inconnu Noma Chirac, Paris, La Table Ronde, 1983 p 440,
119, Thierry Desjardins op c i t ,  Les Chiraquiens,, , , , ,  p US-6, Saussez argued that it was
possible to make strong declarations, reflecting Chirac's temperament, in a “warm and 
effective" communication style, so that the polemic was a "false debate", (Saussez, op 
c i t , pp 194-5)
120, Desjardins op c i t ,  Les Chiraquiens,, ,,, pp 128-9
121, Interview with Andre Fanton, 21 "4-89; V /  t rouva it  que c 'b t a i t  e x trao rd ina ire , , , ,  I I
rdum ssa ii  23 personnes, , m i ,  ,/ fa i lu, je  ne sais pas o/J j e  .1'a i , je  1 'a i gardd,,, un 
document extraordinaire, On,,, on demands i t  aux gens qu'on rdun issa it  come ca par le  
t irage au s o r t , H Orleans ou je  ne sais pas oil, en disant, "Qui est Chirac?" Olors i l  y
a eu des rdponses: “Chirac, c 'e s t  un po ly technician", "Son f i l s  est poly technic ian,, , ,  "
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// n ’s pas de h i s ,  m j s  Crespi Pisa.it, "Ah, c ’est int&ressant, vous comprenez; on 
c r o i t  q u ' i l  a un f i l s ! "  Lui a lo r s 1 Et je  Pisa is, "fa veut d ire  quoi? Vous en t i r e s  quoi 
come conclusion p o l i t iq u e ? "  dais i l  d isa i t ,  "C’est mtdressant, c ’est 1 ' image!"
 les panels de Crespi, c ‘eta.it Cathelat, 11 ate ravi parce q u ' i l  y  ava it  un
decent re, i l  y a van un recentre, e tc, Alors pa a ate un mode, parce que M, Cathelat, 
aujourd'hui, p lus personae n'en par le , saur dans les um vers ites  de sociologie, "
\Chapter 7 The Sources of Ideas
If there was a debate on ideas within the RPR elites, it was not cast 
in terms of the defence or adulteration of an ideological inheritance. In 
the early 1980s the party did not debate ideas through the clash of rival 
factions and the presentation of motions at party congresses. Rather, 
change iesulted from the the way in which outside events affected 
different groups within the party. In this and the next chapter, we 
describe the key changes in the intellectual environment at the turn of 
the 1900s and trace the way in which they led to the abandonment or 
modification of existing ideas, producing a new amalgam of conservatism 
and liberalism which won widespread acceptance throughout the party.
In the first section of this chapter we examine the influence of 
GRECE, (Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes sur la Civilisation 
Europ^enne) a shadowy extreme-right organization which set itself as early 
as 1968 the task of capturing the ideological and cultural domination 
which GRECE believed the Left had exercised since 1945. Since few 
influential Gaullists had any connection with GRECE, the group's 
significance lies not in what it was able to achieve inside the parly, but 
in its contribution to a climate of opinion, especially through what many 
saw as its "infiltration" of the mass-circulation right-wing press.
In the following section we contrast GRECE ideas with those of the 
self-styled "new economists", a group of young intellectuals who 
consciously set out in 1975 to expound to the French people the ideas of a 
"new generation" of American economic and political theorists, which had 
helped fuel the Republican revival in the United States and which they had 
fervently adopted as their own. These two schools of thought represented
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opposite poles of French conservative ideology in the 1980s, the ultra- 
authoritarian and the ultra-liberal. We leave until chapter 8 a full 
consideration of how each was interpreted, accepted or rejected within the 
RPR.
GRECE and the Nouvelle Droite
There were several reasons why right-wing extremism was going through 
a bad patch in France at the end of the 1960s. The return to power of de 
Gaulle had symbolically sealed the moral and political bankruptcy of Vichy 
and collaboration; in 1962 the victory of the Algerian liberation struggle 
deprived the nostalgics of imperialism of their last hope of preserving 
French rule over a substantial foreign territory; in 1965 de Gaulle 
humiliated Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, carrier of the extremists' hopes, 
in the first Presidential election held under universal suffrage, and in 
the 1967 legislative elections, votes cast for extreme-right candidates 
amounted to no more than 0. 8% of the total.
These were hardly propitious circumstances for the launch of a new 
extreme-right movement. Inevitably the duplicated first number of a 
magazine called "Nouvelle Ecole'\ dated February-March 1968, passed almost 
unnoticed amid the tumults and moods of May. In the August-Septernber 
number it published the names of the 40 founder members of the 'Group for 
Research and Study on European Civilization' (GRECE), which was officially 
registered as an association in Nice in January 1969.1 By the 1980s GRECE 
and Nouvelle Ecole were more or less synonymous with what had come to be 
called the Nouvelle Droite. Most of the 40 were known to each other 
through their participation in extreme-right politics, and the first two 
or three years of GRECE's existence were a rather uncertain period during
-275-
which little seemed to distinguish either the politics, the contributors,
or indeed the prospects of Nouvelle Ecole, from those of two recently
extinct predecessors. ■s
However, Alain de Benoist, the new magazine's editor-in-chief,
adopted the successful strategy - christened m£tapolitique, and
provocatively attributed to the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci - of
abandoning the traditional political arena, with its round of elections,
campaigns and demonstrations, in favour of a "cultural struggle" aimed at
the "winning of minds. "a Once the early difficulties were surmounted,
GRECE emerged as an innovative force propagating themes some of which
differed sharply from those of traditional French conservatism. By 1979,
an influential right-wing editor, Louis Pauwels, could claim;
My ideas are those of what could be called the "Nouvelle 
Droite", which has got nothing to do with the bourgeois, 
conservative and reactionary right. *
Alain de Benoist, the undisputed intellectual leader of GRECE, has 
defended the novelty of his right-wing ideology as neither traditional, 
nor fascist, nor Christian. 5 Certainly, GRECE's keenness to address 
contemporary social issues, such as the role of women, urban planning, 
administrative devolution, and educational philosophy has sometimes seemed 
to bring them closer to the Left than to the traditional Right.& Likewise, 
their general cultural criticism derived a "modern" feeling from their 
willingness to discuss cinema and cartoon books as well as more 
traditional art-forms. 7
If not traditional, is the Nouvelle Droite fascist? De Benoist's 
brand of aristocratic elitism allows him to claim that he has "nothing but 
contempt for Hitler", the contempt, that is, of the aesthete who places 
culture ahead of race as the decisive factor in history.e Furthermore, the
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"Gramscian" strategy of cultural encirclement and infiltration of the 
decision-making elite - to which the original GRECE leaders have 
faithfully adhered - has little in common with the fascism of the 1930s, 
which relied on brute power and manipulation of the masses by a group of 
plebian, if heroic, upstarts. 'B
In terms of public impact, however, the fascist reference is less 
important the attack on Christianity, which is arguably the most 
fundamental, as it is the most disconcerting of Nouvelle Droite themes. 
GRECE wants to put the clock back not just to before 1945, but to before 
Christ.
At its simplest, GRECE doctrine amounts to a denunciation of 
contemporary decadence, the identification of the roots of this decadence 
in the judeo-christian tradition, and the necessity to return to pre- 
ehristian values and social forms. 10 The signs of decadence, first, are 
all around; 1i11er on the beaches, informality in dress, bad teaching, 
hypocrisy in sexual behaviour, the mediocrity of politicians, vacuous 
consumerism, the reign of the market, the cultural hegemony of Marxism, 
the breakdown of homogeneous societ ies. 1 1 Christ ian responsibility for 
this state of affairs follows from its two principal vices, monotheism, 
(which it shared with Judaism and Islam) and egalitarianism. Both helped 
on the fall of the Roman Empire, and in this respect GRECE writers came t 
see Christianity as the "bolshevism of antiquity", undermining the 
str uctures of the f amily and the polity. 12 Subsequently, Christ ianity 
cont ributed little of value to European culture; as Europe emerged from 
the middle ages, the most important achievements in science and art 
occurr ed "not within Chr ist ianity, but rather in most cases against it. "1
In the modern era monotheism is said to be at the root of imperialist 
drives, which were legitimized by the conquerors' conviction of possessing 
the truth. The Nouvelle Droite joins the left, therefore, in condemning 
colonialism. 1A
But the adherents of "totalitarian" religions, while regarding 
themselves as superior to unbelievers, are equal to each other, to the 
disgust of GRECE, which shares the classic conservative organicist view of 
people in society, in which a person's true nature is fulfilled only when 
s/he feels at one within a community in which everyone has an allotted 
place,
a society which the European tradition regarded as 
integrating the individual, (in the sense in which an 
organism integrates the organs which compose it within a 
higher order. ... >1S
The Nouvelle Droite clings more tenaciously than mainstream
conservatism to the belief that, today as in pre-christian times, the
members of the national community should be linked by a common attachment
to the land, by ties of blood and tradition, and by the cult of heroic
deeds. 1e Both bourgeois and workers make the mistake of being more
concerned with owning than with beings so that those most likely to defend
the community's interests are the aristocracy, defined in the words of
Pierre Vial, GRECE general secretary, by
A very simple distinction; aristocrats attempt to preserve 
what they are, bourgeois endeavour to preserve what they 
have.17
On this reading, elites are as likely to be defined by self-selection 
in Nietzschean fashion, through the quality of their actions, 10 as by 
their noble birth. Political democracy is rejected because it is neither 
in touch with national identity, nor likely to produce appropriate rulers.
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Indeed contemporary western society, more than any other, has degenerated
to become no more than the sum of the individuals composing it.
The nation is henceforth nothing but the sum of its
inhabitants at any one time  Political sovereignty
itself is reduced to the level of individuals. Since there 
is no principle of authority which is aloof and 
transcendental, power is no more than a delegation by 
individuals, whose votes are added together whenever 
elections come around. The "sovereignty of the people" has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the people as a people, but is 
the indecisive, contradictory and manipulable sovereignty of 
the individuals who compose the people. '*
On one level, the Nouvelle Droite' s call for the defence of cultural
continuity was cutting with the grain of contemporary right-wing politics.
Since the return of de Gaulle, it had become habitual for at least a part
of the French Right to launch attacks against American culture and
American economic power. Some items on GRECE's list of afflictions, such
as Hollywood, alleged American financial backing for French ecologists,
and US refusal to sell uranium for the French nuclear programme, have a
Gaullist ring to them. 20 But the denunciation of the destruction of
national cultures goes beyond the mere supplanting of French interests or
the stealing of French markets by a more powerful rival.
The sale to foreign buyers of national art treasures, the 
interpretation of "usefulness" in terms of short-term 
commercial profitability, the dispersion of populations and 
the systematic organization of migrations, the handing-over 
to "multinational" companies of the ownership or management 
of entire sectors of national economies or technologies, the 
unfettered spread of exotic cultural fashions, the 
subjection of the media to modes of thought and speech 
linked to the momentary development of certain political or 
ideological superpowers, etc. -
- all this is not, could not be, the fault of the Americans alone -
- all these characteristics of contemporary western 
societies derive logically from putting into practice the 
principal postulates of liberal doctrine.21
GRECE ideology, in short, contains a powerful critique of liberalism.
It deplores the way in which, armed with the liberal philosphy, 
industrialism spread itself all over the globe, everywhere extinguishing 
local and ancient cultures in its path. It complains that the liberal
v/
conception of political rights destroys the cohesion of nations, while its
conception of human nature substitutes quantity for quality of
satisfactions and imposes a '’bourgeois'* obsession with money-making - the
key symptom of the ritually denounced soci&t& marchande. In so doing
Liberalism is responsible for Communism itself, thanks to the influence of
the classical economists on Marx;
The conception of man as an economic animal/being, (the Homo 
oeconomicus of Adam Smith and his school) is the symbol, the 
very sign which connotes at the same time bourgeois 
capitalism and marxist socialism. . . .
Defined essentially as an economic actor, man is considered 
as always able to behave in his own "best" (economic)
"interests".33
Rejecting the optimistic and rationalist liberal model of "economic man", 
de Benoist asks the questions which liberalism has never satisfactorily 
answered;
As for the advantage and the Interest which the individual is 
supposed to seek, they remain ill-defined. What kind of 
interest is in question? In relation to what value-system is 
the advantage to be judged?-*3
According to the Nouvelle Droite, neither the bourgeois conception of
material benefit, nor the Marxist idea of class interest are properly
grounded in convincing value-systems; these can only be provided by
national culture.
Naturally, the attack on liberalism is shared by other right-wing 
extremists with organicist convictions, like the members of the Club de 
1'Horloge, despite their differences on other points such as the new 
Right's paganism and alleged racism. 24 In dealing, however, with the
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challenge represented by the "rebirth" of liberalism in French political 
thought in the 1980s, the various families of the extreme Right responded 
differently. It was not the "pure" Nouvelle Droite of de Benoist but the 
branch represented by the Club de l’Horloge which was more willing to 
colour its discourse with liberal overtones and, indeed, to try to 
integrate liberalism into its conservative doctrine. To see how this was 
done we need to explain what the Gr6cist.es actually mean when they demand 
the return to pre-christian forms of social organization.
In this respect, Nouvelle Droite ideas are based on research into 
Indo-European languages and religions carried out by a distinguished 
French historian and linguist, Georges Dum£zil. GRECE has adopted and 
popularized Durn£zil’s focus on the tripartite classification of social 
functions in any society into those which possess a sacred character, 
those concerned with warfare, and those concerned with economic activity. 
More particularly, Dum^zil theorized that only peoples who spoke Indo- 
European languages developed an ideology in which the functional 
separation became codified to the extent that the personnel concerned with 
religious, military or economic affairs were not to step outside their own 
domain, and that a hierarchy was established between the different 
functions, with the sacred at the top and the economic at the bottom.
For GRECE, the tripartite division of social functions was more than 
just a key to political organization. It was "the web of the Indo-European 
conception of man and of the world, of nature and of the universe. Club 
de 1'Horloge authors likewise justified the division of fundamental social 
functions into law-giving, defence and consumption by stressing their 
correspondance to the three organs of the individual man - brain, muscles, 
and mouth. 26
In the Nouvelle Droite interpretation of Dum£zil, the definitions of
the military and economic spheres in society remain what they have always
been; the sacred functions, however, are not only religious but concern
the demarcation and celebration of national identity and national
sovereignty. -£'7 These tasks are - or should be - the responsibility of the
state, and consequently state officials ought to be at the pinnacle of the
hierarchy of functions.
By and large, the Nouvelle Droite are agreed that western society is
fatally unbalanced in that there is a confusion between the economic and
the sovereign functions. But there are different ways of depicting this
confusion and proposed solutions carry different emphases. For Alain de
Benoist, the economic function has come to dominate all others, and its
personnel continually interfere in domains which do not concern them;
Liberalism has a two-fold attitude to the state. On the one 
hand it subjects it to virulent criticism, referring to its 
"Inefficiency", and denouncing the "dangers of power". On
the other hand, later on, it tries to drag the state into
the economic sphere, in order to depoliticize it and reverse 
the ancient hierarchy of functions. As it grows in strength, 
the economic cast brings within its own sphere the substance 
of the state, gradually subordinating political decisions to
economic imperatives  Henceforward, the state should be
as little political as possible. Nor should it substitute 
itself for the centres of economic decision-making. Its only
task is to maintain order and security  to protect the
money-men at the same time as leaving them complete freedom 
of action - in short, it is no longer to be the master, but 
the very slave of those who, understanding better "economic
laws" .......  are precisely better placed to organize the
world in their own "best interests".
It is clear from this that for the chief Gr&ciste the disequilibrium 
between the state and the economy in modern society was mainly to the 
disadvantage of the state, which appeared in danger of being colonised by 
private business. In the late 1970s this view seemed odd to most political 
commentators, for at that time France was usually held up (approvingly or
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disapprovingly) as a model of planning and interventionism.
Jean-Yves le Gallou and the Club de 11Horloge analysed the separation 
of economic and sovereign functions in a more subtle fashion which opened 
up room for attacking the State instead of unconditionally defending it as 
de Benoist appeared to do. Le Gallou began by arguing that laissez-faire 
is a distortion of the necessary relationship between the three functions
- the abandonment of the productive sphere to its own devices, with no
incentives or checks organized by the sovereign power, led directly to the
inter-war crises and the demise of ’'classic liberalism". One attempt to
reforge the links between State and economy was fascism, equally an
aberration since it subordinated the two other functions to the military
one,29 Another attempt was Keynesianism, a partial solution based on the
idea "in itself justified" of general regulation of the economy by the
political sphere. But this empirical approach, which had no overall grasp
of the relations between the sovereign and productive functions,
necessar ily degenerated into "St at ism";
This results in a society which is at the same time 
mercantile and bureaucratic; dominated by economic concerns 
and commercial values, in which the economy is put under 
direct control, and the State substitutes itself for private 
actors. 30
For the state to take on economic functions means, among other 
things, that it has to lower itself to negotiate with its own employees, 
and that the special status previously reserved for the armed forces and 
civil servants is extended to the directors of nationalized firms and 
various other hangers-on. In both cases the result. Is a dilution of the 
State's authority. The confusion of roles thus leads to a double drawback
- the State's loss of authority is matched by the citizen's loss of 
freedom. 31 Le Gallou's formulation left room for the Club de 1'Horloge to
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participate in, and indeed advance, the emerging ’’liberal" critique of
past political practice. From it followed a two-fold political task
identified by the liberal revival in France in the early 1980s; the
State's sovereign functions should be restored and the authority of its
agents strengthened at the same time as the extent of its authority should
be rolled back to allow economic actors greater freedom.
De Benoist and his friends, in contrast, were increasingly isolated.
Although a later formulation made concessions to the newly fashionable
liberal language, they still clung to the statist core of their doctrine.
When the 1983 GRECE annual congress passed a resolution on the economy
which demanded;
very powerful internal competition, an economy made up of 
private companies, desocialised and freed from the burdens 
of taxation, but at the same time a national economy, 
subordinated to politics and directed by a State which is 
streamlined yet strong, a State which plans, which does not 
intervene in the economy, but directs it. 3:2
the deliberate choice of the terras "planning" and "dirigism" underlined 
GRECE's idiosyncratic determination to row against the current wherever 
they could.
Another aspect of Dum^zil's theorizing proved useful to an extreme- 
right trying to come to terms with post-imperial ism. Since the tri­
functional model of social organization seemed to have been codified in an 
ideology only in Indo-European cultures, the way was open to argue that 
today's European nations, despite their different history and 
institutions, had in fact the one, the great, the only civilizing idea in 
common. Dum<§zil had provided, for those who wanted to use it, like Le 
Pen's Front National, a simple but prestigious and serai-mythical
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justification for switching the centre of their political enthusiasm from 
the unique historic mission of French or German or British culture to a
elements of their existing creeds.
All in all, the idea of the three functions (as we shall see in 
chapter 8) proved extraordinarily easy to grasp and to manipulate, and was 
effectively relayed into the RPR by the Club de 1'Horloge in the 1980s. 
Meanwhile, as a proselytizing organization, GRECE itself had a rather 
chequered career, as we now show.
The founders of GRECE never intended to build a mass organization,
but had set themselves the task of recruiting, or at least influencing
those few thousand people who make a country what it is. At 
this moment, France is nothing without thinkers, the leaders 
of cultural, sports and workers' associations, scientists, 
publicists and administrators who control, influence, and 
direct the activities of millions of individuals. A few 
thousand is not many in absolute terms, but a few thousand 
such important people, sharing the same ideas and the same 
methods, could cause a revolution. 33
By 1976-7 the group claimed 1,000 to 1,200 members, but had
apparently failed to recruit or to spread its influence among the layer of
French society. 3/1 In building the group, quality was so much more 
important than quantity that would-be members were filtered by means of a 
questionnaire which tested their academic and literary achievements, their 
current reading, and their cultural interests. Commitment to the group's 
ideas and activities was also expected to be demonstrated by hefty 
financial contributions. 3S
Nevertheless, GRECE was successful in spreading its influence through
pan-Europeanism which would celebrate and integrate the most reactionary
private-sector managers which it had identified as the key 'deciders' in
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journalism, especially towards the end of the 1970s. Assiduously applying 
his strategy of cultural encirclement, de Benoist went in search of 
endorsements by reputable figures in the intellectual and cultural world, 
and by 1973 had built up a credible comit.4 de patronage for Nouvelle 
Ecole. From the autumn of 1973 the general public were able to read 
regularly for the first time Elements de la Civilisation Europ£enne, which 
had previously been published only as an internal bulletin, and this was 
followed in 1974 by the theoretical review, Etudes et Recherches. In 1976 
the group began its own publishing operation, Editions Copernic.
As well as editing Nouvelle Ecole, Alain de Benoist had throughout 
the 1970s a column in Valeurs Act uelles, a weekly news magazine edited by 
an old extreme-right colleague, Francois d'Orcival; in addition he wrote 
for the monthly Spectacle du Monde, along with other gr£clstes, Michel
Marmin, Michel Mourlet and Loius Rougier. The group also had access to the 
publications of the press-group M£dia, including titles such as Jacinte, 
Enfants-magazine, Vingt-Ans and Biba (launched in 1980), as well as to 
Question de (edited by Louis Pauwels), and Item, founded in 1976 by 
Philippe Heduy. 3<5 In 1978, however, occurred an event which was probably 
as significant as all these minor conquests put together; Robert Hersant, 
the press millionaire who had bought Le Figaro in 1975, decided, in an 
effort to boost its circulation and advertising revenue, to remodel his 
Sunday colour supplement and switch it to Saturday, under a new title, 
Figaro-Magazine. By 1981, Fig-Mag was selling just over half a million 
copies weekly. 37 Its editor, Louis Pauwels, whose interests included 
magic, astrology and paganism, and who had dabbled in right-wing 
nationalism in the 1950s, lost no time in recruiting his friend de Benoist 
and half a dozen of his closest GRECE collaborators to write for the new
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magazine. Relayed by the powerful Figaro group, GRECE ideas appeared to 
have reached the peak of their possible influence at the turn of the 
1980s. 30
In the summer of 1979, however, a nationally-known left-inclined 
journalist, launching a highly public counter— attack, branded Pauwels as a 
Nouvelle Droite sympathizer, alleged that the elaborately constructed 
comity de patronage of Nouvelle Ecole was intended to obscure its position 
as organ of a tightly-knit group, denounced the translation by Editions 
Copernic of the elitist psychological and biological theories of Eysenck 
and Jensen, and ’’revealed" the behind-the-scenes influence of young GRECE 
members employed as researchers by prominent right-wing polticians wanting 
to "pass themselves off as theorists."30 Thierry Pfister, author of this 
expose probably over-stated his case on the degree of direct GRECE 
influence on establishment politicians. He pointed to GRECE involvement in 
the writing, within a two or three year period, of Jacques M6decin's Le 
Terreau de la Liberty Philippe Malaud's La Revolution Lib£rale, and 
Michel Poniatowski's L'avenir n'est 6crit nulle part.AO Not one of these 
works could be described, at the time or indeed retrospectively, as making 
a significant impact on the development of right-wing ideas.
Of the authors in question, Philippe Malaud, was for a long time 
president of the Centre National des Independants et Paysans, a kind of 
half-way house between the respectable and the extreme Right, but his role 
dwindled into insignificance with the emergence of le Pen's Front National 
in the 1980s. Jacques M6decin's greatest achievement in politics was to 
become under-secretary for tourism in the mid-seventies, but his chief 
preoccupation has undoubtedly been to remain mayor of Nice for two 
decades, a task which did not require him to play a major role in the
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RF’R! s programmatic renewal. Of the three, Poniatowski rose to the greatest 
heights, as Giscard's righthand man and Minister of the Interior. As such 
he played no role at all inside the RPR, and after 1978 became just 
another ex-minister when Giscard was forced to sacrifice him.
Exaggerated or not, Pfister's accusations provoked a flood of 
denunciations and denials which showed how far GRECE was from conquering 
the hearts and minds of other mainstream Rightwingers. For the UDF, 
Raffarin, Bussereau and Maigrat warned pragmatically against Nouvelle 
Droite attempts to pull the Giscardian majority towards the right, while 
Stasi, Stol£ru and Lecanuet on doctrinal grounds denounced elitism and the 
threat to civil liberties. For the RPR, Debr6 denounced en bloc GRECE’s 
attacks on Christianity and liberal political philosophy along with their 
abandonment of the great idea of the French nation."11
Pfister was right, however, to warn about one young RPR man largely 
unknown to the public, who had already worked in the cabinets of the 
Giscardian ministers, Poniatowski and Christian Bonnet, who was thoroughly 
imbued with GRECE ideas, and whose influence in the RPR was still growing. 
This was Yvan Blot, founder and leader of the Club de I1 Horloge, whose 
influence we discuss in the next chapter.
The Left's "exposure" of GRECE did not seem to do the group any 
immediate harm. Twenty new names were added to the comity de patrongage in 
1979, including those of Arthur Koestler and Konrad Lorenz, their first 
Nobel prize winner. *-2 In the spring of 1981 the group claimed 4,500 
members, while Elements, which was now openly the revue de la Nouvelle 
Droite, claimed 6,000 subscribers, against 2,000 only 2 years 
previously.*3 At the end of the year 1,000 people turned up to the GRECE 
annual colloquium.
-288-
Neverthless the 1979 debate had succeeded in opening a rift between 
GRECE and the Right-wing mainstream. In a bid to underline their 
independence and their radical identity, and perhaps irked by the attacks 
to which they had been subjected, the group announced in 1981 that they 
would endorse no candidate in the forthcoming Presidential election, 
denounced the exploitation of their "antiegalitarian" message both by the 
Club de 1'Horloge and by Giscardian education ministers who simply wanted 
to defend existing privileges, and refused the role of ideological think- 
tank for the right. 44 They greeted Mitterrand’s election as a vindication 
of their own "Gramscian" interpretation of the relationship betwen culture 
and politics which confirmed that "objectively speaking” the Right had not 
deserved to remain in power. Serving notice that they would not 
systematically oppose the government, they gave grudging approval to the 
anti-Americanism of the new minister for culture, Jacques Lang.45 De 
Benoist followed this up in the spring of 1982 with an article stating his 
belief that the Soviet Union was "more Russian than Marxist”, and less 
imbued with universalism, egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism than its
U '
superpower rival. 445 Two years later he announced his intention to vote 
Communist in the 1984 European elections47 and likened the established 
Right to Versaillais (the liquidators of the Paris Commune). Piere Vial, 
the GRECE secretary-general, regretted his mockery of Che Guevara 20 years 
previously, and expressed sympathy for the Baadei— Meinhoff gang and the 
Italian red brigades. 40
By this time the two GRECE leaders seemed to have crossed the line 
separating iconoclasm from phrase-mongering, and were on terrain where the 
respectable Right had no desire to follow them. As the 1980s progressed, 
the concentrated GRECE presence in the mass-circulation press was steadily
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diluted,** and the group fell into a certain ideological and 
organizational disarray. No issue of Nouvelle Ecole appeared between the 
end of 1979 and the summer of 1981, after which the frequency was reduced 
to one per year, for financial reasons. In 1981, Editions Copernic was 
taken over by Albatros-Valmonde; 1982 was a year with no "annual 
colloquium", and the 1983 meeting was devoted to the sketchy elaboration 
of a so-called "third way" which was not well received by all GRECE 
stalwarts. Disagreements surfaced as to whether the leadership of a united 
and nucleai— capable Europe belonged to France or to Germany, and the 
commitment to regionalism was dropped, causing the disaffection of Jean 
Mabire, one of the founding members. so
Most important of all, however, GRECE's natural supporters, 
disenchanted by the group's refusal to campaign actively against the u
Socialist government, drifted increasingly towards the Front National, 
which succeeded in winning over 10-12 key second-rank Gr6cists and was 
denounced unambiguously by de Benoist for its racism and Atlanticism as 
well as for Le Pen's attack on the 5th Republic's institutions. ~;1 In 1985, 
de Benoist set the seal on his rejection of the more pragmatic and 
"liberal" branches of the Right-wing family by negotiating a rapprochement 
with an insignificant. exlrerne-Ri ghl. groiipuscu] e, the Mouvement 
Nationalists R£volutionnaire. This action made it clear that, after years 
of patient efforts which for a while had seemed crowned with remarkable 
success, GRECE had missed its rendez-vous with history. It had opted 
definitively for the nationalist and "revolutionary" camp of Right-wing 
extremism, as opposed to the "national-liberal" camp in which the FN was 
rivalled intermittently by the RPR.
By withdrawing the support of Figaro-Magazine, Louis Pauwels played
-290-
an important role in steering GRECE into this political backwater, just as 
he had in lifting them from obscurity in the first place. In 1984 he told 
a French researcher that his unexpected conversion to Catholicism was only
one of four reasons for the break. The others were the Gr6clsts attempts
to impose their own group's views, Pauwels' adherence to "the fundamental 
theses of liberalism", and his belief that the political success of Ronald 
Reagan signalled the "renewal of American civilization".*53 The last two 
reasons, cited by a man in Pauwels' position, give an indication of the 
tremendous impact of the Reagan revolution on the development of French
V
political thinking. We turn now to that revolution's chief apologists, the 
self-styled "New Economists."
The "New Economists"
It would be impossible to overstate the key role which 
Henri Lepage's book played in our country from 1978 
onwards in making the French people aware of the 
radical intellectual changes taking place across the
Atlantic (Its appearance was) without doubt the
starting point for the creation of the New Economists'
group in France. K4
There are good reasons for accepting at face value this tribute to 
Lepage's book, Demain le Capitalisms^, which became a best-seller in 
France and was later translated into English. Its author, Jacques 
Garello, is himself an economics teacher, and one of the self-styled new 
economists, a group whose most obvious quality is not modesty.
Nevertheless, although Lepage's proselytising style, and the manner in 
which his book was marketed, rightly made it the r£f£rence obligee for 
later discussion, the 'new economics' was already in its infancy during 
the two or three years before 1978.
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Parts of the book were prefigured in articles which Lepage himself 
wrote in the magazine R£alit£s during 1977,67 which in turn followed 
seminars held by a group of academic economists in Paris during 1975 and 
1976. Shortly before the appearance of Demain le Capitalisme, the 
contributions to one of these seminars were collected in a work which 
covered much the same ground, entitled L'Economique Retrouv£e. sei The 
contributors to this volume can justifiably claim to be the founding 
members of the new economists' group.
Unlike the Nouvelle Droite, the new economists arrived with a bang; 
journalists were soon extolling the freshness of their ideas both on the 
political scene, and in academic life, where older representatives of the 
liberal tradition had all but disappeared from view. 60 One even suggested 
that they had prepared the ground for a change of tack in government 
economic policy which occurred after the 1978 elections.61 Their impact 
was probably due as much to their self-advertisement as to the quality of 
their ideas. The group deliberately launched itself in the media, a few 
months before the parliamentary elections held in the spring of 1978, with 
a manifesto in the form of a display advertisement - paid for by a 
supporting Association Pour la Democratle - which appeared in one of the 
Paris dailies and several times on television. Counting on extra pre­
election sales, their publishers seized the moment to bring out Maurice 
Roy's Vive le Capitalisme and L* Occident en d£sarroi edited by Pascal 
Salin and other group members. 63 But the biggest effort was reserved for 
Demain le Capitalisme, with the advertisements being paid for partly by 
Livre de Poche and partly by Lepage himself waiving a fraction of his 
royalties.
The group did not try to spread the message simply by writing their
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own books. The first of what became the annual sessions of the Universite 
d'Et£ de la Nouvelle Economie was hosted in 1978 (as every year 
subsequently) by Jacques Garello at the university of Aix. Here French 
liberal economists were regularly joined by fellow-thinkers from abroad as 
well as by politicians or their advisers, such as Philippe Auberger, the 
RPR*s tax-expert. rSe Garello has also sought to carry the liberal message 
outside academic circles through the publications, seminars and other 
activities organized by the Association Pour la Liberte Economique et. le 
Progres Social (ALEPS) which he has presided since 1979. In parrallel 
fashion, Pascal Salin founded the Institut Economique de Paris (IEP) which 
has published the works of revered liberal ancestors such as Bastiat and 
von Mises, while Aftalion has used his position at the Presses 
Universitaires de France to publish Hayek.
Henri Lepage and the Defence of Liberal Theory
Henri Lepage consciously set out to expound for French readers what 
he called "one of the great intellectual events of the century", the 
"discoveries" of the Chicago school of economists and their refinement and 
application by a generation of American scholars to a number of unsolved 
"problems" during the 1960s and 1970s. 7 These efforts, says Lepage, have
served to rescue classical economics from long-standing doubts about its 
intellectual coherence, especially its central proposition that the 
pursuit of individual self-interest inevitably produces the greatest 
common good, thanks to the invisible operation of the market, which 
automatically matches supply and demand. Assembled in one volume, these 
vindications of classical liberal theory provided, on a number of points, 
the "intellectual" justification for the attacks on state intervention in 
the economy which were soon to be launched in France and elsewhere.
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Lepage begins by dismissing the argument that the unfettered 
development of capitalism produced giant trusts which strangled the 
automatic compensating mechanisms assumed by classical theory. Laissez- 
faire has never really existed, he says; in 19th century America, the 
railroad bosses were only corrupt because the state was there to be 
bought, Likewise government policy, - Rothbard and Friedman have proved 
it - and not capitalism's inability to match supply and demand, were 
responsible for the crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression.
Against the idea that states can organize the economic life of 
nations in order to create wealth, Lepage brings to bear the "property 
rights" theory of Douglas North,'’’0 whose research into the origins of 
capitalism "revealed" that economic growth only took off when legal 
changes (the enclosures) enshrined the state's role as that of protecting 
the right of private entrepreneurs to make a profit - the latter being the 
chief motivating force in economic activity. 71
Pigou's concept of "market failure",73 which justifies state 
involvement in welfare, is rejected in favour of James M Buchanan and his 
"Public Choice" school, who theorize that state bureaucracies do not exist 
for the public good, but in order to maximize the private advantages of 
their own members. This explains their apparently unstoppable expansion 
(paid for by other people), and underlines the need for taxpayers to find 
ways of introducing "market" principles into the work performance and 
rewards of bureaucrats. In the longer term, says Lepage, a reform of the 
entire political system is needed in order to roll back the bureaucracy, 
for at present public money is allocated as a result of deals made among 
powerful lobbies (not least the bureaucrats themselves), which effectively 
shut out the ordinary citizen.73
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Next Lepage argues that welfare systems are an illogical and
inefficient way of achieving the aim of providing a decent level of
existence for all human beings. Closely following Milton Friedman, he
charts the unplanned consequences of the regulation of American
industries, both public and private, and demonstrates that minimum wage
and social security regulations induce a "dependence mentality" of
demoralization and laziness among citizens who would have become self-
reliant individuals and valuable members of society if welfare legislation
had never existed. 7A
Finally, the theories of human capital and of consumer behaviour,
elaborated by Gary Becker, produce the clinching argument for rolling back
the welfare state, and in so doing, vindicate classical theory's
assumption of rationalizing and maximizing "economic man". Lower taxes
mean increased individual income, and with a higher income, individuals
will expand consumption of everything, including the consumption of esteem
through donations to charity. Therefore, the authorities should cut taxes
and welfare programmes, and the shortfall in public solidarity will be
made up by private charity. 7B
As our summary is intended to show, Lepage's scientific pretentions
were cast in a pedagogic style. Early in Demain le Capitalisme he left the
reader in no doubt as to what he saw as its political message.
anything reinforcing the scientific validity of this 
analytical instrument, the economic model of the human 
being, consolidates the edifice of political doctrine 
favouring economic freedom, and, of course, the whole 
theory of the market, which rests on the key concept 
of exchange between rational individuals. 7'*
In interpreting his chosen authors, Lepage clearly endorsed their
prescriptions for the economic and social reform of American capitalism;
replacing welfare hand-outs by a negative income-tax system, cutting 
taxes, abandoning or cutting back state regulation of industries such as 
food, drugs, transport and posts, breaking up or privatizing state 
monopolies, replacing universal compulsory secondary education by a state- 
funded voucher system, and abandoning most of the minimum wage and anti­
discrimination legislation on the statute book.
Today, that list of remedies looks decidedly reactionary, thanks to 
its association with the successful conservative politicians, Reagan and 
Thatcher. But it is likely that there was a genuine tension between 
liberal and conservative elements in Lepage's theorizing. He was 
attempting to revive liberal theory before it was taken up and popularized 
by the so-called "Reagan revolution." Therefore when he wrote, (in a 
judgement which disturbed James Buchanan, the prestigious sponsor of his 
book);
"The philosophy of economic and social freedom is 
neither right-wing nor left-wing, it is beyond 
politics. "77
it was a claim which perhaps seemed less bizarre then than it did later.
Not only did he believe that liberal remedies were compatible with an
extension of personal freedom and higher living standards for all
citizens, but he argued that the liberal crusade must enlist the support
of those who think they are on the "left" because they reject the
inhumanities of capitalism as it functions at present;
......economic freedom will have no chance of being
put into effect unless it demonstrates there is a wide 
gulf between it and conservatism. yQ
Lepage is closer than some of the other new economists to the branch 
of the American liberal family calling themselves "libertarians", who wish 
to abandon altogether state regulation of private affairs such as sexual
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relations or the sale and use of drugs, and favour the privatization of 
justice, the police and defence.7'3 In his next book, Autogestion et 
Capitalisme, he argued that the existing level of economic development 
adequately provided for all material needs, which were now giving way, in 
the scale of human priorites, before the need for more humane and 
communicative satisfactions summarized by the term "conviviality". In the 
not too distant future, the decentralized use of new technology would lead 
to the development of "anarcho-capitalism", a form of society in which 
everyone leads their own life, and may be members of groups practising 
capitalism, socialism, communism or some other form of mutually agreed 
interaction. Necessarily, the state as we now know it would cease to 
exist. eo
The other new economists share Lepage's claim to be "beyond 
politics", if not his anarchist tendencies. Jean-Jacques Rosa and his 
colleagues like to stress the scientific character of their work, and 
disclaim any political engagement, but the French journalistic and 
political elite had no trouble placing the group on the right of the
political spectrum. Some left-wing critics were quick to leap to the
defence of the welfare state, and even Keynesian theory, while others 
bracketed the group with the advisers of Pinochet; 131 a glowing welcome 
came from at least part of the extreme Right®2, and an only slightly 
lesser one from Contrepoint a right-wing liberal literary-political 
magazine not yet taken over by the Club de 1'Horloge, but run by the
former extremist street-fighter and future RPR deputy, Patrick
Devedj ian.03
All the new economists particularly resented being amalgamated with
}
the Nouvelle Droite. Jean-Jacques Rosa attacked the latter's ignorance of
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economics, and what he took to be their defence of the nation state, which
he contrasted with the economists’ "mondialism". Garello has been even
more forthright;
The Nouvelle Droite has such a horror of the market 
and of individual freedom, and harbours such a passion 
for the prerogatives of the state, that it is now 
revealed for what it has always been; a hankering for
right-wing statism, almost a national socialism. ss
The Nouvelle Droite gave as good as they got. GRECE responded to 
Lepage's book and to the new economists' media success by devoting their 
13th annual colloquium to a detailed refutation of liberal t h e o r y . I n  
defending his own idea of enracinement ("rootedness") de Benoist 
characterized the economists' modern version of laisser-faire laissei—  
passer as "permissive nomadism", a phrase which eloquently combines his 
sense of moral outrage and injured patriotism.®'7'
At the end of the 1970s the Nouvelle Droite and the new economists
were both fresh intellectual forces, both broadly situated on the Right, \,
both seeking to affect the course of events, both gaining in influence,
and they were mutually hostile. This was logical, for even if not all the 
new economists were as libertarian as Lepage, and not all conservatives
were as fanatically organicist as de Benoist, still there is a
contradiction between conservative and liberal thought. Conservatism 
celebrates the social, historical and moral continuity of communities, 
while liberalism seeks to unchain the forces which destroy it.
In 1980 an unexpected event drew a new audience for the debate.
Ronald Reagan's election as President of the United States, on a pledge to
cut taxes, deregulate industry and roll back the American version of the 
welfare state, shed new light on the potential for conservative-liberal 
collaboration. In France, as elsewhere, the Left denounced what they saw
as a new and virulent combination of the two philosophies, but French 
liberals took Reagan’s victory as a sign that their ideas could be put 
into practice with popular support. The most successful apologist for the 
"American Conservative Revolution", Guy Sorman, drafted a liberal 
programme for France which drew its inspiration directly from across the 
Atlantic.
Sorman is not exactly a new economist, in the sense in which we used 
that term above, although he is an ENA graduate and teaches from time to 
time at Paris' prestigious Institut d'Etudes Politiques. He is rather a 
professional pundit of liberalism who in successive years produced an on- 
the-spot reportage of the political sources of Reagan's success,03 and a 
blue-print liberal solution to French economic and social problems, 30 
both of which were rapidly given paperback second editions. Ambiguous 
politically, eclectic in theory, dismissed as unrealistic by politicians, 
Sorman is nevertheless useful to us for two reasons. Firstly, his work 
illustrates the near unanimous approval given to Reaganism by a certain 
layer of potentially influential French intellectuals. Secondly, his 
liberal programme is a yardstick against which we can judge how far RPR 
writers were prepared to follow him in his adulation.
In his tour of the USA, Sorman cast his net wider than Lepage, 
interviewing not only distinguished academics but also politicians, 
business and union leaders, and grass-roots activists in a variety of 
campaigns. Like his predecessor, and for the same reasons, he dismissed 
social-democracy as a failed system and unions as a failing but still 
dangerous force,31 attacked the federal civil service as a "new class", 92 
and denounced civil rights, minimum wages and welfare. 33 He went about 
this with all the more confidence in that he believed all these features
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of social democracy to be irrevocably condemned by technological change 
and the end of what he called "the era of the masses". 94
Much of his first book is devoted to the conservative activists who
helped build the successful Reagan coalition by campaigning amongst their 
friends and neighbours about the things which most concerned them. They
liked very much the right to life, prayers in school and the death
penalty; they intensely disliked taxes, feminism, atheism, the left-wing 
bias of the media and the "lay humanist" bias of school-books. We can 
deduce Sorman's globally positive view of what he took to be a challenge 
to the status quo from his assertion that politicians have accompanied, 
but not themselves led, this "revolution from below", which is due above 
all to the
extraordinary democratic and religious vitality of the 
American people. -*s
Later, however, he seemed to have toned down his admiration for these
qualities. In La Solution Lib6rale) he takes a swipe at the "artificial"
enthusiasm for liberalism of the "new Left" and the "old Right" in France
and doesn't forget to denounce the Nouvelle Droite for good measure.96 In
October 1984 he spoke of his fear that liberalism was being hi-jacked by
the employers and the political establishment; if this happened,
liberalism would become no more than "a conservative reaction with no
future. "'a'7 In another interview about the same time, he even seemed to
adopt Lepage's anarchistic vision of liberalism which
has nothing to do with the repressive bourgeois order.
It can be libertarian, include a certain creative and 
permissive and social spontaneity. It can include as 
well some of the ideals of May ' 689S
If he had no very consistent view of the political implications of 
liberalism, Sorman was equally vague in his theoretical borrowings from
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the USA. During the early eighties the economist Arthur Laffer, author of 
the "Laffer curve"'3'5' which purports to prove that cutting taxes is an 
appropriate remedy for a budget deficit, was joined by Irving Kristol and 
George Gilder in developing so-called "supply-side" theory in opposition 
to Milton Friedman's monetarism, hitherto the liberal orthodoxy.100 For 
the two anxious years during which Reagan had been in power and cutting 
taxes with no pick-up in the American economy - which did not occur until 
the end of 1982 - the supply-siders excused the failure of their remedy by 
blaming the monetarists in charge of the Federal Reserve, whose high 
interest-rate policies allegedly neutralized the effects of the tax- 
cuts. 1 01
Sorman himself declined to choose either camp, observing somewhat 
unconvincingly102 that the greatest contribution of supply-side theory has 
been the defeat of Keynesianism, and that it reccornmended itself more 
because of its appeal to common sense and the experience of nations, than 
for its actual effectiveness. 103 Later, he would claim that monetarism 
does work if it is given a chance, but that both Thatcher and Reagan used 
it in a stop-go fashion which did not amount to a fair trial.10*
However blurred in theoretical inspiration and political 
consequences, Sorman produced a liberal programme of great clarity which 
listed the essential features of a liberal society, and outlined the 
political steps needed to achieve them. 10E Some of its content, summarised 
in table 7. 1, recalls the ideas put forward by Lepage. The notion of 
direct democracy and that of the workplace charter have particular 
resonances for Gaul1 ism which need a note of explanation.
Sorman's workplace charter is a synthesis of the Gaullist ideal of 
participation and of ideas picked up during his observation of changing
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Table 7. 1 The Liberal Programme of Guy Sorman.
(page numbers refer to Sorman op cit, La Solution..)
Public Ownership (pp 197-201)
Public and Private Monopolies to be suppressed 
Weifare
Citizens should be encouraged to make private insurance 
arrangements for health and social security (pp 218-226) 
The unemployed should be obliged to carry out socially 
useful work in exchange for their benefits (pp 189-93)
Education (pp 229-241)
State education to be thrown open to parental control,
through a voucher system
Privately run and funded universities.
Taxation (pp 124-5)
Retention of top-rate 50%
Abolition of all taxes on savings107
Industry (pp 179-189)
Workplace charters to be signed in each firm by bosses and 
workers. No union involvement.
Wage cuts in exchange for participation and a job for 
life.
Institutions
Amend the constitution to require balanced budget (p IV-V) 
Give central bank independence from government in 
controlling money supply. Public to supervise money supply 
figures, (pp III and 134-7)
Direct Democracy, Swiss-style. Citizens free to take the 
initiative in changing laws or setting constitutional 
limits to the actions of legislators, (pp 243-249)
working practices in the USA, Japan, Spain and even the UK. In all major 
Japanese firms, and some successful American ones which had followed the 
Japanese example, only basic wages are guaranteed, with a bonus - which 
can amount to as much as 50% of annual earnings - dependent on the firm's 
performance. Sorman noted that the US' return to employment growth at the
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end of 1982 followed a decade In which average wages had fallen overall,
and the bulk of new jobs created were often only part-time, and usually in
low-wage, 1ow-productivity sectors.1oe If French workers wanted to see
renewed growth, they ought to sacrifice part of their wages in bad years,
as Japanese and American workers did. The charter would offer them a
double-compensation; firstly participation, the Gaullists' term for a say
in the running of the firm, and a share of the profits - more familiarly
known to up-to-date western managements as the Japanese system of "quality
circles", where the emphasis is on discussion of the way each individual's
work is organized. The second element of compensation was the promise of a
"job for life", traditionally guaranteed by the big Japanese firms since
the 1950's. Sorman recommended his scheme in terms which could be expected
to appeal to the RPR especially;
it is quite astonishing that general de Gaulle's most 
modern and most fertile idea, participation, has been 
the least understood and the easiest forgotten by all 
French people.10®
but he felt obliged to spell out that;
There is no question here of creeping socialism, but
of real popular capitalism: the rights of the worker
and the shareholder remain distinct, management's 
powers intact.10®
If he was apparently cutting with the grain on workplace charters, 
Sorman* s advocacy of direct democracy, ran counter to the traditional 
Gaullist idea of plebiscitary democracy. When the general organized 
referenda to endorse his own decisions, it was always assumed that there 
ought not to be any intermediary bodies between the State and the 
individual. De Gaulle himself habitually dismissed the claims of protest 
groups such as parents, wine-producers, or lorry-drivers, as
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unrepresentative corporat ismes. Drawing on his American experience, Sorman
took a different view;
It’s impossible not to notice that grass-roots demands 
are cast more and more often in corporatist form.....
For the Americans these intermediate bodies are a 
fundamental part of the vitality of their
democracy  they simply look after the concrete
interests of each citizen, and countei— balance the 
power of the bureaucrats....
Naturally, the liberal solution involves excluding no 
corporatist group. On the contrary, they should be 
multiplied, for all special demands are acceptable 
within the play of a democratic system when they are 
counter-balanced by a thousand others.110
Conclusions
The term Nouvelle Droite refers to those intellectuals associated 
with a body of doctrine which identifies the genius of European 
civilization in the habit of keeping separate the social institutions 
dealing with the sovereign, military and economic functions in society. 
Tracing this arrangement to the pre-Christian era of European history, the 
doctrine's chief organized representatives, the Groupement de Recherche et 
d ' Etudes sur la Civilisation Europ&enne (GRECE) and the Club de 1'Horloge, 
are highly critical of what they see as the excessive power of the 
bourgeoisie and the weakness of the state in contemporary European 
society, and of Europe's subjugation by the superpowers. For a while GRECE 
enjoyed an important platform in the mass circulation press, but at the 
end of the 1970s an effective "exposure" of the pagan and serai-fascist 
aspects of their theory and practice mounted by the Left, and soon 
followed by the traditional Right, contributed to the decline of their 
influence.
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Another reason for GRECE's fall from grace was the revival in the 
popularity of American capitalism among French elites. This reached a 
height probably unknown since the 1940s thanks to Ronald Reagan's 
electoral victory in 1980, which seemed to be based on a renewal of 
optimism, democratic activism and the spirit of enterprise. The virtues of 
the US system were popularized in France by a group of young academics, 
attached to classical liberal theory and grass-roots democracy, who called 
themselves the "new economists".
Traditional Gaullism would have been sympathetic to the Nouvelle 
Droite* s defence of the sovereign functions of the state, and to the cult 
of national traditions, but repelled by their paganism and extreme anti- 
egalitarianism. On the other hand Gaullism found nothing to admire in 
American society, traditionally rejected the new economists' laissez-faire 
liberalism in favour of a "third way" between it and collectivism, and 
embraced a version of direct democracy founded on the direct relationship 
between the leader and the people, from which intermediate "lobbies" were 
absent.
Neverthless the Nouvelle Droite and the new economists were the most 
active forces on the French Right, and Gaullists were bound to be 
subjected to their influence, Representing the opposite poles of 
contemporary conservatism, the ultra-authoritarian and the ultra-liberal, 
they polemicised against each other, but there were signs that the Club 
de 11Horloge might be able to fabricate an amalgam from both doctrines 
which would be useful to the parties of the French Right. To that 
possibility, our next chapter is chiefly addressed.
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Chaplet ft Tire Dee of Ideas
Before we attempt to trace tire "ideological" development of 
influential RPR members during the late 1970s and early 1980s we must 
stress that most Gaullist deputies usually paid little attention to 
doctrine, instead pragmatically defending constituents' interests with 
whatever ideas came to hand. In the first part of this chapter we show 
how, within the parliamentary party, instinctive recourse to the state as 
protector combined with impatience with bureaucratic red-tape to form the 
irregular ground in which liberal ideas were later to take root. At the 
same time, one or two deputies contributed original ideas which helped to 
shape tire liberal revival.
Next, we follow up our earlier suggestion that the party's 
programmatic development cannot be read as a battle of ideas from which 
one group or another emerged victorious. Me show that senior Gaullists 
such as Peyrefitte, Bourges and Guichard who had thrown in their lot with 
Giscard and formed the "liberal" (in economic terms) wing of the RPR, made 
no co-ordinated attempt to convert the party to their views, even though 
these were later adopted by the Chiraquian leadership. Their defeat and 
isolation were seen both by themselves and by the Chiraquians as a simple 
question of power rather than a battle of ideas.
The rest of Chapter 8 is devoted to the way in which different 
individuals and groups within the party contested, conciliated or borrowed 
from the Nouvelle Droite, the new economists, and the Reagan revolution. 
Paradoxically, as we show in the third section, it was one of the older 
generation, Albin Chalandon, whose arguments for liberalism most closely 
resembled those advanced by the new economists. A number of influential
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younger party members made the pilgrirnmage to the USA between 1978 and 
1983, returning with renewed faith in grass roots democracy but most were 
sceptical about the relevance of both monetarism and supply-side economics 
to French economic problems.
In the fourth part of the chapter we turn to the role of the right- 
wing political clubs and think tanks in mediating the implicit conflict 
between US-style liberalism and the anti-capitalist pan-European elitism 
of the Nouvelle Droite. A study of the texts reveals the creeping 
influence of the new economists on the Club de 1'Horloge. In the first 
half of the 1980s the Club, which had been founded with a strong GRECE 
presence, took an increasing interest in liberal economic doctrine, and 
through its publications and seminars helped to attenuate the hostility to 
American-style capitalism which it had earlier propagated. At the same 
time the Club modified its view of the unique legitimacy of the state by 
making concessions to the idea of direct democracy. In the development of 
the Club's doctrine and the spread of its influence in the RPR, a pivotal 
role was played by Yvan Blot, assistant to the RPR general secretary.
The RPR's own Club '89 was founded in September 1981 with the aim of 
developing a corpus of doctrine for use by the party president. A late­
comer to the scene, it could do no more than re-work, in eclectic fashion, 
themes already elaborated by its longer-established rivals. Its programme, 
which appeared in 19851 reads like a fragile and internally contradictory 
compromise between the rival positions of the Club de 1' Horloge and the 
new economists.
If the new economists, the American example and the Club de l'Horlc 
all joined the Gallo-Giscardians in promoting liberalism within the RPR, 
was there any group in the party willing to stand in defence of the
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statist tradition? In the fifth and final part of the chapter we show that 
the so-called "left-Gaullists" were weak and divided; some were induced to 
recast their own most distinctive programmatic trade-mark - participation 
- in liberal form, some took refuge in purely formal opposition, while 
others eventually left the party in disgust.
Pragmatism and dogma
The Gaullist s' halting steps towards open endorsement of the 
principle of free competition are illustrated by the gradual adjustment of 
the ideas of a former industry minister under the impact of changing 
economic circumstances. In 1979 a parliamentary debate on unemployment 
demanded by the RPR in response to the crisis in the steel-producing 
regions, showed that the state-market dilemna then evoked an uncertain 
response among Gaullist deputies. National ambitions remained, but the 
halting of dynamic growth fed doubts about the efficacy of all-round 
Intervention in the economy, and about the state budget's ability to 
finance rising transfer payments. This disenchantment with the state was 
reflected in swelling complaints about the social security contributions 
levied on businesses, about bureaucratic interference which falsified the 
laws of the market, and about slow and cumbersome procedures which held 
back the creation of new wealth and new jobs.
A fine example of the pragmatic and piece-meal adjustment of doctrine 
to circumstances is given by the long career of Michel Maurice-Bokanowski. 
Born in 1912, a pre-war colleague of Andr£ Citroen in the motor industry, 
he first entered Parliament for the RPF in 1951, was de Gaulle's Minister 
for industry 1962-66, and was still mayor and Senator for Asni£res, a 
working-class suburb of Paris, when I interviewed him in 1988.
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In the 1960s, gearing public investment to regional policy and the 
balance of planned output31, he afirmed the government's intention to use, 
as often as possible, big industrial firms, especially the nationalized 
industries, as "instruments of industrial expansion" in the developing 
regions, with the aim of making France "a great industrial nation",3 even 
going so far as to accept that it was the state's job to plan and finance 
the production of a high-performance racing-car.a
In response to the first signs of the economic downturn, in 1973, he 
introduced, from the Senate back benches, a debate on the difficulties of 
the French aircraft industry, during which he demanded continued state aid 
and state-organized rationalization, suggesting for the first time that 
this could be carried out on a European scale (military planes excepted). 
In case the administration should find itself not powerful enough to deal 
with all the issues involved, he recommended "a ministry of aviation with 
the authority required by all its enormous responsibilities."B Two years 
later the ex-minister called for state stimulation of investment in new 
forms of energy production "which industry does not seem very enthusiastic 
about at present". Drawing attention to the inconvenience of bankrupt ices, 
he called for stricter control of the setting up of small firms, by means 
of a permit to be issued by the Chambers of Commerce. e
By 1977, however, in response to the rise of unemployment, he had 
turned his fire against the "slowness of administrative procedures" in the 
job-placernent service, called for "more humane" relations between the 
administration in general and the people, and drew applause from the RPR 
benches for his criticism of the control exercised by the Ministry of 
Finance over all the other ministries. While this attack on red tape 
prefigured one of the main lines of the general assault on the state soon
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to be mounted by Chirac, Bokanowski's call for tax reform took a different 
direction from that of the American liberals; he wanted exemption for the 
poorest, especially the old, and for young couples, who would be 
encouraged, as a result, to start families. 7
A 1980 debate on the motor industry revealed, however, how the ex-
Minister, so interventionist twenty years earlier, had gone a stage
further in his conversion to liberalism;
I think, for my part, that it would be deplorable if 
we were brought to subsidize, more or less directly, 
in one form another, this great sector of our 
industry, as some people propose. This would be a 
renunciation of the rules of liberalism and
competition which we have set for ourselves....
Neither should we give advice or poke our noses into 
the strategy of the big firms, Renault as well as 
Peugeot, who manage their own business very well. e
Maurice-Bokanowski' s conversion, completed before Chirac unveiled his 
liberal platform for the 1981 election, cannot be read as an attempt to 
align himself with his leader's position (a move for which the veteran 
Senator-Mayor would have no motive), nor did the ex-Minister, despite his 
string of company directorships figure among Chirac's private advisers.* 
Rather, the revision of his views on the role of the state in the economy 
came about imperceptibly, probably unconsciously,10 in response to the 
more and more detailed daily interventionism with which the Giscard-Barre 
governments responded to the economic difficulties of the late 1970s.
The National Assembly debate on unemployment of March 1979 gives 
evidence of other Gaullist parliamentarians’ indiscriminate recourse to 
both liberal and interventionist remedies in order to protect their 
constituents from the worst effects of the slump. One wanted the 
government to ask Peugeot to open a new motor-cycle factory.11 Many 
demanded state aid for the local economy12, but, whereas the left Gaullist
Jean de Lipkowski (Charente-Maritime) backed his appeals with a 
doctrinaire defence of planning and regional development, Lucien Neuwirth 
(St. Etienne) called at the same time for the relaxation of price 
controls and the lowering of employers' social security contributions. 13 V/ 
H61£ne Missoffe, deputy for Paris, joined Lipkowski in stressing the 
state's role as planner and co-ordinator, and proposed to use the 
construction industry as a possible pump-primer for a new upturn, but she 
also called for simplification of administrative formalities "so 
cumbersome and paralysing that they discourage initiative"1A On this 
ground she was joined by Daniel Goulet, who made no particular demands for 
Basse-Norrnandie, but urged greater freedom of action for the various 
ministries' field services, a more flexible attitude from bank managers, 
and changes in the regulations governing hiring and firing.1S
Michel Debre, in the ideological set-piece of the debate, produced an
even longer list than usual of "essential" sectors of industry, and called
for protectionism organized at EEC level, (while rejecting Brussels' claim
to fix the level of French steel output) but he also turned his fire on
fiddling bureaucratic regulations
Our France is like a bird prevented from flying by too
many ties  They must be reduced, rapidly and
considerably. 16
Debre was joined by Michel Noir in condemning as counter— productive 
the various schemes for work-sharing, early retirement and longer holidays 
put forward in the same debate by Philippe S6guin, among others. Noir also 
endorsed Debra's concept of the "economic war", calling for a European 
external tariff and "community preference". Signs of his later 
enthusiastic liberalism were his stress on training, re-training and 
research as responses to technological change, and his critique of the
idea of "economies of scale", over which he favoured small business. A 
positive reference to planning did not, reappear in his subsequent 
writ ings. 17
A  less prominent deputy, Jaques Sourdille of the Ardennes, deduced a 
general lesson from the particular situation of his constituency. His 
region was in decline because its crude steel was too dear, but some of 
his consituents also produced high-quality steel products which were 
competitive on the world market. In future, French competitiveness was 
likely to depend on the exploitation of such skilled labour, and the 
" savoit— faire et savoit— vendre" of a mature economy. It was therefore 
important generally, argued Sourdille, to invest in hi-tec industries, 
potentially rich sources of added-value.13
Only a handful of very senior figures, including the Gallo-Giscardian 
ministers, translated the misgivings about interventionism aired in the 
1979 debate into a coherent challenge to traditional Gaullist doctrine, 
but they made no serious attempt to win the party to their views, as we 
now show.
The Gallo-Giscardians
After resigning as prime minister in 1976, Chirac, had announced a 
"permanent war" against the Giscard-Barre strategy of gentle growth, 
moderate inflation and creeping unemployment.13 In Parliament a continual 
series of RPR amendments to government projects obliged Barre to make one 
after another an issue of confidence; outside Chirac devoted a series of 
press interviews to explaining the case for a Keynsian-type reflation, 
import controls and government direction of investment funds.'*20
But his approach was contested in the press by two former Gaullist 
ministers: Olivier Guichard, and Albin Chalandon, who had by turns been a
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successful banker and industrialist. Chalandon*s front page article in le
Monde on 2nd October 1979 opened with an undisguised critique of the
policies currently being pressed by his leader. He argued that a durable
solution to economic difficulties could not come from "autonomy within
closed frontiers", or from
...ill-judged guidance or paralysing state controls, 
the protection of inefficient activities, or global 
reflation of the economy....21
Chalandon went on to list what he saw as the real weaknesses of the
French economy; a lack of raw materials, agriculture the least efficient
in Europe, industry too small, of indifferent quality apart from one or
two sectors, and with the habit of trying to solve problems by raising
prices rather than reducing costs, unions which were anachronistic and
malthusian, an education system in which the grandes £coles sterilized
initiative and which produced young people unsuitable for available jobs.
He attacked the civil service,
for whom interventionism has become second nature, and
who have never been able to adjust themselves to the
way a competitive economy works. 22
and ended with a dismissal of twenty years of Gaullist practice, which had
sought to impose more or less unreal plans on market forces, judged
investment by the criteria of prestige instead of profitability, and fixed
prices without regard to costs, all of which led to unsaleable excess
pr oduct ion.
Like Chalandon, Guichard23 expressed his respect for Prime Minister 
Barre's "tenacity, clarity, and spirit of responsibility", and his own 
conviction that no other course was possible. In general he made a plea 
for a balanced approach which would be neither "all-public" nor "all-
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private", but a mixture of both. He made a more measured critique of the
"global reflation" strategy;
As for public investment, it is unwise to justify a 
general inrease by referring to the absolute sums 
involved. Public investment should be judged less by 
its money value than by the job it does for the 
economy. 2/1
Guichard and Chalandon were of course not the only long-serving 
Gaullists who expressed disagreements with Chirac's policy at this time, 25 
yet there was no serious collective effort to push the party into a change 
of line mainly because they believed Chirac's attacks on Giscard derived 
from political rivalry and not from serious ideological differences.
Despite having been a convinced liberal since a visit to the USA in 
1 9 6 5 , Albin Chalandon claims no credit for provoking the RPR's liberal 
turn in the 1980s. As a close political ally of Chaban Delmas he was out 
of government after 1972. Yet he remained friendly enough with Chirac to 
secure his help in getting appointed boss of Elf-Aquitaine in 1977. At the 
end of the 1970s he was therefore officially outside politics. In May 1979 
he felt involved enough to sign "because the others asked me to" the 
letter addressed by the party's previous general secretaries which warned 
Chirac against repeated attacks on the state President. But he and 
Guichard did not co-ordinate the appearance of their two similar critiques 
of RPR policy in Le Monde within the same month. 1:7
Having resigned from Parliament to take his Elf job, Chalandon did 
not stand again in 1981. He was "not at all" consulted by Chirac about the 
platform on which he ran for President in 1981 and, perhaps more 
remarkably, was ignored by Balladur when the privatization plans were 
being drawn up, even though he had published his own suggested schema for 
ensuring that the allocation of shares was carried out openly and
fairly,2® and at various times sent Balladur three draft bills on the
subj ect.29
Although ministerial solidarity, as we saw in chapter 4, had obliged 
them to make periodic statements of their identity of views with Giscard 
and Barre, the "Gallo-Giscardians" had diverse attitudes to their own 
party and played diferent roles in the inner-party struggle at the end of 
the 1970s. Robert Galley, who had been venemously denounced by Pons when 
he was Giscard's minister of posts, mended his fences with the Chirac camp 
well enough to become RPR national treasurer by 1984. Yvon Bourges was the 
most senior of the handful of ministers who served from 1974-6 with 
Chirac, for whom, like Chalandon, he retained a personal regard, and 
subsequently with Barre. After the Socialists' victory in 1981, he took a 
seat in the Senate and became a full member of the RPR group after 
spending a token six months as an apparent4 more for form's sake than for 
any other reason.30
Frequently on the receiving end of RPR attacks, Bourges attributed 
them more to party political rivalry, stirred up by Poniatowski's 
manoeuvering during Chirac's tenure as prime minister, than to serious 
policy or ideological differences. For him, the Gaullists' economic 
policies, including those of Debr6 and de Gaulle, had always been a
i/
judicious mixture of liberalism and pragmatism. Therefore he had no 
difficulty in defending the similar policies of Giscard and Barre, did not 
take Chirac's posturing seriously, and saw no particular need to join in a 
debate on ideas within the party.31 From this it followed that Bourges did 
not experience Chirac's conversion in 1981 as a ralliement to his own 
position, unlike Chalandon and Peyrefitte, who had both written books and 
articles setting out their views.
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Peyrefitte furthermore, as we saw in chapter 4, made a serious 
attempt behind the scenes to undermine Chirac as party leader. When asked 
what he had done to change Chirac's mind up to the time of the 1981 
elections, he preferred to draw a veil over those efforts and instead 
said, "I wrote some books. "3:2 Influential as his books may have been, 
however, their composition amounted to a rather unfocussed way of winning 
over party opinion, the effectiveness of which proved difficult to 
quantify.33 Furthermore, Peyrefitte himself modestly suggested that books 
were less important in changing minds or in educating the "new 
generation" of young RPR liberals than were the facts of life, in 
particular the poor economic performances of the eastern bloc countries, 
and the lacklustre records of politicians such as Harold Wilson and Jimmy 
Carter when compared to Thatcher and Reagan.34
This essentially "political" rather than "ideological" reading of the 
RPR-UDF conflict at the end of the 1970s is echoed by those of today's 
younger deputies who were involved in it. Francois Fillon observed the 
struggle at first hand, as parliamentary assistant to Gaston le Theule, 
the Gallo-Giscardian transport minister in 1979-80. He is convinced that 
the conflicts were essentially "false quarrels" engendered because "if 
Giscard was for one thing, Chirac had to be for something else, and vice 
versa."35 Patrick Devedjian was in 1979 the chairman of the party disputes 
commission which had the task of suspending Peyrefitte's party membership. 
A decade later he was willing to accept that the Barre government's 
economic policies were close to those he himself wished to see adopted, 
(though he was dissatisfied in other policy areas, such as education.) For 
him, the intra-RPR conflict was part of
a partisan conflict. It was a conflict between one lot
of people who had power in a party, and another lot.
Giscard wanted to cut the RPR down to size, and in 
fact that is what led to his defeat. Giscard wanted to 
do down the RPR and a number of people in the RPR 
played the Giscard card. ... to do down the RPR. . .. 
that's what the conflict was about. Ideology was
fairly absent really  from this conflict. It was a
pretext.
It is clear, then, that even those senior Gaullists who were at odds 
with Chirac over economic policy in the late 1970s seem neither to have 
tried hard nor to have had much effect in swinging the party to their 
point of view. It was striking that in conversations with Gaullists on 
both sides of the argument, and across the age-groups, there was little 
awareness of the sharpness of Chirac's "turn". Among those who were 
willing to accept that the RPR had shifted its official position, there 
was a tendency to attribute this to a general change in mentality brought 
about by the long-term "failure of socialism", the Thatcher— Reagan 
phenomenon, or the arrival of the French Socialists in power. When it was 
pointed out that Chirac had defended tax-cutting and anti-state policies
V
in the 1981 election campaign, the response was very often - "As early as 
that?". These findings confirm the impression of unconscious absorption of 
liberal doctrine given by the career of the former industry minister,
Michel Maurice-Bokanowski.
America
The Gaullists of the 1980s in general speak well of the United 
States. One describes the political qualities of Ronald Reagan 
audacieuse, muscl£e, pat riot IqueF*'7 - as just those which Gaullists have 
always admired; Another celebrates the rassemblement of the American 
people around the President who embodies their aspirations,3S' A third
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welcomes the democratic potential inherent in modern American 
communications technology. 3-3 All and sundry - even still after the 
sobering defeat of 1988 - speak with pride of their multiple business 
trips to the USA.
In addition, an astonishing number of senior Gaullists have made
special visits to the USA during the 1970s and 1980s in order to study the
political system and talk to politicians, social scientists and
journalists. Fanton and Noir, as we saw, travelled all over the country in
1975; Alain Jupp6 went to California in 1978, and Philippe Auberger in
1979, both meeting representatives of the anti-tax campaigners. 40
Philippe de Bausset, the France-Soir journalist who joined Chirac's
campaign team in 1981, had spent some years on station in the US, and
Jacques Toubon, who followed the 1980 election campaign in person,
returned home with a copy of Reagan's campaign poster, which he stuck on
his office wall.*' Yvan Blot kept in touch with the development of
American political thought through contacts between his Club de 1*Horloge
and its homologues such as the Heritage Foundation of Washington. In 1983,
with Jean-Fran^ois Mancel, he took time off from his job in the RPR
executive committee to spend three weeks studying American direct-mailing
techniques and meeting more members of the various business-funded think-
tanks which had manufactured the ideology of the conservative revival.'*3 
%
Not all these trans-Atlantic pilgrims had equal access to the RPR
V
power-centre. Neither Fanton nor Mancel nor Noir had any official 
responsibility for doctrine, but Blot, Auberger and Jupp6 were well placed 
to get an audience for their ideas. The first of these, as we shall see 
later in the chapter, spent nearly ten years in or around the leadership. 
Auberger was less interested in working at party headquarters, and
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actually turned down Chirac's offer to make him head of research at the
end of the 1970s. But on his return from the USA he did transmit to the
party leader directly the fruits of his experience, sending him, at his
request, monthly briefing papers on economic questions;
... so those elements were used, if you like, in the 
platform (of 1981) in which Chirac began to say that 
we had to reduce taxes and that state expenditure was 
too high.43
Auberger also played a significant role subsequently in the drafting 
of programmes and platforms. At the Grenoble congrees in November 1984 he 
was the rapporteur of a commission which presented the economic part of 
the RPR programme subsequently published as Le Renouveau. Throughout 1985 
he was a member of one of the joint-committees set up by the RPR and UDF 
to negotiate the platform of government signed in January 1986.
Juppe in turn, as we have seen, was held in such high regard by 
Chirac that he had an almost permanent place in the party leader's inner 
circle of helpers and advisers, even when his own electoral misfortunes 
tended to disqualify him from a senior party position. At the end of the 
19/Os his role was above all that of speech-writer, "a young assistant to 
his boss" rather than an indepedent adviser.4B In 1981 he was made
/
general-secretary of the party's semi-independent think-tank, the Club 
'89, for which he wrote a book on economic policy in 1983. But in the run­
up to 1986 his role was even more important than that of Auberger, since 
he was in overall charge of the RPR side during the negotiation of the 
joint platform with the UDF.4*3
The American experience of these key members was not transmitted 
uniformly to party programmes, however, and certainly not in the terms in 
which the new economists tried to sell American liberalism to the French
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public. In his debates with the liberals both in California and the
University of Aix-en-Provence Philippe Auberger remained ul to the
"social" preoccupations of traditional Gaullism. Jupp6 tried to effect a 
synthesis between liberalism and the technocratic outlook which had 
moulded so many Gaullists of his generation, while Michel Noir sought in 
"systems theory" the answers to the economic and social problems of the 
1980s. Blot and the Club de l'Horloge tried to transmit to the party an 
ambitious synthesis of new right conservatism and economic liberalism. In 
the next few pages we compare the conclusions to which these approaches 
led, on certain key issues; the firm, planning, macro-economic theory, 
social policy and institutional reform.
Between 1980 and 1984 the RPR's official programmes abandoned State- 
defined sectoral policy in favour of a new emphasis on the autonomy of 
individual firms, a change of focus crucial to the intellectual acceptance 
of liberalism. The more fully party members wanted to embrace liberal 
theory, the more completely they would have to abandon the fate of the
nation to market forces, a proposition expressed by Albin Chalandon in
1986 in terms which owe a lot to the new economics;
Statist economics conceives of demand as the basic 
premiss from which one can deduce the production 
necessary to satisfy needs. It is nothing of the sort.
Supply, that is the production of goods and services, 
has a devastating effect on demand, thanks to its 
innovation and its ability to lower prices; at the 
same time it makes any attempt at planning an 
illusion.47
He rejected "national independence" as a criterion by which the State 
should favour the development of one sector or another;
In a competitive economy .....  who cares whether
firms are making ball-point pens, trousers, cars or 
aeroplanes? The only criteria for their success is a 
high level of technique.40
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While Chalandon is very close to the American liberals and the French 
new economists both in ideas and in jargon, some of his younger 
colleagues, arrrived at similar conclusions from a completely different 
direction and using a different method - systems theory.
Originally derived from biology, and later applied to genetics and 
thermodynamics, systems theory has been progressively extended to 
organizations and to sociology by, among others, the RPR's Alain Devaquet,
a university physics teacher. A system, in this view, is conceived as a
number of elements making up a closed circuit, without beginning or end, 
which is engaged in a process of exchange with its environment. It 
produces "outputs", in the form of decisions and actions, and receives 
"inputs" in the form of supports and demands. But inputs are partially 
conditioned by feedback, that is they are a response to outputs, which in 
turn involve the processing of inputs. The exchange between a system and 
its environment is thus circular, without beginning or end. The whole 
process, and systems themselves, are self-regulating; systems have a 
permanent tendency to re-establish (an unattainable) equilibrium in 
opposition to the events which transform them. so
Michel Noir, a "systems" enthusiast, bases his rejection of both
liberal and collectivist views of people in society on
the new paradigm (which) invites us to observe the way
in which, at the same time, one evolves in relation to 
the other, thanks to, and in the other, the unity and 
the totality. 61
Noir asserts that ideologies which express the struggle for 
domination either of the individual over society, or society over the 
individual, being mere linear or binary conceptions, are necessarily 
defunct, while systems theory expresses perfectly the relationship between
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the capitalist firm and its environment. The economic crisis is to be
welcomed, for
Crisis is the normal state of all living systems, and 
the economic system is one.
Therefore, according to Noir, French unions should recognize, like 
their American colleagues, that the jobs lost in steel, cars, textiles and 
machine-tools are the price paid for adapting to new competitive 
conditions, and will never be recovered. S3 To adapt the whole economy, an 
immense effort of education and retraining is required, and this in turn 
means "glorifying risk and individual initiative. "B/1
Both Noir and Juppe propose a new partnership between bosses and
workers at the level of the firm, but without Guy Sorman's compensating
promise of a job for life. In Noir's view, if the workers are to have
their say, and a share of the profits, (but not of the capital,
apparently) it is the employers who should be compensated by the repeal of
the Auroux laws and the ending of the rights currently enjoyed by the
unions. BB Like Sorman, both stress the limits of the proposed new
arrangements. For Noir;
Every structure needs a chain of command: spontaneism 
and workers' control have not succeeded anywhere, SlS
Regretting the poor results of previous Gaullist legislation on 
participation, Juppe paradoxically insists that the right to manage 
"cannot and should not be shared",B'7 but is alone among his colleagues in 
arguing that, after privatization, the workers now owning 15-20% of the 
shares in their firm should elect their own representatives on to the 
board. The same would apply in private companies whose owners had decided 
to introduce worker— shareownership. BS Given the insistence on 
management's right to manage, it is difficult to see what could be the
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role of the workei— directors.
If Chalandon and Noir deduce the same conclusions from different
premisses, Juppe seems to go backwards from where they end up. He starts
out with a bald faith in the automatic compensating mechanisms of
classical theory which is more than worthy of the new economists
themselves;
The free market rests on a simple rule of 
responsibility; each individual, group or organization 
is free to use the information at their disposal in 
the pursuit of their own ends, with free competition 
acting to balance out all their projects and actions 
in the general interest. £;ss
Acording to Jupp£, only the market is flexible and decentralized, it
alone guarantees the optimum distribution of resources (if bankruptcies
occur this can only be due to the incompetence of individuals), and it
alone meets the requirements of social justice by ensuring that wages
properly reflect social utility. e'° This leads straight to an enumeration
of the familiar elements of the liberal programme; cuts in the income and
expenditure of the state, cuts in transfer payments and social security
contributions, and sweeping privatizations. But what comes next makes us
sit up and rub our eyes;
 at the same time we must redefine the positive
role which an efficient state should play in emerging 
from the crisis in the best possible conditions.*'1
Tribute is paid to the usefulness of planning in meeting the
challenges of the early years of the 5th Republic, and it is suggested
that the state has a similar role to play in piloting France towards the
so-called "third industrial revolution";
It is not enough, then, to look after in static 
fashion year after year the major indicators like 
inflation, unemployment and the balance of payments.
Both fiscal and monetary policy, together with
expenditure on infrastructure, utilities, education
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and research must be integrated into an overall plan 
in order to ensure a coherent pattern of growth in the 
medium term. &:£
This is not the same, claims Jupp4, as the detailed 5-year indicative 
forecasting which planning had involved in the past. But in the new 
version, the plan is still expected to provide "a clear frame of reference 
within which firms can make their investment decisions", and the state 
itself is to guarantee the achievement of a "hard-core" of prioritized 
targets. Planning was being pushed out of the door, only to come back in 
through the window!63
Jupp£ rounds off his discussion of the new role of the State with a 
call for a "commercial and diplomatic strategy", which appears to advocate 
a measure of protection for the French electronics industry, and aims to 
"give back to France a place in the front rank of nations in a changing 
world.M6A
In short, the man who would become party secretaire national for
economic revival in 1984 and general secretary in 1988, far from being
part of the vanguard who sought to turn the party towards liberalism, j /
found it very hard to break free from a dirigist frame of reference. This
loyalty to ideas whose time seemed to have passed was noticed by some of
his colleagues, and attributed as much to the technocratic training of the
Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), the elite civil servants' training
school, as to Gaullist doctrine;
What you have to realize with ENA is that the training 
one is given is exclusively macro-economic. One 
receives no, or practically no training in micro­
economics or commercial management. So one is 
deformed, if I can put it like that, by that 
training.
By the time of the Grenoble congress in November 1984, Juppe had
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apparently been left behind by the bulk of the delegates, and his speech 
against the stream on the necessary - albeit limited - role of the state 
was very badly received.
It is remarkable how uniformly sceptical RPR writers were about the
value of the macro-economic "techniques*' with which the Americans proposed
to release pent-up market forces, and which some believed had stimulated
the economic upturn which got under way in the USA at the end of 1982.
"Intransigent monetarism" is damned by Jupp6 as a remedy worse than the
evil it is meant to cure, for its failure to work on all the causes of
inflation, and its tendency to provoke recession, but his strongest
invective is reserved for supply-side theory;
If the state does no more than reduce taxes without 
attacking the causes of its deficit, this will lead
straight to bankruptcy  The American experience of
the Reagan administration serves as a striking 
example; the reduction of tax revenue caused the 
budget deficit to explode, fuelled the demands of the 
Treasury, pushed interest rates up and held back for 
at least two years the upturn in the economy. Laffer's 
theory, which predicted that cutting taxes would
produce an almost instantaneous rise in national
income, turned out to be nothing but pie in the sky.ee
In comparison, Noir sounds almost mild in dismissing in turn
monetarism, (for the same reasons) Keynesianism - along with all other
"full employment models" - and the supply-siders;
Nor is there anything to prove that the most recent 
theory, so dear to the Americans, of an upturn 
stimulated not by demand, but by supply, has an 
automatic effect on the level of activity.. . .&9
Philippe Auberger has likewise deduced from the Reagan experiment 
that tax-cuts were not the "panacea", and could not produce the "magic 
effects" that some people liked to believe in. 70 The American revival was 
due to "the profound, rapid, and sometimes dramatic efforts at
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restructuring" in sectors such as steel, cars, and chemicals, as well as 
the upturn in housing construction, restocking, and intangibles like 
changing economic behaviour and the climate of expectations.7"1
In explaining why it was impossible for France to imitate the 
American achievement, Auberger implicitly admitted what the Left had 
argued all along; far from being the fruit of liberal theory, the American 
upturn was based on classic Keynesian demand maintenance, in this case 
indirectly the result of a large military budget financed by borrowing 
from abroad;
...our situation is fundamentally different from that 
of the USA, in the sense that we have little or no 
chance of turning to foreign capital to finance our 
budget deficit; little footloose capital is likely to 
come into France, especially in view of the present 
exchange-rate risks.73
In addition to these intellectual reservations, the social policy 
implications of American iberalisrn were difficult for some - but not all - 
Gaullists to swallow. For Philippe S6guin, who stands on the left of his 
party, Reagan's capacities as rassembleur had more to do with moral 
revival than with discoveries in economics. The President's all-class 
appeal was precisely what the RPR risked sacrificing by its over—  
concentration on economic issues.73 Jacques Toubon was another who 
accepted some, but not all, of the Reaganite programme, describing himself 
as a "conservative", in American terms, on economic issues, but a 
"liberal" (still in American terms - that is, a "social democrat" in 
European terms) on social issues.7*
Auberger showed his freedom from the influence of the "public choice" 
school by attributing state expansion not to the activities of a self- 
seeking "new class" of bureaucrats, but to the fulfilment of necessary
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tasks imposed by economic growth - urbanization, regional development, and
the provision of transport and industrial infrastructure. He went further;
growth also leads to certain disparities of income 
which it is appropriate to correct by transfer 
mechanisms and redistribution. 75
With Albin Chalandon the social conscience is more subdued, though 
still present. He explicitly refers to the American debate in arguing that 
"excessive" unemployment benefits both stimulate unemployment, and 
increase rather than reduce inequality, but proposes no concrete remedy, 76 
and lie draws back from a fully privatized system of social insurance on 
grounds of the great inequalities this would entail. '7"7 Neither Auberger 
nor Chalandon are as radically "liberal" as Michel Noir, who cites the 
American workfare schemes in arguing that the unemployed must be made to 
give something in return for their benefit.'7®
Jupp£, for his part, proposes to diminish or cut off benefits in
order to induce the unemployed to take jobs for which they were
overqualified. 79 But Noir goes further still. He is willing to substitute
private arrangements for publicly funded welfare, as reccornmended by
Becker and Lepage;
The welfare-state in crisis will not be able to avoid 
the revival of private rnutual-aid systems, and will 
not escape a reform of its present interventionist 
structures.®°
Michel Noir was also the RPR writer with the most radical ideas for 
institutional reforms leading to the sort of direct democracy which Sorman 
saw as essential for the achievement of the liberal utopia. He favoured 
Swiss-style referenda activated by grass-roots initiative,®1 but went 
further than Sorman in proposing to shorten mandates for all elected 
offices, not just the presidency, and to limit consecutive terms to two
only, in order to end the concept of the "political career" as it is 
presently understood.®2 Education should be decentralized and schools 
managed by bodies made up 50% by local councillors and 50% by parents, who 
were also to have a role in financing the school to which they chose to 
send their children, through a tax-credit system. ®3
Auberger and Jupp£ are more lukewarm in embracing direct democracy, 
Auberger finding it "perfectly convceivable" to widen the range of issues 
on which referenda may be used, perhaps by popular initiative, while 
Juppe limits himself to proposing "consultative commissions" of taxpayers 
which would give their opinions to elected councillors at each level of 
local government.®'1
On the other hand, Noir avoids the question of banning deficit 
budgeting, or fixing the share of state expenditure in GDP by 
institutional means. He suggests that this is a trap set by those opposed 
to reform, for the most important thing is not the figures involved, but 
to "revise profoundly the concept of the state. More concretely, 
Auberger's analysis of the existing mechanisms of democratic control 
reveals that the Cour des Compt.es, has only 7 full time officials for the 
109 public enterprises whose accounts it is supposed to vet, and that its 
reports are poor and not adequately or regularly debated by Parliament. In 
consequence, it is necessary to increase the resources of the Cour des
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Cornptes and extend its responsibilities. es
Both Jupp£ and Auberger agree that the demand for legal prohibition 
of deficit budgeting at a stroke is probably unrealistic, given the size
of the deficit'37 For Auberger, moreover, a budget deficit is not in itsell
to be condemned outright. The size of a deficit is not a good guide to a 
budget's usefulness;
one would have to examine the structure of 
expenditure, separating current from capital, and 
deciding whether in each case it is likely to create 
wealth.... Equally, the methods of financing a budget 
deficit should be examined, because these can vary 
considerably. If one is wise enough to finance it 
through savings, deficit is acceptable, especially if 
it concerns capital expenditure likely to generate 
wealth in the future.
But deficits financed by printing money are inflationary and to be 
condemned. ,3S
Auberger approves the idea of limiting the growth of state
expenditure to the growth of GDP, but believes that to elevate it into a 
principle enshrined in a special law is undesirable, since policy is 
better made for a number of years together rather than year-oii-year. 133 
Juppe strikes a more energetic note, with a demand to freeze the number of 
civil service posts, and a list of urgent measures to keep spending down, 
including legislation to change the way the budget is presented to 
Parliament.®0 The two also took a different view of the urgency of 
privatization. Auberger advocates;
progressive denationalization of enterprises for which 
public status is not at all appropriate. . . . Naturally, 
such a process of denationalization will be slow....-3'1
whereas Jupp6 put it like this;
....the first priority is to announce the immediate 
denationalization of most public enterprises in the 
competitive sector, should the oppostion win (the 
elections). No time must be lost, for whatever is not
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done in the first flush of victory will be frittered 
away by quibbling and delaying tactics.3*"
As these exerpts show, the lengthy policy proposals put forward by 
influential party figures during the early 1980s were as likely to be the 
products of individuals working alone as of co-ordinated efforts. The 
ideas of an Auberger or a Jupp£, as we have seen, resulted from the clash 
of their own social democratic or technocratic frames of reference with 
the liberalism they had encountered in the USA. Within the party, these 
individual efforts had to contend with the coherent doctrine of an 
organized group whose inspiration was rather different. From the mid- 
1970s, Yvan Blot and the Club de 1'Horloge had been among the principle 
defenders of the ideas of the Nouvelle Droite, and their dialogue with 
liberalism reflected this different•starting point.
The Club de 1 ’Horloge and Club '89
Yvan Blot differed from his RPR colleagues in that for him party 
took second place to ideology, as shown by his overriding commitment to 
the intei— party Club de 1'Horloge, by his fortuitous infiltration of the 
RPR leadership and subsequent desertion to the Front National. The early 
association with GRECE of a number of the Club de 1' Horloge's leaders has 
led some to suppose that the Club has never been more than a GRECE front. 
However, an analysis of articles appearing in the Club's review,
Contrepoint, shows that, despite sharing identical concepts and analyses, 
GRECE and the Club moved in different directions after the significant 
conjuncture represented by the victories of Reagan in the USA and 
Mitterrand in France. Alain de Benoist led GRECE in opposition to the
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reinvigorated US liberalism, as we saw, while Blot tried to use 
Contrepoint as a platform both for the reactionary American supporters of 
the Reagan revolution, and for a concerted "liberal" onslaught on the 
newly-elected French Socialists.
Meanwhile Blot himself held a succession of key auxiliary positions 
within the RPR leadership which gave him daily opportunities to spread his 
ideas in the general secretary's office and among party workers throughout 
the country. Although Contrepoint probably had little influence within 
France as a whole, Blot was able to draw into collaboration some important 
supporters of Jacques Chirac, as well as the self-avowed conservatives 
within the party. He was not the key figure in pushing Chirac himself > 
towards liberalism, but he played a crucial role in conciliating 
conservative and liberal ideas in the party and channelling them into what 
he called "national liberalism", in a way which helps explain the near 
unanimity with which the party fell into line behind the 198G programme of 
government.
Born in 1948, Parisian lyc£e, Sciences Folitiques, and ENA, Blot 
followed the classic administrative career of many of his Gaullist 
contemporaries. As an admintstrateur civil working for the ministry of the 
Interior he had already, in his twenties, worked in the cabinets of 
succeeding heavyweight Giscardian politicians, Marcellin and Poniatowski. 
But he appeared in no hurry to come from behind the scenes into the 
limelight. It was not until after he had rather fortuitously achieved an 
important position in a party machine - the RPR - that he first won 
elective office as a modest town councillor in Calais in 1979. He did not 
become conseiller general (county councillor) until 1985, and was depute 
for Calais only from 1986 to 1988.
Blot did not come to Gaullisrn during one of the critical moments of
the 5th Republic - not in 1958 when he was ten, like Mancel, and not in
1.968 when he was twenty, as others such as Noir and Godfrain had done. He
joined the RPR in 1978 when discord within Chirac's entourage led to the
resignation of the general secretary, Jerfirne Monod, and his replacement by
Alain Devaquet. Hirnself a newcomer, Devaquet had to rely on those who had
ousted Monod for help in setting up his office. As Blot puts it;
No, I didn't know M. Devaquet, but he had been. ... or 
rather, I had been recommended to him by several 
members of Chirac's entourage, and that is how he 
asked me if I would be his directeur du cabinet. So we
met, and we got on well together, and he hired me. a3
He remained in the job of director of the general-secretary's office,
serving first Devaquet and then Bernard Pons for more than six years,
sharing the day-to-day running of the party as a member of the Executive
Committee. During this period Blot estimates that he must have written for
i/"
Chirac 40 or 50 papers concerning "ideological orientation", each ot 
between 2 and five pages in length, and he gave scores of lectures on 
various subjects to provincial party officials, as part of the training 
courses organized by Mancel. BA
But Blot's influence within the party leadership did not come to an 
end in 1984. From the general-secretary's office he switched to the 
cabinet of Charles Pasqua, by then president of the RPR group in the 
Senate. Here he joined Devedjian, Marleix and others in a "think-tank" 
whose task was to develop ideas which Pasqua would use in his bid to make 
the transition from the role of Chirac's "Mr Fix-it" to that of a serious 
politician in his own r i g h t . A t  the same time - until his election as 
depute in March 1986 - Blot held down the job of co-ordinator of 
"legislative studies", which involved a three-way liaison .between Senate,
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Assembl£e and the general-secretary's office to ensure that the 
parliamentarians' votes and legislative proposals were in tune with party
policy.96
During his years in the leadership of the RPR Blot worked in 
accordance with an ideology to which he was already fully committed before 
he even joined the party, and of which the main lines remained intact when 
he left to join the Front National in 1989. The Club de 1'Horloge, founded 
at his home in 1974, - its name is taken from his own grandfather clock - 
was throughout the main vehicle for his ideas and the key focus of his 
activity. He was its first president, is the permanent honorary president, 
and has edited the review, Contrepoint since the Club took it over in 
early 1980.
Blot's fellow founding members were nearly all students of the elite 
civil service training schools, ENA and the Polytechnique. They included 
Jean-Yves le Gallou, later secretary-general of the Front National' s 
parliamentary group, Michel Leroy, of the Giscardian Parti R£publicain, 
later a close collaborator of Alain Madelin, one of the party's rising 
stars, and Henri de Lesquen of the RPR, whose job in the city housing 
authority later made him a link in the chain of Chirac's Paris power 
system. All would remain leading Club members for the next decade.
The founders shared the belief that there was "a lack of doctrinal 
density" among the ruling parties of the period, and hence an "unconscious 
deviation towards socialist ideas" which they wanted to combat, 37 but they 
did not set out to create a mass movement. Two hundred and fifty members 
were admitted after undergoing two interviews, and their subscriptions 
were fixed at 200 francs (roughly £20) per month, as a test of 
seriousness. In common with the plethora of other intellectual
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societies and political front organizations which exist among £narques and 
polytechnlclens in Paris, the Club de 1'Horloge* s early activities were 
those of the dining and debating club. By 1981, the average seminar 
audience was up from 200 to around 800-900, •9-;' an achievement which clearly 
marked the Club de 1* Horloge out from its rivals.
Apart from the energy and organizational skills of its leaders, the
reason for the Club's success may have been, as Blot claimed, that it was
distinguished from the other technocrats' clubs of the mid-1970s by its
scepticism about the virtues of state intervention in the economy.
Although the Club remained "for a very long time" the preserve of hautes
Conctlonnaires, who in 1989 still made up more than half of its board,
Blot built up a clientele amongst businessmen by calling himself an
£narque defroqu&, and outdoing them in his scorn for the maze of
interventionist bureaucracy. His own work had required him to represent
the ministry of the Interior at the planning commissariat on questions
concerning local government finance. Here,
... I saw how useless the Plan was. It absolutely 
failed to work, it was a catastrophe. I have never 
seen a branch of the administration as badly organized 
and as useless, really.100
The decision to set up an organization outside but astride existing 
parties probably owed something to the ramshackle organization of the 
French Right, which would have made it difficult to prefer any one party 
to another, 101 but it also reflected the founders' endorsement of de 
Benoist's concept of metapol11ique, 102 used both to elucidate the 
"domination" of the Marxists, and to sketch the Right's own circuitous 
approach to power, concentrating on the battle of ideas rather than 
conventional politics. As Blot put it later;
The ten years' experience I have had of the RPR has 
convinced me that it is very difficult to ask
political parties, which are electoral machines, to go
in for deep thinking. They are not the sort of bodies 
equipped for that, Every attempt at serious 
ideological production in a political party has 
generally resulted in nothing. I'm very sceptical. I 
think, as far as political thinking is concerned, it
is better to do it in organizations which are 
completely independent, like clubs and foundations.103
The importance of this work was confirmed for him by his study of
history (in this case the French revolution);
One should always study the actual organizations whose
aim it was to spread ideas.... Ideas do not speak for '
themselves, they are spread, they are effective only
to the extent that people work for them, that men help
them along, particularly in influential circles. 1on
The similar strategies adopted by the two organizations, and the 
leading Clubmen's early links with GRECE led some observers to wonder
whether the Club was no more than a front established by GRECE to act as a
pole of attraction for its sympathizers in political circles.10® Blot 
himself was said to have taken part in GRECE seminars, in which he 
justified slavery and racial differentiation, in 1972 and 1974.106 Le 
Gallou worked on the distribution of de Benoist's Nouvelle Ecole, to which 
he contributed an article, and Leroy wrote regularly for Element s up until 
1976-7.107 It was hinted that the attenuation of these personal links over 
time, the denial of all organizational ties between the two groups, and 
even the Club's official rejection (in 1982) of the label Nouvelle Droite 
and "notions which are foreign to us", 103 could have been part of a 
devious attempt to obscure the Club's real origins. 103 Certainly these 
suspicions tended to be confirmed by a comparison of the two 
organizations' shared ideas.
The Club's members form a series of commissions each of which studies jt
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certain intellectual or social questions with the aim of publishing a book 
when their work is completed, after which the commissions are dissolved 
and new ones formed. 1,0 The first work produced in this way, written over 
the years 1974-6 and appearing in 1977111 was a founding statement which 
established the Club's general view on a number of topics, a "Livre- 
Programme" as Blot puts it. 112 It showed clearly the imprint of GRECE 
ideology, being built around Dum6zil's notion of trifunctional social 
organization; his name is cited as early as page 14, the concept is 
referred to repeatedly113 and the book's central section is divided into
three chapters of equal length, each one devoted in turn to problems of 
political sovereignty, defence and the economy. The theme of 
trifunctionality reappears constantly in other Club publications, ’114 as 
does enracinement, 115 and the nostalgia for "heroic" values11 and the 
stress on the historic role of great leaders in embodying the aspirations 
of the nation.117 The references to the German anthropologist Arnold 
Gehlen are also there, with fascistic and social-Darwinist overtones,1"3 
which are developed further in the Club's second book, La Politique du 
Vi vant1 13 and elsewhere. 130
In dealing with the economy, finally, the Club and GRECE shared a 
basic frame of reference leading, until about 1980 at least, to identical 
conclusions which set them apart from the unconditional liberalism of the 
new economists. The Club blamed laissez-faire for the crash of 1929,131 
while the new economists blamed the state. The Club called for political 
regulation of economic activity ("conjunctural", "structural" and 
"social"133) and in certain cases justified state control, where the new 
economists wanted to privatize and deregulate. The Club blamed immigrants 
for holding down wages, and called for a graduated minimum wage which
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would allow manual workers to improve their position,1:23 where Lepage and 
his friends regarded immigrants as victims of such schemes and called for 
their abolition. The Club reserved "family policy" for the state1 3<1, while 
some of the new economists evoked the libertarian spirit of 1968. The Club
shared with GRECE a distaste for the acquisitive values fostered by 
contemporary capitalism, typically denounced as la soci&t& marchande, 135 
and in 1980 Michel Leroy published an article in the Club's review,
Ccmirepainti in which he attacked the fundamental tenet of liberalism) the
concept of homo oeconomicus. 136
However, as we argued above in chapter 7, the Club's interpretation 
of the conflation of the sovereign and the economic functions in society 
provided them with a starting point from which they could integrate and 
develop later anti-state theorizing. They attacked price controls, lauded 
the spirit of entreprise,127 demanded the substitution of private for 
public insurance13,3 and tried to define which productive activities should 
and should not be part of the public sector. 1 33
After 1980, in solidarity with what he saw as the positive elements 
in the American Republican revival, and especially after 1981, in order to 
attack the newly-elected French Socialists, Blot deliberately focussed 
more closely on the conventional political battleground and was able to 
build on the Club's more sophisticated approach in order to swing it round 
in defence of some aspects of the liberal programme proposed by people 
like Lepage and Sorman.
The vehicle for this was the review Contrepoint which, throughout the 
1970s had been a modest tribune for that mixture of conservative and 
liberal instincts represented in France by figures like Raymond Aron, 130 
and which Blot claimed to admire in Georges Pompidou, Pierre Juillet and
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the British Conservative party. Blot acquired control in 1980, and within 
a few issues had changed the journal's character completely.131 Literary 
and artistic reviews were abandoned in favour of an exclusive concern with 
politics, in which the publications of the Club de 1* Horloge were given 
pride of place. The news section was turned into politique actuality 
dominated by the RPR, and an entirely new rubric, Economie-Entreprises was 
introduced. In June 1981, the review moved its editorial address to the 
Club's own premises, and at the same time, significantly, an innoccuously 
liberal quotation from de Tocqueville was removed from the mast-head and 
replaced by a stronger anti-socialist statement from Vladimir Bukovsky.132 
These changes were justified by the new editor on the grounds of the 
Socialists' arrival in power, 133 The abrupt increase in the number of 
articles by known party members signalled an attempt to turn the review 
into a platform which would rally the opposition across party lines to 
launch concerted attacks on the government. 1:3/1 In this Blot was hardly 
successful, for the review soon began to appear in double issues, a sure 
sign of disorganization and inability to meet deadlines, and from no 41, 
which appeared sometime in 1982, no dates were printed on the cover or 
title page, while the general quality of the contributions was distinctly 
inferior to the standard of the old Contrepoint.
If all this meant that the Club's Contrepoint could not hope to build 
up a mass audience, nontheless the participation of senior RPR figures was 
impressive. Yves Lancien, and Jean-Pierre Cassabel attacked the Socialists 
on defence and decentralization, the subjects for which they were the 
party spokesmen, 135 Jacques Godfrain, Jacques Toubon and Bruno Bourg-Broc, 
director of the party training school, contributed pieces on the "state of 
the struggle" in Parliament and the country, 136 while Godfrain and Daniel
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Meraud (Bernard Pons' adviser on economic questions) set about demolishing 
the nationalizations and the Socialists' economic policy. 137 Michel 
Aurillac had a stab at a philosophical piece which was presumably included 
in order to demonstrate the warm relations between the Club de 1'Horloge 
and the Club '89 which had just been set up under Aurillac's 
presidency. 130 Some of these authors were no strangers to collaboration 
with the Club de 1'Horloge, having contributed to the seminars which were 
later written up into Club publications.133
Meanwhile the Club members, principally Blot, carried on a serious 
debate with the new economists, on certain of the themes raised by them, 
which ended with Blot's endorsement of the American "Republican 
Revolution".
In 1980 Blot and Leroy were still defending the idea of the nation 
and the great leader ("1'bomrne lllustre"> as the fount of values and focus 
for the ambitions of all citizens. They took a side-swipe at the 
"permissive and anarchistic bourgeois spirit of personal development" (of 
the sort defended by Lepage) and called for the cultivation, through 
state-controlled education, of the "republican type", the citizen proof 
against such corruption, and the only type fully compatible with the 
spirit of enterprise and efficiency.1'10
At the same time, however, they invited Lepage to outline the public 
choice analysis of the bureaucracy and argue for constitutional reform 
which would introduce a measure of American-style direct democracy.141 
Other Club members argued for the scrapping of minimum wage legislation 
and universal social benefits, in favour of a means-tested "safety- 
net". 143 This was a distinct move towards the positions of the new 
economists and away from Le Gallou's 1977 proposal, as a means of
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"rSequilibrags social", to of fset the downward pressure on wages caused by
immigration, by instituting a ’'manual minimum wage" growing faster than
the ordinary one. 1 Soon the Club was debating economics and inequality
with representatives of the new economists who were pumping the liberal
orthodoxy into the universities. 1 44
Blot also produced an extremely lucid statement of his ideas on
political strategy which showed how far he had advanced from the sterile
oppositionism of de Benoist;
The essential act of politics is identification of the 
enemy. . .
necessarily, for Blot, the Socialists. Three mistakes were to be avoided, 
he argued; not to identify any enemy, and to claim to reduce politics to a 
question of simple management; to identify everybody as the enemy (the 
mistake made by extremists); and to be incapable of identifying one enemy 
at a Lime (the mistake of the cenl.ri si.s). '
As well as collaborating with the new economists, as part of the 
anti-Socialist strategy, the Club regularly exchanged pamphlets, speakers 
and ideas with some of the American think-tanks, particularly the Heritage 
Foundation of Washington, which flooded political and business circles 
with intellectual ammunition in support of Ronald Reagan's Presidential 
campaign. Unhampered by GRECE's anti-Christian prejudice, Blot was also in 
intermittent contact with the American Enterprise Institute run by the 
Catholic intellectual Michael Novak who had deduced a moral defence of 
capitalism from his religious faith. 1 4S
The rapprochement was sealed with issue 47 of Contrepoint, devoted to 
the Club's homage to the Reagan revolution, which Sorman was invited to 
summarize.147. The transformation wrought by the Republicans' victorious
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campaign had led the Club to revise both their earlier critique of
American society
characterized by a one-dimensional ethic (primacy of 
money, homogenization of life-styles)... 1 lte
and their condemnation of the United States' relationship with the rest of
the world. 1 Now Blot personally translated four contributions from three
Republican standard-bearers, including two by Congressman Jack Kemp which
regretted that American influence in the thirld world had been undermined
by the bad "Keynesian" advice handed out by successive Democrat
Presidents, and looked forward to a new era of American leadership founded
on rediscovered strength and self-confidence. 150
In his own contribution to the special issue, Blot took care to
stress the moral and religious aspects of the populist revolt, warning
against their reduction to "classical liberal doctrine stricto sensu", and
emphasized the conservative elements in Hayek's thought;
The evolutionism of Hayek is not simply a belief in 
the benefits of freedom. It is also a belief in the 
benefits of tradition, which expresses the genius of a 
people making history. It is not an appeal to break 
with the past in order to construct a future dreamed 
up a priori by a few people, which is the way the 
constructivists look at things.1®1
Nevertheless he felt it necessary to address the demands for
Institutional reform raised by the American anti-tax campaigners, and
implicit in Kemp's praise for direct democracy as practised in
Switzerland. 1®a Despite his earlier dismissal as futile and dangerous of
the "constructivist" ambitions of revolutionaries from Robespierre to Pol
Pot, 163 he was now prepared to recognize that;
In certain situations of over-rigid societies, a rapid 
rearrangement of institutions, that is to say a sort
of revolution, can be beneficial (In France)... a
profound transformation of the state's activity is 
necessary in order to liberate the creative energies
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Blot, who had always looked to the state as the defender of 
hierarchy, duty and tradition, had deduced from his own reactionary and 
organicist premisses a slogan identical to that brandished at every 
opportunity by the most libertarian of the Chicago-inspired economists and 
by the most democratic of grass-roots politicians. By the mid-1980s he had 
embraced supply-side economics and accepted that the only necessary public 
guarantee of social solidarity was Kemp's "safety net".1SB
Another of the new economists' ideas, that unelected citizens should 
exercise a measure of direct democracy, had been dismissed as a
"Rousseauist fiction" by Le Gallou in 1977, 'B6 while autogestion was
condemned as a confusion of the sovereign and economic functions by Leroy 
in 1980, 1 s’5' and Blot had later grappled again with the definition of 
"democracy", remaining reluctant to make any concessions to the idea of
popular initiative. 1-;a In 1985, however, after examining the Swiss system,
again following Kemp's lead, he allowed that French citizens might use
referenda to veto laws but not to propose them, at least not until after a
trial period.1 At the same time he proposed a simple and effective 
amendment to the French constitution - a practical version of Sorrnan's 
utopian schemes - which would clarify the distribution of competence in 
economic affairs between the state and other actors.1eo By 1989 he had 
become an active advocate of direct democracy, through a new association 
founded by himself, 16,1 a position enjoying less sympathy in the RPR than 
in the populist Front Natlonal, which Blot joined in June of that year. 1 ,=';r-
Asked to recall the achievement of which he was proudest during his
time with the RPR, Blot named the joint platform of government signed in
January 1986, which was " totalement conservative". 1 S31 In support of this 
he cited his analysis of the platform in terms of 100 points, which 
revealed that there were 86 on which there was identity of views between 
the RPR, DDF and FN, and only 14 on which the FN differed from the RPR- 
UDF. Ie*
While believing that the party had adopted most of his own views by
1986, Blot does not overstate his own contribution to that outcome;
It is true that, during the period when the RPR found 
itself in opposition, public opinion moved very very 
sharply towards the right. Chirac wanted to take 
account of that, and then there were very very strong 
pressures also coming from business circles, which 
meant that the RPR programme did become quite liberal, 
in fact. That is certainly true.1
Likewise, he downplays the American example;
The influence of the Reagan experience must have 
played a role, certainly. But there was also the 
shock, the shock of the Socialists' corning to power.
For the first time for a very long time the Socialists 
were in power, and what's more, allied to the 
Communists. 1656
Furthermore, the actions of different ministers when once the party 
was in power, showed that important figures remained hostile to the Club's 
"national liberalism". According to Blot, some applied the programme - 
Balladur on privatization, Pasqua on immigration; but others backed down 
on the campaign promises - Devaquet on the universities, but also S£guin, 
at social affairs and employmernt, who was "in total disagreement with the 
programme" which he "absolutely did not apply", even defending his civil 
servants against cuts.1,37
Despite all this, Blot probably underestimated his role and that of 
the Club, in the transformation of the party's economic policy. It is true 
that the Socialist victory induced the Gaullists to redefine for
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themselves rather abruptly the dividing lines between intervention and 
collectivism, between solidarity and egalitarianism, and that Chirac 
listened carefully to his businessmen friends, although, (as we saw in 
chapter 6) Blot exaggerates the degree to which public opinion endorsed 
the liberal programme. But the businessmen’s demands, hostility to the 
Socialists and an appropriate response to the American events popularized 
by Sorrnan and others, all had to be articulated, conciliated as far as 
possible, and moulded into a form which could be readily absorbed by the 
membership and plausibly presented to the electorate. This was the service 
which the Club de 1'Horloge, despite its quirkily mystical and fascistic 
pedigree, performed for a section of the RPR, and which Blot himself 
performed with his memos to Chirac and his lectures to the party workers. 
As Blot himself has reminded us, ideas are not spread on their own, they 
are spread by organized groups of people.
Of course the Club de 1'Horloge was far from dominant within the 
party. Edouard Balladur had nothing to do with it, nor did the left or the 
Gallo-Giscardians, and some of these groupings had bulletins and 
newsletters of their own. But there were none - apart from the Club '89, 
formed only at the end of 1981 - which compared in financial backing or in 
prestige with the output of the Club de l'Horloge. Furthermore, the 
minority of party members who were members or sympathizers of the Club 
included loyal and influential Chiraquians such as Toubon, Godfrain and 
Aurillac, whose contributions to Contrepoint and participation in the 
Club's seminars helped provide a frame of reference for the inchoate 
instincts of the Chiraquian rank and file. Godfrain demonstrated this role 
perfectly when he wrote;
The state is a vital institution. Nevertheless, it
should fulfil its own functions of sovereignty and law
and order. It is not its job to play at being a 
businessman on behalf of the people.16®
Only two years previously, as we showed in chapter 5, Godfrain was 
calling for state regulation of the price of pork. The abruptness of his 
conversion clearly owed much to the Socialists' victory; the form in which 
it was expressed owed everything to Blot, and to the adaptability of 
Dumezil's theory of the three social functions.
The Club *89
The Club '89 was founded by leading Chiraquiaris as a "think tank" for 
the RPR, which was effectively in control, though membership of the Club 
was open to non-party members. The Club's President, Michel Aurillac, 
believes that, although not carried through by the government, most of the 
1986 joint platform was identical to the Club's own ideas. However, a 
reading of the Club's programme, published in 1985, shows it to be both 
internally inconsistent and rather eclectic - influenced by the 
conservatism of the Club de 1'Horloge, the liberalism of the new 
economists, and the "techno-liberalism" of Alain Jupp6, the Club's 
secretary-general. Accordingly, the Club's activities and findings should 
be seen as the reflection rather than as the motor of the RPR's 
programmatic development in the early 1980s.
The Club '89 was set up in the autumn of 1981 at the initiative of 
Alain Juppe, Michel Aurillac, and Nicole Catala, all loyal supporters of 
Jacques Chirac, and all at one time or another having worked at the rue de 
Lille or at the Paris town hall. All four believed, like Yvan Blot, that 
the independence and quality of their research would be enhanced if freed
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from unconditional party loyalty. A second organization, occupying 
essentially the same space as and pursuing the same activities as the Club 
de l'Horloge, was justified by the founders on the ground that the latter 
was too "ultra-liberal", and "had links with certain ideas we don't 
approve of. "ies*
Unlike the Club de 1'Horloge, however, whose restricted membership 
was devoted to the propagation of an ideology, the Club '89 claimed 100 
local organizations by 1903, covering nearly 3,000 members (half outside 
Paris) and no less than 48 study groups, 170 and its aims were both to 
develop practical policies which could be put before the electorate by 
Chirac, and to help bring new activists into politics.171 Chirac made 
sure that the Club was able to pay the rent for its own headquarters and 
meeting rooms, and to produce 9 books of 150 pages or so, for which he on 
occasion himself signed the prefaces, before the Club's own programme was 
published in 1985. 1 7:S He also deliberately identified himself with the 
Club by making speeches at its annual conventions, and joint meetings with 
other clubs. In return, the Club provided him with one or two handy but 
not very original slogans, such as the juxtaposition of the £tab g£rant 
(managerial state) with the &tat garant (the state which protects or 
guarantees)173 and provided a forum in which RPR members could debate with 
each other.174 Inevitably, however, the output of this amorphous 
organization was moie diverse and less intellectually rigorous than that 
of the Club controlled by Blot, Leroy and Le Gallou.
Each chapter of the Club's programme is a synthesis by an individual 
author of the discussions of a particular working party. On the central 
question of the role of the state in economic policy, the tone is set by 
Juppe, whose half-liberal-half-technocratic work, which we discussed
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above, was published under the Club imprint. 17,5 Edouard Balladur, on the 
other hand, the architect of the economic policy of the 1986-88 
government, "never set foot" in the Club's rooms. 176
Juppe's technocratic temptation can be seen in the Club's 
preoccupation - absent from the new economists or the Club de 1'Horloge - 
wilh "international competition", which justifies breaking up the civil 
service, sacking immigrants, and cutting company taxation.177 Alongside 
this, however, and showing the influence of the new economists, there is a 
clear statement of faith in the automatic self-regulation of the 
capitalist system, defended on grounds of efficiency morality and 
democracy;
The market and free competition necessitate the 
continuous adaptation of ideas and methods. By these 
means, developed societies have found a way of 
subjecting individual activity to the countervailing 
power of others, and thus to the common good. 173
This in turn is rapidly contradicted by the observation that
" 1ib£rali&rne integral” is not possible in the field of passenger
transport, which is "structurellement d&flcitaire,', 17S> and by the defence
of state hand-outs to "development programmes which are of strategic
irnpoi tance for the country". 'eo Faced with the task of summarizing this
message for the introductory chapter to the Club's programme, the
rapporteur general plumped for a forthright attack on the very principle
of 1 aissez-f air e\
At any rate, freedom does not mean 1aissez-f aire. When 
the convergence of individual and collective interests 
is not organized, there is no dynamic of positive 
exchanges, but simply relations of domination.131
This eclecticism is reflected in other policy areas. There is a 
strong defence of the socializing role of the family, reminiscent of the
Club de 1' Horl oge;
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Indeed, the family represents the seat of memory and 
the transmission of a heritage; accordingly, it is 
indispensable for the training and education of young
people  It is within the bosom of the family that
a nation's culture is protected and passed on.... ' 153 2:
but this impression is cancelled by the passage in the introduction which
refers, in the manner of Lepage or Sorman, to;
archaic relationships in which forms of domination 
Inherited from the past leave no room for new 
aspirations to autonomy and personal 
responsibility. 1,533
The theme of autonomy and responsibility in Libres et Responsables, 
the 1984 party programme, which we focussed on at the beginning of chapter 
5, is aired further in the passage on participation in the workplace, 
which proposes a subdued version of Sorman's workplace charter, 1 e/l and in 
the chapter on local government, where the Club strongly favours local 
referenda, freedom of information, and an active role for community 
associations, "3S following, in this respect the trail of direct democracy 
blazed by Giraud and subsequently followed by Carignon and the new 
economists.
This liberal posture was in sharp contrast, however, with the Club's 
positions on immigrants and immigration. With no more preamble than a 
reference to "the realities which worry French people", 1,533 immigrants are 
blamed for low wages and for discouraging employers from making needed 
investments. The notion of multicultural society is attacked in terms 
borrowed from the Club de 1' Horloge, 1(37 but international competition is 
invoked, in technocratic fashion, to justify employers sacking "immigrants 
who are surplus to requirements"13'53 The Club demands quotas in public 
housing, the deportation of immigrant unemployed, restriction of family 
allowances to natives only, abolition of the 10-year residence permit
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recently introduced by the Socialists, refusal of naturalization through 
marriage, and a ban on the right of foreigners to form associations or 
take part in politcal activity in France.
In contrast with this one-dimensional catalogue of reaction, the 
Club's programme for education can be read as an attempt to conciliate 
conservatives and liberals without sacrificing the votes of the well- 
organized teachers. The state's involvement in the transmission of 
national culture which the conservatives were very reluctant to see 
reduced,13,0 is dismissed as a "wrong direction" by the Club in a way which 
seems to damn not just the Socialists, but 100 years of Republican 
practice.,ai This is followed, logically by a call for diversification in 
types of schooling on offer, among which parents should be free to 
choose,1®s At the same time the Club took some trouble to defend teachers' 
working conditions, denounced by the rest of the party as priviliges 
extorted by the unionized and self-interested bureaucracy,1 but ended, 
after all, with the typical conservative demands for "history with dates" 
and quality control through frequent examinations, of which the content 
"of course" should be determined by the state. 1
The success of the Club '89, founded and led by loyal Chiraquians, 
indicated that it responded to a widespread interest in discussion and 
programmatic development among the RPR's members and symnpathizers. Yet 
the very diversity of the participants, and the eclecticism of their 
inspiration, led to a programme which combined technocratic, laissez- 
faire, and conservative ideologies, and occasionally reflected corporatist 
interests. This, together with the Liming of its foundation - after Chirac 
had fought the 1981 election on a liberal platform - disqualifies the Club
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from consideration as a serious force in the party's conversion to 
liberalism.
Left Gaullism; the end of an illusion
The party* the [${?• hs4 fcssn an hsh tersffi. w4-th
most of the so-called left ever since the retirement of de Gaulle and 
Pompidou's election as President in 1969,,3e and a further split occurred 
in 1976 when Jean Charbonnel formed the Federation des Republicains de 
Progr&s in protest at "the lack of a truly democratic structure" in the 
UDR. 1
In launching the RPR at the end of that year, however, Chirac secured 
the co-operation of Philippe Dechartre, who, unlike his leftist comrades, 
had remained in government after Pompidou's takeover of the UDR. As under­
secretary for employment in Chaban Delinas' "New Society" cabinet, he 
shared the credit for reforming industrial relations in the public sector, 
upgrading the minimum wage and extending worker share-ownership. 1 A 
veteran of resistance Gaullism and co-founder with Capitant and Vallon of 
the UDT in 1958, he had been personally charged by de Gaulle both in 1959 
and in 1967 with the task of holding together the leftist splinters in a 
series of umbrella organizations.13®
Dechartre's task in the RPR was to rebuild the Action Ouvridre et 
Professionnelle CAOP), a network of supporters organized in the 
workplaces, with the aim of winning back the two million workers who had 
voted for de Gaulle in 1958. With the 1978 elections in view, the AGP 
sections organized propaganda meetings, mirroring the work of the 
Communist and Socialist sec L ions d'entreprise, in defence of the 
Gaullists' general record on issues like the nuclear deterrent, votes for
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women, the social security system, and the progress so far made on
par ticipati on.
Of all those who had ever held ministerial office, Dechartre probably 
had the most radical conception of this idea, first mooted by the RPF in 
1950, ' pulled out of the hat by de Gaulle after May ' 68, 2°°, and revered 
by the Gaullist left as a test of loyalty and identity. Since leaving the 
government, he had devoted his free time to making speeches in its 
defence, on behalf of the Mouvement. pour le Socialisme par la 
Farticipation, of which he had been general-secretary since its foundation 
in 1971.
In de Gaulle's definition of participation the workers should have a
share of profits, capital and "responsibilities" in the firm, but the
general ruled out collective decision-making, 201 as did Pompidou20-2 and
Debi t;, 203 Dechartre insisted, however, that;
it would be an abuse of vocabulary to speak of 
participation if we did not mean by that that it 
should finish up as co-management204
Chirac himself was happy to endorse the idea that participation meant
sharing responsibilities, though Dechartre did not manage to persuade the
RPR leader to commit himself to co-management.20*
Dechartre regarded the Action Ouvridre et Professionnelle as a 
genuine workers organization guaranteeing the party's populist 
orientation. The burst of enthusiasm stimulated by the launch of the RPR 
enabled him rapidly to build up 250 AGP groups in 80 departments, ten 
times the number of factory sections inherited from the UDR.20* In 
parallel RPR Entreprises was founded in order to conduct propaganda with 
big business, aimed at overcoming their considerable resistance to the 
whole idea of participation. 207
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The early progress reflected Chirac’s personal support for the 
operation and the party's success In convincing a few thousand workers 
that they were actually going to fight against Giscard and his 
governments' unpopular policies. But the target audience was increasingly 
resistant to the AOP message, especially after the 1978 elections when the 
Gaullist deputies continued dutifully to vote for the policies which the 
shop-floor propagandists were attacking. 3:0®
With the 1978 elections out of the way, workers' votes were no longer 
the leadership's main preoccupation, and the AOP's stock in the party 
fell. Dechartre claims that the employers demanded his removal because too 
many workers were talking about participation, and that he was replaced by 
"people whose mission it was to sabotage what we had done, to go into 
reverse." At the beginning of 1980, "so as not to cause problems for 
Chirac" he abandoned his connection with the AOP and accepted the title of 
"adviser to the President of the RPR". :ZO'B
Whatever the AOP's real ability to worry the employers, it is likely 
that Dechartre was kicked upstairs partly because his style of work did 
not suit the new party general secretary Bernard Pons, who took over in 
the autumn of 1979,210 and partly because Chirac was preparing a 
rapprochement with another left Gaullist returning to the fold.
Jean Charbonnel's flirt with the opposition, during which he tried to 
negotiate an alliance with the Socialists for his F&d£ration des 
Republicains de Progr&s came to an end when he almost lost his town hall 
at Brive in 1977, and came bottom of the poll in the Parliamentary 
elections of 1978. In March 1979 he seized on the chance to keep a 
Communist out of the presidency of the Corr&ze conseil general by voting 
RPR, and in September Chirac charged him with the "mission" of persuading
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all the other particles of the left Gaullist diaspora to return to some 
form of association with the Rasserablement. 21 1
In this Charbonnel predictably failed, despite his own later claim to 
the contrary, 212 for he had lost credit with the "exiles" by continuing to 
work with Pompidou after 1969. 213 Neverthless, he was duly installed in 
Dechartre's old job, D&legue a 1'Action Ouvri^re et Professionnelle at the 
rue de Lille in January 1980.214
His spell at head office, which lasted little more than a year, did 
nothing to revive the fortunes of the AOP and left no strong impression on 
his colleagues,21  ^ but it did help provide Chirac with something of a left 
face during 1980, the year in which he was trying to develop a strategy 
for the forthcoming presidential election. He and Pons gave a number of 
signs that they were sympathetic to Charbonnel's wish that the RPR should 
distance itself from Giscard and seek to construct a "new majority".21*' At 
the end of February Pons made a speech claiming that the "popular and 
national" Gaullist movement was close to non-Marxist socialism, 21 while 
Chirac and Charbonnel appeared together at a diner-d&bat in Charbonnel's 
political base at Brive21® and in April Charbonnel spoke for the party on 
participation at Toulouse.21® In the autumn Chirac claimed that a 
Socialist admission of the definitive failure of their on-off unity with 
the Communists would create "a totally different context"; 220 soon 
afterwards Porrs promised that the RPR would "attract votes from the left" 
at the next elections221, while Chirac himself enumerated in public the 
points on which RPR and PS agreed and disagreed.222 This hidden threat 
that the RFR would consider negotiating a "new majority" with the 
Socialist Par ty excited a degree of interest among socialist academics, 222 
but was soon revealed as a not very successful tactic intended to garner a
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few votes and blackmail Giscard, when Chirac dismissed the whole idea as 
"ridiculous".
Charbonnel decided in September 1980 to give up his position at head 
office, apparently not because of this abandonment of the putative anti- 
Giscard front, but because of the leadership's decision to withdraw the 
party's Bill on participation which had already begun its passage through 
Parliament.2255 He was replaced as D£l£gu£ for the AOP the following March 
by Jean-Pierre Delalande, a young deputy who had specialized in debates on 
the subject of participation since entering Parliament in 1978.
Charbonnel did not return to his F£d£ration das R4publicains de 
Progr&s because they were Mitterrandiste, but remained within the RPR. 226 
In 1983 he published a long essay combining measured criticism of the 
Socialists' record with muted disavowal of the liberal revival, which 
avoided treating in concrete fashion any of the topical issues, such as 
privatization, tax-cuts, or the social security deficits, or even 
par t icipat ion, on which many of his younger colleagues were 
contemporaneously rushing into print.5227 On his own admission his 
opposition to the RPR's accelerating infatuation with liberalism was 
limited, to avoid embarrassing his party publicly, to occasional speeches 
at the Central Committee and other bodies of which he continued to be a 
member,22® and to his conversations with Chirac at the fortnightly 
meetings of the Corr&ze conseil-g£n4ral. Even when Balladur privatized the 
Soci4ttf General e, one of the banks nationalized by de Gaulle in 1945, 
which Charbonnel was "absolutely" against, he again did nothing because 
the Right had a majority of only one or two votes in the Assembly.22®
Separated by his youth from the old left-Gaullist tradition rooted in 
the resistance, Jean-Pierre Delalande was nevertheless one of a small
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collection of individuals in the parliamentary party who shared a fully- 
worked out social-catholic philosophy. His notion that the state ought to 
control the operation of the market economy on occasion - to ensure social 
solidarity, to guarantee competition, maintain strategic industries, and 
perhaps even to nationalize, - set him at odds with what he saw as the 
"liberal right", while his democratic ideas on party organization did not 
endear him to the generation of technocrats who had taken positions of 
power in the Gaullist movement during the Pompidou era.230
Although he remained with the AOP for an even shorter time than 
Charbonnel had,231 Delalande's parliamentary interventions on 
participation showed a degree of expertise which indicated that he was no 
less influential within the party on the subject. 333 What is significant 
from the point of view of the RPR's programmatic development is that 
neither had a conception of participation which would require them or 
their supporters to make a serious stand against the expanding influence 
of the liberals. Charbonnel was on record as believing that de Gaulle had 
not intended
to challenge management's right to manage, which he 
absolutely wanted to keep intact.333
and Delalande explicitly refuted Dechartre by arguing
Participation is not co-management. In contrast to the 
latter, it does not challenge the authority of the 
head of the firm. . . . 33/1
On the other hand even Dechartre agreed with them that participation
posed no threat to the operation of the market. He had written in 1975;
The present-day form of co-responsibility is co- 
management. Tomorrow it will be self-management, a 
system which, remember, is perfectly compatible with a 
market economy and represents the most highly 
developed form of par ticipative society. 335
while Delalande told Parliament in 1980,
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Participation does not conflict with the market 
economy. It reinforces it.... It will improve firms’ 
competitivity, since everyone will have a motive to 
contribute to it; so the firm will become really a 
team of people in competition with other teams. 23<s
This approach was echoed by one of another group of young RPR 
deputies who entered Parliament for the first time either in 1978 or 1981. 
As parliamentary spokesman on employment policy in the late 1970s, when he 
advocated distinctly interventionist measures to offset the impact of the 
slump on the working class-3'7, and later as a dissident over RPR policy 
towards the Front National:23S,J Philippe Seguin for a while appeared set to 
take on the role of leader of a youthful "social" wing in the party.
Almost alone among RPR notables who produced books in the early 1980s, he 
ir onically dismissed the fashionable obsession with "liberalomania”, 233 
warned that the bulk of the population was strongly attached to the
existing social security system, 3/10 and counselled the Right to avoid a
"spirit of revenge" over the Socialists, which could only perpetuate a 
damaging polarization in French society. But his book was chiefly an essay 
on constitutional questions, ground on which he was later to conclude an 
unexpected alliance with the arch right-winger, Charles Pasqua.a*ri In the 
early 1980s, furthermore, his energy, with that of colleagues like Michel 
Barnier and Francois Flllon, instead of being directed at a battle of 
ideas within the RPR, was diverted towards building an informal cross­
party group with like-thinking younger deputies of the UDF, which they 
called the CERCLE, 3,12 This did nothing to endear them to the Chiraquian 
leadership, and was effectively another factor in the Left's failure to 
fight the national liberal ideas propagated by the Clubmen.
Delalande conceived his work with the AOP as supporting rather than
challenging the party's elaboration of a new programme. Some of his work
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on industrial relations, including studies of incentive techniques in use
in the USA and of privatization in the UK, was done in co-operation with
Octave G e l i n i e r , w h o s e  work on Japan had helped popularize the notion
of quality circles among French employers, and whose conclusions closely
ressernbled those of the new economists Lepage and Sorman. When asked if
tire democratic and humanistic aims of participation were not jeopardized
by the possibility that one firm or industry might at any one time be more
profitable than another, subjecting workers' living standards to arbitrary
variations, Charbonnel agreed that this was indeed a "problem" which
needed working on. 2/1/1 Delalande, in contrast, immediately came back with a
classic "market" defence;
Yes, I mean, that's life, that's life. It's the same 
everywhere. It's up to you, if you think you are in an 
industry which is working badly, to try to get 
yourself together to go and work in an industry which
is doing better, or to work like mad to make the one
which is working badly work better, to adapt it...:2yis
This atitude was far removed from that of Dechartre and the old left-
Gaullists. For Dechartre, the AOP organized the Gaullist working-class
electorate, and guaranteed the RPR's populist strategy; his successor's
activity, on his own admission, was "more cultural titan political",
involving the elaboration and popularization of an "enterprise culture"
among both employers and workers. When Delalande left to become
Chirac's foreign affairs adviser, in October 1981, the burying of the
AOP's working-class tradition was confirmed by its handing over to Georges
Repezcky, whose working life had been spent as a manager in the steel
industry, and Gerard Leban, who specialized in organising for the party
amongst insurers, bankers, doctors and other professionals. 3/1:7
This was an evolution which Dechartre ultimately could not stomach.
By 1988 he had concluded that
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\The AOP, whatever anyone may tell you, has no longer 
anything to do with the working class. It's the world 
of the bosses, either capitalists, or simply 
technocrats. . . . 2<le
His political activity was reduced to inviting and being invited to a
series of genteel seminars held in the sumptuous surroundings of the
faubourg St. Germain where increasingly unreal speeches on familiar themes
were made by the same dwindling band of left Gaullists like Charbonnel and
Yves Gu£na. Finally, the character of the personalities invited to
Chirac's 1988 Presidential campaign meetings convinced Dechartre that he
had reached the end of an illusion;
You'll never find a worker, you'll never find the son 
of an immigrant, or an artist or an intellectual. Just 
small shopkeepers, small bosses, big bosses. . .
and accordingly
Considering that the RPR has no longer anything to do 
with Gaullism, with the popular base of Gaullism, that 
its become a party of the Right like any other,-'2'4®
he sent his resignation to the new general secretary of the RPR, Alain
J uppe. 3(50
Conclusions
We are now in a position to piece together the different intellectual 
processes and influences by which a layer of RPR first- and second-rank 
leaders were brought progressively to abandon traditional Gaullist 
reverence for the state and the instinct for economic interventionism. 
First, there was a general kind of osmosis, typified by the career of 
Maurice-Bokanowksi, in which fundamentally pragmatic politicians 
imperceptibly changed their language, while believing that they remained 
true to their ideas.
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Second, the Club de 1* Horloge was originally founded as the vehicle 
which a group of young civil servants hoped to use to spread their 
nationalist, hierarchical and anti-collectivist ideas within the political 
and economic elite. Its early publications reproduced important parts of 
the ideology of the pagan and semi-fascist GRECE, but the Club's positions 
and those of GRECE diverged under the impact of the consevative-liberal 
revival in the USA, and the election of the Socialists in France. From 
1980 onwards, the Club amended a number of its former positions, in 
particular its hostility to American society and America's world role, and 
joined the new economists in advocating some of the measures already on 
trial in the United States - supply side economic policy, minimum means' 
tested social benefits, constitutional reform to delineate precisely the 
state's competence in economic affairs and some element of direct 
democracy.
The Club was never a dominant force in the party, but it was the most 
efficient vehicle for a coherent set of ideas, and enjoyed the patronage 
of a number of important Chiraquians, who helped to give credibility to 
the Club's brand of national liberalism. This, and the personal position 
of Yvan Blot in the party head office, helped the Club to play a crucial 
role in channelling and articulating the forces which led the RPR to 
transform its economic policy. Other groups, such as the Gallo-Giscardians 
or the younger generation around figures such as S£guin and Fillon, for 
whom the general outlook of the Club de 1'Horloge was uncongenial, did not 
try to "capture" the RPR for a particular set of ideas because they were 
more interested in building bridges to fellow-thinkers in the UDF.
Finally, most of the "historic" generation of left Gaullists had 
already broken with the "official" party when the RPR was founded in 1976.
The efforts of one of the last of those remaining, Philippe Dechartre, to 
build up a working-class electorate through the Action Ouvri&re et 
Professionnelle (AOF), were neutralized by the patty's continued support 
for the Giscard-Barre governments up until 1981. In 1980 the AOP was 
handed over to Jean Charbonnel, a former Gaullist minister who had been 
outside the party since 1976, as the price of his role as conciliator 
between Chirac and other leftist dissidents. Unsuccessful in this effort, 
Charbonnel soon abandonded party responsibilities, and remained in the RPR 
as a "tame" leftist, increasingly at odds with the liberal revival, but 
doing virtually nothing inside or outside the party to impede it.
Under Jean-Pierre Delalande, Charbonnel's successor as AOP organizer, 
the former network for working-class voters, which had traditionally 
advocated a doctrine supposedly equally hostile to liberalism and 
collectivism, was converted into a forum for elaborating and 
propagandizing an "enterprise culture" which was perfectly compatible with 
the American liberal approaches to worklace relations popularized in 
Fiance by new economists like Henri Lepage and Guy Sorman. With the 
capture of their organization and the perversion of their doctrine, the 
Left in the RPR was powerless to resist the liberal flood-tide.
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procedure de denationalisation sera lente,,,,"
92, Emphasis in the original, Jupp£, op cit, p 74, ",,,,, la premiere priority est 
d'annoncer la denationalisation immediate du plus grand nombre des entreprises publiqes 
concur rentiel les, an cas de succcis de 1'opposition, 11 ne faut pas per dr e de temps car 
ce qui ne sera pas fait dans la fouiee de la victoire se perdra en arguties et combats 
re tarda teurs,"
93, Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89; "Non, je ne connaissais pas M, Devaquet, mais il
m'avait ete,,,, enfin, je lui avait ete reccommende par plusieurs personnages de
I'entourage de M, Chirac, et c'est comme fa qu'il m'a demande si je voulais etre son 
directeur de cabinet, Et alors nous nous some rencontres, le contact s'est bien passe, 
et il m'a embauche,”
The recommendations came from two people among Chirac's advisers whom Blot knew 
particularly well - Pierre Juillet and Marie-France Garaud, In fact, through Juillet, 
Blot probably knew more about the conflicting factions among Chirac's advisers than 
Devaquet did, He particularly admired Juillet and shared what he regarded as his 
"liberal" ideas, siding with him, and certain businessmen who had been part of 
Pompidou's circle, against technocrats like Monod and Jupp£, Blot regretted Juillet's 
later depature from Chirac's inner circle, which allowed the technocrats to get the 
upper hand, Nevertheless Juillet must have felt he had scored something of a posthumous 
victory in placing his proteg£,
9 4 ,  Interview with Yvan Blot, 23-4-89, During this interview Blot recalled with pleasure - 
but without suggesting that there was a direct link - that, a few months after sending 
Chirac some extracts from Hayek, with passages underlined by himself, he was invited to 
the ceremony at the town hall at which Hayek in person was awarded the gold medal of the 
city of Paris,
95, Interview with Yvan Blot 23-4-89; Interview with Jean-Fran$ois Mancel, 20-4-89; see also 
Philippe Boggio and Alain Rollat, Ce Terrible Monsieur Pasqua, Paris, Olivier Orban,
1988, pp 202-3
96, Interview with Yvan Blot 28-4-89
97, ibidem
98, Patrick Jarreau in Le Monde, 21-10-82, The Club did not contest these figures in a reply 
to Le Monde (on 7-11-82) but said the subscription could be varied for students, Serge 
Baumann, in "Le Renouveau des Clubs?", Revue Politique et Parlementaire, no 898 May-Jurte 
1982, pp 63-79, mentions 150 francs per quarter for ordinary members, and 250 francs p, 
month for members of the conseil d'administration,
99, Jarreau and Baumann agree on this figure, though Jarreau notes that the Clubmen claim 
1,500, (Jarreau, loc cit)
! 00. Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89; j ' a i  vu 4 quel po in t le  Flan ne se rva it 4 rien, 
11 ne fonetionnait absolument pas, c '4 ta i t  une catastrophe, Je n 'a i jamais vu 
d'adm inistration aussi mal organises, aussi in u tile , mais rSellement, "
101, The Club has always welcomed members of all tendencies, from the Front National through 
the Centre National des Independents to the RPR and the UOF, By tradition, the 
President of the Club de l'Horloge has usually been RPR (at one time Blot, and later 
Henri de Lesquen), and the general-secretary a member of the UDF, (at first Jean-Yves 
le uallou who, when he joined the FN, was succeeded by Michel Leroy, (Interview with 
Yvon Blot, 28-4-89)
102, Jean-Yves le Gallou et le Club de l'Horloge Les Facines du Futur, domain la  France, 
Paris, Albatros, 1984 pp 76-85; Yvan Blot Les Facines de la  L ibe rty  Paris, Albin 
Michel, 1985 p 130
103, Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89; " Noi, 1 'experience que j ' a i  eu du FPF pendant 10 
ans me convainc q u ' i l  est tr4s d i f f i c i le  de demander 4 des p a rtis  p o liit iq u e s  de fa irs  
de la r4 flex ion  approfondie, Ce ne sent pas des organismes qui sent fa i t  pour gal 
toutes les tentatives de fa ire  vraiment de la r 4flex ion  approfondie dans un p a r t i
p o litiqu e  ne donnent rien, Je suis i r is  sceptique, Je pense que pour les organismes,,,
pour ce q u ' i l  est de la r4 flex ion  i l  vaut mieux fa ire  ga dans des organismes totalament 
independents comma des clubs, des fond a tions, "
104, Yvan Blot, op c it,  p 41; " On do it toujours 4 tudier les associations concrdtes qui se
f ix ire n t  comma but la d iffu s ion  des id4es,, , , , ,  Les id4es ne parlen t pas d'elles-mimes, 
e l les sont d iffus ies , e l les n'agissent que dans la  mesure ot) 1'on a g it pour e l les, ot) 
des homes viennent 4 leur aide, e t notamment dans les m ilieux influents, "
105, See the article by Thierry Pfister in Le Monde 22-6-79, and Ouranton-Crabol op c i t  p
47, Pascal Sigoda, in "Les Cere les Ext&rieurs du RPR", Pouvoirs, no 28 1983 pp U S -
163, makes a similar (not very well substantiated) amalgam between GRECE, the Club de
l'Horloge, and, even more tendentiously, Club 'SB
106, Le Monde 27-3-81
107, Duranton-Crabol, op c i t  p 164-5
108, Le Honde 7-11-82
109, One critic found evidence of GRECE's willingness to camouflage their true opinions in 
appropriate circumstances; "Once armed, each o f us can choose the route which seems the 
most l ik e ly  to gain fo r him a small amount o f power in  the community o f men, But in  
doing so, he is  not obliged, and in  certa in  cases, he would be ill-adv ised , to reveal 
wholly or in  pa rt the ideas o f SFECE, He w i l l  apply himself to in f i l t r a t in g  our 
concepts, our rules and our vision as he judges appropriate, That is  as i t  should be 
for a philosophical society , " (Jacques Bruyas, in ElSments mai 1969 p 15; cited in 
Duranton-Crabol, op c it, p 140; " Une fo is  arm4, chacun d 'entre nous peut s 'o rie n te r  
dans la  d irec tion  lu i  paraissant le  plus propre 4 lu i  fou rn ir une parcelle  de pouvoir 
dans not re communaut4 d'hommes, Nais, fa isant ce l a, i l  n 'es t pas tenu, e t dans certains  
cas i l  ne lu i  est pas conseill4  de d4voiler en tout ou en par t ie  les id4es du SFECE, 
C'est en fonetion de 1 'opportunit4 q u ' i l  s'attaquera 4 in f i l t r e r  nos concepts, nos 
r4gles, not re vision, C'est cela le  propre d'une soci4t4 de pens4e,")
110, Baumann loc c i t  p 69
- m -
11, Jsin-Yvei le Gallou et le Club de l'Horloge Les Racines du Futur, detain la  France1, a
second edition with no changes was produced in 1984 (Paris, Albatros), and it is to 
this edition that page references are made in the following discussion
12, Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89
13, Le Gallou op c it, pp 14, 67, 94-5, 153-6, 255
14, Michel Leroy, "L'Etat et la Fonction Souveraine", in Contrepoint, no 34, Autumn 1980,
pp 108-113; Yvan Blot, "Pour une Red&couverte de la Tradition R6publicairie" Contrepoint 
no 37, April 1981, pp 77-90 (esp pp 88-90; Blot op c i t , Les Racines,,,,,, pp 139-40 and 
p 140
15, Le Gallou, op c it, pp 14, 45, 187-94, 225; Yvan Blot, op c i t , Les Racines de la
L ib e rt*   pp 9-13, 28, 52, 56, 68, 92-99
16, Le Gallou, op c it, p 131
17, Le Gallou, op c it, pp 105-108; Blot, loc c it, "Pour une redicouverte "
18, Le Gallou, op c it, p 33, 52-3
19, Henri de Lesquen et Le Club de l'Horloge , La Politique du Vi van t, Paris, Albatros, 1979
20, Blot op c it ,  Les Racines,, , , , ,  pp 101-124
21, Le Gallou, op c it, p 153
22, ibidem p 163
23, ibidem p 175
24, ibidem p 171
25, ibidem, pp 42, 47-8, 59-60, 68-75
26, Leroy, loc c it, "L'Etat " p 110
27, Le Gallou op c i t  p 158-9
28, ibidem, p 170-4
29, ibidem, pp 156-7 and 160-2
30, Georges Li&bert, "Cinq Arts de Contrepoint" in Contrepoint, no 20 1976 pp 203-209,
31, despite promises to the contrary, cf Blot's editorial in Contrepoint no 33 spring- 
sumrner 1980
32, Contrepoint SB, June 1981; due voulei-vous, nous sommes de vieux eniStds qui avons
donn* dans la  l ib e r t * humaine....e t qui ne saurions, du tout, en revenir, (de
Tocqeville, le t te r  to Gobineau, J9-2-1S54)
Contrepoint no 39, autumn 1981; De toutes les ideologies de masse, le  socialisme est la
plus dangereuse car e lle  lib * re  1'home de toute responsabilit*, (Vladimir Bukovsky)
-
133, Contrepoint no 39 pp 5-6
134, As well as regular articles by the Club's cross-party triumvirate of Blot (RPR), Leroy 
(DDF) and Le Gallou (FN) Blot also secured a large RPR presence (see below) and the 
participation of the Centre National des Independents, heirs to the liberal tradition 
of Antoine Pi nay; Philippe Malaud, "Revolution Lib£rale, Revolution Nationale,
Revolution Conservatrice, Revolution Culturelle" in Contrepoint, 47, pp 49-51; "Le 
Neutralisms contre la Paix", in Contrepoint no 48, pp 153-165; Jean-Antoine Giansily,
"Le Grand Silence", in Contrepoint, no 46 pp 159-164; "R&ponse & Michel Polac", in no 
49 pp 134-139, etc,
135, Yves Lancien, "Les Comptes du Dfeclin", in Contrepoint, no 42-43 pp 27-36; Jean-Pierre 
Cassabel, "Decentralisation et Mis£res des Communes", in Contrepoint, no 46 pp 115-119
136, Jacques Sodfrain, "Dieu est-il Frangais?", in Contrepoint no 44-5 pp 7-12; Jacques 
Toubon, "Le Travail de l'Assembl^e Nationale depuis les Elections Legislatives des 14 
et 21 juin 1981", in Contrepoint no 41 pp 35-40; Bruno Bourg-Broc, "La Fin de la Nuit", 
in Contrepoint no 40 pp 25-28; Bourg-Broc, "Rester Frangais pour Rester Libres" (about 
New Caledonia), in Contrepoint, no 42-3 pp37-46
137, Jacques Godfrain, "Le Vrai Danger des Nationalisations", in Contrepoint, no 39 pp 77- 
81; Daniel Maraud, "Politique Ecoriomique, la Grande Illusion", in Contrepoint, no 40 pp 
65-68,
133, M i c h e l  A u r i l l a c ,  " J ' E c r i s  ton nom, Liber t y " ,  in Contrepoint, no 42-43 pp 11 - 2 0
139, A u r i l l a c  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the s e m i n a r  on Le P Sril Bureaucratique, (Paris, E d i t i o n s  C l u b  
de l ' H o r l o g e  1980), G o d f r a i n  in t h o s e  on Rchecs et In justices du Socialisms (Paris,
A l b i n  M i c hel, 1982) a n d  Le D£fi Ddmographique (Paris, E d i t i o n s  C l u b  de l ' H o r l o g e ,  1980)
140, M i c h e l  Leroy, loc c it,  " L ' E t a t  et la F o n c t i o n  S o u v e r a i n e , ,,," pp 108-113; Yvan Blot, 
" R 6 p u b l i q u e ,  F £ o d a l i t 6 s  et B u r e a u c r a t i e " ,  in Contrepoint no 34, p p  103-107; Blot, loc 
c i t  " P o u r  u n e  R e d i c o u v e r t e  pp 7 9 - 9 0
141, H e n r i  Lepage, " P o u r q u o i  l ' E t a t  c r o i t - i l ? " ,  in Contrepoint, no 34 p p  1 1 4 - 1 1 9  A u W v j a  \CS<P
142, P h i l i p p e  B a c c o u  et J a c q u e s  S z m a r a g a d ,  " S a l a i r e  Minimum, E g a l i t a r i s m e  et P a u v r e t i " ,  in 
Contrepoint no 35 w i n t e r  1980, p p  71-81
143, L e  G a l lou, op c it, p 175
144, " T a b l e  R o n d e  sur le t h S m e  ' L ' E c o n o m i e  et les I n & g a l i t £ s ' "  w i t h  the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of
Y v a n  Blot, J e a n  F o u r a s t i § ,  P h i l i p p e  Baccou, A l f r e d  F a b r e - L u c e ,  S e r g e - C h r i s t o p h e  Kolm,
K o s t a s  P a p a i o a n o u ,  A l a i n  U o l f e l s p e r g e r ,  in Contrepoint no 41 pp 53-83
145, Blot, " P o u r  u n e  S t r a U g i e  R S p u b l i c a i n e " ,  in Contrepoint, n o  41 pp23-33, T h i s  quotation
t a k e n  f r o m  Blot, op c i t, Les Racines,,,,, p 234
146, I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  Y v a n  Blot, 2 8 - 4 - 8 9 ;  on Novack, see Gu y  S o r m a n ,  La Revolution 
Conservatrice AmSricaine, Paris, Fayard, 1983, pp 107 an d  112; on the H e r i t a g e  
F o u n d a t i o n ,  s e e  ibidem, pp 1 2 4 - 5
147, G u y  S o r man, "La R e v o l u t i o n  C o n s e r v a t r i c e  A m & r i c a i n e " ,  in Contrepoint, no 47, pp 53-59,
-378-
143, Le Gallou, op c it, p 249; " caractArisAe par 1 'unidimensionnalitA Athique
(primat des valeurs d'argent, homogSnAisation des modes de vie , , , "
143, "In half a century, because their imperialism was only defensive (protecting, but not
extending the free world) and mercantilist (imposing its products, its modes of 
production and consumption) the United States have gone from expansion to contraction, 
from aggrandizement to withdrawal," (Le Gallou op Ci'tfp69, "En un demi-siecle, parce 
que leur impArialisme n 'A ta it que dA fens i f  (pro tAger, e t non A tend re, le  fnonde l i t r e ) 
et mercantile ( impose r des produits, un mode de production e t de consomme tion), les 
Etats-Unis sont passes de 1' expansion au re tra it ,  du flu x  au reflux, ")
150, George Nash, "Les racines historiques, philosophiques et sociologiques du Conservatisme
aux Etats Unis", in Contrepoint, no 47, pp 15-25, Translated from German to French by 
Vvan Blot; originally published in Forschungsbericht no 16 o f the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, Irving Kristol, "Les racines historiques, philosophiques et sociologiques du 
Conservatisme", in Contrepoint no 47, pp 27-31; Translated from German to French by 
v'van Blot; originally published in Forschungsbericht no 16 o f the Konrad Adenauer 
StiftungJ The two pieces by Jack Kemp were translated by Blot from Kemp's book, An 
American Renaissance*, Jack Kemp, "La Renaissance AmSricaine et le Module Suisse", in 
Contrepoint no 47, pp 61-69; Jack Kemp, "Les Erreurs id6ologiques de la politique 
6trang&re amfericaine avant Reagan", in Contrepoint no 47 pp 71-78,
151, Yvan Blot, loc c it, "Pour une Revolution R6publicaine  " p 10 "L 'Avolutionnisme de
Hayek n 'est pas seulement une croyance dans les b ien fa its  de la  libertA , C'est aussi
unecroyance dans les b ien fa its  de la  tra d ition  qui exprime le  gAnie d'un peuple en 
marc he, Ce n 'est pas un appel A romp re avec le passA pour construire un fu tu r imaginA A 
p r io r i  par quelques uns, comme c 'e s t le  cas dans 1'optique construetiviste, "
152, Jack Kemp, loc c i t , "La Renaissance Am£ricaine et le Module Suisse,,," pp 61-69
153, Like many French conservatives, Blot adopts the "revisionist" reading of the French 
revolution popularized by Francois Furet, ( Fenser la  Revolution Frangaise,, , , , , )  
according to which ancient national rights, not class interests were at stake, so that 
the attempted establishment of constitutional monarchy in the 1790s was good; 
everything that happened from Robespierre on was bad, Yvan Blot, Joe c it, "Pour une
Red§couverte de la Tradition R6publicaine. . . "; Blot, "Le Marxisms et la Revolution
Frangaise", in Contrepoint no 40 winter 1982 pp 8-18; Blot op c it ,  Les Racines,,,, pp 
192
154, Blot, loc c it, "Pour une Revolution R£publicaine,,,," pp 7-11; "Dans certaines 
s ituations de sociAtAs hloquSes, une mutation rapide des in s titu tio n s , c 'e s t A d ire  une 
sorte de revolution, peut A ire  bAnAfique,, , ,  (In  France,, ) , , , ,  une profonde 
transformation de 1 'action de l 'E ta t  est nAcessaire pour libA re r les Anergies
crAa trices de nos concitoyens, "
155, Blot, op c it ,  Les Racines,, , , , pp 48-9
156, Le Gallou, op c i t  p 50
157, Michel Leroy, loc c it, "L'Etat et la Fonction Souveraine "pp 108-113
158, Yvan Blot, "Pour une D£mocratie Authentique", in Contrepoint no 41, pp7-10
153, Blot op c it ,  Les Racines,, , , ,  pp 167-189, and 227-231
- m -
160, ibidem p 157-158
161, Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89
162, Le Monde 2-6-89, This transfer was not in itself the sign of a switch in ideological 
allegiance, Blot's loyalty, like that of Leroy and Le Gallou, went solely to the ideas 
they worked out in common, and which, by 1984, they had christened lib ira lism e  
national, (see the preface to the 1984 edition of Le Gallou, Les Racines du Futur (no 
page numbers) Choice of party was a question of mere strategy, Blot left the RPR 
because Chirac's defeat in the 1988 Presidential election and the Right's loss of their 
narrow Parliamentary majority marked the end of a strategic period - during which the
party had come close to putting his own ideas into practice - and the opening of
another during which the unity fashioned around the conservative-liberal programme 
would be frittered away in short-sighted search of a new direction, Better for an 
ideologue like Blot to expound his ideas among a more congenial group of potential 
sympathizers,
163, Blot likes to adopt English terminology to describe his political credo, He calls 
himself * "conservative" in the manner of Margaret Thatcher - whose portrait adorns the
wall of his office in the Club's premises - that is; liberal on economic policy,
c o n s e r v a t i v e  on s o c i a l  policy,
164, Interview with Yvan Blot 28-4-89; Blot would later give the same account to Le Monde,
on the occasion of his transfer from the RPR to the FN, (Le Monde 2-6-89
165, Interview with Yvan Blot, 28-4-89, "C 'est vrai que, pendant la periods ot) le  RPR s 'e s t
re trouv i dans 1* opposition, 1 'opinion pub li que s 'est d ip lac ie  vers la  d ro ite  de fag on 
t r is  t r is  nette, Mt Chirac a voulu ten ir comp te de ga, et puis i l  y a eu des press ions 
t r is  t r is  fortes aussi du m ilieu iconomique qui a fa i t  que le  programme du RPR en 
iconomie s 'e s t quand mime l ib i r a l i s i , fa, c 'est certain , "
166, ibidemi "L 'influence de 1 'experience Reagan a dd jouer, ga st)rement, Mais i l  y a eu
aussi le  choc, le  choc de 1 'a rr iv ie  au pouvoir des Socialistes, Pour la p re m ire  fo is  
depuis i r is  long temps, les Socialistes ita ie n t au pouvoir, en plus a l l i i s  aux 
Communis ies, "
167, ibidem
168, Godfrain, loc c it, "Le vrai danger des Nationalisations pp 77-81; " L 'E ta t est une 
in s t itu t io n  essential le, Mianmoins, i l  do it assurer les functions de souverainetS e t de 
s ic u r i t i  qui sont les siennes, Mais ce n 'est pas sa vocation de vouloir jouer les
entrepreneurs au non du peuple, "
169, Interview with Michel Aurillac, 3-2-89
170, Pascal Sigoda, "Les Cercles ExtGrieurs du RPR", in Fouvoirs, no 28 1983, pp 143-163,
esp p 146,
171, According to Michel Aurillac, the Club's President, the founders were not sure at the 
outset whether to go for a group of 20-30 people, or to make it larger, As he put it,
"we expected 20, and we got 500," Interview with Michel Aurillac, 9-2-89; for Chirac's
role, see Le Monde 8-10-83 and 11-10-83; on the Club's role in finding new political 
activists, see Juppe's comments at the first AGM, reported in Pascal Sigoda, loc c it, 
esp p 151-2,
- 3#X) —
72, Club '89, Une Strat#gie de 6ouvernmentt ?wi%t Albatros, 1985, For the list of Club 
publications, see opposite the title page of this programme
73, Le Monde 11-10-83; see also Michel Aurillac, "La Convention Lib§rale", in Revue des
Deux Mondes, July 1985, pp 3-8
74, According to Aurillac, indeed, the liveliest debates took place precisely on the 
question of the correct balance between liberal ecorioffiics and soical protection, 
Interview with Michel Aurillac, 9-2-89
75, Alain Juppf?, La Double Rupture, Paris, Economica for the Club 'S9t 1983
76, Interview with Michel Aurillac, 9-2-89
77, Une S tra tig ie  de gouvernement, pp 46, 80, 95; The new economist^concentrte on the
unintended consequences of welfare measures, while the Club de l'Horloge  stresses the 
state's loss of prestige if involved in matters which do not concern it,
78, Alain Teyssonnifcre de Gramont, "LibGrer la creation de richesses, condition de la 
creation d' emplois", in Club '89, op c it ,  Une S tra tig ie  de Souvernment,, , ,  pp 31-106 ( 
93); "Le march# et la l i t r e  concurrence obilgent <3 1 'adaptation permanents des id#es et 
des moyens, Par ces ou tils , les soci#t#s ivo lu ies  out su d isc ip line /' 1 ‘a c tiv it#  
ind iv idua l le  au contre-pouvoir des autres e t done i  l ' u t i l i t #  commune, "
79, ibidem p 103, This s t a t e m e n t  in t u r n  is f o l l o w e d  by a d e m a n d  ( p l 0 5 )  for the 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n  of Air F a n c e  a n d  A i r  Inter,
30, ibidem p 95; "Seules devraient subsister les actions de l 'E ta t  en faveur de
programmes de d#veloppemeni d'importance s tra tig ique  pour le  pays, (recherche-
d# veloppemeni, industries naissantes),, , , ,  "
31, Hervfe L e h £ r i s s e l ,  "Phi 1o s o p h i e  d ' u n  Projet; D e s  C i t o y e n s  L i b r e s  p o u r  u n e  N a t i o n  f i & r e
et  sol i da ire" I n t r o d u c t i o n  to "One S tra t ig ie  de Souvernment, pp 43-48 (p 46), " Pour 
autant, lib e r t#  ne s ig n if ie  pas "la issez-fa ire ", Lorsque la convergence des in t# r# ts
ind iv idua ls e t co lle t t i f s  n 'est pas organ/'s#e, i l  n ' y a pas une dynamique d'ichanges
p o s itifs , mais seulament des procedures de domination,"
32, J e a n - C l a u d e  D u t a i l l y ,  " D e s  S o l i d a r i t y  C l a i r e s  e n t r e  les F r a n j a i s "  in Une 
S tra tig ie ,, , ,, pp 1 2 5 - 1 3 4  Cp 127); "En e ffe t, la famillejreprisente un lie u  de mimoire 
et de transmission d'un p a ir imoine; <3 ce H ire , e lle  est irremp lay able dans la  
formation et 1 '#ducation des Jeunes,, , , ,  C'est en son sein que la cu lture  d'un pays 
trouve sa d iffus ion  et sa pro tec tio n ,,,
133, Leh irisse l loc c i t  p 43-4; "CorrSlativement, au sein mime de la s o c iit# c iv ile ,
1 'immobilisme des structures e t des apparails perpitue des rapports archaiques ot) les 
dominations h # ritie s  du pass# ne font aucune place aux aspirations nouvelles 
d'autonomie e t de responsabi1it#  personalle,"
34, N i c o l e  C alala, " R e l a t i o n s  de Travail e t  P a r t i c i p a t i o n ;  transformer la relation de 
travail", in Une S tra tig ie  de Souvernemeni,,,,, pp 119-124
35, B e r n a r d  M a g n i n y ,  " M e t t r e  l ' E t a t  au s e r v i c e  de la Nation", in Une S tra tig ie  de 
Souvernment,, ,, pp 4 9 - 6 0
■tv
136, Catherine Bonnefoy, "Maitriser 1'Immigration" in Une S irs t ig ie  de Gouvernement,, , ,  pp 
77-89 Cp 78)
137, "there can be no common law if there are no common basic values,,," " i l
ne peut ex is  ter de lo i  commune s i les valours de rd f France sont
hStdrocli tes,,,, "Bonnefoy, loc cit p 82
138, "im igr&s en surnomhre", Bonnefoy loc c it,  p 80,
139, Bonnefoy, loc c it, pp 80-88, Most of these demands were to be found in the programme of
the Front National, and went beyond what Pasqua was prepared to undertake when he 
became Minister of the Interior in 1986; see Peter Fysh, "Government Policy and the 
Challenge of the National Front", in Modern and Contemporary France, no 31, Oct 1987, 
pp 9-20,
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Chapter 9 Interests
In chapter G it was shown that the RPR's programmatic renewal ignored 
what was known of aggregate opinions about economic policy among the 
electorate, and apparently took scant regard even of the opinions of the 
self-ernployed and small-scale employers who were among their strongest 
supporters in 1981. In the last two chapters, after sketching the 
increasing interest in liberal ideas among some Fiench intellectuals, we 
tiaced the RPR's fragmented and at times contradictory reception of these 
ideas through the writings of various party members. Although in some 
cases these efforts were collectively organized through the Club de 
l'Horloge and the more heterogeneous Club '89, the Clubs' members 
definitely saw themselves as disinterested intellectuals rather than 
spokespeople for particular interests. Often, the intellectual productions 
were the solo efforts of individuals not associated with any identifiable 
ideological or interest groups. This chapter is devoted to an alternative 
approach to the linkage between social events and party programme content. 
Steering between the macro level of anonymous opinion research and the 
micro level of individual thinkers, we examine the relationship between 
the programme writers and organized interests.
From their first appearance on the political scene, the Gaullist s' 
linkage with organized interests was the subject of controversy which 
increased in theoretical complexity as they became the dominant party at 
the start of the 1970s. The French Communists reacted to de Gaulle's 
return to power in 1958 by stressing his personal links with the northern 
industrial bourgeoisie and characterizing "Gaullism" as no more than the 
policy of finance capital carried out by a government itself largely made
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up of bankers and their employees. 1
Others on the left, equally hostile but refusing the Communists' 
i eductionisrn, ressurrected and applied to the Gaullists a formula from the 
pen of Karl Marx which has a special relevance for France; Bonapartism.2 
On this reading, the Gaullists came to power as a result of the armed 
conflict between the Algerian FLN and the fascistic elements in the police 
and the army who defended Algeria Fran$aise, With few solid supports among 
the political elites or the civil service, the Gaullists were obliged to 
manoeuvre between opposing social forces - relying mainly on the left to 
disarm the OAS3 and bring the war to a close, and thereafter leaning more 
to the right to counter the economic and social demands of the working 
class. A
As time passed and the new regime achieved a durability which 
coincided with a period of economic success, the imbrication of the new 
party's leaders with the state administration and their shared grip on the 
levers of economic power seemed to vindicate the Gaullists' own claim to 
be even-handed guardians of the general interest. Rather than endorsing 
this vision of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism, however, 
academic commentators have interpreted the Gaullists' achievements and 
their technocratic style as the fulfilment by the dominant party, in 
association with the state, of the role of a putative "collective 
capitalist", laying down economic and political conditions thought to be 
necessary for the smooth functioning of a social system based on private 
proper ty.
According to Cerny, in leading French society towards "advanced 
capitalism", by rationalizing the state's fulfilment of certain essential 
economic functions, far from being the tool of one class or balancing
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nervously between conflicting interests, the Gaullists were securing the
conditions for
the actual creation of a new and modern capitalist 
class where one had not spontaneously evolved befor e.
Birnbaum agrees with Cerny that, with de Gaulle and Pompidou in 
office "the political-administrative power" exerted certain claims to 
independence, but insists that the Gaullist "regime" served the same 
interests as the straightforwardly capitalist Giscardian version which 
followed it. What distinguished them was simply their different division 
of labour within the ruling class. Under the Gaullists, according to 
Birnbaum, this was rather rigid, whereas under Giscard there was a more 
noticeable intermingling, with representatives of the economic elites 
taking posts in the government, and former state officials finding berths 
in industry or banking.e
While Cerny concentrated on the economic functions of the state as 
collective capitalist, others, such as Poulantzas and his followers have 
stressed that the state’s "relative autonomy" from particular class 
Interests allows it to play an important role in fashioning a political 
coalition which conciliates the potentially disparate interests of 
different classes of property owners. In situations where a single party - 
like the Gaullists - both places its members throughout the state machine 
and is electorally dominant, it performs a large part of this brokerage 
role and again contributes to preserving the existing power relations. 7
A weakness of most of this theorizing about the Gaullists' mediation 
of class interests is that it seeks to impose an interpretative pattern on 
events - the fulfilment of exogenously determined "functions" - without 
proving a relationship between active subjects, organized interests on the
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one hand, and the party on the other. Indeed Cerny blandly disdains to
decide whether the Gaullists' creation of "advanced capitalism" was
"historical accident or ingenious design".®
A second major problem with these characterizations of Gaullism is
that they relate to the time when the party was in power. Far more
attention has been paid to interest groups' approach to the party members
as state officials than as potential political champions of their causes.
Hardly any attention has been paid to the possibility that the party
itself has sought out group interests, which it offered to represent in
the political domain. As Cerny puts it;
Once Chirac had resigned, (in 1976) business and 
financial leaders no longer sought out the Gaullists 
for access to government support and bureaucratic 
influence...®
By 1980, acotding to Birnbaum;
To a certain extent abandoned by the modernist grande 
bourgeoise the Gaullist right continues to receive the 
support of a more heterogeneous electorate, stretching 
from workers to small and medium scale proprietors..10
Nothing is said by either of these writers about whether the official
attitude of the party as a party, or of individual party members, towards
class or other organized interests changed as the Gaullists progressively
lost their gr ip on central government power . Cerny sets out to discuss the
RFR's "adjustment problem", once the "transition period" to "advanced
capitalism" was over, comparing it to the post-colonial adjustment
problems of third world parties which had temporarily united all sections
of the population in a successful independence struggle. After this rather
grandiose introduction, however , Ire abandons the focus on interest
Intermediation and plunges into the minor rivalries of day-to-day
poli t ics. 11
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In 1984, a study of the sociology of the RPR membership showed that 
the party had gained new leciuits among the upper class, and among the 
self-employed non-professional middle-class, while the working class base 
was disappearing.'- In 1985, the liberal aspects of the new party 
programme were juxtaposed with the RPR's electoral success amongst 
employers, professionals and managerial staff. 13 But there was still no 
clear causal link established between the group interests of members or 
voters, and elements of the programme. The fact that certain party members 
or supporters have an interest in, say, abolition of government control of 
redundancies may be the reason why this policy was included in the party 
programme, or it may have been written in just because the drafters 
thought it was a good idea. The links between interests and programme - if 
there are any - remain circumstantial until we have evidence that the 
party deliberately transferred to its programme tire key demands of 
identifiable interests.
This chapter aims to examine some of that evidence, without 
pretending to account for the shape of the programme line-by-line. In the 
first section we show that leading party members in the 1980s ruefully 
accepted that a liberal programme was at odds with the interests of shop­
keepers and self-employed craftsmen, whose votes therefore risked being 
transferred to the Front National.
Next, we demonstrate that the party deliberately sought to 
incorporate the interests of the professions into their programme, though 
this was complicated by the fact that professionals’ interests were not 
uniform, being vety close to those of small shopkeepers at one end of the 
scale, and big business at the other end.
In the third part of the chapter we first summarize the way in which
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business Interests in French politics are defended by groups of varying 
! epresentativity, purpose and organizational style which in general do not 
attach a high priority to influencing parties or party leaders. By the 
1980s, despite their heterogeneity, most employers' organizations were 
moving towards a liberal consensus, but the initiative for the exchanges 
which took place between them and the party came from the RFR itself, 
which sought to involve certain non-party figures in the elaboration of
key elements of the new programme.
In the fourth and final part of the chapter we show that the 
technocratic "Interest" remained strong in the RPR. In one important 
policy area - privatization - a group of technocrats succeeded in imposing 
their own style on the execution of party policy. They had themselves been 
closely involved in drawing up liberal policies, however, so they did not 
act entirely as a brake on the new ideas. Rather, they were involved in a
new "liberal" alliance with big business, just as they had formed a more
interventionist coalition in the 1960s. The reasons for this change of 
orientation are discussed in chapter 10.
Shopkeepers and Self-Employed Craftsmen
During the rapid expansion of the French economy after 1945, changes 
in the way in which goods were sold and services delivered stimulated 
defensive organization by shopkeepers and artisans threatened with 
invasion of their markets by competitors operating on a larger scale. In 
the Fourth Republic, this took the form of Poujadism, a movement combining 
parliamentary tactics with powerful and sometimes violent mass protest 
actions by the shopkeepei s themselves. Side-tracked by other political 
Issues, however, particularly the Algerian war, the Poujadists failed to 
develop either a coherent programme or a well-defined constituency. After
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1958, with the consolidation of the new regime and the success of Gaullism 
in penetrating both the white- and blue-collar electorates, the self- 
employed lost their pivotal position in the balance of political and 
social forces which had been part of the reason for their initial 
successes. 1 *
The Gaullist governments of the 1960s, committed to modernization by 
expanding the size of economic units, felt able to ignore the shopkeepers' 
interests; they effectively ended resale price maintenance, operated a tax 
regime which was easier on larger firms than the smaller, and turned a 
blind eye to planning decisions which forced small-scale distributors out 
of business. In the period 19G6-71, 1,307 new supermarkets and 143
hypermarkets were opened, while 20,000 corner shops disappeared. 1B
This massacre provoked tire formation in 1969 of a new organization 
for the defence of shopkeepers' corpoiatist interests, the Centre 
d'Information et de Defense - Union Nationale des Travailleurs 
Independents (CID-UNATI), led by Gerard Nicoud. In 1970 CID-UNATI 
organized a 40,000 strong demonstration in Paris, and in 1972-3 enjoyed 
significant electoral success in the Chambres ue Metiers and the 
organizations which run tire sel f-ernployed's pension funds. With the 
Gaullists' popularity amongst workers seriously damaged by the events of 
May '68, the shop-keepers were able to exploit their renewed strength in 
lire 1973 election campaign. Tire same year they were gratified by the 
passing of the loi Royer. This blunted competition by forbidding the use 
of loss-leaders and making certain changes to the regulations governing 
advertising. Planning decisions on any irew supermarkets over 1,000 sq 
metres (over 750 sq metre in towns smaller than 50,000 people) were handed 
over to departmental commissions d'urbanisme commercial, made up 50% of
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local councillors and 50" of the small shopkeepers' representatives. This
was an astonishing victory, more even than CID-UNATI had demanded. 1 * In
1974, 30% fewer supermarkets were opened than in the previous year, and
1975 saw a tax reform which cut self-employed craftsmen’s tax bills by 53%
and those of shopkeepers with less than 3 employees by 62% 17
By the end of the 1970s, relations between the RPR and the
shopkeepers and artisans seemed to be based on mutual confidence and a
certain self-satisfaction. From October 1979 until October 1981 the
party's charg& de mission du commerce et de 1'artisanat. was the young
deputy Jean-Fran^ois Mancel. With no major piece of legislation
concerning the small traders before Parliament, his role was to meet,
usually in his office at the National Assembly, the leaders of the scores
of federations representing each branch of retailing and services, to
listen to them and keep them informed of his own activities. The most
exciting events of his tenure were the "epic battles" which took place
when Parliament was required to fix annually the maximum percentage
increase in rent which landlords were permitted to charge their commercial
tenants.1Q Although Mancel believed that the federation leaders went to
see deputies of other parties as well, he felt they were particularly
sympathetic to the RPR,
because Chirac symbolized extremely well for them, I 
think, the ideal they believed in, that is freedom, 
but also sensitivity to the problems of the little man 
in relation to the big commercial and industrial 
groups. 1 '3
At the end of the 1970s there was more emphasis on protection than on 
freedom. The party programme, At out France20 linked the health and 
prosperity of small firms with the fight against unemployment, promising 
to re-examine and enlarge the scope of the Agence pour la Creation
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d'Entreprises as well as to amend company law in such a way as to limit 
the risk to the personal capital of those attempting to set up new firms. 
The programme also reiterated Debr6's insistence on the state's duty of 
protecting otherwise "healthy" firms against temporary or external 
difficulties such as tardy payment of bills by large customers, political 
risks arising from dealings with third world governments, and 
"conjunctural" problems within the economy or the industry in which 
individual firms weie active. Alongside capital-market reforms to allow 
small firms greater access to private savings, the party suggested freeing 
them from some of the responsibilities towards their employees enshrined 
in current labour law, and urged that the state subsidize directly "as in 
Germany" the salaries of any workers in small firms who were engaged full­
time on research.21 In addition, a further 13 pages of the 1980 programme 
were devoted to an examination of the regulatory framework and current 
range of government aids available to different branches of commerce and 
service industries, together with detailed suggestions for improvements.2- 
As Mancel put it;
given that the liberalism which we have evolved today 
had not got to its current stage of development, in 
our- political attitude the aspect of protectionism 
towards those categories of the population was in fact 
quite strong, which means that we certainly had a very 
strong presence and roots in all those groups and 
professions.22
This attitude, furthermore, suited most of the party's deputies and 
senators. 2<i
Despite their victories of the 1970s, the high cost of credit, the 
inexorable competition from large-scale distributors, and the increasing 
amount of time that had to be devoted to bureaucratic form-filling, all
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left the independents discontented. Although the loi Royer was still in 
place, it was increasingly circumvented by the practice of building stores 
of 999 sq metres and then asking for a series of extensions. 2e
The shopkeepers' combativeness was paradoxically encouraged by the 
Socialist government. In an attempt to diversify their points of contact 
with the business community, the government hinted at possible talks with 
a self-appointed small business' association, the Syndicat National de la 
Petite et Moyenne Industrie CSNPMI), set up in 1977 by the right-wing 
extremist G6rard Deuil, who was dissatisfied with the representation of 
the smallholders by tire traditional employers' organizations.26 Encouraged 
iather than charmed by the Socialists' advances, the SNPMI drew 15,000 to 
a mass protest demonstration in Paris in September 1982, widely publicized 
as a result of a number of violent incidents. A month later the artisans' 
federations held demonstrations all over the country, and in May 1983 
thousands of shopkeepers and small businessmen joined three Paris 
demonstrations in succeeding weeks, organized by SNPMI, the CGPME, and 
CID-UNATI. **
In general the difficulties which the RPR would have in keeping their 
electoral hold on these petty bourgeois groups during the liberal turn 
after 1981 were compounded by what Mancel called their dual - and 
completely contradictory - discourse. On the one hand, they asked only to 
be left in peace by the government, arguing that the greatest possible 
freedom was the only condition likely to allow the creation of new jobs 
and the start-up of new businesses. On the other hand, whenever their 
specific fields of activity rather than general questions were discussed, 
they instinctively turned towards the state for protection.2®
Mancel's answer to this conundrum was to try to adopt a "didactic"
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strategy, making himself the defender of the shopkeepers' interests while 
at the same time trying to convince them that they would not be able and 
should not try to withstand indefinitely the pressures making for 
"modernization" since liberalism would be beneficial to a large number of 
their businesses, even if some were bound to be eliminated. The 1984 
programme, Libras at Responsables contained next to nothing on the 
shopkeepers' problems, beyond a restatement of their difficulty in 
obtaining suitable f i n a n c e . I n  1985 the party published a programme of
more detailed measures, le Ranouvaau, for which the 1984 essay served as a
general philosophical apology. Here, paradoxically, small firms were 
placed at the heart of the party's economic stratagy, but the conditions 
for their prosperity were not assumed to require measures different from 
those proposed for all businesses. On the one hand big was no longer 
beaut i f ul;
a number of foreign examples indicate, on the 
contrary, that small and medium-sized firms are at the 
root of competitive and dynamic economies. So they are 
an important trump-card which must be brought into 
play. Our whole project of r educing charges and 
simplifying rules has this end in view. 30
On the oilier, apart from some comments on the legal conditions surrounding
the creation and inheritance of small companies, the programme expects
them to profit in the same way as larger ones from decontrol of prices and
profits, a new law on competition, abolition of the taxe professionnelle,
arid proposals on industrial training and workplace organization.31
For the RFR it was uphill work convincing the shopkeepers that they 
still occupied a special place in the party's heart. Even if they had not 
read the party programmes they could not have failed to notice that after 
the 1981 Presidential election Chirac began to attack market regulation 
more and more frequently;
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The more Jacques Chirac developed really liberal 
ideas, the more those people began to realize that, 
after all, that was not what they really wanted. .. 3:2
The party's chances of holding on to a larger part of the petty-
bourgeois electorate were not helped, Mancel beleives, by succeeding
governments' failure to manage the impact of modernization on the
traditional way of life of the shopkeepers and artisans as well as they
had managed the transition in the agricultural sector by compensating
financially the proprietors of uneconomic smal1-holdings who gave up
working them altogether, or merged them with larger concerns. 33 For this
general failure, the RPR was punished electorally by the rise of the Front
Nat i anal, which led ultimately to the rout of 1988;
I would say he (Chirac) had completely changed his 
message in 1988, and that those people were
incontestably drawn towards the National Front....
That was, furthermore, without a doubt one of the 
reasons why we lost the 1988 Presidential election by 
quite a margin, because we lost to the National. Front 
a big part of what we might call the "traditional" 
electorate, shopkeepers, artisans, a few peasants, 
professionals, who had the feeling that the much more 
modernist RPR programme was forgetting them....3"1
Mancel's account of the special regard in which the shopkeepers and 
artisans were at one time held by the party is echoed by other leaders3*, 
and their progressive disillusionment with RFR policy is confirmed by 
analysis of election results.3*' This loss of support cannot be assigned 
directly to the fine print of the economic programmes, since the Front 
National in turn defended a "liberal" economic policy33 and since, as we 
have seen, the shopkeepers' own ideas on their place in society involved a 
contradictory mixture of free enterprise and protectionist attitudes. Much 
was owed, no doubt, to the other facets of Le Pen's programme, and to his 
image as a common man. It is clear, however, that the tone of sympathy
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with the slightly old-fashioned world of the shopkeepers, together with 
detailed attention to their interests, disappeared from RPR programmes 
between 1980 and 1986. In 1985 the party encouraged them to defend their 
prosperity and their traditional values by using modern technology to 
protect themselves and their goods from attack, and urged them to invest 
in the techniques of bureautique and mongtique (office automation and the 
use of plastic money) concepts which sound almost as foreign to a 
provincial French commer$ant as to the English reader.3® Deliberately, or 
by oversight, but certainly without regard for the electoral conequences, 
the party had abandoned its earlier concern to balance the values of 
freedom of enterprise and the protective state in favour of a discourse 
dominated by change, risk and gadgetry.
Professions
In French, one does not speak of "the professions", but of les 
professions 1i berales - "the liberal professions", a formula which 
emphasizes individual rather than collective provision of services and 
hence freedom from politically-determined regulations. Each professional 
field is regulated by a para-public "Order", membership of which is 
compulsory for those wishing to practice, and which is responsible for 
establishing and enforcing standards and laying down guidelines for any 
ethical questions which may arise. In addition, most professional fields 
feature one or more associations which seek, like a trade union, to 
represent the members' specific interests. In the medical field, for 
example, the r tigulatory body is the Ordre des Medecins, and the largest of 
three doctors' associations is the Confederation des Syndicate Medicaux de 
France. Both have been described by an American researcher as 
"conservative"; the former is supposed to be apolitical, but its role in
-398-
opposing the liberalization of abortion and contraception led to Francois 
Mitterrand's promise (not kept) to abolish it if he should come to
power. 33
At the end of the 1970s there was some debate as to whether the 
professions in a given locality should be given the opportunity of pooling 
their interests and experience in a para-public Chambre in the same way as 
manufactur ers and r etailers do in tire Chambres de Commerce et. d’ Industrie, 
and artisans in Chambres des Metiers. Instead, there was an attempt at a 
kind of national union organization, encouraged by the government, with 
the formation in 1978 of the Union Nationale des Associations des 
Professions LibSrales (UNAPL). Despite affiliating 58 associations, UNAPL 
lacks a proper office and staff of its own and had still not developed an 
important presence 8 year s later. Apart from tax and social security 
questions, there are few issues which affect all professions equally, and 
it is difficult to see on which issues the members of different 
professions could be expected to take an Interest in the problems of the 
others. 40 This lack of cross-professional identity means that the 
professions often align themselves with small business interests, "since 
the professionals typically have small offices with problems similar to 
those of small shopkeepers."''1
The RFR has been active in organizing amongst professionals, with 
varying results for their ideological commitment to liberalism. In at 
least one case - that of the pharmacists - the profession's demands did 
closely i assemble those habitually raised by small shopkeepers, at some 
cost to the liberal ideal. In another case - that of the doctors - the 
corporatist defence of existing priviliges arguably helped spread the 
liberal message. In the case of the banks, the professionals with whom the
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RPR were involved were clearly the representatives of big business, and 
they made a substantial contribution to the party's programmatic
orientation.
A key figure in the RPR's relationship with the professionals was 
Gerard Leban. A<St Sympathetic to Gaullisrn by reason of his arrest and 
deportation during the Second World War at the age of 13, he made a 
business career in the distribution side of the clothing trade and was 
drawn into active politics in 1968 when he joined the massive pro-de 
Gaulle street demonstration which signalled the imminent defeat of the 
Left at the polls. He joined the UDR and became d£legu& departemental for 
the Action Ouvriere et Professionnelle in the party's Paris organization. 
From this position he helped to set up the first real AOP section oriented 
on a profession - accountants - in 1978. Working first under Dechartre and 
later with Delalande, he was effectively the chief of the professional 
sections until 1987 when he took on a job in the party organization 
dealing with Chirac's second presidential campaign. 43
By 1981, following on the accountants, AOP sections were established 
for, among others, doctors, dentists, taxi-drivers, travel agents, and in 
banking and insurance. Their contribution to the party's programmes was 
systematized by Lebanj before each national election, both legislative and 
Presidential, each section was asked to supply a document summarizing the 
condition of their profession, and their propositions; these documents 
were then fed into the party campaigns. The same procedure was used before 
tlie drafting of Libres et Responsabl e&.
Due partly, no doubt, to this corporatist method of organization, and 
in the absence of a pattern of "professional interests" applicable to all 
fields, the party occasionally got drawn into the defence of special
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interests even though these sometimes contradicted the ideology of 
liberalism and free competition. For example, during the 1980s the 
pharmacists - among whom there was a strong AOF section - were drawn into 
a conflict with the supermarket chain Leclerc which won from the Conseil 
Je la Concurrence the right to sell certain paramedical products over 
which pharmacists had had a monopoly.'1'1 The conflict was eventually 
resolved by a classic corporatist compromise worked out by Chirac’s own 
1 9 8 6 - 8 8  government, thanks to the strong presence of the professionals' 
representatatives in the cabinet of the Minister of Health, Michele 
Barzach. As
Although the 01ganized pharmacists - for many years a protected 
species - wei e not vei y keen on fi ee competition, some of their colleagues 
in the other medical professions integrated it more easily into their 
criticisms of Socialist policy, dismissed as "egalitarianism" plus 
"assistance g&ner allsee'' (hand-outs for everyone).'16 The doctors objected 
to the government’s plans for integrated health centres, associated with a 
scaling down of the proportion of GPs' income coming from private fees in 
favour of a capitation system similar to the one in use in the UK; they 
objected to tire proposal to abolish the competitive examination which 
traditionally i egulated entry to hospital internships, claiming that this 
would lead to an over-supply of doctors who, when they found themselves 
unemployed, would demand the status of civil servants. One of the most 
emotive issues concerned the Socialists' attempts to democratize the 
extremely hierarchical hospital service, which the doctors interpreted as 
an attack on their authority, traditionally sanctified by academic 
qualifications. "Expertise", as one of the doctors' leaders, the RPR's 
Bernard Debre put it, "must be the only legitimate source of the
-401-
indispensable hierarchy..."'17 The demand for protection of the divine 
right of the top doctors was incorporated into the 1984 party programme.'1®
Gerard Leban and the AOP's section de I 1Assistance Publique 
uonsidered that the government's proposals, which meant that the heads of 
department would no longer be the real bosses, "didn't fit our liberal 
ideas at all."'1-9 The section was extremely active, distributing leaflets 
outside the hospitals and organizing protest meetings addressed by a 
number of distinguished medical professors "who worked very closely with 
us."so The spectacle of white-coated medics engaging in political 
demonstrations naturally caught the imagination of the press, and the 
doctors had ample opporunity to add to the exposure liberalism was getting 
generally by expounding their "two axioms of liberal philosophy, the 
recognition of expertise, and the responsibility of the individual." Under 
the latter heading they attacked the Socialists' policy of reimbursing the 
cost of abortions performed by the national health service, and looked 
forward to the day when health insurance would be partially privatized.S1
As we saw in chapter 8, although the AOP was de Gaulle's "big idea"®2
to help spread his support among the workers, by the mid-1980s the
workplace groups (.sections d' entreprises) had been taken over by employers
and managers at the expense of the the rank and file, much to Dechartre's
disgust. Leban, on the other hand, was enthusiastic about the fact that
the spread of ideas could sometimes be in the reverse direction to the one
originally intended;
....it's true that a large number of ideas and a large 
number of innovations in our .... let's say our schema 
- political as well as economic - came to us from the 
professions and from the firms where we were 
working.®3
Wo groups performed better in this respect than those organized in
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banking, insurance and the stock exchange. The banking section, led by
Pierre Habib Deloncle, son of a former Gaullist minister, had already
distinguished itself by organizing street demonstrations outside a bank
where a Communist leader, Philippe Herzog, had come - illegally according
to the AOP - to address a union meeting. In 1981-2, when the Socialists
put through the legislation nationalizing the few banks which had remained
in the private sector since 1945, and the cream of French manufacturing
capacity, the leaders of the bank section effectively serviced the RPR
deputies leading their defence;
Our friends were at the side of Michel Noir who at 
that time was the deputy dealing with the question in 
the chamber; and people worked day and night to 
prepare the documents, the texts tor out deputies who 
were going to speak. They were at the National 
Assembly with them, and they contributed a great deal 
to all the amendments which we put forward. BA
Having helped mould the party’s policy during round one of the
nationalization battle in 1981, the members of the section Banque returned
to the fray in 1985-6, in anticipation of round two. This time, helped by
AOP activists from the Paris stock exchange, and representatives of the
insurance companies, they were "intimately involved" with the teams which
helped Balladur draw up his privatization legislation in anticipation of
the Right's electoral victory in March 1986. BB
To summarize then, whereas the pharmacists were concerned exclusively
with their own fortunes and tended to push the party in a protectionist
direction, the doctors, as well as dosing the party programme with their
notions of liberal medecine, had a more public impact which helped
reinforce liberal ideas generally, while the bankers and insurers fought
state intervention in the commanding heights of the economy and fed their
own interests directly - if discreetly - into the party's policy-making.
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We consider their role again at the end of the next section, on business 
interests.
Business
In this section we first describe the traditional heterogeneity of 
French employer-unionisra, and then examine the employers' contribution to 
the revival of liberal ideology. Although for many years content to form a 
profitable partnership with the state, some employers' organizations were 
growing increasingly impatient with state controls by the turn of the 
1980s, when they began actively and with growing unanimity to demand 
decentralization and deregulation. Most employers' groups avoided party 
politics, however, and it was the RPR which sought to draw the employers 
into their programme-making, rather than organized business which sought 
to influence the party.
The most representative French employers' organization is the CNPF, 
(Conseil National du Patronat Frangais) whose affiliates include more than 
one hundred national federations covering thirty or so branches of 
industry, federations of regional associations and about 800 national 
trade associations. se It is the CNPF which speaks for the individual 
members of all these bodies when corporatist-type discussions with 
government and unions take place at national level.
The CNPF's legitimacy has been continually contested, however, by a 
succession of associations, claiming to represent France's army of small 
and medium-sized firms, which accuse the "official" movement of selling 
out to government drives towards mergers and concentration. The longest 
established, though not always the most influential, of these is the 
Confederation Generals des Petites et Moyennes Industries (CGPME) which 
has a contradictory relationship with the parent body, refusing the title
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of membre assoc i 6, but preserving 75 seats in the 500-rnember Assembles
General e. B'B
The national federations, trade associations, and chambers of 
commerce and industry concern themselves with the day-to-day problems of 
running a business, informing their members about new techniques, product 
regulations, labour legislation, discounts, credit and marketing 
opportunities, as well as lobbying on matters of common concern where 
possible. In general, the federations are of greatest help to the small 
and medium-sized firms, while the largest intervene directly with the 
government or the civil service on matters which concern them. ®° The CNPF 
can set the tone for the overall employers' movement, but it cannot 
command it. As a confederal body it must abstain from taking sides on 
public policy issues which divide its members, such as whether to 
construct a canal system in the south-east or the north of the country.61 
Even if it wished to, the Conseil National does not have the resources to 
upstage the national federations which are organizationally stronger and 
better financed than itself.62
Alongside the organizations handling what might be called day-to-day 
nut-and-bolt issues, French business has a range of more intellectually 
adventurous groups at its disposal. Debates about general public policy, 
the employers' role in society and blueprints for harmonious relations 
with the workers, have traditionally been conducted by what one author has 
called "opinion" or "vanguard" groups especially constituted for that 
purpose.63
French employers have long been regarded as the least Imaginative, 
the meanest and generally the most reactionary and parochial of western 
Europe, relying for success on family share-holding, out-dated techniques,
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a protected home market, and hostility to trade unions, rather than effort 
and risk.**"1 But alongside the traditionalist mass there have always 
existed groups of radicals, inspired by Christian social teaching, whose 
members were intent on developing model management relations in their own 
firms as examples of a better way for their colleagues to follow.
Some of these, like the Centre des Jeunes Patrons (CJP) and the 
Centre Frangais du Patronat Chretien (CFPC, known until 1948 as the 
Confederation Frangaise des Profesions) date from between the wars, when 
their ideals found expression in local family allowance systems, company 
housing and other paternalist arrangements. At the liberation they emerged 
as champions of a national framework of collective bargaining, profit- 
sharing and unemployment Insurance. Although few in numbers - the CJP and 
CFPC had between two and three thousand members each by the 1980s - the 
social-Christian vanguard played an important role in the 1950s and 1960s 
in moving the employers movement towards acceptance of responsibility for 
their employees' welfare.®61
In this they were helped by ACADI, (Association des Cadres,
Dirigeants de 1'Industrie), f ounded in 1945, some said in order to protect 
the interests of top managers of the largest firms in the event of 
nationalization. During the 1950s and 1960s ACADI acted as a kind of club 
in which 300 managers - from both public and private sectors - and some 75 
"associates", mostly bankers and civil servants, together urged a high- 
growth Keynesian model for the future development of French society, 
stressing the importance of public finance, wages policy and technical 
progress. Because of their stress on "competence" rather than property as 
the source of the manager's legitimacy they have been said to represent 
the technocratic or "Saint-Simonian" wing of the employers' movement.®6
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From their different perspectives the Christians and the technocrats have 
conducted a running battle over several decades against the traditionalist 
influence of the smaller and medium-sized firms within the the CNPF, and 
especially against the CGPME, the progressives' b£te noire.
When the explosion of May '68 revealed the inadequacy of the official 
movement's approach to industrial relations, the presidents of a score or 
so giant enterprises, both public and private, whose fate is closely bound 
up with that of the national economy, responded by forming a club even 
more exclusive than ACADI; this was AGREF, the Association des Grandes 
Entreprises Faisant Appel A I'Epargne. Other radicals at first sought to 
set up an entirely new confederation to outflank the official movement, 
but the CNPF managed to hold the centre ground by collaborating from 1969 
onwards with prime minister Chaban Delrnas' attempts to set up a new 
tripartite corporatist framework for industrial relations. The May events 
had effectively stimulated the main-strearn to narrow the gap between 
themselves and the avant-garde. The new organization therefore turned 
itself into the most intellectual and the most ambitious of all the 
employers' think-tanks, Entreprise et Progr&s. 617
Whereas the Christian organizations were chiefly concerned to 
establish workplace relations bearing witness to their members' organicist 
conception of society, and ACADI sought above all to push forward French 
economic development, Entreprise et Progr&s set out not only to influence 
their business collegues, but to turn employers as a class into the 
vanguard of the whole society, remedying what a 1972 opinion poll 
revealed as the "execrable" image of employers among the French people. 1513 
In 1983 they challenged their colleagues to choose between the negative 
strategy of being a simple "veto group" whose only power was to prevent
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decisions which run counter to their interests and the ’'hegemonic"
strategy of pushing themselves forward as a "cat 4gorie dirigeante", by
asserting a collective identity... announcing 
ourselves as a social category conscious of our 
responsibilities who, by reason of our cohesion, our 
permanence, our self-confidence, exert an influence on 
the whole of society*9
As befitted a movement with hegemonic ambitions, recruitment was on 
the same basis as to a political party - firms wishing to join had to 
agree with the group's aims and to undertake to further them in their own 
domains. Together they organized conferences and day-schools in which they 
discussed general economic and social developments, as well as schemes for 
making work more interesting, abolishing production lines and 
decentralizing management. 70 In 1983 Entreprise et Progres launched a 
scheme designed especially to educate Parliamentarians about the problems 
of the business world, which we discuss below in the context of business 
and politics. First we trace the history of the French employers' 
attitudes to liberal ideas.
Before May 1981, when the political pendulum swung in favour of the 
Socialist Party, few French employers' groups were strongly attached to 
doctrines of economic liberalism. War-time emergencies had twice 
dramatically extended state control of wages and prices, and state 
allocation of raw materials, credit and labour. Business organizations had 
been only too happy to form cartels which policed these arrangements, 
extending them as best they could in peace-time, thanks to reconstruction 
and national planning. 71 In the early 1970s the CNPF co-operated in a 
rather two-legged form of corporatism in which the unions were rather weak 
and mutually antagonistic, the government very powerful, and the employers
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motivated to sign generous deals mainly by the political aim of helping to 
keep the existing parties in power. 72
Rival wings of the movement damned each other for their lack of 
liberal credentials. The petits patrons considered that they were the only 
real entrepreneurs since only they daily risked their and their family's 
personal fortunes in their business operations, whereas the hired managers 
of the giant firms had no such personal stake, and in any case their 
companies' fortunes were assured by their virtual symbiosis with the 
state. 72 The technocrats replied that the family firms held back 
production by refusing to borrow money and invest in new technology, and 
that, if they were not sheltering behind a protective tariff, they ran cap 
in hand to the government to ask for a subsidy.7*
A modest revival of liberalism in the early 1960s culminated in the 
adoption by the CNPF's 1965 general assembly of a so-called "liberal 
charter" which prefigured in almost every detail the manifestos of twenty 
years later - pursuit of personal interests was identified with the common 
good, homage was paid to competition and the role of profit, controls on 
prices, wages and hiring and firing were condemned, along with high 
company taxation, and above all dirigist interference by bureaucrats and 
politicians. 755
Though adopted thanks to the liberal convictions and energetic 
lobbying of small firms by one of the CNPF leaders, Pierre de Calan, the 
charter was disowned both by the Christian wing and the technocrats who 
felt themselves attacked. The government also, in the form of Michel 
Maurice-Bokanowski, made its disapproval known. 7e' Eventually, the 
sharpening of class struggle, which culminated in May ' 68, changed both 
the balance of power in the workplaces and the official language of
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industrial relations. The liberal charter was forgotten, 1969 saw the 
birth of AGREF, through which the leaders of the giant firms intended to 
pursue their profitable relationship with the state, and in 1972 the 
presidency of the CNPF was entrusted to Francois Ceyrac, a careful 
technocrat who had spent his entire career as functionary of the 
employers' movement.77
At Ceyrac's retirement in December 1981, his heir apparent, Yvon 
Chotard, the CNPF's chief negotiator and chairman of the social committee, 
was unexpectedly defeated in the presidential election by an outsider,
Yvon Gattaz. In some ways the result seemed to be the victory of the grass 
roots, the "real" bosses, over the intellectuals and the "establishment" 
with their long familiarity with the corridors of power. Gattaz was 
supported neither by the Parisian elite nor by the leaders of the powerful 
national federations. Secondly, with his brother he was the proprietor of 
a provincial electronics firm which they had built from nothing and of 
which only 20% of the capital was held outside their own family. Finally, 
Gattaz had been campaigning for five years among his fellow patrons to 
make the CNPF more responsible to the mass of affiliated members.^®
The left were perhaps too quick to conclude, however, that the 
employers had responded to the challenge of Mitterrand's election by 
handing over their organization to a reactionary and a backwoodsman.
Gattaz' company, Radiall, belied the parochial image normally attached to 
family firms. ao Gattaz sought the CNPF presidency to give a voice not to 
small firms, but to the middle-sized, which he defined as those employing 
between 50 and 2,000 workers. The prosperity of the post-war years had 
fostered the emergence of an economically significant stratum of such 
firms - 30,000 of them, all family-owned, were responsible for million
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workers and 40% of added value - which were largely ignored by the CNPF. 
Finally, the association founded by Gattaz and his friends in 1976, ETHIC 
(.Ent reprises a Taille Humaine Indust riel les et Commercialese, had more in 
common with the vanguard movements than with the CGPME. Its four 
principles were hierarchy based on competence (not inheritance), open 
accounting, social harmony, and the employers' devotion of one-tenth of 
their time to public affairs. 6,1
In short, the new president of the CNPF was neither a 19th century 
liberal nor a starry-eyed philanthropist.62' From our point of view,
Gattaz' election has a particular significance. With the existing 
leadership tainted by its collaboration with dirigism, a man with Gattaz' 
background, the self-made boss of a successful firm free of government 
contracts or handouts, was uniquely placed to draw together the threads of 
liberal doctrine implicit in the discourse and the practice of the 
employers' movement, in order to campaign plausibly on what was 
effectively a new "liberal charter", the employers' response both to the 
apparent crisis of 1970s interventionism and to the Socialists' own 
statist solutions. ,313
In contrast to the liberal ideologues whose work we studied in the 
last chapter, the employers' programme was marked by their own immediate 
preoccupations, and by the institutional framework in which they had to 
work. It was their unanimous demand for cuts in taxes and charges which 
conditioned their reflections on social policy questions such as the 
appropriate balance between state-financed benefits and individual effort, 
while their innovative ideas on workplace organization made them champions 
of de-regulation.
The battle for tax cuts concentrated on the taxe professionnelle, a
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pay-roll tax, levied by local authorities and denounced by everyone, up to 
and including the President of the Republic and the Minister of Finance, 
although the government somehow could not find a way of making up the 
revenue short-fall which would result from its abolition.®4 More complex 
was reform of the semi-public semi-contractual French systems for 
unemployment and sickness insurance which were in endemic crisis during 
the early 1980s due to the multiplication of claimants and the shrinking 
number of contributors. After two months of negotiations the CNPF achieved 
some of its aims on unemployment benefits by what were arguably 
corporatist rather than liberal methods. Certain categories of the 
unemployed were struck off the register and re-directed I.o government 
hand-outs, while the unions agreed to increases in their members 
contributions. If they did not achieve cuts, the employers were at least 
satisfied that their share of the costs were not increased.
De-regulation of the economy in the French context primarily 
concerned the labour market, given general anxiety about high unemployment 
and the fact that the Socialists had themselves taken the initiative in 
de-controlling prices. Gattaz occasionally launched comprehensive attacks 
on the indexed minimum wage (the SMIC) which would have pleased 
Friedmanites everywhere,®*5 but the CNPF stopped short of demanding its 
abolition and the federations took different positions about how it shold 
be reformed, with some again suggesting that it could be a subject for 
negotiation with the unions. Gattaz* idea for a lower "youth minimum wage" 
was withdrawn after the Socialists supervised the installation of a youth 
training scheme at rates lower than the SMIC.®7
The CNPF did demand, however, a deregulatory package which would 
loosen controls on part-time and temporary work, abolish administrative
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oversight of redundancies and relax rules surrounding the so-called 
thresholds in French workplaces. The latter was a particularly emotive 
issue because it concerned not only job security but also workers' rights. 
In any French factory, if there are at least 10 employees, they have the 
right to elect a representative (.ddldgu^ du personnel') to whom the 
employer is legally obliged to grant recognition and certain facilities.
If the threshold of 50 workers is passed, the employer must accept, pay 
for , and from time to time talk to a comitt: d' entreprise. Both thresholds, 
in addition, trigger the employers' obligation to pay certain payroll 
taxes. According to the CNPF, the existence of the thresholds dissuaded 
many employers from expanding their workforces beyond 9 or 49 people. 
Gattaz argued that nearly half a million "special category jobs", which he 
dubbed ENCAs (emplois nouveaux <3 contraintes all&gges), could be created 
within five years, if exempted from most of the existing regulations. The 
claim was rninutiously examined and declared fanciful in Le Monde,™* and 
was even privately sneered at by the technocrats among the CNPF 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t b u t  that did not stop the demand for labour-market 
deregulation, including reform of the thresholds, finding its way into all 
the liberal programmes of the early 1980s, including those of the RPR.31
Gattaz' crusade for "flexibility" on behalf of the mass of employers 
who sought to survive the economic war at the workers' expense was clearly 
in line with the liberal philosophy of the Chicago school and the French 
new economists. Nevertheless, he did not come under attack from the so- 
called "progressive" employers because they had already reached 
conclusions on flexibility which allowed a synthesis between liberalism 
and their own vaguely corporatist ideas. This was clear from their 
reaction to the Socialists' lois Auroux, passed in 1982, which, among
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other things, introduced compulsory annual negotiations at both industry 
and firm level and sought to strengthen in-plant union rights, but also 
encouraged the formation of work-place groups through which employees 
could express directly complaints about work organization and 
condi t ions.33
The legislation was fought strenuously by the CNPF and by the 
opposition in Parliament, and was formally condemned by Entreprise et 
Progrds, on the grounds that legal obligation would damage the spontaneity 
of the employers' efforts, while the CJD, approving in principle, had 
reservations about certain of the required procedures. But all three 
organizations called on their members to apply the new laws faithfully, 
filling the mandatory consultation committees with technical and 
supervisory staff where possible.93
This muted response can be explained by the fact that the employers' 
vanguard organizations had for some years been developing their own 
versions of workplace charters enshrining the trade-off which Guy Sorrnan 
had discovered in operation in Japan and California - workers granted a 
share in decision-making in exchange for total flexibility on job 
organization, hours worked, and salaries.3*1 Members of the CJP (which in 
1968 became the Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants, CJD) had already 
experimented with profit-sharing and the distribution of shares to their 
workers. ACADI supported the 1975 rapport Sudreau, which (unsuccessfully) 
proposed to introduce an element of co-management into the statutes 
governing the organization of French firms'3®. The Institut de 1'Entreprise 
the CNPF's own in-house think-tank founded in 1975, had set up a "movement 
for quality circles" as early as 1976 and in 1983 produced a report on 
flexible working hours which recommended that salaries should be
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calculated according to the annual totals worked. a,B Francois Dalle,
chairman and managing director of l'Or^al and a founder member of
Entreprise et Progr&s was already expounding his doctrine of the
decentralization of authority in the firm in the late 1960s®7, and
Entreprise et Progr&s could claim with some justice in the 1980s that
Innovations like flexitime and the workers' rights of 
expression in the workplace have been inspired by 
(our) propositions.
Entreprise et Progr&s also found the loop-hole in the Auroux laws 
allowing local managements to negotiate with workers' representatives - 
not union officials - company agreements setting aside existing 
regulations, particularly on wages and hours, for up to three years.
This option became more attractive after December 1984 when the unions' 
rank arid file rejected a national deal on "flexibility" which their 
leaders had spent seven months negotiating with Yvon Chotard.100 As the 
1980s progressed, the employers' most determined innovators continued to 
make the running with their proposals for management buy-outs, stock- 
options and Individualization of hours and salaries, which were endorsed 
by the CNPF, and in some cases by the Socialist government. 101 By now they 
saw no reason to reject the liberal tag, as their spokesman told a French 
researcher;
May 1981 showed that the members of Entreprise et 
Progrds are attached to the market economy and don't 
like dirigism; in short they are liberals and not 
socialists, not even moderate ones, which their 
progressiveness on social matters and their diatribes 
against the conservatism of the CNPF might have led 
one erroneously to believe.1oa
In the face of this desertion of the ranks, the CJD preserved its 
radical reputation by disapproving cuts in public investment, 103 while 
Entreprise et Progrds railed against what it called the "omnipresent and
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impotent state."10* But, while the CJB also demurred at the official 
movement's attack on the thresholds, its own reform proposals partook of 
the liberal model of the workplace charter - each firm, whatever its size, 
should have a consell d'entreprise which would henceforward fuse in itself 
responsibility for matters at present dealt with by a plethora of 
different committees or representatives, (health and safety, comity 
d'entreprise, d£14gu£s du personnel, union sections, etc.) and would be 
able to negotiate fixed-term deals setting aside existing labour 
regulations. 1os What remained of the CJD's radical tradition was in any 
case diluted during the 1980s as the influence of the small-scale catholic 
bosses was out-weighed by a new intake of professional managers, and the 
group's audience shrank, reflecting its failure to recruit among the new 
generation of hi-tec and service companies. 1
The fact that the employers were fashioning a consensus among 
themselves on liberal economics did not necessarily mean that they united 
to convert the RPR to their own ideas. Linder Gattaz' leadership, the CNPF 
preferred to work constructively with the government in power rather than 
try to form a bloc with the right-wing parties. According to one employer 
he reduced to a minimum the "too visible" relations with the 
opposition,107 which meant both refusing public talks with them, a policy 
badly received by Gaullist politicians in particular, 1oe and absence from 
the 1984 mass demonstration against the Socialists' schools policy. 109
In avoiding party politics the CNPF behaved in the same way as most 
other interest groups in France at the beginning of the 1980s.110 Research 
carried out at that time confirmed what had been implied by an earlier 
study of the administrative elite in France, ' 11 namely that all interest
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groups attach a much lower priority to influencing parties or party 
leaders than to contacts with elected government officials or civil 
servants.
When a sample of 99 interest group officials were asked to choose 
among a list of ten types of action that groups might adopt to forward 
their cause, only 10 (9.9%) said they often tried to influence parties or 
leaders, far fewer than those who said they often participated in 
government committees (55.2%), or cultivated frequent formal and informal 
contacts with government officials (53.6% and 46.9%). Other frequently- 
used strategies included public relations campaigns and parliamentary 
lobbying on specific issues. Even action in the Economic and Social 
Council (26. 1%) and demonstrations, strikes and other direct action 
(12.8%) were resorted to more often than party contacts, and only legal
action (7.8%) was less popular. 113 Among the smaller sample of business
organizations, (33 respondents) government contacts were even more 
frequent, (60-70% saying they often used them), with influencing parties 
again coming near the bottom of the scale of priorites (9.7%). 113
The paucity of party contacts matches interest group leaders' poor 
opinion of their effectiveness. Respondents were asked which type of 
action was the most affective in influencing policy, and the replies were 
classified according to the type of action mentioned first. Of 94 
respondents across all types of interests, not one cited first influencing 
parties and their leaders as an effective method of pursuing their 
aims. 11/1 About a third of the sample said they often lobbied individual 
Parliamentarians,,ie but only 8.5% had a full-time lobbyist and over 70%
none at all. Most groups relied on local branches to influence deputies in
their constituencies.
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These findings contrast with practice during the 1950s, when some 
parties were more or less targetted for capture by interest groups.1,15 One 
reason for this is undoubtedly that the 1958 constitution shifted the 
balance of power markedly from Parliament to the Executive. There would 
not be much point in capturing parties whose ability to influence policy 
had been heavily circumscribed. Furthermore, it has been suggested, 
parties in the Fifth Republic have been larger, with broader electoral 
support than they were in the Fourth, making them better able to resist 
special pleading by organized groups. 1 1
By the early 1980s, business involvement in politics still existed, 
but was sporadic, not always visible, and variable in form rather than 
systematically oriented towards a single party. Close business involvement 
in Alain Carignon's campaign in Grenoble in 1983 seems to have been 
remarked on because it was exceptional.11® Often, rather than investing 
heavily in a single party or a single candidate, businessmen preferred to 
run for office themselves. The RPR dislodged a Communist mayor in Nimes, 
also in 1983, thanks to Jean Bousquet, the owner of Cacherel. In the Paris 
municipal elections both the CGPME and the Confederation Generale des 
Cadres, a managers' union, successfully negotiated places on the RPR 
lists.113 Party tickets were not sought systematically, but they were 
certainly the surest guarantee of success, Businessmen like Jean-Maxime 
L£veque who tried to mount their own non-party campaigning organizations, 
or local businessmen who ran for office on their own but failed to get 
elected, were soon forgotten. 11:0
Parliamentary lobbying itself tended to be directed towards deputies 
of all parties when the legislative programme turned up issues which the 
groups were interested in. One in four organizations maintained an all­
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party subject group or arnicale in Parliament.1-21 The CGPME counted 
Socialists among the 160 deputies in its arnicale in 1979,122 while 
Entreprise et Progris, with its self-assigned goal of expanding employers' 
influence in society, targetted its programme of work experience 
placements at the parties of the Left as well as the Right. Begun in 1983, 
they made it possible for Parliamentarians to make a series of programmed 
visits, covering between 12 and 25 days in a year, to one of the member 
firms, in order to study at first hand the effects of their legislative 
activity, and to familiarize themselves with any aspect of the business 
they were interested in, from corporate planning to selling products on 
the shop-floor.
The verdict of one RPR deputy who took part in the programme was that
there was a considerable rapprochement between the world of work and the
world of politics between 1981 and 1986. They had been far apart, without
realizing it, 123 but began to understand and appreciate each other more
through participating in many seminars and day-schools as well as through
the stages d'entreprise. Etienne Pinte spent one day a week for 16 weeks
at the French subsidiary of IBM;
I was initiated into the world of work, of which I 
knew little, and that not very well, and that gave me
another view, another side, another vision of the
workplace. For me, if you like, it was very fruitful,
very enriching, because afterwards, every time I was
involved in legislating I asked myself whether the new
laws we were about to vote would foster or hinder the 
dynamism of the economy, the dynamism of individual 
firms. 12 4
By 1986, the programmes had attracted 25 enthusiastic stagiaires, of 
whom only 3 were from the RPR (14 were Socialists and 8 UBF), and the
following year there were 55, including some candidates applying for a
second course in a different firm. '-2B The higher proportion of Socialist
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Party deputies availing themselves of this opportunity probably reflected
their own sense of their greater unfamiliarity with the employers'
concerns, as well as the intentions of Entreprise et Progr£s who had no
wish to preach to the converted. Nevertheless, Pinte's testimony shows how
the RPR's conversion to liberalism in the wake of Chirac's 1981 election
campaign owed a lot in a variety of small ways to developments in the
business world, as well as to the arguments of Chirac's most committed
supporters. G6rard Leban, recounting the influence of the AOP sections in
the drafting of Libres et Responsabl es, no doubt spoke for many when he
implied that business had a more or less natural right to determine key
aspects of the party programme;
The more important they (the sections) become, the 
more we realize that its in the world of work and the 
professions that a country's politics are decided at 
the end of the day. They are the life of the 
country.1
While those rank and file deputies who felt they lacked insight into 
business problems did their best to remedy their deficiencies, the party 
leaders had no hesitation in bringing business leaders directly into the 
work of drafting party programmes. We have already seen the contribution 
made by the AOP's banking section under Pierre Habib Deloncle, who, as a 
director of the Banque Indosuez had a direct interest in the party's 
policy on privatization. A colleague to whom he and the RPR turned during 
the nationalization-privatization episode was Jean-Maxime L6v£que.127 
This banker and former civil servant already regarded himself as a liberal 
and a monetarist in the 1960s1,2® and was aggressive in defending the 
private sector from the threat of government interference. He campaigned 
publicly against the left before the general elections of 1974 and 1978, 
and even more vigorously in 1.981, when his bank, which had narrowly
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escaped nationalization in 1945, was at the top of the Socialists' list. 
From 1976-81 he was a member of the CNPF's economic policy committee, and
from 1981 onwards a member of the conseil d'orientation of the Institut de
1' Entreprise, one of the CNPF's research institutes responsible, as we saw 
above, for popularizing quality circles and flexible working conditions.
Despite his earlier association with de Gaulle, from which he
retained "a few links" with the RPR, Leveque was not a strong supporter of
the party, nor of its leader, blaming Chirac's rivalry with Giscard for
the victory of the left in 1981. In general he was sceptical about the
ability of the RPR and the UDF to defend the ideas he believed in;
I knew only too well their links with the civil 
service elite, which had drawn them into pursuing the 
indefinite extension of the state's activities....
These parties had become electoral machines serving 
the ambition of their leaders and the interests of 
their entourages. They had abandoned the battle of 
ideas and little by little reduced their conception of 
politics to a vague system for managing a society 
which had become more or less socialist. 133
Despite this lukewarm attitude towards the right-wing parties he
nevertheless threw in his lot with them in the face of their common enemy,
and in 1981 joined in the battle of amendments to the Socialists'
legislation, most of which, he claimed, were worked out in the CCF 
offices. 130 When the battle was lost he left CCF and with some friends set 
up a new bank outside France, 131 but was persuaded "by thousands of 
letters" to remain on the political stage, as leader of the Union pour 
I'Initiative et la Responsabilltg, which he founded in May 1982, and which 
was to play a modest role, through its meetings and symposia, in 
elaborating and popularizing the "popular capitalist" approach to 
privatization which Balladur put into practice in 1986. 1:321 At the same 
time he continued to contribute indirectly to the RPR's programme-
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formation through his participation in meetings and discussions organized 
by the AOP banking section, 1:a® but much more directly as a member of one 
of the groups formed by Edouard Balladur and Jacques Friedman which worked 
out the details of the proposed privatization and tax-cutting legislation 
during 1985. 1 3 A
The party's willingness to seek advice and help from outside their 
own ranks in drawing up the programme on which they hoped to return to 
government was even more pronounced when the time came to negotiate a 
common programme with the UDF. This was done during a series of meetings 
at which the participants were not only members of the two parties but 
also figures from the business world who had no party affiliation. The RPR 
side was led officially by Alain Jupp6, who liaised with Balladur's groups 
as well as running a small team of his own. 13s The committee chiefly 
concerned with the future government's economic programme, however, was 
formed by Andr6 Giraud of the UDF and Jacques Flassard, a member of no 
party and long-time director of the CNPF*s in-house economic forecasting 
unit, REXECO, (Recherches pour 1'Expansion de l'Economie). Consisting of 
about ten people, including the RPR's Philippe Auberger, the group "worked 
throughout 1985", to produce the blue-print of the economic aspects of the 
1986 joint platform of government. '
A comparison of the various texts reveals that during 1984-6 there 
was a developing symmetry between the ideas of the employers, the RPR 
programme and the final joint programme of government. In 1984, the 
party's proposals for the workplace included decentralization, quality 
circles, profit-sharing, and the linking of wages to performance of the 
firm, but the programme promised only to "re-examine" the social and 
fiscal thresholds which were alleged to hold back firms' growth, and to
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"make more flexible" the regulations covering hiring and firing, and it 
was vague about tax cuts. 137
In 1985, administrative control of redundancies was judged to be no 
longer needed, and the thresholds were to be set aside for a period of 
five years, 1 33 while the programme gave clear support to the employers' 
preference for part-time and temporary work, for variable wage-levels 
within the firm, and for local bargaining which would set aside national 
agreements. 133 The 1986 joint programme of government contained all this 
plus 20 billion francs of tax-cuts for business and a proposal for 
"enterprize zones", the relaxation of a wide range of existing regulations 
on working conditions within depressed regions. 140
Plassard, described in a 1977 study of the employers' movement as 
their "number one economist"1A 1 earned a respectable income for his bosses 
by selling his unit's sectoral and regional economic studies to the 
biggest firms in the country, including the national Railway and 
Electricity boards1'-1* In 1975 he was said to produce "reports on the 
economic conjuncture which are often remarkable but which are read, in 
spite of that, by few people."143 A decade later, thanks to the RPR and 
the UDF, he was given a larger field than usual over which to exercise his 
t alents.
We may summarize as follows the impact on the RPR of the employers' 
conversion to liberalism. The French employers' movement before and for 
twenty years after the Second World War had the reputation of being 
industrially lethargic and politcally reactionary. A traditional division 
of labour between different organizations left the CNPF and its industrial 
and commercial affiliates with responsibility for bread and butter issues
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while a number of progressive ginger— groups fought a running battle 
against the official movement's political and social conservatism. Neither 
wing of the movement was renowned for its attachment to liberal economic 
doctrine.
Tliis situation changed after 1981, when the gap between the CNPF and 
the avant-garde narrowed and nearly all sections of the movement pressed 
for a reduction of state intervention in the economy, decentralization of 
collective bargaining, and flexible working conditions agreed at plant 
1evel.
During the Fifth Republic organized interests have not often sought 
to Influence political parties directly, but in the early 1980s,
Entreprise et Frogres campaigned to increase employers' influence in 
society generally. They organized a series of work experience sessions for 
individual deputies which some RFR deputies found useful, although more 
Socialist deputies took part in this scheme than those of any other party.
The RPR* s published pr ogrammes nevertheless show that the party 
adopted all the employers' demands on tax-cuts and deregulation of the 
labour market. This is best explained not by business lobbying but by the 
party leadership's willingness to turn to business leaders for advice and 
in some cases to br ing them directly into tire process of programme- 
writing.
Technocrats
An intriguing question raised by the RPR's turn to liberalism is how 
the party could bring itself to attack the civil service and the state 
which traditionally provided both its institutional avenue to power and 
the moral and intellectual justification for the way that power was used. 
Older party leaders like Chirac, Boyon and Peyrefitte had all begun their
political careers as civil servants seconded to the cabinets of powerful 
ministers. Chirac's closest confidants among his own generation were 
fellow graduates of' the Ecole Nationale de 1' Administration such as Monod 
and Friedmann who later dropped active politics in favour of business. Key 
members of his band of young loyalists, like Jupp§, Toubon and Ferben were 
trained at ENA, as were their rivals for influence within the party like 
Blot, Stguin and Mancel. Of these, only Blot, as we have seen, openly 
questioned the value of his training. How was tire party convinced that it 
was wise for the elite to abandon their stewardship of the nation's 
affairs?
There are a number of a priori ieasons why we might expect the 
influence of graduates of the elite civil service schools to diminish 
within the RPR after 1981. The number of I.he patty's deputies was more 
than halved in that year, so there was not much scope for the infusion of 
new blood, Chirac chose to find berths for some of the defeated deputies 
in party hedquat let s, as we saw in chapter 4, so there wet e 
correspondingly fewer openings for ambitious ENA or Polytechnic graduates 
just starting their careers. Above all, in the years after 1901, the 
classes of newly qualified technocrats seeking openings in public life had 
a choice only of Socialist or Communist ministerial cabinets in which to 
apply their training and to seek powerful sponsors of their future 
careeis. If they were RPR or DDF sympathisers they could take ordinary 
posts in the civil service Involving little political discretion. 
Alternatively, they could seek out the rate bastions of local power in 
which RPR notables could give them jobs commensurate with their abilities.
The Paris town hall, as we saw in chapter 4, was far and away the 
most Important souice of such jobs. Fremontier, in his study of the rising
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generation of 40-year-old rightwingers, unearthed the examples of Bruno 
Bouig-Broc, whose career look in a spell in charge of the RFR cadre- 
school, Patrice Mar t in-Lalande, whose first job was as directeur de 
cabinet for the president of the Centre regional council, and of Dominique 
Perben, who was for a while directeur administratifof the Rhdne-Alpes 
region. 1 But of these, only Perben was an ”enarque", indicating that 
such joba were usually unattractive to graduates of the elite schools. 
Revealingly, Perben had himself transferred to the region because it made 
a better base than Paris from which to campaign for his successful 
election as mayor of Chalon-sur— Safine in 1983, a project which was itself 
largely inspired by Iris dissatisfaction with working for Socialist bosses 
at the ministry of the Interior. 145
In general, however, it is too early yet to say whether the loss of 
power by the parties of the Right will have long term effects on their 
traditional patterns of elite recruitment. Fr6montier discovered seven 
graduates of ENA or the Ecole Folytechnique among the 33 RPR members of 
the young guard. Of these, Toubon, Juppe and S£guin had already served 
conventional apprenticeships in ministerial cabinets during the 1970s, 
fean-Louis Masson, an engineer, was already a deputy in 1978, Jacques 
Vernier, his colleague in the Corps des Mines, was director of the Artois- 
Picardy water authority before being elected mayor of Douai in 1983, the 
sixth was a professional diplomat. 14fe' Perben was the only one of the 
seven who felt obliged to make a radical change of direction in response 
to the blocking of the usual career path.
Whatever may have been the career choices of the RPR graduates of 
1981-8G, clearly they were too young to affect the new party policy being 
worked out by their elders. People like Toubon and Juppe were comfortably
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installed in key party positions, with colleagues like Seguin waiting to 
challenge them, and the example of Per ben showed that, lor those ambitious 
enough, oilier means of iising within the par ty were available. In terms of 
generational renewal, therefore, one could not expect much impact on 
policy to result from the changes set in train by the Socialists' 
victories. On the contrary, there was evidence that the enarques who 
controlled the RPR had not relaxed their caste's grip on the levers of 
economic power, and had no intention of doing so. This was illustrated by 
the execution of the privatization programme master— minded by Edouard 
Balladur.
Despite the party's widely publicized attacks on state interference 
in the economy, their avowed faith in the laws of the market, and their 
promise to create a kind of "popular capitalism" by encouraging widespread 
share-ownership, the massive and extremely rapid1'17 sell-off of state 
assets carried out in 1986 and 1987 achieved none of these things. After 
taking account of multiple applications from the same family, and the rush 
to take profits by selling as soon as the shares were quoted on the stock 
exchange, share-ownership was little more widespread in the French 
population at the end of 1987 than it had been in 1981. 1
The sales were accomplished under conditions which hardly reflected 
faith in market forces. The government insisted that the new owners of 
each firm should include a "stable core" of shareowners pledged not to 
sell their holdings, and to work together to block attempted takeovers.
The constitution of these "stable cores" was to be decided 
administratively rather than by sale of appropriate blocks of shares to 
tire highest bidder s. 1 Furthermore, the government left on the statute 
book laws which made administrative authorization necessary before any
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non-EEC company could aquire more than 20% of any French firm, and which 
piotected armaments and financial companies against takeovers by any firm, 
foreign ot French,1
The most telling criticism of the privatizations, however, was that 
the manner in which they were organized in no way broke with the existing 
pattern of state domination of French economic affairs. No-one has summed 
up better that Balladur himself the extraordinary concentration of powers 
granted to the finance minister and his close colleagues. It was the 
Minister wlro decided in what or der companies should be br ought to the 
market, he who chose the members of the Commission de la Privatization1B1 
and the merchant bankers who would advise the government, he who fixed the 
sale pr ice of each company, who decided on the composition of the stable 
cores, who fixed the percentage of shares to be made available in each 
case to the core, tire public and the firm's workers, and he who made the 
final allocation when the subscription was closed. "So many pointless 
discussions were avoided - and so much time was saved!", exuded Balladur, 
thanks to such a concentration of decision-making in one person. 1 
The new minister's previous career, discreet to the point of 
obscurity, bore the mark of the faceless technocrat rather than of the 
RFR's vaunted new openness to the grass loots. A member of Pompidou's 
cabinet from 19GG-G8, he was, with Chirac, one of tire small group closest 
to the prime minister dur ing the tr ials of May ' G8. Later, as assistant to 
Michel Jober t, Pompidou's secretaire g4n£ral at the Elys6e palace, Ire was 
said to have drifted away from Chirac, who was under the influence of 
Jobert's rivals, ruillet and Garaud. When Chirac became prime minister in 
1.974, Balladur went Lo work in industry. ' L~Their reconciliation began 
only when Tuillet and Garaud had left Chirac's staff and was sufficiently
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complete during 1980 for Chirac to ask Balladur to take a leading role in 
his 1981 campaign. Balladur refused and advised him not to stand.1
During the next five years Balladur continued to work in the private 
sector, seeing Chirac only on a personal basis, but usually once or twice 
a week by 1985. He guided Chirac towards acceptance of the idea of 
cohabitation with Mitterrand in the event of an opposition victory in 
1986, and played a key unofficial role in developing the policies the 
party hoped to put into effect on its return to power, It was in his rooms 
in the i ue Dumont d'Urville that a small group of colleagues spent 1985 
drafting the privatization law, the list of firms to be privatized, the 
tax and budget cuts to be implemented during the next two years, and
proposed amendments to the labour law.
Since he had no official party position and no contacts with the 
world of politics, Balladur's role was hidden from the public, and his 
name absent even from the various contemporary journalistic portraits of 
the leading lights of the RPR. 1 Admitting a preference for working 
alone, and a distaste of long meetings, 1 s,r he had no contact with tire Club 
de 1* Horloge, and "never set foot" in the meeting rooms of the RPR's own 
Club'89, according to its president, Michel Aurillac. 1 ,s;e' Only his surprise 
appointment as Minister of State for Finances, the Economy and 
Privatization in March 1986 revealed publicly for the first time the
ieliance which the RPR leader placed on him.
Balladur's sudden emergence from obscurity, his lack of political 
credentials, and tire extraordinary concentration of his powers, themselves 
evoked the archetypal Gaullist technocrat. But it was his allocation of 
parcels of former state assets to the selected stable cores of tire newly 
privatized companies, together with the choice of the new managing
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directors, which did most to Fuel accusations that he wanted to establish
and artificially prolong the control of a narrow caste of ENA-trained ex-
civil servants, many of them friends of the RPR, over the commanding
heights of the economy, even after these had been returned to the private
sector. 1 Fat from exposing the French economy to a vigorous shake-up at
the hands of experienced pi ivate-sector managers, the new appointments
amounted, according to one critic, to tire restoration of a "traditional
system of establishment solidarities, stiucluied around an all-powerful
finance minister." The new presidents of Paribas and the Havas group
were close friends of Jacques Chirac, as were J£r6me Monod and Francois
Heilbronner, Lire bosses of Lyonnaise des Eaux and the still publicly-owned
GAN (.Groups des Assurances Rationales'). II so happened that Lyonnaise des
Eaux and Paribas became pai t of the stable core of Havas, while the GAN in
turn was pai t of the stable cores of Paribas and the Society G£nerale, and
the same interlocking pattern extended to the other newly privatized
giants including the Compagnle G&n&rale de 1'Electr iclte and the Credit
Commerclal de France. Furthermore, Heilbronner and de la Geni&re, the new
head of the Compagnle Financiers Suez, were both active members of the
group which had helped Balladur draw up the whole scheme. 1 Le Monde
described it as
a gigantic self-controlling mechanism covering the 
whole nation, made up of a series of dual, 
triangular or cascading interlocking 
investments. 1 *-'3
Even some members of the UDF felt impelled to protest against the creation 
of a new "RPR state-within-the-state. "1,5/1
All this is revealing of the RPR leaders' reluctance to emancipate 
the French economy from the protective embrace of the civil service, and
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of their desire to reward friends who might later be in a position to 
donate suitable sums to party funds. But it does not fully explain why 
Balladur and his fellow technocrats opted for privatization. After all, if 
the continued rule of the technocracy was what counted, it was simple 
enough to replace all the heads of the nationalized firms with party 
supporters after each election, as had been the tradition up to date, and 
there would have been no need to privatize at all.
The party went further than that and the technocrats made no 
objections. This was because, rather than constituting an obstacle to the 
execution of the new policies, the technocrats had themselves helped to 
draw them up. They had formed a de facto alliance with sections of big 
business to put forward a kind of "technocratic liberalism" which 
satisfied the ideas and interests of both. The RPR leaders' decision to 
privatize depended on more than their penchant for empire-building, and 
should be seen as linked to a genuine attempt to reassess — albeit through 
a frame of reference warped by their technocratic past and their political 
friendships - the challenges facing the national economy of which they 
aspired to be the guardians. We make our own survey of these changes in 
chapter 10.
Conclusions
Although political scientists have sometimes applied the term 
"collective capitalist" to the actions of Gaullist-dorninated governments, 
there has been no serious study of the relationship between the Gaullist
party and interest groups.
Our research shows that, during lire 1980s, the RPR paid less
attention to the interests of small shopkeepers and artisans than they had
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done in the past. The party actively sought the views of both professional 
groups and organized business when drawing up its programmes in 1984 and 
1985. The professions had some impact on programme content, but this was 
mitigated by their own lack of homogeneity. Some key business demands, on 
the other hand, were directly Incorporated into RPR policy, partly because 
business presented a united public case for tax-cuts and deregulation, and 
partly because the party Invited individual representatives of big 
business to take part in drafting their programmes. They shared this work 
- completely outside any party framework - with a group of technocrats who 
acted as advisers to the party president. The technocrats' influence 
superficially seemed to negate in practice some of the liberal principles 
which they and the par ty espoused. We shall argue in the next chapter, 
however, that, although they tried to keep power in their own hands, tire 
technocrats intended to use it in a direction broadly consistent with big 
business interests.
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Chapter 10 The World
In this chapter we account for the tempering of Gaul list technocrats' 
interventionist ambitions in the 1980s, in comparison with what they had 
been in the 1970s and especially the 1960s, It is shown that pervasive 
interventionism was the cause of certain diseconomies even in the 1960s, 
but that France was partially cushioned from their effects by participation 
in a world system in continuous expansion until 1974, A survey of changes 
in the world economy since the end of the 1960s implies that the retreat of 
the state was even more appropriate for the prosperity and expansion of 
French capitalism in 1980 than it would have been in 1960, As a result, the 
formerly interventionist alliance between technocrats and some sections of 
big business, which had solidified during the 1960s, had by the 1980s 
turned into a liberalizing coalition in which the technocrats' "rational" 
approach to securing French competitive advantage in the world system 
postulated the new freedoms which their key business partners were now 
demanding,
A technocrat tackling a priori the organization of national economic
activity with a view to successful competition in the world market would
start out by recognizing that there are three ways in which exchanges of
values between nations can take place; through capital movements, through
I
trade and through movements in exchange rates, This chapter, in three 
parts, examines each of these in turn,
In each of these dimensions the Gaul lists of the 1960s developed
characteristically interventionist lines of policy, First, success in world 
trade was thought to depend on the creation of "national champions" in each
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branch of industry, together with the selective allocation of credit to 
branches offering the best prospects in international competition,
Secondly, the funding of French-only prestige or strategic projects aimed 
to protect key sectors of the economy from being bought up by American 
capital as a result of long-term capital movements, Finally, the general’s 
attachment to fixed exchange rates linked to the gold standard reflected 
his understanding of the advantages accruing to any nation with a strong 
currency, Close government supervision of the financial sector therfore 
served the twin aims of controlling the value of the franc nad guiding the 
allocation of credit to private economic actors,
In the rest of this chapter it is shown that, in the twenty years
between the hey-day of Gaul 1 ism and the RPR's return to power in 1986,
economic changes took place on a world scale which logically led — in some 
cases compelled - even the most hard-bitten technocrat to abandon much of 
the tradi tional Gaul list interventionism in favour of reliance on market 
forces, The 1960s were a period of booming production and trade, during
which there was a large net flow of direct investment from the United
States to France and the rest of Europe, while exchange rates were governed 
by the system of fixed parities established at Bretton Woods in 1944, By 
the 1980s, steady expansion was a thing of the past and the 
internationalization of production was reflected in tighter competition 
both in manufacturing and in the financial services industry, There had 
been massive changes in the structure of capital flows, and exchange rates 
were floating,
Long Term Capital Flows
At least one strand of Gaul list industrial policy, the development of 
grencis projets linked to French prestige or strategic independence, had
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a 1 ways i rnp 1 i c i 11 y conf I ic ted w i th a pure 1 y rat i ona 1 approac hi to the
organization of the national economy, because of the way it ignored
comparative advantage, The French-only projects made some political sense
in the 1960s. however, at a time when there were fears about an American
take-over of European industry,
During the early part of the post-war economic boom, up until the mid-
1960s, techni c a1 super i o r i ty and economi es o f scale he1ped Arne ri c an fir ms
to run up large dollar surpluses on visible trade, which they channelled
into a flow of overseas direct investment facilitated by the then low price
of labour and other goods in the rest of the world, including Europe, The
pattern was soon established that American exports of capital exceeded in
volume even the size of US trade surpluses, thanks to the position of the
2
do11 ar as a maj or reserve currenc y,
Even as late as 1968 the total of European financial assets held in
the USA was nevertheless greater than the total of American investments in
Europe - some $26 billion against $24,7 billion, But 3/4 of European
holdings in the USA consisted of indirect investments, implying no control
over American industry, while US firms preferred to hold directly the
totality or a large majority of the shares in their European subsidiaries,
Four fifths of all US investment in Europe was in the form of direct
investment at the end of the 1960s, In Germany, /9% of Us—owned
subsidiaries were controlled 95% or more by the parent, In France, of 272
American subsidiaries, 117 were owned 99% or more by the parent, while only
3
28 had 40% or less of their capital in American hands,
In France, where a 20% shareholding is officially regarded as 
sufficient to secure effective control of a public company, the American 
invasion prompted fears about foreign control of strategic sectors, and
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foreigners1 ability to transfer or repatriate advanced technology to or 
from France at will, The government responded with administrative controls 
on inward investemnt and with subsidized programmes of research and 
development in fields such as computers, energy, weapons, and space 
exploration among others. In 1959, the creation of subsidiaries by foreign 
companies, and foreign holdings of 20% or more in any firm were made 
subject to administrative approval, As a result, the aerospace and 
armaments industries were kept entirely French during the 1960s, Americans 
continued to buy up subsidiaries in other EEC countries, however, and were 
able to penetrate the French market thanks to the progressive abolition of 
tariffs, As early as 1967, the French controls on direct investment were
4-
re1axed,
Shortly afterwards, the sheer cost of some of the French-only projects 
favoured by de Gaulle, and their disproportionate demands on resources 
needed for other economic activities, convinced his successor as President, 
Georges Pompidou, of the inevitability of partnership with American or 
European capital, In computers, he sanctioned the marriage between 
Honeywell and the French Machines Bull, after massive spending on 
development of new products which ultimately proved inappropriate for the
S'
market, the Anglo-French Concorde project was succeeded by Airbus, which 
associated France with Spain, Great Britain and West Germany, French space 
research efforts were linked to the European Ariane programme, In other 
fields, the relaxation was even greater - the electricity utility, EOF, was 
allowed to buy American nuclear technology from Westinghouse, and aero—
b
engine manufacturers SNECMA began to buy material from General Electric,
During the 1970s, the trend towards internationalization of production 
was intensified, Average annual foreign direct investment CFDI) by US-
registered companies was 3 billion dollars in the early 1960s, 5 billion at
the end of the decade, and 7 billion in the early 1970s, By 1978 it had
7
risen in fits and starts to 16 billion dollars annually, although there
is some evidence that the year-on-year rate of increase slowed in the
$s e c o n d h a.!. f o f t h e i 970s,
The really significant trend to emerge in the 1970s, however, was that
for the first time European and Japanese firms developed enough resources
to contemplate establishing production platforms in the USA, lhe decline
in the value of the dollar during the 1970s cheapened American assets so
that in 1980 DM 123 million could buy an American firm worth DM 183 million
in 1970, Over the same decade, American labour costs increased by one-fifth
the Japanese rate, one quarter the German, and half the British, making
10
production in America a more attractive proposition,
In the period 1961—7, the United States had been the source of 61,6% 
of all direct investment emanating from the top 13 capital-exporting 
nations, In the period 1974-79, its share had fallen to 29%, the lead 
undermined principally by Germany and Japan, <17% and 13% of FDIs each in
the latter period), while France had managed a modest increase from 6,9% to
n
7,8%, 1981 was the first year for thirty years when foreign investment
in the US exceeded American investment overseas, to the tune of $18,6
b i11ion against $ 7 b i11ion,
This trend was reflected in the pattern of FDI in France itself, In
1971, the share of direct investment in France by EEC countries (51,9%) had
already overtaken the American share (30,7%) By 1978 the disproportion was
even sharper - 61,1% of the inflow was European, and only 15,1% American in 
\1
origin. By the end of the 1970s, the blunting of the American challenge
had removed the major justification for the earlier autarchic policies of
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de Gaulle and his die-hard followers like Debre, Instead, the French 
economy was increasingly integrated with those of the EEC countries, with 
whom the French government had agreed in principle to pool sovereignty, But 
meanwhile a new pattern of long-term capital movements was emerging, in 
which France was a rather modest performer,
The trend was now against 100%-owned subsidiaries, reflecting the fact 
that none of the developed countries enjoyed the same technological lead in 
a large number of fields that the Americans had had in the 1960s, No longer- 
able to command superprofits arising from a long-term technical advantage, 
investors were more willing to share with others the benefits - and the 
risks - of new ventures, There was thus a new trend towards interlocking 
investments in which firms' decisions were determined less by the 
"nationality" of their prospective partners than by what each could offer
>4-
the other in the context of international competition,
Reflecting the end of the colonial era and the enormous disparities
b e t w e e n t he wo r1d 's r i c hest and poo rest c oun tries, c ross-bo r d e r i nvestme n t
was concentrated more and more in the developed world and the newly
industrialized countries, In 1971, 56,% of French FDIs went to the OECD
(the world’s richest countries); by 1980, the share was 67%, In the same
period, the share going to the UbA rose from IX, 3% to 144,5%,
But between 196/ and 1976, the French share of the stock of foreign
direct investment worldwide fell from 5,7% to 4,1%, and France was
overhauled in the international league table by Germany, Japan and
b’witzer 1 and, In 19/9, the French share of the stock of i-DIs in the UbA
was 5% The British (18,9%) and Japanese (3%) shares showed the importance
I?
of long-term accumulation in the mature American economy, But it was in 
the mosaic of internationalized production in the newly industrializing
countries that the French lag was disturbing, American firms had cornered 
30,2% of foreign investment in Brazil by 1973, while the Germans had 14%, 
Japan 10,7%, the Swiss 11%, and the French only 5%, In Mexico, France had a 
meagre 1 , S%, as against /2, 2% owned by the US, 5, o%- by West Germany, 4, 7% 
the UK and 4,2% Switzerland, French foreign investment was still strongly 
structured by ties with former colonies in Africa, located in the poorest
I?
and slowest developing continent in the world, This pattern had been
encouraged by interventionist policies, for the four major official
organizations providing subsidies or insurance to would-be investors have
t radi t iona11y a imed thei r operat i ons at francophone Af r i ca and 
19
Madagascar,
Some have seen this as a symptom of France's reduction to the status
of an "intermediate" economy, whose characteristic role is to import high-
technology and high-ski 11 products from her main rivals, the USA, Japan and
West Germany, and in turn to manufacture and export medium technology and
medium skill products, such as metal processing plant, transport systems,
Zo
and nuclear power stations, to the Eastern bloc and the third world, One
way to halt or reverse this trend would be to invest more resources in 
education and research, as urged by the Gaul list deputy for the Ardennes in 
relation to the steel industry, as we saw in chapter 8, For his part, aware 
of the way in which the French share of claims on the world stock of value 
was hampered by the colonial past and de Gaulle's dreams of grandeur, 
Edouard Baliadur determined to integrate French capital into the most- 
technical ly advanced part of the world system, 1o do this, he wanted to 
privatize it;
Nothing would have been more harmful and dangerous 
than to exhibit an outmoded spirit of nationalism,
Now that competition is world-wide, French firms must 
be present everywhere, and the best way of ensuring
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this is for them to have substantial financial and 
industrial links with international groups, That is 
why it was essential to be able to reserve for 
foreign buyers part of the capital of the firms put 
on sale,
Although on the day of the sale, the total foreign participation was 
limited to 20%, and any single investor from outside the EEC would need 
Treasury permission to exceed a 20% holding, from the first day of trading 
there would be no limit placed on total foreign holdings in any non­
armaments company, Many French firms owned foreign subsidiaries, argued 
Balladur, so
By what right could we have forbidden the same 
freedoms in France to foreign firms coming from 
countries which like us are members of the EEC or the 
OECD, It was unthinkable, against natural rights, 
against our very national interest,'
Balladur's arguments had been prefigured by the bankers on whom the
party relied to make their case against the Socialists' nationalizations in
1981, While still laying claim to "an ambitious policy of national 
23
independence" the RPR deputies recognized that that ambition was now 
conditioned by the internationalization of the key sectors of the French 
economy, All the industrial groups it was proposed to nationalize made more 
than 50% of their turnover outside France, they told the National Assembly, 
Mearly all of their growth plans, which were now in jeopardy, depended 
on tie-ups with foreign, especially American, firms, For good measure, they 
added that the proposed new monopolies were against the spirit of the 
t re a t y o f R ome,
Twenty years of change in the shape of world capitalism had forced 
leading Gaul lists to admit openly that it was now time to abandon the 
general's dream of establishing French-only production units subject only 
to the orders of the French government, By the end of the 1970s there were
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similar reasons for disillusionment with the second major strand of
Gau11i st i ndus tr i a 1 poliey,
T r a d e
Endorsed by Gaul lists as different as Chaban Delmas and Debra, and 
expressed in the 5th plan which ran from 1965-70, this was the proposed 
amalgamation of a number of medium-sized firms in each branch of industry 
into one or two "national champions", giant companies considered to be of 
sufficient size to succeed in international trade, To achieve their aims, 
the planners targetted grants and subsidized credit on individual firms in 
return for their acceptance of state-proposed reorganization schemes
Ik
codified in individual contracts,
Michel Debra, Minister of Finance from 1966-8, later boasted of the 
fusion of two deposit banks into the BNP, one of the world's top ten, the 
amalgamation of 13 insurance groups into three, the formation of the SNIA 
(.Socistd Nationals Industrie!Is Aerospatiale) from three existing firms, 
the merger of the chemicals concerns Ugine, and Kuhlmann, later to be 
joined by the aluminium producer, Pechiney, and of the help given to 
SNECMA, (Socieie nationals d 'equipements si ds constructions de motsurs 
d'aviation), Overall, in each of the years from 1966-69, the value of
merger operations was double or more the sum of the value of mergers in the
   _
entire period 1950— 1960,
The steel industry provided the most graphic example of this dirigist 
policy going awry, By borrowing huge sums from the banks, scrapping their 
older plant, pooling their more efficient operations, and constructing two 
brand new super complexes using the latest technology on coastal sites near- 
Dunkirk and Marseilles, French steel companies contributed to the absolute
overproduction which destroyed profit margins throughout the European
industry, At the same time the companies' debts rose from 33% of sales in
1952 to 112% in 1978, until their solvency came to depend completely on
annual transfusions of public money, Subsequently, the political
considerations which weighed most in the painful rationalization decisions
taken by the Gaul lists' successors in power, had more to do with avoiding
the political consequences of massive regionally concentrated unemployment
Vi
than with the international trade in steel,
Although steel was the worst case, there were other drawbacks to a
policy oriented exclusively on big firms and closely supervised by the
government, Mergers did not always lead to enough rationalization and
streamlining, but were sometimes limited to a "confederation" of existing
structures which retained their old practices, and added new problems in
the shape of additional layers of management, There was a tendency for
wages to drift upwards to the highest level in the new group, and the
"champions" were still not big enough in some sectors to take the field
suc cessfu11y agai nst thei r Ame r i c an rivals, a 11hough they had become "too
big" for France in the sense that managerial decisions on wages or
redundancies were immediately loaded with political and social 
3o
implications, Above all, it was not clear that state aid was essential 
to bring about those amalgamations which had the strongest market logic, In 
computers aids were crucial to keeping the French industry afloat, but 
ultimately ineffective in international terms, On the other hand, it 
allegedly played no role at all in the merger of Saint-Gobain - Pont a
Mousson, which would have occurred as a result of market logic in any case,
31
according to the group's new manager,
After 1974, the governments of Giscard d'Estaing, in which the
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Gaul lists were progressively less and less influential, continued the 
highly interventionist approach of their predecessors, identifying certain 
industries and even firms as key to the national effort and seeking to 
influence the structure and volume of output with import quotas, export 
suhsidies, preferentia1 publie purchasing, artificially induced
ll
restructuring and even the blocking of attempted foreign takeovers, But
under the impact of economic crisis the political concern to head off
unemployment led to a certain loss of coherence and the managed economy
began to ressemble a field hospital whose patients were lame ducks rather
33
than n a t iona 1 champions,
Later studies showed that even when the state pursued plans for 
individual sectors vigorously and consistently, it was prevented from 
achieving its aims by problems peculiar to each case, In chemicals and 
machine tools, governments tried to pick the industry up off the floor, but 
were defeated by the poor adaptation of existing French firms to 
international competition, In consumer electronics and computers, they 
tried to impose on moderately successful private-sec tor firms product 
development and marketing decisions dictated by state preferences for a 
certain pattern of international tie-ups, but were ultimately defeated by 
the .industrialists' adherence to their own strategies, In oil and 
telecommunications, governments succeeded in building up para—public 
industrial units of international rank, but at the cost of losing control
3i*
of long-term strategy to the bureaucracy they had themselves created,
Apart from Chalandon, as we saw in chapter 8, Gaul lists have rarely 
admitted that it was mistaken in principle to expect civil servants and 
politicians to predict which sectors French businesses ought to operate
in, In 1979 the RPR in Parliament was still officially endorsing Debre's 
calls for protectionism and a state-directed investment programme, while 
the plethora of investment aids were criticized in fit-out France not because 
they existed but because of poor targetting, In the 1980s, however the turn 
to liberalism was associated with recognition that the conditions of 
international competition had changed dramatically since the recession 
provoked by what economists call "the first oil-shock" in 1974,
Whatever the results of individual domestic policies, prosperity under 
the Gaul lists was clearly conditioned by French participation in the 
thirty-year world boom, fuelled by an interlocking circuit of manufacture, 
trade, and expectations, which integrated all the industrialized countries 
with open economies, When the boom was at its height, so was the 
concentration of trade among the leading nations, In 1960, two thirds of 
the import trade of industrial countries was between themselves, and by
37
1971, the proportion had risen to three-quarters, As part of this co­
operative pattern, the French economy itself became much more open, The 
share of French GDP which was traded in the early 1950s was roughly one 
twelfth, In 1960, exports represented 15% of GDP ( imports 14,9%); in
1970, exports were 16,3% (imports 15,8%), and in 1980 the figures had risen
39
to 44,3% and 44,1%, The effects of partnership with the other EEC 
countries were particularly striking, In 1958, just over a quarter of 
French trade was with the EEC; by 1979, it was over a half,
But France's effort was essentially participatory rather than decisive 
in world expansion, The French share of advanced countries' combined GNP 
rose from 8% in 1953 to 9,7% in 1977, In the same period, the American and 
British shares of world production shrank, but France was herself 
overhauled by West Germany and Japan, up from 6,5,% to 13,2% and from 3,6%
to 17,1% respect i ve1y,
If France prospered during the boom, despite or because of Gaul list
interventionism, by the end of the 1370s French industry was having
increasing difficulties coping with much tighter international competition
in a period of static or shrinking markets, In each of the years 1978 -79 -
80, France ran a trade deficit with the USA, the EEC and OPEC, selling more
than she bought only in the Eastern bloc and the non-oil developing 
L+L
countries, between 197y and 198b the only industrial branches to record
a surplus in the balance of payments were agri-business, capital goods, and
transport equipment, Of these, only agri-business had strengthened its
4-3
position during the four years. Foreign penetration of the French
consumer goods market was rising most strongly in clothing and in brown
goods containing electronic components, sectors in which the newly
industrializing countries of the Pacific were specialized,
These were the figures which prompted Michel Debre to desribe free-
trade as mortelle for trance, while the 198U RPR programme called for a
reconquest of the domestic market and the former Gaul list minister Jean-
Marcel Jeanneney repeatedly demanded protectionism at EEC level, In
contrast, Balladur's appraisal of these developments led him to the
conclusions already reached by Chalandon, His growing influence on Chirac
helped them to become the new party orthodoxy;
There came the oil crisis of 1973, then another in 
1979, There was the crisis of the international 
monetary system, inflation, and a slump in economic 
activity,,,,, The legitimately protected economy of 
1945 no longer bore the slightest resemblance to the 
open economy of the lyS'Us, Ue were in the era of the 
lowering of barriers, of the internationalization of 
the economy, of sharper and sharper international 
c ompet i t i on demandi ng the abi1i ty to respond qu i c k1y 
which only freedom can guarantee, In the face of 
these new challenges, among the great modern nations, 
only our own economy was still astonishingly
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kb
sheltered, regulated and state-dominated,
In reaction to the failure of macro-level attempts to predict the best
market opportunities for French businesses, and worried by France's
galloping deficit with West Germany, her biggest trading partner,
policy-makers and commentators turned their attention to the relative
performance of French and German firms, In 1976, the Ministry of Industry
officially abandoned the national champions policy and announced that the
future lay with small firms,
If so, the future was not very promising, A survey of firms employing
less than 500 workers revealed that 60% would reject an increase in their
capital that gave a bank or state agency some share in their firm, 78% of
them used no market studies, 31% never test-marketed a new product, and 67%
had no trade union organization in the plant, In the late 1970s, three
quarters of all French exports were provided by less than 1,000 firms,
including all of the biggest, each of which devoted at least 40% of its
turnover to exporting, The remaining quarter of the total was provided by
10,000 small or medium-sized firms, for which exporting constituted some
20% of turnover, A former minister of foreign trade, J-F Deniau, calculated
that France needed to convert a further 10,000 firms to the idea of
e xpo r t ing r egulariy, i n or der to appr oach the s i t u a t i on pe r ta i n i ng i n West
SO
Germany or Belgium,
In 1982, a fifth of all French companies and a third of the hundred
largest were in the red, the rate of profit across industry had fallen from
28,5% in 1973 to 24,4% in 1980 and 22,6% in 1982, and the rate of self-
51
financing had fallen from 76,1% in 1979 to 51,2% in 1982, In 1986, the 
greater dynamism of the West German smal1—business sector seemed to be 
confirmed by the report of a. Swiss research institute which found that
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German firms were more likely to take the initiative in Franco-German 
co-operative ventures, which in consequence were more likely to be aimed at
n
the French market. All of these figures help to explain how the RPR's 
technocrats fell in with the employers' outcry against taxes and charges, 
their attempts to by-pass union organization, and their claim to greater 
freedom of decision making in response market changes,
M o n e y
The distinctive Gaul list exchange-rate policy of the 1960s was the
work of the general himself, his special financial adviser Jacques Rueff,
and Michel Debr-e, prime mininster 1959-63 and Finance minister 1966-68, Its
essential feature was defence of a high value for the franc, in order to
maintain French diplomatic and economic leverage; in pursuit of this aim
the Gaul lists distinguished themselves during the 1960s by persistent calls
for the reorganization of the international payments system, and actions
designed to frustrate US domination in this area of international
relations, Even during the 1960s, however, economic changes were working to
u n d e r m i n e a single coun t r y 1s ab i1it y to ma nage its own exchange rate, These
changes were magnified greatly during the 1970s, and the general's
interventionist policy did not long survive his own loss of power,
In 1971, the money value of world trade was 3ST times what it had been 
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in the early 1960s, In the same year, if the value of world exports were
added to the value of the non-exported output of firms owned or controlled
abroad, the total amounted to roughly 20% of estimated world output, or
-
over half of the GNP of non-Comraunist countries, Taken together,
expansion of trade and international production implied the need for 
private economic actors to hold larger and larger stocks of the world's
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currencies, As a result, quite small changes in the cost of borrowing money
or in expectations of variations between parities began to result in
PS
violent lurches of funds across the exchange rates,
This was a problem not only for the currency which was under attack; 
under the system of fixed exchange rates which obtained throughout the 
l960s, the author i t i es i n c harge of a strong c ur rency, sueh as the 
Deutschmark, which was usually on the receiving end of speculative flows, 
were obliged to "buy up" vast quantities of the threatened currency in 
order to defend its parity, an operation which usually entailed an 
unplanned increase in the domestic money supply, a n d  the wrecking of 
existing inflation and growth targets,-
Western governments reacted to the problem of excessive private 
liquidity in piecemeal fashion, Germany and the USA enacted legislation
5*1
penalizing foreign borrowing, The Japanese had won exemption from the
spirit of international agreements, and operated stringent controls on
5i?
currency markets and foreign investment, . The British relied on periodic 
US assistance to bolster sterling, During the 1960s the French argued more 
and more insistently that only a wide-ranging reform of the international 
monetary system, preferably giving a prominent role to gold, could deal 
adequately both with exchange rate instability, and with the unfairness of 
the US ability to finance their trade deficit by printing dollars,
By the end of the 1960s, in the US, Japan, the UK and France reserves 
were less than 10% of money supply defined as cash and current accounts, In 
1969 the identified short-term dollar assets held by banks and firms in the 
international money market were $162 billion, In 1970 they rose to $212 
billion, and in 1971 to $268 billion, The latter figure was more than twice 
the value of all the international reserves held in central banks and
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international monetary institutions, In 1973 a US government committee
coneeded]
These are the reserves with which the central banks 
fight to defend their exchange rates. The resources 
of the private sector outclass them,
The imbalance between private and official liquidity ruled out 
decisively any national exchange rate policy which did not have powerful 
support within the international community, and during the decade from 
about 1965 to about 1975 it progressively destroyed the system of fixed 
exchange rates which had governed international payments since 1944,
By the late 1960s the USA had begun to return deficits on visible
trade, which were financed by the export of dollars, We have already seen
that this was the source of complaints that Americans could “buy up" Europe
if they chose, The excess of dollars in the system, turned into a flood by
the cost of the Vietnam war and dubbed the "dollar overhang", cast doubt on
the Americans' ability to exchange gold for dollars, as they officially
promised to do, if presented with too many demands at the same time, Under
the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement the US Federal. Reserve was committed to
handing over gold only for dollars presented by central banks, But Japan
had promised unofficially not to exchange dollars for gold - which
represented only 15% of their reserves in the 1960s, a much smaller figure
61
than was usual in Europe, and in 1967 the West German government 
announced that it would not seek to convert its dollars, in exchange for 
increased US payments for the cost of its armed forces stationed in 
Germany,
In contrast, French policy after 1958 was to seek to have part of 
their payments surpluses settled in gold, while the Bank of France 
converted existing dollar holdings into gold at the rate of 30 tons a
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month, In January 1965 it was announced that this would continue, that $150 
million was to be converted immediately, and that the French government 
w o u 1 d s e e k a u t o m a t i c a 11 y t o c o n v e r t a n y n e w a c c u m u 1 a t i o n o f d o .1.1 a r s, A t a 
famous press conference in February 1965, de Gaulle made an eulogistic and 
flamboyant call for a return to the gold standard, A year later, Giscard 
was replaced as finance minister by Debr£, a 'hard-line' defender of
65 
gold, •
While the avowed French aim was to double the price of gold, the
Americans wanted to prevent it rising at all and causing a de facto
devaluation of the dollar, France's membership of the US-sponsored Gold 
Pool, a purchasing cartel managed by the Bank of England and designed to
smooth out fluctuations in its price, was thus less than ful1-hearted, In
mid-1967, in response to a rising world-wide demand for gold which pushed 
the price up, France withdrew unilaterally from the Pool, Between June 
and November there were 14 extensions of $5u million each to the Pool's 
buffer stock, financed by contributions from central banks, sterling was 
devalued, and the gold rush continued into the new year, forcing the US 
Congress to abolish the statutory American gold reserve minimum of $10 
billion, despite the announcement of "draconian" new measures aimed at 
stemming the dollar outflow. With the free market price of gold soaring way- 
above the "official" price established by a short-lived two-tier system, 
the US monetary authorites finally renounced dollar-gold convertibility in 
August 1971, and were obliged to abandon the notional price of $42 to the 
ounce in the spring of 1973,
The mid-1960s can be seen as the high-water mark of the independent 
Gaul list exchange-rate policy, during which the French government made its 
modest contribution to bringing down the dollar, Yet the forces which
produced that outcome would probably have done so even without de Gaulle, 
and it was the French government itself which was to be their next victim, 
The events of May '68 led to a drain of $4,7 billion from the French 
reserves in the following 12 months, Together with the weakening of the 
franc, this undermined the French position in negotiations for the reform
u
of the international payments system, After his victory in the June 
general election, which momentarily stemmed the flight from the franc, de 
Gaulle's last show of defiance was to refuse the widely anticipated 
devaluation and reirnpose a deflationary credit package along with exchange 
controls which had been lifted only 6 weeks previously,
But the franc came under renewed pressure immediately following the 
general's departure in April 1969, Bowing to the inevitable, Pompidou 
devalued by 11,11% in August, and France was obliged publicly to swallow 
the pill of consultations with IMF officials with a view to arranging a 
s tand-by c redi t of $ 1 bill i.on, More di sc ree11 y, France thie foilowi ng 
December ratified an expansion of the IMF's system of Special Drawing 
Rights - an alternative to gold which de Gaulle had always rejected ~ and 
all demands that reduction of the US deficits should proceed reorganization
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of the international payments system were quietly buried, Some seven
years later the IMF adopted another reform of its statutes, by which no
member nation would be permitted to define its currency by reference to
gold, the official gold price was abolished, and exchanges of gold between
70
central banks accordingly came to an end,
Giscard d'Estaing represented France at this funeral of the gold 
standard in Jamaica in 1976, but did not ask the French parliament to 
ratify it until April 1978, when the reform had already achieved the 
appropriate qualified majority among the Fund's other members and the only
effect of rejection would have been to reduce the size of stand-by credits
7/
available to any future needy French government, La Lettre de la Nation,
guardian of the Gaul list conscience, vigorously reiterated the RF'R's
72.
opposition to a system of floating currencies, Couve de Murvilie
protested that the new statutes constituted the formal abandonment of all
the ideas which France had defended since 1960, and Debre led a small group
73
in opposition in the chamber, But the party's official spokesmen, 
signalling reluctant acquiescence, implicitly admitted that the era of 
individual central bank interventions had passed with the system of fixed 
parities and, significantly, looked forward to a future stabilization of
7*-
rates based around a possible European pole,
The 1970s was a decade of even faster growth in private liquidity than 
the 1960s as the Eurobond market outgrew Eurodollars, multinational firms 
set up their own banking operations, and there was a proliferation of all 
kinds of new credit instruments, more and more freely traded outside the 
confines of the old stock exchange closed shops, According to one estimate, 
by the mid 1980s no more than 10% of all the foreign exchange traded daily 
around the world was earmarked for the payment of bills or the purchase of 
goods; the rest was pure speculation, I he problems caused by the 
consequent exchange-rate volatility for the calculation of returns from 
trading in goods more or less compelled the organization of something like 
the European Monetary System, in an attempt to maintain rough parities 
within a target zone, The Gaul lists have long since given up to the British 
prime minister the distinction of being the system's chief opponent,
Along with the consequences for exchange-rate policy, an equally far- 
reaching consequence of the vast expansion of private liquidity has been an
explosion in the range of financial products on sale since deregulation
during the 1970s in the USA and the UK, A Gaul list deputy, Pierre Bas
implicitly abandoned previous orthodoxy when he told the Socialists in 1981 
that it was pointless to carry further the nationalization of the banks, 
since interest rates depended on many external factors which governments
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cannot possibly master in an open economy,
During the 1980s it became clear that liberalization of the French 
financial services industry was essential if Paris was to continue to 
profit from the spin-offs of status as a major financial centre, and if 
French-owned banks were to compete on equal terms with their rivals,
France, like all European countries including the UK, lost market share in
the Eurocurrency business during the 1970s to the growing off-shore centres
7?
in the Caribbean, the Middle East and the Pacific, Whereas in 1971 only 
New Vork C55> and London ( 217) harboured more international bank branches 
than Paris, (38) by 1978 the French capital, having advanced to 66, had
7?
been overtaken by Hong Kong (102) and yingapore (73.1, In 1981 a 
comparative study oi the Euromarkets and international financial policies 
concluded that Paris could never become a major world-wide financial centre 
because of the close control over financial markets exercised by the Bank 
of France,
During 1984-5 it turned out to be a Socialist government which 
energetically pursued deregulation, The stock exchange was reformed to 
allow dealing in swaps, options and the other paraphernalia of high class 
gambling, An unquoted shares market was established and the former division 
of functions between banks and other financial actors broken down, allowing 
each to lend over a bigger range of terms, at variable rates or 
interest, Bowing to the logic of these developments when he took over
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the ministry of Finance in 1986, Balladur, the F'ompidol ian technocrat,
carried further the abolition of exchange controls, and put an end to the
last elements of the system of detailed quantitative control of credit
which had once been the pillar of the Gaul list state's management of the 
SI
economy,
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Chapter 11 Interpretation
In this case-study of the RPR, academic approaches to party behaviour
starting point of parties’ links with the wider society. Some authors, 
such as Panebianco and Lagroye, have recently provided welcome exceptions 
whose work we have tried to build on.
Nevertheless, a survey of the party's organizational development and 
transformations in chapter 4 revealed no link between programmatic 
development and changes in the make up of the party's dominant coalition. 
Ironically, the ideas of a defeated faction, the Gallo-Giscardians, were 
those which triumphed in the party in the 1980s.
In chapter 5 we encountered a rather crude sociological variant of a 
class explanation of party behaviour. New party activists, claimed 
Fremontier, are from business backgrounds, whereas their elders are 
state-trained technocrats, Therefore it was inevitable that the party's 
attachment to interventionism would give way to liberalism. After careful 
consideration, we dismissed the argument on Fr£montier's own evidence: he
had not proved that a new generation of activists had tipped the balance 
in favour of business interests. Furthermore, there is no necessary 
correlation between numerical dominance of a certain class of members, 
and influence on party programmes.
establish no causal link between party competition, voting behaviour or 
opinion research and the content of the programmes which the RPR placed
have generally been criticized for failing to tackle the subject from the
the present work it was argued that the political
scientist's stock-in-trade of election studies and even the comparatively
more exotic discipline of political communications in the end could
before the electorate in the 1980s.
On the basis of the evidence presented in chapters 7-10, can we begin 
to construct an alternative and more satisfying theoretical model which 
could account for party programme change? This is the task of most of 
this chapter, which addresses the linkages between party, class and 
ideology.
A point we can make fairly confidently is that in this case 
sociological data is of secondary rather than primary importance. One of 
our arguments against Fr6montier was that data about rather loosely drawn 
occupational categories was not sufficient on its own to account for the 
ideas of his subjects. Similarly, we know that the membership of debating 
societies like the Club de 1' Horloge and the Club '89 was largely 
recruited from professionals and private-sector managers, 1 but we do not 
know for certain whether the work-situation of all such members led them 
to favour the retreat of the state, or whether, on the contrary, they 
worked for firms comfortably surviving on safe government contracts or 
sheltering behind cartels or other restrictive practices.
Brechon, Derville and Lecomte, in their study of the delegates to the 
1984 RPR congress, are more precise. They found both that professionals 
and private sector managers were more numerous among the generation of 
activists who joined the party after 1981 than among those who joined 
before,2 and that such activists were more favourable to the market and 
less favourable to reducing disparities of income than other categories. 3
But this in turn raises another question. There is no data which 
tells us whether such people joined the party because it was already 
beginning to put across a message which they agreed with, or because,
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moved by outrage at the new government's policies they flocked to the 
party which seemed to be the Socialists' most uncompromising opponent, 
thus changing its character. Whichever way round it was, (perhaps both at 
once) neither the sociological background nor the ideas of individual 
activists affected programme-content directly, as we showed in chapters 4 
and 9, because the members had a negligible practical role in actually 
drawing up the programme.
Neverthless, members do sometimes abandon their parties en masse 
because of policy disagreements.'1 That this did not happen to the RPR 
implies that the bulk of the members were happy with the programme. The 
programme-drafters may have supposed that their projects would be 
acceptable to a milieu which they knew and understood, but we have no 
evidence that they wrote the programme to please the members. Such 
evidence as we have deployed in chapter 4 seems to show that they took no 
notice of the members.
From all this, we can construct the following hypothesis of the 
linkage between party and club membership and programme content: a new
programme was drawn up relatively independently of the members and their 
particular concerns, but its content was such as to gain the assent of 
activists made up primarily of professionals and private-sector managers, 
who were perhaps those whose work situation made them most favourable to 
liberalism. Once the process of ideological production (in the case of 
the clubs) or revision (in the case of the RPR) was under way, it may 
have been reinforced by a pattern of self-selection in recruitment to 
clubs and the party.
If it did not emanate directly from the party and club activists, 
what was the source of the coherent liberal programme to which they gave
their assent? In chapter 7 we sketched something of ideological changes 
among mainly non-party intellectuals of the French Right. In Chapter 8 it 
was shown that American experiences vied with more traditional organicist 
conceptions and pragmatic instincts in those thoughts of RPR notables 
which were recorded on paper or in speeches. From this cross­
fertilization emerged the formula that the state should do less in order 
to do better the things which it does.
This formula could be interpreted either in a mainly liberal sense, 
implying that the state should reduce its constraints on individual non­
economic as well as economic activity, or in a mainly authoritarian 
sense, implying that the state should abandon its egalitarian ventures in 
order to concentrate on its role as guardian of law, order and morality. 
As such, the formupla could appeal to RPR members of different political 
sensibilities, and was easily assimilable by members at any level of the 
hierarchy. It also corresponded roughly to the interests of many French 
employers.
Some of the latter, as we showed in chapter 9, had themselves 
selectively drawn on their own experiences and on the intellectuals' 
output, in order to develop a liberal programme which concentrated on 
tax-cutting and deregulation of the labour market. We saw that similar 
conditions led to similar conclusions in Japan, the USA and France. The
enough to allow us to dismiss Wilson's suggestion that business,
rarely takes an interest in formulating broader 
future social or economic policies, usually it 
reacts to government initiatives. B
But some would-be Marxists have tried to impose equally unsuitable
blanket interpretations on the international popularity of liberalism;
French employers' contribution to the liberal
according to one attempted account of "capitalist strategy in the
crisis",
The thesis we shall defend is that there is really 
only a single capitalist strategy Cby the term 
capitalist, we mean at the same time the employers 
and states) ®
In attempting to assign appropriate explanatory weight to each of the 
variables in the RPR's ideological renewal, we are struck rather by the 
disjunctions between the ideas of Blot, the more rigorous of the new 
economists, and the interests of different groups of employers. Like 
their colleagues elsewhere, French employers have developed diverse 
attitudes to the question of discipline and hierarchy within the 
workplace. To the extent that quality circles and flexible working can 
persuade workers to discipline themselves, some managers cancontemplate a 
relaxation of the state's traditional role as moral standard-bearer and 
regulator of the picket lines, and they have a corresponding incentive to 
support a programme of relative democratization of local government. 
Certainly, like the new economists but unlike Blot and his friends, most 
employers can afford to be indifferent to the question of whether their 
employees or clients are homosexuals, patriots, catholics, or even 
republicans. In his continual attempts to drag in these issues, Blot was 
distinctly out of phase both with the new economists and with the grass 
roots aspirations for a less hierarchical society which we discussed in 
chapter 5.
Secondly, in the nature of things, employers are divided amongst 
themselves both on where the limits of state interventionism should be 
drawn, and on such other liberal tenets as the undesirability of 
monopoly. Although there was a growing liberal consensus on deregulation
-476-
of the labour market, state contracts conserved their importance for arms
manufacturers; regulation, price-fixing and cartellization were more
attractive to the technocrats who ran Air France than to the bankers
threatened by international financial deregulation. Some business leaders
were much more careful than others to set limits to the retreat of the
state from the economy and from its redistributive role. Their pragmatic
liberalism is perfectly expressed by Raymond Barre;
It is not a question only of the competitivity of 
French firms, whether they are public or private, 
agricultural, industrial or commercial, but of the
competitivity of the nation as a whole.....  from
the education system, through social security, to 
the administration, so that there is a notion 
which seems more and more important: the notion of
the fixed costs of the nation. This notion should 
be systematically taken into account today so that 
these fixed costs do not amount to a serious 
handicap in international competition.'7’
This is a far cry from the demands of Lepage and Sorman that the
provision of education and social insurance should depend essentially on
the whims of the "consumers*'. Barre's approach was echoed by Francois
P^rigot, president of the CNPF, welcoming the opportunities of 1992,
on condition that we reform the tax-system, the 
social system and especially the educational 
system which turns out unemployed people...®
The most pragmatic representatives of business interests, in short, 
saw a continued role for the state in creating and maintaining by the 
most economical means an infrastructure sufficient to provide French 
businesses with a healthy and educated workforce and the minimum 
administrative assistance necessary to help them face up to international 
compet i t ion.
The stance of Barre and his fellow thinkers provides a useful guard 
against the temptation to conclude that objective conditions have
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combined to ensure that an era of ’’liberal" capitalism is now set to 
succeeded the preceeding "state-capitalist" phase of expansion. In 
chapter 10 we summarized the objective factors which contributed to 
French technocrats' disillusionment with pervasive interventionism, but 
it is still far from clear that, for all industries and all states, a 
completely "hands-off" relationship is the one which best suits business 
interests. The success under different conditions of the newly 
Industrializing countries of the Pacific basin illustrates the point 
wel1.®
It is a rich irony that the first element of explanation of the 
Gaullists' programmatic renewal is the party's handing over drafting of 
parts of their programme to small groups of unelected businessmen and 
technocrats. Our study has found no evidence that the business interests 
involved formed any kind of coherent fraction of the bourgeoisie, united 
by similar material interests. Attempts to divide the modern bourgeoisie 
up into rival fractions of financiers and industrialists have not been 
very successful. '° The ideas of the RPR's friends may have been more 
liberal than those of other colleagues, partly because they included a 
number of bankers and financiers, whose industry was seriously 
disadvantaged by state controls. But equally significant was the 
participation of representatives of firms which hoped to buy into the 
state or municipal assets which it was planned to put on sale. There were 
strong personal and clientelistic links between them and the RPR leaders. 
On one level, the class input into the new RPR programme was no more 
mysterious than that.
On another, more general level, however, it seems fair to say that
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class interests had a lot to do with the international liberal revival of
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Liberal ideas have existed in various
forms since Adam Smith. Why did they enjoy such a burst of new theorizing
and such a revival of popularity when they did? Giving a new twist to
Marx's notion that the ruling ideas in any society are the ideas of the
ruling class, Irving Kristol, one of the American thinkers close to Yvan
Blot in his ideas, paid this homage to his business benefactors;
Not that they contributed much in the way of 
ideas, their real contribution was money. In the 
last twelve years, the business world has shown 
itself to be more and more and more sensitive to 
and interested in the neo-conservative current, 
and it generously encourages more and more studies 
of conservatism and neo-conservatism, with the 
result that the "think-tanks" of this current of 
ideas, the Hoover Institute, the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the 
Hudson Institute, are steadily becoming centres of 
competence and authority in the United States11
In short, there was a revival of liberal self-confidence because 
American employers were prepared to pay American intellectuals to produce 
ideas which aimed to "roll back" what they regarded as noxious 
collectivist influences in American society. Not only did they succeed in 
securing the election of Reagan in the USA, they also spread their 
influence across the Atlantic into European politics, as our own study 
has shown. Developments in the RPR are a precious illustration of the 
lesson that it is one thing for more or less common interests to exist, 
another thing for ideologists to articulate those interests into a 
coherent programme, and still another for an organized group of fellow- 
thinkers to campaign for that programme.
The maturation of a number of objective conditions - developments in
v
the world economy, the French Socialist electoral victory, unemployment
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and the crisis of French trade unionism1 which undermined workers' self-
confidence - made it possible for liberal ideas to gain in popularity in
a country where they had been weak for most of the 20th century. The 
theoretical work of the American think-tanks gave those ideas freshness
about a remarkable realignment in the traditional stance of a major 
national party.
might fruitfully form the basis for further research. The first is the 
degree to which the RPR contributed to shifting the whole centre of ^  
gravity of French politics to the right during the 1980s, even though 
they gained precious little electorally from the decade.
If our study has proved anything it is that the RPR leaders ignored 
voter scepticism in launching their liberal campaign, yet managed to win 
a few converts on the way to a narrow election victory. There is a lesson 
there for members of the British Labour party who have justified revision 
of their own traditional policies by arguing that Thatcherism satisfies 
citizen aspirations.
More generally, our findings ought to reinforce the view that parties 
are key autonomous agents for social and political change. Even if 
political scientists rightly point to their marginal impact on policy 
outcomes once institutional and interest-group constraints are taken into 
account, parties have a key role in focussing the ideas which citizens 
have about the society they live in. Indeed party rivalry is virtually 
the only framework within which most voters can think about broad social 
questions. It is for this reason that one is tempted to think that the
and contemporary relevance. Yvan Blot and the Club de 1'Horloge were the
self-appointed vanguard of the "national liberal" current which brought
That realignment in its turn has raised a number of questions which
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RPR, paradoxically urged on by the freakishly reactionary Club de 
1'Horloge and the elitist technocrat Balladur converted more people to 
liberalism in France than the combined efforts of non-party propagandists 
like Lepage and Sorman.
A related question concerns the degree to which economic or social 
factors, relayed through the party system, were responsible for the 
break-up of the right-wing coalition after the 1988 French presidential 
elections. Should the decision of the Centre des Democrates Sociaux to 
set up its own group of deputies, and the acceptance of government posts 
by some of their fellow-thinkers, be taken as signs of a serious 
disagreement among the former coalition members over the best economic 
strategy for France, provoked by the "liberalization" of the RPR? Was the 
break forced by the Centre's distaste for the hegernonizing ambitions 
displayed by the RPR during the 1986-88 government, notably in the 
controversial privatization process? Or, at its lowest, does the Centre's 
partial rapprochement with Mitterrand's Socialists rest on no more than 
the personal ambitions of number of professional politicians, merely the 
latest exponents of the rich traditon of opportunism in French politics?
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RESEARCH SOURCES
Interviews
This thesis could not have been completed without the co-operation of 
twenty-three RPR members who agreed to be interviewed. Twenty were 
politicians of first or second rank, and three were party workers. The 
list of names and interview dates includes brief statements of the 
interviewees' relevance to my project. They are not necessarily complete 
summaries of their careers.
I Indicates the interview was tape-recorded.
Philippe Auber ger I, G-l-89
Mayor of Joigny, 1977- Deputy for the Yonne, 1986-
Author of L'Allet gle Fiscale, the party's "tax expert". Sent briefing 
papers to Chirac, 1979—80.
Michel Aur iliac, t, 9-2-89
Former prefect. Deputy for Indre, 1978-81; Minister of Co-operation, 1986- 
88. Founder and president of Club *89, 1981-
Yvan Blot I, 28-4-89
Co-founder of tire Club de 1'Horloge in 1974; Directeur de cabinet to RPR 
general secretaries, Alain Devaquet, 1978-9, and Bernard Pons 1979-84. 
Member of RPR commission ex&cuti ve during this period; active in training 
of party cadres, and in sending briefing papers to Chirac and other 
leaders.
Yvon Bourges, 11 — 1—89
Gallo-Giscardian, Minister of Defence, 1975-80; Mayor of Dinard, 1962-7 
and 1971-89; Senator for Ile-et-Vilaine, 1980- ; President of Brittany 
regional council, 1986-
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9Jacques Boyon I, 27-4-39
Mayor of Pont d'Ain, 1971- ; Deputy for Ain, 1978-
Responsible for professions lib£rales at party headquarters, 1979-81. 
Responsible for local government, 1981-4. Also worked in non-party group, 
directly with Chirac and others, based at Paris town hall. 198G-38, junior 
minister in defence department.
Albin Chalandon, 1-12-88
Cbabaniste, former general secretary of UNR, Minister of Justice 193G-88, 
author.
Jean Charbonnel I, 17-4-89
Left Gaullist; junior minister 19G9-73. Deputy and Mayor Brive-la 
Gaillarde intermittently since 19G7. Left UDR and went into opposition in 
1975. Returned to fold in 1979, as part of Chirac's attempt to rally 
Gaullist diaspora for 1981 campaign.
Philip Deoliarlre I, 6-12-88
Left Gaullist; junior minister '1969-72. Responsible for Action Ouvri&re et 
Professionnelle, 1976-80. Resigned from RPR in 1988 in protest at move to 
the right.
Jean-Pierre Delalande 1, 21-12-88
Deputy for Val d'Oise, 1978-81, when he was main parliamentary spokesman 
on participation. Lost seat in 1981; briefly in charge of AOP at rue de 
Lille, before moving to foreign policy, where he was member of RPR 
commission executive, 1981-83.
Patrick Devedjian 1, 9-1-89
Mayor of Antony, 1983- ; Deputy for the Hauts de Seine, 1986- 
Responsible for federations at party headquarters, 1986-8; part of 
Chirac's 1988 campaign team.
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Herve Fabre-Aubrespy, 25-4-09
Worked for Toubon, on elections, and for Balladur on drafting of 
privatization legislation. Currently directeur de cabinet of Alain Juppe, 
RPR general secretary.
Andre Fanlon i, 21-4-89
Debr&iste, UNR deputy for Paris, 1958-78, except when junior minister 
1969-72. Responsible for communications, at party headquarters, 1979-81, 
and afterwards for opinion polling up to 1985.
Francois Fillon, 5-1-89
Deputy for the Sarthe, 1981- Mayor of Sable, 1983- 
Mi chel Giraud I 10-1-89
Mayor of le Pen eux, 1971- President of lie de France regional council, 
1976-1988. Senator, 1977-88; Deputy, 1988- 
Chief spokesman for decentralization in the RPR
Jacques Godfrain, 21-12-88
Deputy for the Aveyron, 1978- ; National Secretary, responsible for law
and order policy, 1984—88
Yves Gueiid I, 5-1-89
Debr eis L e, Deputy for Dordogne, 1962-81, and 1986-88;
Mayor of Per igueux, 1971- ; Various ministerial posts, 1967-9.
General secretary of UDR, 1976, when he helped Chirac found the RPR;
Del ague Foiltique of RPR, 1977-8.
Gerard Leban I, 26-4-89
Businessman who from 1978-87 set up and ran the "professional” side of the 
Action Ouvri&re et Frofeasionnelle. Adjoint to Chirac at Paris town hall.
Jean-Fran^ols Mancel l, 20-4-89
Deputy for the Oise, 1978-81 and 1986- President of the Consell gen&ral
of the Oise, 1985-
Responsible for commerce and artisanat at party headquarters, 1979-31. 
Responsible for animation and member of Executive Committee, 1981-4.
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Michel Maui ice-Bokunowsk 1 I, 14-12-88
Minister of Industry, 1962-66. Mayor of Asniet es, 1959- ; Senator for the 
Hauts de Seine, 1968-
Pier re Messioer, 20-12-88
Prime Mirdstei 1972-74; President of RPR group of deputies, 1906-88.
Alain Peyrefitte I, 6-12-88
Gallo-Giscardianj Minister of Justice, 1976-81, author.
Etienne Pinte t, 13-12-88 
Deputy for the Yvelines, 1978-
Main parliamentary spokesman on family/demographic policy In late 1970s. 
Georges Repeczky I, 6-12-88
Retired industr ial manager; worked in party headquarters, for the Actioii 
Quvri&re et Ft ofessionnelle since the mid-1970s.
Tn addition to the members of tire RPR, T am grateful to Dorothea Fournier 
and Paul Bui g of Enlreprise et Ft ogt&s, who described their work and 
supplied me with some of the organization's publications.
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Appendix 1 Michel Giraud on the Gr abb Roots against the Bureaucracy
November 1974 The town council of the commune of Le Perreux makes an 
application to ILe department of \7al-de-Matne for the provision of a third 
municipal creche. Reply; Le Perreux is in 25th position on the waiting 
list.
October 1975 The commune decides, because of the urgent need, to fake 
charge of the project itself. Asks for a subsidy from the District de la 
Region Fa/ isienne and from the Caisse d' Allocations Fanrillales of the 
department. A number of forms are filled out and despatched to I lie sub­
prefecture (which lias a r ight of i eview over all br anches of the 
administration within its geographical area), and to the depar tment*s 
Social and Health Ser vice, (The Direction Depar I emeniale des Affaires 
San it aires et Sociales DDASS)
End 1975 The mayor of Le Perreux receives a letter from the regional 
prefect; "The third cr&che will be subsidized." Tin ee new files are sent to 
the sub-prefecture.
F.arly 1975 The Pr efecture demands flu ee mor e files, the DDASS six.
Spring 1976 The DDASS accepfes the project, but. asks the commune to manage 
the construction. The commune accepts, on condition that the running costs 
of the third creche, like the those of the first two, will be borne by the 
department. Condition accepted; but all the files have to be rewritten to 
fake account of objections from the DDASS medical inspector, (even though a 
purpose-built and mass-produced unit is concerned). Ten copies of the new 
file are sent to the DDASS.
Autumn 1975 The commune accepts further recommended changes. A number of 
"final" documents are sent to the DDASS with the aim of getting an opinion 
from the safety officers. Seven further files are demanded and duly 
despatched. Technical approval is given.
December 1975 The prefecture asks for five more "definitive" files. The 
Caisse d* Allocations Fart/i Hales asks for one more, Tire construction permit 
is issued. Meetings are organized between the architect and the 
department's works and safety services.
February 1977 Definitive permission to go ahead is granted, but the 
contract with the building firm still has to be approved, and the commune 
has to be officially notified that it will receive its subsidies.
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Autumn 1977 The contract is approved. The Caisse d*Allocations Familiales 
announces its agreement; the department votes through Hie subsidy; work 
commences.
March 1979 The creche is already half-built, but the Caisse d'Allocations 
Familiales asks for thirteen more documents. ‘Hie departmental and regional 
medical inspectors have come up with eight new recommendations. The Caisse 
will only release the subsidy if the Commune pledges in wr iting to follow 
them. New discussions, in an ef for t to avoid extra building work.
The depet latent appear s I o go back cm i Is fur mal agr eement to staf f and 
equip the creche; the mayor makes several personal inter vent i one to get 
confirmation of the original agreement.
July 1979 The creche is almost finished, and its waiting list is getting 
longer, but no staff or equipment have been allocated. New meetings with 
the DDASS to ensur e that this is done.
Surpi tse; the completed u  eche ha*s been planned to r un off an ener gy source 
which is mostly non-electiic. The DDASS requires an industrial—type all- 
el ec t ric power-unit. Extra work has to be or ganized and means found of 
pay ing for if,
1979 Ai ter 5 years, 10 council meet ings arid 10 kilos of correspondence, the
c t eche opens i ts door s.
! i oru Michel Giraud, Nous Tous 7a Fiance, Far is, Jean—Claude Lattes, 1983, 
p p  1 6 9 - 1 7 1 .
Appendix 2 Gary Beckei ' is theory of consumption
Henri Lepage deploys Beckei 1 s fheor ies I o i efute ! hose diehard 
enemies of liberalism - in both the socialist and the conservative camps - 
who attack the very grounding hypothesis of classical economic theory by 
suggesting there is more to human motivation than "rational choice" by 
each individual of the action which will pioduce the gieatest individual 
benefit. Do they not have a point in arguing that life only seems to be 
about choices concerning what to consume, and how to get the necessary 
money, because capitalism "r equires" us to buy an ever-inet easing flow of 
goods, and is prepared to spend huge sums on adver tsing to make sure that 
we do so',' If let! to themselves, would not people show that they are 
motivated by other considerations, sur.h as love, altruism, self-respect 
and tradition?
We may think so, says Lepage, only because we are not iami liar with 
the magisterial vindication of classical economics which is Gary Becker's 
theory oi consumer behaviour . (The next ft-'w par agt aphs at e based on 
Lepage, op til, Tomorrow CepJ. I el Ism. . , . pp 1G1 — 184) According to Becker, 
consumption is not the "final" act which economists have supposed if to 
be. People seek not market goods alone, but satisfaction, and this is only 
achieved by combining goods with the time it takes to enjoy them. The 
value of time is the value of what could have been produced (for most 
people: earned) in that time, and since productivity is continually
increasing, time is continually increasing in value. As is normal in 
capitalism, production of any good leads to economising on the most 
expensive input, and it follows that, in all their activities, people seek 
to use less time. Hence, we buy more labour-saving devices, and accumulate 
more and more objects. Our preferences change because of a change in price 
- the pr ice of time - and not because of moral decadence or a conspiracy 
of producer s.
B e c k e r  and his followers have used this theory of consumer behaviour 
to explain a number of phenomena previously thought (by them) to be 
intractable to economic analysis. Divorce and common law man Lage are on 
the increase because the high cost of time makes it irrational for women 
to stay al home and perform work which can be done by machines. (Anyone 
familiar with Marxism or feminism will have difficulty recognizing this
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idea as " 11e w" . ) Hea11 h expendifut e i i ses as i 11 c ome r ist;s because illness 
i epresents a gr eatfei cost to Uie higher-paid.
W7!iy are old people more motivated by tradition than younger people, 
and is not. adherence to traditional ways of doing things a refutation of 
the rationalism assumed by liberal theory? Adherence to tradition is in 
fact rational, says Becker, in that it saves on information costs. To 
abandon tradition is to "disinvest" present knowledge and "retrain" by 
Investing in new knowledge. For old people, this new knowledge may not be 
needed for long, therefore it is irrational to invest in it. (Becker and 
Stigler, "De Gustibus non est Disputandum", in American Economic Review 
no G7, 1977 p 81; cited in Lepage, op cit, . pp 17G-7)
Why do people behave in an altruistic way, such as by giving money to 
charity? Becker's answer to this question hinges on the concept of esteem, 
which he assumes is sought by everyone - although how it is allocated may 
differ from one social milieu to another. But even the purchase of esteem 
is a function of the time/cost equation. In general, it can be assumed 
that the supply of altruism in the form of donated time (eg. voluntary 
work) will decrease as the value of time increases. Hence, in poor 
societies and in the working class, social solidarity, which buys esteem, 
is paid in time, which is cheap, In societies where time has a high value, 
altruism is expressed in the form of money. The new economists thus have 
yet another "scientific" reason for rolling back the welfare state; lower 
faxes mean increased individual income, and with a higher income, 
individuals will expand consumption of everything, including the 
consumption of esteem through donations to charity. Therefore, the 
authorities should cut faxes and welfar e pr ogi amines, and the shortfall in 
public solidar ity will be made up by pr ivate char ity. (Gar y Beckei ,
"Social Interaction", j n I he Jour rial of Puli I real Economy, no M2 1974. 
Conclusion by Lepage op <. it pp 173-G)
Appendi x 3 Guy Sor man and Liber al Them y
There is much that, is unsatisfactory in Sorman's popularization of 
liberal theory. We have ignored it up until now, because it does not affect 
our main argument directly, but we p r e f e r  not to skip over it altogether.
In pai t i of /.a Solution Liberals,, Sor man mounts a defence of 
Schumpeter ians against Keynesians;
The Schumpeter ians, on the oilier hand, look to 
individual initiative. For them, it's managers, 
inventors, and traders who provoke growth. It was not 
consumer demand which created the car industry or the 
home computer, but the inventive and commercial flair 
of the entrepreneur s®
Flsewher e he delves even further into history to illustrate the 
continuity of ttrought between differ ent generations of supply-sider s ;
Growth is therefore - to borrow the ter ms of one of 
I lie f ounders oi French liber alism, Jean-Bapr iste Say 
- the result of supply by producers, which in turn 
creates consumer demand. This supply Is itself 
influenced by the climate, which may be encouraging 
01 discouraging to producers. ^
Leaving aside the concession Lo Keynesianism in the last line (our 
emphasis) - Keynes himself perfectly integrated into his theory the neo­
classical notion of "expectations", proposing a modest dose of 
interventionism piecisly in order to remedy declining expectations during a 
slump - it is interesting to Juxtapose this with what Sorman Iras to say 
about Galbraith, the b£t.e noire of US liberals. In the 1970s, says Sorman,
He described the modern economy as a society 
dominated by giant multinationals run by an elite of 
mangers which he called the "Lechnostructure". The 
technostructure decided which products were to be 
launched on the market, and imposed them with the
help of advertising  Today, reality is the
opposite of this schema. The technostructure does not 
know what the company is going to sell tomorrow, and 
it is the market which gives it the anwer . If the 
managers make a mistake, advertising, no matter how 
massive, cannot do anything about it, it cannot 
impose a p r o d u c t  rejected by consumers.-
So, according to Sorman at one moment the producer is king, at another 
moment the consumer is king! A juxtaposition which makes us suspect that
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his liberal pi ogi amine lias more to do wil.li ideology than with scientific 
thinking.
a . Les SchuepiterieffSt A V i  ever set par ten  t  sur I ' in i t ia t iv e  in d iv id u a l le, Ce soni le s  chefs
d 'e n trep rise , las inventaurs, les , ornery ants qui t ir a n t  Is  croissance, Ce n 'e s t pas Is
demands des consommeteurs qui a c rM  une Indus trie  de I'autom obile, de I'o rd in a te u r  
in d iv id u a l, me is  le  g in ie  produc t i f  e t commercial des entrepreneurs, (Sorman, La Solution  
L ib ira le , Paris, Fayard, 1PS4 p 144)
b. La croissance es t done - pour reprendre les femes d'un bonds teur franca is  du lib e ra lis e ,  
Jean-Bapiiste Say, le  r is u l ta t  de I 'o f f r e  des produc teurs qu i suscite A son tour la
. Hat o f f  i t  e l l  ■' t r ih u t  Vun H eat qui encourage ou
d ir  our age Ins produc teurs f  ibidem p ( v) )
■ , 11 die r iv a l  i 1 ‘ Sc onomie mode me comma une s o c i i t i  domini par des m u ltina tiona les giantas 
H i t  gars q u ' i l  , , f a i t  "feehm strue tu re t>t La iechm stfuc iu re
die ids  i t  quel p ro d u it lam nr sur la  marc h i  a t V  impose t g r i  \ la pub lic  H i ,.
Sujourd'hui, la v i r i t i  est A I ‘ inverse de ce s cbima. La technostructure ne s a i l  pas ce que
la compagnia vendra demain, e l c 'e s t le marc h i qui le  lu i  d i i ,  Si e l le  se troupe, la  
p u b lic  its, mime massive, n 'y  pourra rient, t i l e  n ‘ imposera pas on p ro d u it que le t 
consommeteurs re fusen i, ( ibidem p 156-7, note 1.)
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Appendix 4 The Sources of Fr ench Economic Gr owth
Tn chapter 10 we j^ ave a summer y account of the sources of I lie post-war 
>•: unoiui c boom which, it was suggeted, helped the Fr ench economy to j<i ow, 
irrespective of the particular policies being pursued by the Gaulllists. 
Among more detailed theories of the sources of economic: growth, some have 
pointed to the existence of "1 g ives" of economic development, the so- 
called Kondratieff-cycle, whose shape is determined by cycles of 
! echnological innoval ion, and is super imposed on the business cycle 
familiar to Marxist and neo-classical economics. (Discussed, along with 
other theor ies, in Clu is Har man, Explaining the Ct Isis, a Marxist 
Resppt aisal, London, Bookmar ks, 1934 pp!32—0; also in Le Moudet hossiej s
et Documents no l Of! December 1983, Dix arts de Ccise). Other s have stressed 
the transfer of large numbers of workers from low-producfivity agriculture 
to high-ptoductivity industry. (Jean Fourasti6, Lee Trente Glorieuses,
Par is, Fayat d 1979; Ghar les Kindelbei ger Economic Gj owth in Br i I ain and 
Fr ance in 79GO, Cambr idge, har var d Univer sity Pr ess, 1904. Yet others 
belong l.o the "permanent arms economy" school, seeing the diversion of 
surplus v a l u e  into waste production as a factor offsetting the long term 
decline in tire i ate of profit. (Michael Kidron Capitalism and Theory London 
Pluto Frees 1974.)
As for the political conditions which can help or hinder gr owtli, one 
point of view is that political stability is harmful, for if fosters the 
consolidation of interest groups whose defensiveness prevents or brakes 
salutory renewal or transformation of social relationships and working 
pr actices. (Mancut Olson, "The Political Economy of Comparative Growth 
Rates" in Dennis C. Mueller fed), The Folitical Economy of Growth London, 
Yale Univesity Press, 1933 pp 7-52.) Applied to France, this thesis runs 
up against the objection that per iods of economic growth have coincided 
with the political domination of supposedly conservative interests and 
mentalities, (J-C. Asselain and C. Morrisson, "Economic Growth and Interest 
Groups; the French Experience", in Mueller, up clt, pp 157-75) while the 
long time-scale of fire economic historian points to a gradual 
transformation of the economic "culture" of the French business class, 
irrespective of political conditions. (Richard F. Kuisel, Capital ism and 
the Stale in Modern France Cambridge, Cambridge University Ft ess, 1983. )
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This last point in tain counters I lie temptation to assign too decisive a 
at i uct in al and cul tui al i ole to a i efor uiing bur eauci acy. (Phi 1 lp G. Cer ny. 
"Gaullisrn, Advanced Capitalism and the Fifth Republic", in David S. Bell
"ud) Contemporary French Political Fatties London Groom Helm 1982 pp 24-52)
A completely rounded summery of all the factors which have contributed to 
post-war French growth would have ! o balance all these points, along with 
the ontribution of Araet ican investment, industrial concentration© spelling 
the 1 jiq of the family firm, new patterns in social- and geographical
’ ill ty, arid the impact pf member ship of ' he EEC. (Fean—Ft ancois Hennart, 
"The Pol j I is il EconoDry of Comparative Growth Rates, the case of France", in
Mueller, up clt, pp 176—202. )
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